9-11 TIMELINE

FOREWORD

A harsh fact of life is that 9-11, and its subsequent consequences, can't rationally be separated from political viewpoints and political commentary. As a larger scale of the Viet Nam War, money and power drove ALL of 9-11 and its subsequent history. Thus, 9-11 doesn't afford the Hollywood-CSI luxury of "…just analyze the evidence."

9-11 and subsequent history demonstrate a new sicience, "Virtual Un-Reality," wherein forensic benchmarks don't line up; but are passionately pandered as being otherwise 'logical' by a perverted mass media.

This presentation compiles various timelines, with the intent of this material being a collective of that which is readily documented, and that which is "…well known." The various timelines have their good & bad points. In the maze of all 9-11 matters, it is necessary to read between the proverbial lines; so as to arrive at a reasonable semblance of the truth, which is otherwise "officially" buried – with great prejudice.

While some readers may prefer to have the 9-11 flights individually broken out, the intent of this presentation is focused upon keeping the time-line continuous, as a somewhat unique forensic perspective.

It should be noted that the "official" version of 9-11 quickly surpassed the influence of Orson Wells" "War of the Worlds" broadcast. The "official" version of 9-11 contains a comparable amount of fiction. Whatever anyone wants to say, "…it sold!"

This timeline incorporates an airline captain's perspective, injecting pertinent "airline insider" information, rounding out the details of the day. When the "aviation professional" perspective is added, an entirely different version of 9-11 appears – as a far greater horror story.

For example, the "official line" is that the 9-11 aircraft had viable crewmembers and passengers, until their crash. Yet, the purported "phone call" accounts of events on board those aircraft don't suggest the 'standard" airline security procedures of the day.

The "psyops" of 9-11 heralds commoners as "heroes," ignoring the command structure of the air crews of four separate flights. In an extreme, that might happen on one flight; not four.

It's necessary to appreciate the element of "probability" in the scenes of 9-11. Four aircraft were hijacked – not by Arab wannabe pilots, who were avid students of aircraft manuals; rather by professional jet pilots.

The hijack issue instantly comes to the fact that no passenger reservation "locator code," passenger manifest or ticket can yet be produced to show that ANY of the named hijackers made it onboard the four aircraft. Certainly, there were at least four. While some measure of "error" can be reasonably anticipated, the total lack of such documentation is too extreme to be considered in the realm of "accident" or a matter of "error."

Passionate language 'suggesting" that the hijackers made the 9-11 flights can be readily found; that's inadequate for the accounting of 9-11 and the subsequent "war" campaigns. In consequence, the 'wars' became War Crimes; however unpopular it may be to say.

The strongest suggestion is that the four ACTUAL hijackers were among the passengers, with false IDs, including cockpit access credentials, such as a pilot's license, airline ID, or FAA identification.

Whether one or two hijackers – or more - on each aircraft, the issue of crew and passenger control are paramount to the designs of the hijacker, as the hijacker knows that there are effective counter-measure procedures in place. The easiest method for "crowd control" – given the suicide mission - is to kill the passengers & crew by depressurizing the aircraft. What is obviously intended is so nefarious, that the light load of passengers won't add any trouble to whatever remaining conscience the hijackers had.

The pandered Flight 93 tapes are supposed to have come from recorders propelled deeper into the ground than a high caliber bullet could reach – emerging with viable data. That's absurd; either the depth or the surviving data viability. Most amazing were the "forensic" photos of the flight recorders, not showing as much as a dent - for all the "G" load it would have taken to get the recorders as much as a foot underground.

There isn't a viable bit of evidence of a cockpit battle. Whatever happened in the cockpits was fast – and effective; very possibly guns having been smuggled on board.

Eight pilots had the training and opportunity to signal their distress or attempt to defeat their attackers by easily turning the aircraft over, using the control yoke, or stomping a rudder pedal. That didn't happen on any of the four aircraft involved. That leaves no suggestion of the purported amateur terrorists.

The scene could easily have been a "pilot" gaining access to the cockpit, via his credentials, killing both pilots & taking control of the cockpit. At most, it would take ten minutes to snuff the flight attendants and passengers. Unconsciousness would be within approximately 30 seconds, death within five minutes, as the hijacker survived, using the flight deck emergency oxygen.

There isn't a viable shred of evidence that an aircraft actually impacted at the 9-11 Pentagon; or at Shanksville, PA. Yet, those sites were obviously "prepped" for the day, just in case – in case of what? In case that only two aircraft were destroyed; notably crashed into the WTC towers. By elementary conjecture, the second two were backups, for the first two. That left two missing aircraft and around 100 missing bodies.

Obvious propaganda aside, the second two aircraft can't, otherwise, be traced to a "mission." If they had a mission apart from the WTC, there would have been no "prepping" of the Pentagon & Shanksville sites. Remember that statement - if the second two airctaft had a mission apart from the WTC, there would have been no "prepping" of the Pentagon & Shanksville sites.

The lack of large aircraft parts, the spread of the 'salted" aircraft debris and the nature of the debris make a factual impact, at those two sites, too improbable to consider. The 9-11 Pentagon and the Shanksville site lack any viable suggestion of burning jet fuel. The aircraft skin planted on the Pentagon lawn was the wrong color - from the wrong end of the purported aircraft. Pre-collapse photos don't show forward-moving damage, nor enough of a hole to swallow an aircraft; leaving the collapsed portion totally unaccountable. The forensic benchmarks leave no viable way for the purported aircraft parts to have gotten into the building. The list goes on.

It must be remembered that no one claimed the 9-11 hijackings and/or attacks; and there was no "gain" demanded. There were no political concessions demanded, no ransom, no prisoner releases – NOTHING! There was no legitimate follow-up "claimant" message to the "terror" attacks. Before the famous – and obviously phony – Osama bin Laden videotape could be produced, bin Laden emphatically denied involvement. No proof of his involvement has yet been produced – save being an involuntary patsy.

Whatever the 9-11 motive was, someone is keeping it to themselves. That's not the style of such "extremists." Years later, no Islamic group has viably claimed 9-11.

Bizarre claims of grandeur aside, Zacharias Moussaoui emerges as another "Manchurian Patsy."

There is no suggestion that the second pair of aircraft had another set of targets. Follow the money; they probably didn't – after the first two aircraft found their mark. The hijackings were terror, for sure; but whose?

The term "Reichstag Fire" comes to mind, in the shadow of the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution," of the Viet Nam War and Texas profiteering!

9-11 is a tale of cover-up; from the White House on down. To understand 9-11, it's necessary to follow the known timeline.


THE 9-11 TIMELINE

Prior to 7:59 AM       Supposedly, nine of the nineteen purported hijackers were selected for special screening before they boarded their aircraft. None of their names are known [Washington Post, 3/2/02 (B)], but one news article made it clear that purported hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, already on a terrorist watch list for international flights, were not selected for screening. [See - Cox News, 10/21/01]

At least seven of the hijacker "names" were almost immediately reported to be still alive, with no attempt to ascertain who the purported hijackers factually were. Nor was there an attempt to track down any "associates." No excuses were given.

By 9-11, airport security was a routine Federal joke; a "filler" for the local evening news. There was no serious airport security; and no appreciable FAA enforcement. By 9-11, the U.S. "private" airport security companies had been merged into three, and sold overseas. One must conclude that their days of profitability were clearly numbered – and known.

The Airlines were criminally responsible for airport security, famous for "outsourcing" the security screening to underpaid and under-motivated workers; famous for quitting.

Instead of being held accountable, the airlines were rewarded for 9-11. Despite the legal responsibility for airport security, the Airlines were not investigated or prosecuted for the purported failings of 9-11 – instead, they were REWARDED with cash grants, tax breaks and loans. Only the airlines were so rewarded. Tom Daschle INSTANTLY led the reward effort in the Senate, his former FAA administrator wife, Linda, lobbied the House; it worked! Imagine that matter as a priority on the day of 9-11.

The FAA was famous for minimal enforcement of the airport security; even after horrendous embarrassments and even security disasters. As convenient, they claimed that they didn't have enforcement powers – a lie. The FAA record of levying fines and revoking airline operating certificates attests to no shortage of enforcement powers.

The airport 'security" video images of the purported hijackers could be anyone – on any day. One's mind should be drawn to the phony "plumped-up" Osama bin Laden videotape of post-9-11 fame; add the phony 9-11 Pentagon fireball. The institutionalized use of phony images has a long record.

As you read the following, note the pattern of the FAA failing to notify NORAD of the hijackings, in a timely manner. The fighters – when finally launched – are kept busy with navigation tasks. Thus, they never had a chance to use their targeting imagery, to witness or record the reality.

7:59 – 8:02 AM       American Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 181 passengers , loaded with 23,980 gallons of fuel, departed from Boston's Logan Airport, 14 minutes after its scheduled departure. [See - Los Angeles Times 9/20/01; ABC News 7/18/02; CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; AP 8/19/02; Newsday 9/10/02; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

The original take-off was scheduled for 7:45. There were supposed to be 92 passengers and crew on board American Airlines Flight 11; but according to the official manifest, published on CNN.com, there were only 86. See - http://911Timeline.net/36or37missingand70percentempty.htm

8:01 AM       In Newark, United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with a capacity of 200 passengers, loaded with 11,489 gallons of fuel, pushed-back from the gate, with 44 people aboard bound for San Francisco, California. Flight 93 would be delayed by 41 minutes prior to taking off. Flight 93 reportedly had to wait in a line of approximately a dozen aircraft before it can take off. [See - USA Today 8/12/02] There were supposed to be 44 passengers and crew aboard, yet according to the official manifest, published on CNN.com, there are only 33. Strangely, no one wants to clear up the passenger manifest issues. The missing hijackers are that sacred.

8:13 AM       The last routine communication occurred between ATC and the pilots of American Flight 11. Air Traffic Controller Pete Zalewski was working the flight. The pilot responded correctly, when told to turn right, but fails to respond to a command to climb. Reportedly, Zalewski tried to reach the pilot, even using the emergency frequency, but he still got no response. [See - 8:13, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 8:13:31, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:14, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:13, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

By all indications, American Flight 11 was hijacked at this time. One Air Traffic Controller speculated that the aircraft was hijacked over Gardner, Massachusetts, less than 50 miles to the west of Boston. By then, he'd have been "handed-off" to the en route ATC "Center." [See - Nashua Telegraph, 9/13/01]

The Boston Globe noted: "It appears that the hijackers' entry was surprising enough that the pilots did not have a chance to broadcast a traditional distress call." It would only have taken a few seconds to press the right buttons. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

In reality, there are multiple signals that a pilot can use, between radio phraseology and the use of the transponder. None are reported. Whatever happened in the cockpit was very quick.

The final takeover control of the cockpit didn't appear to be in place until approximately 8:20; evidenced by the transponder being turned off. (see - 8:20 AM ).

Shortly after Air Traffic Controllers ask Flight 11 to climb to 35,000 feet, the transponder stopped transmitting its code. The transponder code identifies an aircraft on a controller's radar screen. The digital data display gives its identification, exact location and altitude. The pilots can also use the transponder to transmit a four-digit hijack code; or a generic "emergency" code.

Air traffic manager Glenn Michael later stated, "We considered it at that time to be a possible hijacking." [See - 8:13, "When given permission to climb to 35,000 feet," AP, 8/12/02, 8:13, shortly after trying contact on the emergency frequencies, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01, 8:15, "Just moments" after radio contact is lost, MSNBC, 9/15/01]

The initial versions after 9-11 suggest that the transponder was turned off around 8:13. But a year after 9-11, Pete Zalewski, the Air Traffic Controller handling the flight, claimed that the transponder was turned off at 8:20. [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

The "9/11 Commission" cites 8:21. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Colonel Robert Marr, the head of NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector, (NEADS) later claimed that the transponder was turned off some time after 8:30. [See - ABC News 9-11/02]

Of special importance is that the radar data was recorded, with no viable question available, as to such details. By Congressional testimony, the radar data was recorded and analyzed – with no public revelation as to details – WHY? The ATC audio recordings of the radio exchanges should have been enough to establish the timeline, alone. It's possible that the FBI seizure of the tapes precluded the documentation. Naturally, one has to ask why those tapes were 'sealed" or possibly destroyed. As 9-11 goes, that information was nothing less than sacred.

It's possible that the FAA was trying to "buy back" some delay time, as to why they didn't notify NORAD, sooner. Other than "teamwork," why would the FAA voluntarily want to take any blame? That tactic, otherwise, instantly invokes criminal investigation and career suicide. It can only be speculated that the FAA took much of the blame, as a means to minimize the NORAD finger-pointing.

8:13:31 AM       American Airlines Flight 11 last instruction from Boston Air Traffic Control: "American 11, turn 20 degrees right." American Airlines Flight 11 responded: "…20 right, American eleven." The ATC instruction was incomplete, as the controller should have indicated the purpose of the turn. Normally, a specific heading is assigned, in the form of "Turn 20 degrees right, heading, heading zero-eight-five, vectors around traffic." A few seconds later the Controller instructs: "American eleven, climb and maintain Flight Level three-five-zero [35,000 feet]." Controller: "American eleven, climb and maintain Flight Level three-five-zero." Controller: "American eleven, Boston…." There was no further response from American Airlines Flight 11.

8:14 AM       United Airlines Flight 175 a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 181 passengers and, reportedly, with 23,980 gallons of fuel, departed from Boston's Logan Airport, 16 minutes after the scheduled departure time. [See - CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; AP 8/19/02; Newsday 9/10/02] It was headed for Los Angeles, California. The take-off was originally scheduled for 7:58 AM. There are supposed to be 65 passengers on board; according to the official death manifest, published on CNN.com, there were only 56 aboard.

Assuming this version is correct, it is necessary to question why this flight would have nearly a full load of fuel on board; nearly twice that of American Flight eleven? In all likelihood, the figure is in error. The "error" seems suspicious, as "tankering" fuel is expensive, due to its weight.

8:14 to 8:20 AM       At some point after the hijacking begins, the pilot of Flight 11, John Ogonowski, is claimed to have activated a "push-to-talk" transmit button, enabling the Boston Air Traffic Controllers to hear what was being said in the cockpit. In all likelihood, it is – at best - a nervous hijacker; if at all. It is possible for a nervous or inexperienced pilot of airliners (versus fighter pilot) to grip the control yoke & accidentally key the mike. An overpowered pilot pressing the "push-to-talk" transmit button would be sure to have some tattle-tale voice message to go with it. Such a move would be very obvious to the hijacker; thus not likely. Activating a "push-to-talk" transmit button on any of the radio-selector consoles would activate a headset-microphone, or an oxygen mask microphone, allowing a chance of cockpit voices getting out. If nothing else, the pilot could tap out the standard SOS. The same pilot would also have the ability to intervene in the hijacking – even if it meant shutting the engines off, ala Egypt Air Flight 990.

There would be three types of microphones available; a hand-held mike, with its own "push-to-talk" transmit button, the headsets and the oxygen mask microphones, which could be selected, then activated by using a switch on the yoke, or any of the four interphone communication boxes.

A controller was claimed to have said, "The button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York." An article later noted that "his ability to do so also indicated that he was in the driver's seat much of the way" to the WTC. The transmissions are claimed to have continued until approximately 8:38 AM. [See - Christian Science Monitor 9/13/01; MSNBC 9/15/01]

8:15 AM       Two Boston Air Traffic Controllers, Pete Zalewski and Lino Martins, are reported to have discussed the fact that Flight 11 can't be contacted. Zalewski reportedly said to Martins, "He won't answer you. He's "nordo" [no radio] roger thanks." [See - See - Guardian 10/17/01; New York Times 10/16/01 (C); CNN 9/17/01; MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

That statement is puzzling; communication radios fail rather routinely – usually due to pilot-error. Speculating that a pilot "won't" answer is off-scale abnormal. Advising that an aircraft is "nordo," still anticipates a pilot determining that something is wrong & making every effort to re-establish communication. That would also include using a special transponder code, 7600, indicating any true aircraft communication distress.

ATC would normally be using a multitude of procedures to contact the pilot, including having the company "page" the pilots with an "Airinc" (Aeronautical Radio Inc.) message, or a 'sel-cal" (Selective Calling). They wouldn't just casually discuss the situation. In a controller's mind, the combination of no transponder and no communication represented a radical situation – whether a mechanical failure, hijacking, crash or a bomb.

If a transponder signal stopped, the controllers" radar console immediately alerted him/her to the situation. Loss of a transponder signal was cause to worry about a bomb or a impact – or a hijacking. Such a failure/error causes controllers a great deal of trouble, with an immediate advisory to the aircraft. One must imagine the situation in the Air Traffic Control Center.

The northeast corner of the United States contains some of the busiest airspace on Earth. Each controller has a 'sector" that he/she is responsible for. Commercial flights are always under what is termed "positive control," they must be in constant communication with the controllers, so as to maintain legal separation (distance) with other aircraft. If an airliner loses its transponder, it causes instant problems, just with the altitude information being lost.

The modern ATC radar isn't designed to readily display traditional radar 'skin paint;" passive radar echoes from the airframe. Instead, it took luck and a good eye to discriminate a "Primary Return."

This particular airspace is normally stretched to the breaking point with controller work overload. Any "glitches" add incredible stress and work. This flight became an instant hazard to air navigation.

The pilot's procedure for a "hard" lost communication emergency is rather simple - follow the last ATC clearance; stick to the original flight plan. The pilot would also 'squawk" the "lost-communications" transponder code; 7600.

The FAA controllers would be switching transmitters; possibly asking other controllers to attempt communication. Within reason, an errant aircraft following its last clearance allows the controllers to reasonably predict the flight path. ATC can reasonably keep other flights out of harms way. If a controller witnesses lost communication and transponder signal, a serious emergency is indicated.

Calls would have been made to other aircraft to attempt contact with the target aircraft, the company would be advised; requesting the company to try communication, from their end. Any sizeable airline company can also pull up a radar display of the aircraft, to see what was going on, for themselves. The privately owned "Airinc" company is called to attempt to contact the aircraft, as well. If the flight then deviated from its last clearance, the ATC system is thrown into an emergency condition. Alarms all over the national ATC system would be going off. Within minutes, the FAA should attempt to have a fighter launched, to investigate the aircraft, ala the Payne Stewart case. There is no record of such an attempt being made – on FOUR hijacked aircraft!

Mysteriously, the 9-11 scenario is prominently void of requests for nearby aircraft to attempt radio contact with the hijacked aircraft. Once an aircraft is presumed to be hijacked, that scenario changes; until that point, there should have been a host of "…contact" requests of nearby aircraft and "company" aircraft, using the "…company frequency."

Beyond the horror of the day, there was no accountability – why?

ATC would be recording the controller and pilot conversations; add the radar image data. These tapes would be designated for investigative preservation. The NORAD data was also recorded.

What happened to this data? What is the world NOT supposed to see or know? Where is the Satellite image data?

The FBI reportedly confiscated all of the tapes between the controllers and these four flights - WHY? 9-11 is long over; where is the data?

Within a few minutes, the air traffic control system would go into a near-panic mode – just with ONE aircraft being "lost."

8:17 AM       It was reported that American Airlines Flight 11 passenger Daniel Lewin, who belonged to the Israel Defense Force Sayeret Matkal, a top-secret counter-terrorist unit, was either stabbed or shot to death. It's far more likely that he would kill the hijackers.

A very preliminary FAA memo stated that Lewin was shot by Satam Al Suqami at 9:20. One must assume that the time citation is a typo; possibly 8:20 is intended. [ABC News, 7/18/02, UPI, 3/6/02, Washington Post, 3/2/02 (B)]

Nothing was later reported as to investigations on how the gun was brought on board. The report was labeled as an "error."

8:17 AM       From Chapter 1, page 32 of the 9-11 Commission report, flight attendant, Betty Ong, notified American Airlines that Flight 11 was hijacked. The report cited the manager on duty, Craig Marquis, as realizing that the situation was an emergency.

8:20 AM       The American Flight 11 transponder signal stopped. [See - CNN 9/17/01]

Flight 11 started to veer dramatically off course. [See - 8:20, {MSNBC 9-11/02} (B)]

8:20 AM       On Flight 11, flight attendant Amy (Madeline) Sweeney reportedly borrows a calling card [credit card?] from flight attendant Sara Low, using an Air-Phone to call Boston's Logan Airport. She supposedly spoke to Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight service manager. He was reportedly a friend of Sweeney; and thus didn't have to verify that the call was not a hoax. The call was not recorded but Woodward reportedly took detailed notes. [See - 8:19, New York Observer, 2/11/04, "Over the next 25 minutes," ABC News, 7/18/02]

Ong reportedly calmly told Woodward, "Listen, and listen to me very carefully. I'm on Flight 11. The aircraft has been hijacked." [See - ABC News, 7/18/02]

She supposedly gives him the seat locations of three hijackers: 9D, 9G, and 10B. She was claimed to have reportedly stated that they are all of Middle Eastern descent, with one speaking English very well. [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Those seat assignments should turn up the names of the legitimate passengers; who are they? Again, the hijackers names don't appear on manifests. A flight attendant would NEVER fear authentication of her identity. Such reports are instant-action events.

Another version has her identifying four hijackers (but still none of the five said to be on the aircraft) and reported that not all of the seats she gave matched up with the seats assigned to the hijackers on their tickets. [See - ABC News, 7/18/02, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)]

She reportedly stated that she cannot contact the cockpit, and didn't believe that the pilots are flying the aircraft any longer. [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Flight attendants would never presume that the pilots are not in control. A legitimate report would cite why she thought the pilots aren't flying the aircraft. Such a report would include details as to the location & actions of the other hijackers. It would include the description of any weapons and demands. It would include a description of an attempt to identify the perpetrators – by name. To airline crews, the report doesn't make sense. In a legitimate hijacking, the perpetrators would have close control of the flight attendants. If a flight attendant factually called, she would explain how she was able to use the phone.

The Los Angeles Times cited: "But even as she was relating details about the hijackers, the men were storming the front of the aircraft and "had just gained access to the cockpit." " (Sweeney supposedly witnessed the storming of the cockpit at least seven minutes after radio contact from Flight 11 stopped and the hijacking apparently begins 8:13 AM.) [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)]

Why the time discrepancy?

Sweeny reportedly cited the hijackers having stabbed two first-class flight attendants, Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin. She supposedly added, "A hijacker cut the throat of a business-class passenger, and he appears to be dead." This is supposed to have been Daniel Lewin. She reportedly stated that the hijackers have brought a bomb into the cockpit. She's asked by Woodward, "How do you know it's a bomb?" She answers, "Because the hijackers showed me a bomb." She describes its yellow and red wires. Sweeney continues talking with Woodward until Flight 11 impacted. [See - Boston Globe 11/23/01; New York Observer 2/11/04]

The story lacks credibility, as the situation aboard the aircraft would be action-intensive. Flight attendants have strict guidelines, as to how to handle hijackings. Fear of death aside, American flight attendants would be too frightened of management, to deviate from established procedures. She should be teaming up with other flight attendants; and seeking help from "able-bodied-assistants." The flight attendants should be gathering weapons and briefing passengers. Calling friends, isn't on the hijacking procedures list. At a minimum, a flight attendant would be calling Dallas Operations; not Boston. If she made such a call, she would be providing structured forensic information, per a standardized protocol. She wouldn't be queried as to whether or not it was a bomb, versus being asked for details about the bomb – real or not.

8:20 AM       Flight 77 departed the Dulles International Airport, ten minutes later than the scheduled departure time. [See - CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04; AP 8/19/02]

American Flight 77 was a Boeing 757 with a capacity of 200 passengers and reportedly 11,489 gallons of fuel. It departed Dulles International Airport, located 30 miles west of Washington D.C., bound for Los Angeles, California. The take-off was originally scheduled for 8:01. There were supposed to be 64 passengers and crew on board, according to the official death manifest list, published on CNN.com, there were only 56.

8:20 AM       In Boston, ATC was reported to have decided that Flight 11 has probably been hijacked. They don't appear to have notified other ATC centers for another five minutes, and reportedly didn't notify NORAD for approximately another 20 minutes. [See - "About 8:20," Newsday, 9/23/01, "about 8:20," New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

ABC News was quoted as saying, "There doesn't seem to have been alarm bells going off, traffic controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There's a gap there that would have to be investigated." [See - ABC News 9/14/01]

The delay was insane – what more can be said?

8:21 AM       Boston Air Traffic Controller Pete Zalewski, handling American Flight 11, noticed that the flight was off course, with both lost communication and its transponder off. Zalewski later claimed that he turned to his supervisor, saying: "Would you please come over here? I think something is seriously wrong with this aircraft. I don't know what. It's either mechanical, electrical, I think, but I'm not sure." When asked if he suspected a hijacking at this point, he reportedly replied, "Absolutely not. No way." Another Air Traffic Controller, Tom Roberts, reportedly has another nearby American Airlines flight attempt radio contact with Flight 11; still no response. The lost flight was now 'drastically off course" but NORAD was still supposedly not notified. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

This version is bizarre. A controller should call in the watch supervisor, who would then direct the action. A situation of lost communication and lost transponder leads instantly to a conclusion of a downed or hijacked aircraft. Just NORAD's radar would make the crucial difference, why were they not called? Lost electronics spells mechanical problems; the addition of "off-course" is a disaster in the making, whether with the individual aircraft, or a midair collision risk. Add the high probability of a hijacking.

From the 9-11 hearings, the FAA's "Hijack Coordinator" somehow went missing – on that particular day. The hearings produced no name; certainly no testimony from the FAA's "Hijack Coordinator." The subject was simply dropped.

8:21 AM       Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong was supposed to have called Vanessa Minter, an American Airlines reservations agent in North Carolina, using a seatback GTE Airfone from the back of the aircraft. [Why call a 'reservations" agent?] Ong supposedly spoke to Minter and an unidentified man for approximately two minutes. Then supervisor [type unknown] Nydia Gonzales was phone-conferenced into the call. Ong supposedly said, "The cockpit's not answering. Somebody's stabbed in business class and … I think there's mace … that we can't breathe. I don't know, I think we're getting hijacked." Approximately a minute later, she said, "…and the cockpit is not answering their phone. And there's somebody stabbed in business class. And there's … we can't breathe in business class. Somebody's got mace or something …. I'm sitting in the back. Somebody's coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, they're coming back."

Mace or pepper spray burns the eyes – it doesn't just "choke." By this version, she was in business class, and in coach – at the same time. Which is it?

In the heat of a hijack incident, her duties as a flight attendant don't include calling anyone other than the cockpit, or company "operations."

Ong was supposedly in the back – in "coach." She supposedly continues: "I think the guys are up there [in the cockpit]. They might have gone there — jammed the way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside."

This simply isn't a description by a flight attendant. She might say that the cockpit isn't answering, not that they can't call. She would be reasonably clear where the hijackers are – or she would be busy trying to discover where they are. The standardized hijacking procedures would discourage flight attendants from going to the cockpit; why would she cite that "….We can't even get inside." That doesn't make sense – to airline crews.

According to another version: "She said two flight attendants had been stabbed, one was on oxygen." "A passenger had his throat slashed and looked dead and they had gotten into the cockpit." She supposedly identifies the seats of the hijackers; saying that the aircraft was descending.

The first four and a half minutes of the supposed call was later played to the 9-11 Commission. Ong supposedly continues speaking to Gonzales and Minter until the aircraft finally impacted (See - 8:23 AM ). [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04, 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

8:21 AM       American Airlines flight service manager Michael Woodward, was reported to be listening to Flight 11 attendant Amy Sweeney (See - 8:20 AM ). He supposedly called Nancy Wyatt, the supervisor of pursers at Logan Airport. [Why not company security?] Supposedly, holding both telephones, he repeated to Wyatt everything that Sweeney was saying. Wyatt supposedly simultaneously repeated his version to the Fort Worth, Texas company headquarters. [The call can't be transferred or "conferenced?]

The conversation between Wyatt and the managers at headquarters was supposedly recorded. All of the details from Sweeney's call reach American Airlines' top management almost instantly.

Strangely, according to victim's relatives later hearing the recording, two managers at headquarters immediately begin discussing a cover-up of the hijack details. They supposedly say: 'don't spread this around. Keep it close," "Keep it quiet," and "Let's keep this among ourselves. What else can we find out from our own sources about what's going on?"

Another former American Airlines employee who has also supposedly heard that recording recalls, "In Fort Worth, two managers in SOC [Systems Operations Control] were sitting beside each other and hearing it. They were both saying, 'do not pass this along. Let's keep it right here. Keep it among the five of us." "

The implication is that American Airlines was in on the hijacking! The managers should have been activating an emergency response team, immediately calling the FBI. These assertions are very serious criminal matters – if factual. Corporate privacy is always a major issue, but not at the risk of safety; particularly in the light of final accountability.

Reportedly, Gerard Arpey, the American Airlines' executive vice president for operations, soon got the details from Betty Ong's phone call (see 8:30 AM ). In theory, he apparently didn't hear about Sweeney's call until much later. The New York Observer quoted the victims' relatives who openly ask if lives could have been saved if this same information had been quickly shared with other aircraft. [See - New York Observer 6/17/04]

8:23 AM       Nydia Gonzalez, an American Airlines supervisor with expertise on security matters, was supposedly patched in to the call with flight attendant Betty Ong on Flight 11. [See - "approximately 23 minutes" prior to impact, Independent Commission, 1/27/04]

"…with expertise on security matters…" – What is the statement here? Why wasn't a security manager on the phone?

8:24:38 AM       It was reported that the captain of American Airlines Flight 11, John Ogonowski - or one of the hijackers – accidentally keys the transmitter, enabling the Boston air traffic controllers to hear one of the hijackers command the passengers: "We have some aircraft. Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport. Nobody move."

The idea presented is that one of the hijackers confused an aircraft radio selector button, with the public-address system. Air traffic control reportedly responded, "Who's trying to call me?" [That's not a controller's response. This would be a time for monitoring. If anything, "Calling Center, say again," would be typical of a controller. ]

Air Traffic Controller John Zalewski reportedly responded, "Who's trying to call me?" The hijacker continued, "Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the aircraft. Just stay quiet." [See - 8:24:38, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:24:38, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:24:38, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 8:24, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, after 8:24, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:28, New York Times, 9/12/01, before 8:28, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01]

After hearing this, Air Traffic Controller John Zalewski "knew right then that he was working a hijack" and called for his supervisor. The frequency of Flight 11 was played on speakers so everyone in Boston ATC can hear. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Village Voice 9/13/01] While dramatic, the radio call – if factual - could have been made from anywhere, by anyone. BUT, one would need to know the correct frequency – not difficult to obtain. Most importantly, why did it take such a call to "certify" a hijacking? His supervisor should have been called with the first indication of trouble.

8:24 AM       Boston ATC radar observes American Flight 11 making a 100-degree turn to the south (already far off-course). The Air Traffic Controllers claimed that even with the transponder turned off, they never actually lost radar contact with the flight (now a Primary Target), although they could no longer determine its altitude. [See - 8:24, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:28, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01]

"Boston Center could still track it on primary radar …." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Boston Air Traffic Controller Mark Hodgkins later stated, "I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down." [See - ABC, 9/6/02]

However, there were also reports stating that Boston ATC didn't spot the aircraft course until just prior to or just after it impacted. (See - Washington Post, 9/12/01 and Newsday, 9/10/02). NEADS had highly sophisticated radar, but supposedly around 8:40 they could not find Flight 11. Supposedly, Boston ATC periodically updated NEADS as to Flight 11's position by telephone. Finally, NEADS reportedly found it a few minutes prior to it impacting into the WTC tower. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02; ABC News 9-11/02; Newhouse News 1/25/02]

The "notification" matter is quite the smoking gun. By all appearances, the factual notification of NORAD was around 8:24. The later notification time citation implication being that the FAA is attempting to 'share" part of the 9-11 "no-response" blame.

Theoretically, NEADS should have been better able to pick out the flight, than could the FAA.

8:25 AM       The Guardian reported that Boston ATC "notifies several air traffic control centers that a hijack is taking place." Boston first lost communication with American Airlines Flight 11 more than 11 minutes earlier. That's a long time to begin to start implementing procedures. Again, why didn't they also notify North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at least by this time? Supposedly they didn't notify NORAD for another 6 to 15 minutes, depending on the particular version (See - 8:37 AM ). [See - Guardian 10/17/01]

If ATC had followed procedure, notifying NORAD at 8:25; with NORAD ordering the 102nd Fighter Wing of the Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts to scramble; then two F-15's could have been airborne by around 8:32. Those F-15's would have had at least 14 minutes to catch American Airlines Flight 11, which impacted the north side of the North Tower (1-World Trade Center) at 8:46:26. The two F-15's, flying at top speed, could have at least buzzed the B-767; even if a shoot-down was impractical, or the order not received. Conceivably, that might have made a major difference.

Strangely, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controller monitoring Flight 77 supposedly claimed that they did not know about Flight 11 or of the Flight 175 hijacking, as of twenty minutes later (see 8:56 AM ). Similarly, the Air Traffic Controllers at La Guardian Airport [local control only], reportedly were never told about the hijacked aircraft; learning about them from watching the news (see 9:01 AM                  and 9:13 AM ).

The aircraft are supposedly known to be clearly headed into New York's airspace; why wasn't New York told, for purposes of midair collision avoidance, alone? The information – at a minimum – would allow a NOTAM       to be posted. The 'suicide" nature of the event isn't yet known or suspected. The information would alert various levels of security to be ready to handle a presumed hostage situation.

The suggestion is that the hijackings were deliberately "compartmentalized." This is no minor question.

No mention can be found of a "Hostage Rescue Team" (HRT) being assembled, for any of 9-11. WHY?

Prior to 8:26 AM )

Reportedly, flight attendant Amy Sweeney identified the seat locations of three hijackers (See - 8:20 AM ), to the American Airlines flight service manager Michael Woodward. He allegedly ordered a colleague at Boston's Logan Airport to look up the seat locations, on the reservations computer. According to that version, the names, addresses, phone numbers, and credit cards of these hijackers are quickly discovered. Abdulaziz Alomari was supposedly identified and located in seat 9G, Mohamed Atta was supposed to be in 9D, and Satam Al Suqami was in seat 10B. 9-11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey claimed that from this information, American Airlines officials monitoring the call would probably have known or assumed right away that the hijacking was connected to al-Qaeda. [See - ABC News 7/18/02; New York Observer 2/11/04]

Why would a lowly Flight Service Manager be called? Why would he not call corporate security? Why would he not get a law enforcement action going? Why would the al Qaeda assumption be so automatic?

To date, there are no known records of ticket purchases or passenger manifest to cite the purported hijackers as being on board the flights.

8:26 AM       American Airlines Flight 11 was now heading west-northwest, its location would have supposedly been somewhere between Albany and Lake George, New York; it's altitude was unknown. Then it supposedly makes a 100 degree turn to the south; heading directly toward New York City. It's assumed that the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 followed the Hudson River, until it impacted the North Tower of the WTC.

An interesting detail is that descending a jet into an airport is a technical undertaking, given just the airspeed of a "normal" flight. With the added speed of the 'strike," the problem becomes more complex. Jets don't easily descend; thus, a descent must be carefully planned – the trade-mark of a professional jet pilot. Amateur hijackers would have been circling the city, all day, trying to lose enough altitude to make the strikes. It took a bright mind and skill to descend to the 'strike" altitudes. In the case of the second aircraft, United Flight 175, the aircraft went south of the city, then turned back north. That could suggest some measure of sloppy descent planning – or an planned strike-path.

While technically possible, the "human factors" of a first experience in an airliner cockpit make it highly unlikely that amateur hijackers successfully re-programmed the cockpit computer from memory, or from written instructions. Nor, are they likely to have been able to readily use the autopilot controls to achieve the needed descent – not on a "first-try."

In theory, flight 11 was always at low altitude – but, can that be certain? Where is the DoD radar data?

8:26 AM       Betty Ong supposedly reported that the aircraft was "flying erratically." A minute later, Flight 11 was supposed to have turned south. Within this same time frame, Amy Sweeney was supposed to have reported that:

1. The aircraft had been hijacked

2. Two flight attendants were stabbed

3. A bomb was in the cockpit

Nothing is mentioned about Craig Marquis contacting the FAA or NORAD, once realizing the emergency. Why not the FBI?

Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM       Craig Marquis, listening to the Air-Phone information from Betty Ong (See - 8:21 AM ), was claimed to have called the American Airlines' system operations control center in Fort Worth. He supposedly stated, "She said two flight attendants had been stabbed, one was on oxygen. A passenger had his throat slashed and looked dead and they had gotten into the cockpit." He relays that four hijackers had come from first-class seats: 2A, 2B, 9A, and 9B. She supposedly stated that the wounded passenger was in seat 10B. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

Did the first class section extend as far back as row 9?

This version conflicts with the seats that Amy Sweeney gave for the hijackers, around the same time: 9D, 9G, and 10B (See - 8:20 AM ). This information was supposedly passed to Gerard Arpey, of American Airlines (see 8:30 AM ). By 9:59, the information was reportedly given to Richard Clarke, as well as other top officials (See - 9:59 AM ).

Lydia Gonzalez reportedly held the headset from Ong up to one ear, and the headset from Marquis to the other. [See - Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01, New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Gonzalez supposedly talked to Marquis continuously until Flight 11 impacted. The first four minutes of this call were later played before the 9-11 Commission. Marquis quickly said, "I'm assuming they've declared an emergency. Let me get ATC [air traffic control] on here. Stand by …. Okay, we're contacting the flight crew now and we're … we're also contacting ATC." In the four recorded minutes, Gonzalez relayed that Ong is saying the hijackers from seats 2A and 2B are in the cockpit with the pilots. There are no doctors on board. All of the first class passengers were supposedly moved into the coach section. The aircraft was reportedly flying very erratically. [See - Independent Commission 1/27/04]

The version doesn't make sense. Was Gonzales in any position of authority, to be making such calls? She should know that a hijacking is an automatic "emergency." Why couldn't she transfer or "conference" the call?

Toward the beginning of the four minute excerpt, from the call which reportedly started at 8:27 (See - 8:23 AM ), Marquis supposedly stated, "We contacted Air Traffic Control, they are going to handle this as a confirmed hijacking. So they're moving all the traffic out of this aircraft's way …. He turned his transponder off, so we don't have a definitive altitude for him. We're just going by … They seem to think that they have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending." Thus, Boston ATC was supposed to be aware that Flight 11 has been hijacked by this time. [See - 9-11 Commission 1/27/04]

8:28 AM       The Boston ATC center called the FAA's Command Center in Herdon, Virginia, telling them that it believes that Flight 11 was hijacked and that it was headed toward New York's airspace. At 8:32, the Command Center function reportedly passed to the Operations Center at the FAA headquarters in Washington. FAA Headquarters was said to have replied that they've just begun discussing the hijack situation with their main FAA New England office. The Command Center reportedly established a teleconference between the Boston, New York, and Cleveland centers [why Cleveland?] enabling Boston to help others understand what's happening. By 8:24 Boston was certain that Flight 11 has been hijacked, still, NORAD was not yet contacted. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

Why is New York Center not the active ATC contact, by this time?

8:30 AM       Gerard Arpey, American Airlines' executive vice president for operations, supposedly hears from manager Joe Burdepelly who stated that he had been trying to page him to tell him about a possible hijacking of Flight 11. Reportedly, Burdepelly told Arpey that he's been informed that another manager, Craig Marquis, was in contact with flight attendant Betty Ong on the hijacked flight (See - 8:21 AM ) and (Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ). Supposedly, Arpey learned that Ong claimed that two other flight attendants were stabbed, that two or three "passengers" are now in the cockpit. Arpey was reported to be the top executive of American Airlines during the early portion of the crisis, as the company president was at home - out of contact. [See - 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

At some point prior to Flight 11 impacting, Arpey also hears about the comment, "We have some aircraft" supposedly made by the hijackers. [See - USA Today 8/13/02]

Around 8:30 AM       Secretary of State Colin Powell left from Lima, Peru after hearing the news.

The question is quickly asked, "Why did he know, prior to the President?" That's no small question.

Many of the US leaders are scattered across the country; and overseas.

1. President Bush was now in Sarasota, Florida.

2. Vice President Cheney and the National Security Advisor are at their offices in the White House.

3. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was at the Pentagon, meeting with a delegation from Capitol Hill.

4. Secretary of State Powell was then in Lima, Peru.

5. The CIA Director Tenet was at breakfast with his old friend and mentor, former Senator David Boren (D), at the St. Regis Hotel, three blocks from the White House.

6. General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was flying to Europe.

7. Ashcroft was flying to Milwaukee. The FBI Director, Mueller, was in his office at FBI headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

8. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta was in his office at the Department of Transportation. [See - Senate Commerce Committee, 9/20/01]

9. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Joe Allbaugh was at a conference, in Montana. [See - ABC, 9/14/02 (B)]

10. George Bush Sr. was supposedly on a flight, en route from Washington to St. Paul, Minnesota. He reportedly had his aircraft diverted to Milwaukee when the air ban began. [See - Time, 9/24/01]

11. The Counterterrorism "leader," Richard Clarke, was at a conference in the Ronald Reagan Building; approximately three blocks from the White House.

8:30 AM       The FAA's Command Center in Herndon, Virginia began the daily senior staff meeting. National Operations Manager Ben Sliney interrupted the meeting, reporting a possible hijacking in progress. The Center had been told about the Flight 11 hijacking a few minutes earlier (see 8:28 AM ). Later, a supervisor interrupted the meeting to report a flight attendant on the hijacked aircraft may have been stabbed (See - Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ). The meeting broke up prior to the first WTC impact at 8:46. Apparently no one in the meeting contacted NORAD. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 12/17/01]

8:30 AM       Captain Charles Leidig, the Deputy for Command Center Operations at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) took over temporarily from Brigadier General Montague Winfield; he was effectively in charge of NMCC during the 9-11 crisis. Winfield requested the previous day that Leidig stand in for him on September 11, starting at this time. Leidig had just started his role as Deputy for Command Center Operations two months prior and had just qualified to stand in for Winfield the previous month. Leidig remained in charge from a few minutes prior to the 9-11 crisis beginning, until approximately 10:30, after the last hijacked aircraft impacted. He presided over an important crisis response teleconference, which had a very slow start (see 9:39 AM ). [See - Independent Commission 6/17/04 (B)]

8:32 AM       The Bush motorcade left the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key, Florida for the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota.

8:33:59 AM       Another radio transmission, supposedly from American Airlines Flight 11, "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves."

8:34 AM       The Boston Air Traffic Controllers attempted to contact the military, via the FAA's Cape Cod facility. Two fighters sit on twenty-four hour alert at the Otis Air National Guard Base, on Cape Cod. Boston tried reaching this base so that the fighters can be scrambled after Flight 11. Apparently, the Controllers make the contact, prior to going through the usual NORAD channels. The 9-11 Commission left the details vague, as to what the outcome of that call was. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

However, the lead pilot at the Otis base, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (code-named 'duff"), later claimed that he was given an advance warning to get ready to scramble prior to the official notification (See - 8:46 AM ), thanks to a call from Boston ATC (See - 8:40 AM ). [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02]

Why would he be called, versus a command position?

8:34 AM      

Around this time, Boston ATC attempted to contact an Atlantic City, New Jersey air base, to send fighters after Flight 11. Why not NORAD or NEADS? For decades, this air base had two fighters on 24-hour alert status, but this changed in 1998, due to budget cutbacks. The Air Traffic Controllers didn't realize this, apparently trying in vain to reach anyone.

Why the desperation? Their SOP should have been more than sufficient to "… contact anyone."

At the time Flight 11 impacted the north tower of the WTC, two F-16s from this base were reportedly practicing bombing runs on an empty stretch of the Pine Barrens near Atlantic City. They were only eight minutes away from New York City, yet they were not alerted to the emerging crisis. Shortly after the second WTC impact - at 9:03 - the two F-16s were ordered to land, to be refitted with air-to-air missiles, then sent aloft – re-launched over an hour after the second impact.

They were supposedly launched to Washington, but didn't reach there until almost 11:00 (see 10:42 AM ). After 9-11, one newspaper questioned why NORAD "left what seems to be a yawning gap in the midsection of its air defenses on the East Coast — a gap with New York City at the center." [See - Bergen Record, 12/5/03, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

It's academic that had these two fighters been notified at 8:37 - or before - they could have reached New York City prior to Flight 11. Why were they not launched, just to verify the reality?

8:34 AM       Air Traffic Controllers hear one hijacker on Flight 11 say to the passengers: "Nobody move, please, we are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves." [See - 8:33, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 8:33:59, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:33:59, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:34, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Reportedly, shortly after this, the ATC tapes were played back to hear the words spoken by the hijackers (See - 8:24 AM ). Everyone in the Boston ATC center heard the hijackers say "We have some aircraft." [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

8:35 AM       Flight attendant Amy Sweeney reportedly continued to describe what was happening on board Flight 11 to Michael Woodward at Logan Airport (See - 8:20 AM ). At some point prior to this, she reportedly stated that flight attendants were giving injured people oxygen. [Not First-Aid?] Reportedly, they've made an announcement over the PA system asking if there's a doctor or nurse on board. [The hijackers don't have control of the cabin?] Sweeney was supposedly calling from the rear of the coach section, explaining that the passengers in the "coach" section, separated by curtains from the violence in first class, were calm; believing that there was some type of medical emergency at the front of the aircraft. [The hijackers left the passengers and flight attendants un-guarded?] Supposedly, at that time, the aircraft suddenly lurches, tilting all the way to one side, then rights itself. [no "G" loads described, nor a pitch-down of the nose. Such a maneuver would be beyond the capability of the autopilot, with any of the supposed hijackers (amateur pilots) losing manual control of the pitch of the aircraft, at lease momentarily.] Then she supposedly reportedly stated that it began a rapid descent. [No descriptions of screaming passengers.] She supposedly tried to contact the cockpit again, but still got no response. [See - ABC News 7/18/02; New York Observer 2/11/04]

8:35 AM       Bush's motorcade left for Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. [See - 8:30, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 8:30, BBC, 9/1/02, 8:35, Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01, 8:39, Washington Times, 10/7/02]

8:36 AM       On board Flight 11, flight attendant Betty Ong supposedly also reported that the aircraft tilted all the way to one side then becoming horizontal again. Flight attendant Amy Sweeney then supposedly reported on her phone that the aircraft has begun a rapid descent. [See - ABC News 7/18/02]

These would be critical moments. Why are the flight attendants not involved with 'standard" hijacking procedures?

8:36 AM       A NORAD spokesman, Major Mike Snyder, reportedly said, that the FAA had notified NORAD of a hijacked aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11, approximately 10 minutes prior to the aircraft impacting into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.

http://www.attackonamerica.net/didhijackersflythroughholesinusairdefense.htm

Following 8:37 AM       NORAD gave the command to scramble fighters after Flight 11, after being "officially" notified (See - 8:37 AM ). Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, at NEADS, told Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, "I have FAA on the phone, the shout line, Boston Center. They reportedly said "…they have a hijacked aircraft." Marr then called Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD's command Center in Florida, saying, "Boss, I need to scramble [fighters at] Otis [Air National Guard Base]." Arnold recalled, "I said go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get the authorities later." Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

After seeing that the proper authorization had been given, NEADS called Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD's headquarters. Jellinek was sitting near Canadian Air Force Major General, Rick Findley, the director of combat operations there. Findley's staff was "already on high alert" because of a joint US-Canada exercise known as Vigilant Guardian (See - 6:30 AM ), and another joint exercise known as Operation Northern Vigilance (See - 9:00 AM ). Jellinek got the thumbs up authorization from Findley to send fighters after Flight 11. Findley later stated, "At that point all we thought was we've got an aircraft hijacked and we were going to provide an escort as requested. We certainly didn't know it was going to play out as it did." Findley remained in charge of NORAD headquarters while his staff fed information to the NORAD commander-in-chief, Ralph Eberhart, stationed in Florida. [See - CBC 11/27/01; Toronto Star 12/9/01; Ottawa Citizen 9-11/02; Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02]

Two Canadians had charge of NORAD. Nowhere is there a suggestion of an American officer jumping in, to assume "American" control. One must ask what it would take for the "Americans" to act.

8:37 AM       The Air Traffic Controllers asked the United Airlines Flight 175 pilots to look for the lost American Airlines aircraft 10 miles to the south of them. The United pilots responded that they can see it. They were told to keep away from it. [See - Guardian 10/17/01; Boston Globe 11/23/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04] . This incident was not included in The New York Times transcript. Why?

http://www.attackonamerica.net/didhijackersflythroughholesinusairdefense.htm

Just prior to this, Flight 11 passed from Boston's airspace into New York's airspace. John Hartling, the New York Air Traffic Controller put in charge of the hijacked flight, later recounted being told that Flight 11 was hijacked: "I didn't believe him. Because I didn't think that that stuff would happen anymore, especially in this country." [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

The statement is almost ludicrous. The acceptance of the statement should have been automatic. A controller would be 100% in the 'reaction" mode.

8:37 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, Boston ATC contacted NEADS (NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector) at this time. This was apparently the first successful "formal" notification of the military about the crisis that morning. Tech. Sgt. Jeremy Powell, a member of the Air National Guard at NEADS, initially took the call from the Boston Center. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Boston ATC reportedly said, "Hi. Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out." Powell replied, "Is this real-world or exercise?" Boston answers, "No, this is not an exercise, not a test." [See - 8:37:52, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, BBC, 9/1/02]

Powell supposedly gave the phone to Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, the regional Mission Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise (See - 6:30 AM ). Deskins later stated that initially she and "everybody" else at NEADS thought the call was part of Vigilant Guardian. After the phone call she had to clarify to everyone that it was not a drill. [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also stated that when he heard of the hijacking, "The first thing that went through my mind was, "..is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?" [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Deskins recalled, "I picked up the line and I identified myself to the Boston Center controller, and he said, we have a hijacked aircraft and I need to get you some sort of fighters out here to help us out." However, the timing of this vital notification is in some dispute. Deskins herself claimed that the call occurred at 8:31. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Another report later stated, "Shortly after 8:30 AM      , behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking [reached] various stations of NORAD." [See - ABC News, 9/14/02]

FAA Administrator Jane Garvey testified in 2003 that the FAA notified NORAD at 8:34. [See - New York Times, 12/30/03]

NORAD, on the other hand, originally claimed they were first notified at 8:40; this was widely reported by the news media prior to the 9-11 Commission's report. [See - 8:40, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:40, AP, 8/19/02, 8:40, BBC, 9/1/02, 8:40, Newsday, 9/10/02]

If 8:37 is the accurate time, that would mean that the Air Traffic Controllers didn't notify NORAD until 24 minutes after radio contact with Flight 11 was lost (See - 8:13 AM ); or around 17 minutes after the transponder signal was lost - and the flight going far off course (See - Between 8:13- 8:21 AM ) and (8:20 AM ), that would also be 13 minutes after voices of the hijackers in the cockpit remove any possible doubt that the aircraft had been hijacked (See - 8:24 AM ).

Nothing makes sense in the reports; add the non-accountability, later.

8:38 AM       American Flight 11 pilot John Ogonowski's reported periodic activation of the "push-to-talk" button, which began around 8:14, stopped around this time. The suggestion being that this was when the hijacker(s) replace him as pilot. [See - Christian Science Monitor 9/13/01; MSNBC 9/15/01]

8:38 AM       The Boston air traffic center notified NORAD that American Airlines Flight 11 was hijacked.

8:40 AM       Major Daniel Nash (code-named "Nasty") and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (code-named 'duff") were the two F-15 pilots from the 102nd Fighter Wing of the Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts who later scrambled after Flight 11; then after Flight 175. Reportedly they got several informal calls warning them to get ready. Nash stated that a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base told him that a flight out of Boston had been hijacked, and to be on alert. [See - Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] They put on their flight gear and get ready.

8:40 AM       The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) notified NORAD that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked. Even NORAD officially admitted that the FAA told them about the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 at 8:40.

NORAD Press Release:

http://StandDown.net/NORADSeptember182001PressRelease.htm

AP Article On NORAD PR:

http://www.AttackOnAmerica.net/8MinutesAway.htm

A NEADS senior technician, Jeremy Powell, informed of the hijacking at 8:37 (See - 8:37 AM ), stated that he telephoned Otis Air Base and told it to upgrade its 'readiness posture." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Robert Marr, head of NEADS, also stated that after being told of the hijacking at 8:37, he said, "I'll call 1st Air Force [at Otis] and let them know we've got a potential incident." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Boston ATC reportedly tried calling the Otis base directly at 8:34, though the result of that call remains unclear (see 8:34 AM ). Duffy recalled being warned: "I was just standing up by the ops desk and I was told I had a phone call. I asked who it was and they said the [Boston] Tower calling and something about a hijacking. It was Flight American 11, a 767, out of Boston going to California. At the time we ran in and got suited up." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, BBC, 9/1/02, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

Duffy said, "Halfway to the jets, we got "battle stations" … " which means to get ready for action. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

The actual scramble order supposedly didn't come until they were already waiting in the fighters: "We went out, we hopped in the jets and we were ready to go — standby for a scramble order if we were going to get one." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Duffy continued, "I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines flight. About 4-5 minutes later, we got the scramble order and took off." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

However, the official notification to scramble these fighters supposedly didn't come until 8:46. The six minute delay between the unofficial and official notification has not been explained (See - 8:46 AM ).

8:40 A.M. In NORAD's logs, this was the first occasion where the FAA reported a possible hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11. Supposedly, the initial report was a possible hijacking; un-confirmed.

The F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, approximately 153 miles away were placed immediately on battle stations by the Northeast Air Defense Sector Commander.

8:41:32 AM       The pilots of Flight 175 tell ATC about Flight 11, "We figured we'd wait to go to your center. We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed the mike and said: "Everyone stay in your seats." It cut out." [See - 8:41, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:41, Newsday, 9/10/02, 8:41:32, New York Times, 10/16/01]

An alternate version: "We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure from B-O-S [Boston's airport code]. Sounds like someone keyed the mike and said, "Everyone, stay in your seats." " [See - Boston Globe 11/23/01]

That was the last transmission from Flight 175. [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

In theory, ATC would have also heard the call, with the Flight 175 flight crew confirming the report, not delivering an initial report on it.

8:41 AM       Flight 175 flew from Boston ATC airspace into New York ATC airspace. Dave Bottoglia was in charge of monitoring the flight. Bottoglia had just been told by the pilot of Flight 175 that he'd heard the threatening communications from Flight 11 (see 8:41 AM ). Seconds later, a controller sitting next to Bottoglia got up and pointed to a radar blip. He said, "You see this target here? This was American 11. Boston center thinks it's a hijack." Bottoglia keeps watching the blip until it disappeared over New York City, failing to notice Flight 175 for several minutes (see 8:46 AM ). [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

8:42 AM       United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with a maximum capacity of 200 passengers and 11,489 gallons of fuel, departed from Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey bound for San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Its take-off was scheduled for 8:01. There were supposed to be 44 victims on board; according to the official death manifest list, published on CNN.com, there were only 33. It left 41 minutes late because of heavy runway traffic. [See - MSNBC, 9/3/02] [Newsweek 9/22/01; AP 8/19/02; CNN 9/17/01; Guardian 10/17/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:42 AM       An air traffic controller said of United Airlines Flight 175, "..looks like he's heading southbound but there's no transponder no nothing and no one's talking to him."

8:43 AM       NORAD was notified that Flight 175 had been hijacked. [See - 8:43, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:43, CNN, 9/17/01, 8:43, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 8:43, AP, 8/19/02, 8:43, Newsday, 9/10/02]

In theory, NORAD didn't need to be notified, because by this time NEADS technicians have their headsets linked to the FAA in Boston to hear about Flight 11, so NORAD theoretically learned instantly about Flight 175. [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

The significance of this is that the controllers working Flight 77 and Flight 93 would have been aware of both Flight 175 and Flight 11's hijacking from this time.

8:43 AM       The FAA notified NORAD that United Airlines Flight 175 had been hijacked. NORAD officially admitted that the FAA told them about the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 175 at 8:43.

8:44 AM       The pilot of US Airlines Flight 583 told an unidentified Air Traffic Controller, regarding Flight 175, "I just picked up an ELT [emergency locator transmitter] on 121.5 it was brief but it went off." The controller responded, "O.K. they said it's confirmed believe it or not as a thing, we're not sure yet.… " One minute later, another pilot said, "We picked up that ELT, too, but it's very faint." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01 (B)]

In reality, an ELT signal would not be associated with an airborne airliner.

8:44 AM       Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, talking about terrorism at the Pentagon said, "Let me tell you, I've been around the block a few times. There will be another event." He repeated it for emphasis, "…there will be another event."

This statement is significant, given that many details of the day attest to a lot of details being "officially" known in advance.

Prior to 8:45 AM       At the American Airline's headquarters in Fort Worth, their crisis command center was activated. A page was sent to American's top executives and operations personnel: "Confirmed hijacking Flight 11." The top managers gathered at the command center; watching the "computer feed" radar blip of Flight 11 until it disappeared over New York City. [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

8:45 AM       Just prior to the impact of Flight 11, flight attendant Amy Sweeney was supposedly asked on the phone if she could recognize where she is. She said, "I see the water. I see the buildings. I see buildings," then after a pause, a quiet "Oh, my God!" Seconds later the line went dead. Meanwhile, flight attendant Betty Ong supposedly ended her call repeating the phrase "Pray for us" over and over. Apparently there was quiet, as opposed to screaming in the background. [See - ABC News 7/18/02]

8:46 AM       President Bush was traveling through Sarasota, Florida in a motorcade when the first WTC impact occurred (see(8:35 AM ) and (Between 8:46-8:55 AM ). According to the 9-11 Commission, at that time, "no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that [Flight 11] had been hijacked. Immediately afterward, duty officers at the White House and Pentagon began notifying senior officials what had happened." However, supposedly no one notified President Bush about the impact until his motorcade reached the school, even though there was a highly secure phone in his vehicle, with others in the motorcade being notified. Not even the Jane Garvey, the head of the FAA, nor her deputy had been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learn about the impact from the television. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

By this time Colin Powell has been long notified in South America. The communications scheme is all wrong.

8:46 AM       The Naudet brothers, the French documentary filmmakers, were filming a documentary on New York City firefighters approximately ten blocks from the WTC. One of them heard a roar, looked up, then capturing a distant image of the first WTC impact. They continued shooting footage of the 9-11 carnage for hours. Their footage was first shown that evening on CNN. [See - New York Times, 1/12/02, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 9/19/01]

Thus, Bush's later two claims that he'd seen the first attack live on TV was impossible (See - 9:01 AM ).

Following 8:46 AM       Shortly after the WTC was struck, the FAA opened a telephone line with the Secret Service, keeping them informed of all events. [See - NBC 9/16/01]

Why not NORAD?

8:46 AM       Flight 175 stopped transmitting its transponder signal. It was 50 miles north of New York City, heading toward Baltimore. [See - 8:46:18, Guardian, 10/17/01, "about the same time" as the Flight 11 impact," [See - Newsday, 9/10/02, 8:47, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

However, the transponder was supposedly turned off for only approximately 30 seconds, then changed to a code that was not designated for any aircraft on that day. [See - Newsday, 9/10/02]

This "allow[ed] controllers to track the intruder easily, though they couldn't identify it." [See - Washington Post 9/17/01]

8:46 AM       Two F-15 fighters were ordered to scramble from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts to find Flight 11, approximately 190 miles from the known location of the aircraft; and 188 miles from New York City. [See - 8:39, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01, 8:44, CNN, 9/17/01, 8:44, Washington Post, 9/15/01, 8:44, Los Angeles Times, 9/17/01, 8:46, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Supposedly, NORAD made the decision to scramble after only one phone call. The decision was made to act first and get clearances later. Yet there is a nine minute gap between when the 9-11 Commission stated that NORAD was notified about the hijacking, and when the fighters were ordered scrambled (See - 8:37 AM ). Supposedly, the pilots received several unofficial warnings prior to the official one (See - 8:40 AM ), possibly warned as early as twelve minutes prior(see 8:34 AM ). One of the pilots recalled sitting in the cockpit, ready and waiting for the scramble order to come. [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Supposedly another six minutes pass before they took off (see 8:52 AM ).

NORAD, by their own version, held on to the information of the two hijackings for at least 6 minutes prior to ordering Otis to scramble. Such bureaucratic "fog" and "friction" are difficult to believe, in this particular environment. NORAD may have held on to the information of American Airlines Flight 11 for possibly 8 minutes, or even 10 minutes (see 8:36 AM #25 statement by NORAD's spokesman, Major Mike Snyder), maybe up to 26 minutes (see 8:20 AM #14 American Airlines Flight 11 transponder signal stopped transmitting its IFF beacon signal). It's necessary to remember that the last transmission of American Airlines Flight 11 to the Boston air traffic control occurred at 8:13:31. NORAD had possibly over 32 minutes before they notified Otis to scramble their two F-15's.

Assuming that's the case, how could NORAD hang on to the 8:40 information of the American Airlines Flight 11 hijacking, versus immediately scrambling Otis? Or; the 8:43 information of the United Airlines Flight 175 hijacking; not immediately scrambling Otis? How could they hang on to the most vital information of both of these hijackings for three and six full minutes prior to notifying Otis to scramble? In such cases, three minutes is a lot of time.

See the NORAD Press Release:

http://StandDown.net/NORADSeptember182001PressRelease.htm

See the AP Article on NORAD PR:

http://www.AttackOnAmerica.net/8MinutesAway.htm

See the two New York Times articles:

Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet But Found No Way to Stop It

http://www.attackonamerica.net/pentagontrackeddeadlyjet.html

Chronology of Plane Impactes: Orders, at the Time of Impact

http://www.attackonamerica.net/ordersattimeofimpact.html

8:46:26 AM       The first jet, American Airlines Flight 11, impacted the north side of the North Tower (1-World Trade Center) between the 94th and 98^th floors. American Airlines Flight 11 was supposedly flying at a speed of 490 miles per hour (MPH).

That speed at sea level is in the realm of "highly-questionable."

When American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower, "it set up vibrations which were transmitted through the building, through its foundation, and into the ground," said Lerner-Lam. The vibrations, as indicated by seismographs at Lamont-Doherty and other locations, were described as the equivalent of a magnitude 0.9 earthquake; too small to be felt.

People in the floors below the 94^th of Building 1-WTC started to evacuate. Officials in the South Tower (2 WTC) told people shortly afterward by megaphone and office announcements that they were safe and to stay in their offices. Some people didn't hear the announcement, others ignored the advisory, and evacuated anyway.

8:46 AM       NORAD claimed this time as receiving the last of very little radar data for the "primary targets," which was not actively noticed on 9-11. It was reportedly reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron and other agencies; professionals at reviewing radar tapes.

This is an interesting issue, by itself. Why couldn't NORAD see these primary targets? Why wasn't the data immediately made public? Particularly that portion of 9-11 had no aspect of "national secrecy," except to obscure failures, which the public needed to know about. The Pentagon and Pennsylvania sites will demonstrate "no aircraft;" where did those two aircraft go. There's the secret!

While the NORAD system is centered on primary targets, the FAA system is largely dependent on transponders. The ability of the FAA to detect Primary Targets is largely a function of the quality of the radar equipment itself; different areas have different quality radar antennas. Additionally, the software which interprets and displays the primary targets is another variable. The allocation of hardware and software is a function of cost-based priorities. The farmland of Missouri or Pennsylvania won't have the same ATC priority as a major city.

There is a certain amount of FAA-NORAD radar data interfacing. However, that is a matter of professional forensic analysis, in the case of 9-11.

8:46 AM       The Otis F-15s were scrambled; airborne in six minutes - well within the time allowed for them to get airborne.

8:46 AM       The United Airlines Flight 175 transponder stopped transmitting.

Following 8:46 AM       Bush would say in a speech later that evening: "Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans." [See - White House, 9-11/01]

Bush just departed the hotel for the school. According to reports and images on television, it was the lower-level officials who activated the Conplan — the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.

8:46:26 AM       Flight 11 impacted the WTC North Tower. See - CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01 (B); CNN 9/17/01; NORAD 9/18/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; AP 8/19/02; USA Today 9/3/02; USA Today 8/13/02; Newsday 9/10/02; Guardian 10/17/01; MSNBC 9/22/01; New York Times 9-11/02; USA Today 12/20/01]

Reportedly, the aircraft still had approximately 10,000 gallons of fuel on board; and was traveling 470 mph. [See - New York Times 9-11/02; USA Today 12/20/01]

That speed, at sea level, is in the realm of "highly-questionable."

8:46 AM       The New York Air Traffic Controller Dave Bottoglia was in charge of monitoring both Flights 11 and 175. He had just watched Flight 11's radar blip disappear over New York City, not realizing that the aircraft had just impacted. "Within seconds" of losing Flight 11's blip, he realized that Flight 175 was also missing. He had another controller take over all his other aircraft so he could focus on finding Flight 175. He reportedly tried contacting the aircraft several times unsuccessfully. Curt Applegate, who was sitting at the radar screen next to Bottoglia, reportedly saw a blip which might be the missing Flight 11. It's actually the missing Flight 175. As Bottoglia noticed it, the transponder signal came back on, with a different code than before (See - 8:46 AM ). MSNBC reported, "There was no longer any question in Bottoglia's mind that he's looking at a second hijacked airliner." He watched it turn to the east and start descending. He kept an eye on it; watching it head toward at Delta Flight 2315. He recalled saying to the Delta flight, "Traffic, 2:00, 10 miles. I think he's been hijacked. I don't know his intentions. Take any evasive action necessary." Flight 2315 reportedly took evasive action, missing Flight 175 by less than 200 feet. [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

The version of Flight eleven is questionable, as the radar "ground clutter" of the buildings of New York City should have obscured the flight, from the ATC "Center" radar.

Still no claim that NORAD was yet notified about the hijacking. According to one NORAD timeline, NORAD was notified by Boston ATC three minutes earlier (see 8:43 AM ). The 9-11 Commission seemed to completely ignore this version from Bottoglia, instead citing his noticing the transponder change at 8:51, not as it was happening, as he claimed (see 8:51-8:53 AM ).

8:46 AM       Flight attendant Amy Sweeney was reportedly still on the phone with Michael Woodward, describing the conditions on Flight 11 (See - 8:20 AM ) and (8:35 AM ). The aircraft was reportedly nearing New York City; with the coach section passengers quiet, apparently unaware a hijacking was in progress. Woodward reportedly asks Sweeney to look out the window to see if she can tell what was going on. She reportedly replied, "I see the water. I see the building. I see buildings." She reportedly told him the aircraft was flying very low. She supposedly then took a slow, deep breath and slowly said, "Oh my God!" Woodward reportedly heard a loud click; then silence. [See - Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, ABC News, 7/18/02]

In reality, the passengers would have been asking a lot of questions. The flight attendants would have been keenly aware of the low altitude (just by virtue of the cabin pressurization changes, alone) and would have "prepared" the cabin for a landing. The flight attendants would also be busy attending to the hijacker(s) and keeping the passengers calm – requiring a lot of open communication. An ignorant passenger going to the lavatory could inadvertently trigger an on-board disaster. The flight attendants would be trying to find any "able-bodied passengers" to assist with either the hijacking or eventual evacuation. In such a call, they would be describing their actions and frustrations. If they suspected the pilots to be dead, they would be frantically be seeking out any pilots – of any kind – among the passengers.

Supposedly, there are at least four hijackers on the flight; they would be managing the passengers, themselves. There are no such descriptions. Given the quantity of hijackers cited, it's ludicrous to think that there wouldn't be major interactions between the flight attendants and the hijackers.

A factual report by a flight attendant would be more on the order of:

"This is ___, on Flight ____; we've been hijacked. I'm on my cell phone, this has to be quick. Get a pen, let me know when you're ready to copy." "There are four middle-easterners from coach, armed with ____, they claim to have a bomb. It's in a fanny-pack, with just a switch on the outside; I can't see anything inside. One hijacker is in the cockpit. They got the crash axe. I don't know names or seat numbers, everybody moved around, when they got on board. They are speaking to each other in Arabic, I think; I can't make out names. No demands are being made, they just want everybody quiet; I don't know where we're going – looks like into Kennedy. They won't let anyone near them. They are holding ____ hostage, threatening to kill her first, then the passengers. No word from the cockpit; nothing. I don't know what's happening in the 'pit. Gotta go."

Reportedly, flight attendant Betty Ong, on another phone, didn't deliver such dramatic descriptions, repeatedly saying "Pray for us. Pray for us," before her phone call ended. (See - 8:21 AM ) and (8:23 AM ).

However dramatic, she should have been trying to coordinate a number of anti-hijacking details. Even if she was just a junior flight attendant, the others would be tasking her for assistance.

8:46 - 8:50 AM       Rick Tepper, an Air Traffic Controller at the Newark, New Jersey tower, reportedly looked across the Hudson River at New York City in time to see the explosion of Flight 11. Another Air Traffic Controller tried to find out what caused it. He recalled that in the next few minutes, "We contacted La Guardia, Kennedy Tower, and Teterboro Tower to find out if they lost an aircraft. And they all stated that they didn't know what it was. I got on the phone to the en route air traffic control's facility out in New York on Long Island, and I asked them if they'd lost any aircraft, and they said, "No, but Boston Center lost an aircraft. They lost an American 767."

The coordination between ATC centers should have "handed off" the flight, regardless. The New York Center and all possible New York ATC agencies should have been on notice, just for an anticipated hostage scenario. In all of the 9-11 reports, there is no description of a hostage scene preparation. WHY?

8:46 AM       At the time of the first WTC impact, three F-16s assigned to Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, were reported to be flying an air-to-ground training mission in North Carolina, 207 miles away. Eventually they were recalled to Andrews and landed there at some point after Flight 77 impacted into the Pentagon. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

8:47 AM       NORAD was informed of American Airlines Flight 11 striking the World Trade Center.

8:47 AM       NYC Fire Battalion Chief Joe Pfeiffer from the 7th Battalion put out an emergency call stating that American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the north side of the North Tower (1 World Trade Center) was no accident.

8:48 AM       Canadian Air Force Major General Rick Findley was reportedly in charge of the exercise "battle stations" at NORAD's Colorado headquarters. [NORAD is a joint-operations effort, shared between the USA and Canada.] According to Findley, "As the phones were beginning to ring, someone said "Sir, you might want to look at that." I looked up and there was the CNN image of the World Trade Center. There was a hole in the side of one of the buildings." Someone reportedly told him it was a small aircraft. "I said the hole's too big for a small aircraft …. I asked if it was the hijacked aircraft. I was scratching my head, wondering if it was another aircraft altogether."

8:48 AM       A manager at a New York ATC center manager spoke in a teleconference between flight centers. The person reportedly said, "Okay. This is New York Center. We're watching the aircraft [Flight 11]. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they've told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there were people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that's all the information they have right now." The manager was apparently unaware that Flight 11 had already impacted. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Following 8:48 AM       The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers saw the first WTC impact [coverage] on television. Myers was the acting Chairman of the US military during the 9-11 crisis, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Henry Shelton was flying to Europe. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Reportedly he saw the TV coverage in an outer office of Senator Max Cleland (D), but said, "They thought it was a small aircraft or something like that," so he went ahead with the meeting with Cleland. He stated that "nobody informed us" about the second WTC impact. Thus, he remained oblivious that there was an emergency. He was leaving the meeting with Cleland, as the Pentagon explosion took place at 9:38. Then he spoke to General Ralph Eberhart. [See - AFPS, 10/23/01]

However, in his version on September 13, 2001, he stated, "after the second tower was struck, I spoke to the commander of NORAD, General Eberhart. And at that point, I think the decision was at that point to start launching aircraft." [See - Myers Confirmation Testimony, 9/13/01]

NORAD claimed the first fighters were scrambled even before the first WTC strike. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

In the 2004 testimony before the 9-11 Commission, Myers' version changed again. He stated that he got a call from Eberhart; then 'shortly thereafter that the Pentagon was struck as we were on our way back to the Pentagon." [See - 9-11 Commission, 6/17/04 (B)]

Myers' claim of being out of the loop contradicted his previous version, and also that of the Richard Clarke version of what Myers did that day. Clarke placed Myers as taking part in a video conference from approximately 9:10 until after 10:00 (see - (Between 9:45-9:55 AM ), and (After 10:06 AM ). If Myers was not involved in that conference, his whereabouts and actions remain unknown until his travel to the Pentagon; showing up at the NMCC around 10:30 (See - Before 10:30 AM ) and (10:30 AM ).

8:48 AM       The first news reports appeared on TV and radio, that an aircraft may have impacted into the WTC. [See - New York Times, 9/15/01 [C], CNN, 9-11/01, Toronto Star, 1/7/03]

CNN was the first major TV network to show footage of the impact scene. CNN broke into a commercial, with anchor Carol Lin saying, "This just in. You are looking at … obviously a very disturbing live shot there — that is the World Trade Center, and we have unconfirmed reports this morning that an aircraft had impacted into one of the towers of the World Trade Center." CNN then switched to Sean Murtagh, the network's vice president of finance, who said, "I just witnessed an airplane that appeared to be cruising at a slightly lower than normal altitude over New York City. And it appears to have impacted into — I don't know which tower it is — but it strike directly in the middle of one of the World Trade Center towers. It was a jet, maybe a two-engine jet, maybe a 737 … a large passenger commercial jet … It was teetering back and forth, wing-tip to wing-tip, and it looks like it had impacted into-probably, twenty stories from the top of the World Trade Center — maybe the eightieth to eighty-fifth floor. There is smoke billowing out of the World Trade Center." [See - A Pretext for War, by James Bamford, 6/04, pp. 16-17]

8:49 AM       United Airlines Flight 175 deviated from its assigned flight path.

8:49 AM       Businessman Peter Hanson reportedly called his father from Flight 175, saying, "Oh, my God! They just stabbed the airline hostess. I think the airline is being hijacked." He was supposedly cut off twice. Still he reportedly managed to state that men armed with knives were stabbing flight attendants, apparently in an attempt to force crew to unlock the doors to the cockpit. He reportedly called again and reportedly said good-bye just before the aircraft impacted. [See - around 8:49, Telegraph, 9/16/01 (B), Toronto Sun, 9/16/01, BBC, 9/13/01]

The 9-11 Commission later concluded, "Reports from Flight 175 included one passenger predicting the hijackers intended to fly an aircraft into a building." [See - CNN 3/10/04]

8:49 AM       According to the Wall Street Journal, the managers at the United Airlines' headquarters in Chicago were unaware of any unfolding emergency until they watched the CNN story at 8:48. "Within minutes," United headquarters got a call from the FAA saying that the aircraft which had impacted into the WTC was an American Airlines passenger aircraft. At approximately the same time and prior to a call about the flight at approximately 8:50 (See - 8:50 AM ), a manager reportedly said to Jim Goodwin, United's chairman and chief executive, "Boss, we've lost contact with one of our aircraft [Flight 175]." [See - Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01]

Why would the FAA advise United of the "gossip" of American Airlines, when it knew that United also had a flight in trouble?

8:50 AM       Flight 175, had passed New York City, flying south, then made a U-turn; heading back north toward the city. [See - CNN 9/17/01]

8:50 AM       As soon as the Boston Air Traffic Controllers heard the news that an aircraft might have strike the WTC, they were sure it was Flight 11. They were tracking it continually since it first began behaving erratically. It took 'several minutes" for Boston to report to NORAD that they thought that Flight 11 was the aircraft. [See - New York Times 9/13/01 (F); Newhouse News 1/25/02]

8:50 AM       Rich 'doc" Miles, the manager of United's Chicago system operations center, reportedly received a call from a mechanic at the airline maintenance center in San Francisco, which took in-flight calls from flight attendants about broken items. The mechanic reportedly stated that a female flight attendant from Flight 175 just called and said, "Oh my God. The crew has been killed, a flight attendant has been stabbed. We've been hijacked." Then the line went dead. A dispatcher monitoring the flight then was reported to have sent messages to the aircraft's cockpit computer; with no response. [See - "a little more" than 8:47, Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01, "around 8:50," Boston Globe, 11/23/01, "around 8:50," 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

That information was quickly relayed to the United headquarters. [See - 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

8:50 AM       The last radio contact with Flight 77 was made when a pilot asked for clearance for a higher altitude. Six minutes later, the aircraft failed to respond to a routine ATC instruction. Presumably it was hijacked during that time frame. The aircraft was being handled by the Indianapolis ATC center. [See - Guardian 10/17/01; Boston Globe 11/23/01; New York Times 10/16/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:50 AM       CIA Director Tenet was told of the first WTC impact while he was eating breakfast with his mentor, former Senator David Boren. Boren reportedly stated that Tenet was told that the WTC had been attacked by an aircraft: "I was struck by the fact that [the messenger] used the word attacked." Tenet then reportedly handed the cell phone back to an aide and said to Boren, "You know, this has bin Laden's fingerprints all over it." [See - ABC, 9/14/02]

While there were 'suggestions" of bin Laden's forces planning such a mission, there was nothing viable that suggested that he was anywhere close to actually doing such.

Another version had Tenet saying into the phone, "They steered the aircraft directly into the building?" Then he reportedly stated to Boren, "That looks like Bin Laden." In a reference to recently arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, he mused out loud, "I wonder if this has something to do with the guy who trained for a pilot's license." [See - Stern, 8/13/03]

If these versions are accurate, it certainly negates the claim of surprise.

8:50:51 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 last radio communication occurred, approximately 285 miles west of the Pentagon.

8:51 AM       Bush arrived at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida for a photo op with a band of 16 second graders. He went there to promote his administration's new bill on education.

8:52 AM       Mike McCormick, head of the New York ATC center, saw the first WTC attack images on CNN. He assumed that Flight 175, which he had on his radar screen, was also headed to the WTC. He reportedly said, "Probably one of the most difficult moments of my life was the 11 minutes from the point I watched that aircraft, when we first lost communications until the point that aircraft strike the World Trade Center. For those 11 minutes, I knew, we knew, what was going to happen, and that was difficult." [See - CNN, 8/12/02]

Strangely, according to the 9-11 Commission, this ATC center didn't notify NORAD of Flight 175 until after it impacted (See - 9:03 AM ).

8:52 AM and after) There are differing versions as to how long the F-15s which were scrambled from Otis took to reach New York City. According to pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, they were in a hurry. Duffy later recalled, "We've been over the flight a thousand times in our minds and I don't know what we could have done to get there any quicker." However, though Duffy reportedly stated that he'd been warned that Flight 11 had been hijacked and appeared to be headed toward New York City, he reportedly seemed not to realize it was something other than a routine exercise: "It's just peacetime. We're not thinking anything real bad was going to happen out there." [See - BBC, 9/1/02, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

But in another version, Duffy claimed that a fellow officer told him prior to takeoff, "This looks like the real thing." Duffy recalled, "It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

"Full-blower" implies that the fighters were flying at or near their full speed. An F-15 can fly over 1875 mph. [See - Air Force News, 7/30/97]

While "full blower" (afterburner) requires a huge amount of fuel to maintain those high speeds, a NORAD commander noted that those fighters were stocked with extra fuel. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Duffy later said, "As we're climbing out, we go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us." He reportedly stated that their target destination was over Kennedy airport in New York City. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

He said, "When we [took] off we [started] climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City. I [was] supersonic …. We [were] to proceed to Manhattan directly and set up a combat air patrol." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

There were different versions offered, as to just how quickly they traveled. According to Major Gen. Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, "The pilots [flew] "like a scalded ape," topping 500 mph but [were] unable to catch up to the airliner." [See - Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01]

ABC News later said, "The fighters are hurtling toward New York at mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

NORAD's commander, Major General Larry Arnold, reportedly stated that they headed straight for New York City at approximately 1100 to 1200 mph. [See - MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C), Slate, 1/16/02]

"An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes, according to an Otis spokeswoman." [See - Cape Cod Times, 9/16/01]

Given an average speed of 1,125 mph, the fighters would have reached the city in 10 minutes — around 9:02. Thus, if Arnold's speed citation was correct, those fighters would have reached Flight 175 just before it impacted. Still, according to a NORAD timeline published just after 9-11, the aircraft took approximately 19 minutes to reach New York City (approximately at 9:11), as they would have been traveling below supersonic speeds at less than 600 mph. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

The 9-11 Commission later concluded that the fighters were never directed to New York City at all, despite the versions of the pilots and others, instead heading out over the ocean (See - 9:08-9:13 AM ). They reportedly didn't reach New York City until 9:25. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:52 AM       The two F-15s took off from Otis Air National Guard Base, 153 miles east-northeast of the WTC, six minutes after being scrambled to go after Flight 11 - which had already impacted. That was 39 minutes after the Air Traffic Controllers lost contact with Flight 11 (See - 8:13 AM ); 26 minutes after the Air Traffic Controllers were certain that Flight 11 was hijacked (See - 8:24 AM ). [See - NORAD 9/18/01; CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/15/01; ABC News 9-11/02; Washington Post 9/12/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:53 AM       ATC reportedly stated to other aircraft about United Airlines Flight 175, "We may have a hijack. We have some problems over here right now."

8:51-8:53 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the Air Traffic Controller handling Flight 175 (presumably Dave Bottoglia [MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]) just noticed that the flight's transponder code had changed. However, indications point to this occurring around 8:46 (See - 8:46 AM ). The controller asked the aircraft to 'squawk" its proper transponder code - with no response. From 8:52, he made repeated attempts to contact the aircraft, with no response. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] ] He reportedly contacted another controller at 8:53, saying, "We may have a hijack. We have some problems over here right now." [See - Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:53:23, New York Times, 10/16/01, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This version conflicts with earlier versions that NORAD was actually notified at 8:43, that Flight 175 had been hijacked (see 8:43 AM ). It also conflicts with Bottoglia's own version on finding Flight 175 at 8:46; realizing that it was hijacked (see 8:46 AM ).

Between 8:46 - 8:55 AM       When Flight 11 impacted the WTC at 8:46, Bush's motorcade was just crossing the John Ringling Causeway, en route to Booker Elementary, from the Colony Beach & Tennis Resort, located on Longboat Key. [See - Washington Times, 10/8/02]

Sarasota Magazine claimed that President Bush was on Highway 301, just north of Main Street when he was advised that an aircraft had impacted in New York City. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

Around that same time, Eric Draper, a news photographer, was riding with Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. He reportedly heard Fleischer say on a cell phone, "Oh, my God, I don't believe it. An airplane just strike the World Trade Center." Fleischer was reportedly told that he would be needed on arrival to discuss reports of the impact. [See - Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/01, Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02]

Fleischer was reportedly told this "just minutes" after the first news reports. [See - MSNBC, 10/29/02]

Congressman Dan Miller also reportedly stated that he was also told about the impact, just prior to meeting Bush at Booker at 8:55. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

Some of the reporters who were waiting for Bush to arrive also learned of the impact just minutes after it happens. [See - CBS, 9-11/02 (B)]

8:53 AM       In the radar reconstruction, NORAD was just picking up the primary radar returns of the F-15s, launched out of Otis.

8:54 AM       Flight 77 from Washington-Dulles reportedly began to go off course over southern Ohio. It reportedly turned to the southwest. [See - Washington Post 9/12/01; Newsday 9/23/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:55 AM       The head New York Air Traffic Controller notified a local manager that she believed that Flight 175 had been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers, but was told the managers were discussing the hijacking of Flight 11 and refused to be disturbed. Strangely, even though the controller who was managing Flight 175 reportedly said "we may have a hijack" at 8:53, NORAD was still not notified. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This version was according to the 9-11 Commission. However, this version conflicts with the previous versions that NORAD was notified of the Flight 175 hijacking at 8:43 (see 8:43 AM ). The head of the ATC center, Mike McCormick, had already decided at 8:52 that Flight 175 had been hijacked and was also on a suicide run to New York City (See - 8:52 AM ).

8:55 AM       Bush's motorcade arrived at the Booker Elementary school. [See - 8:46, ABC News, 9-11/02, 8:55, Washington Times, 10/7/02, 8:55, Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01, "just before 9:00," Telegraph, 12/16/01, 'shortly before 9:00," Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/10/02, "just before 9:00," New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), 9:00, Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02]

Prior to 8:55 AM       Captain Deborah Loewer, the director of the White House Situation Room, was traveling with the Bush motorcade to the Saratoga elementary school. She received a message from her deputy in the White House Situation Room on the first WTC impact. As soon as the motorcade reached the school, she ran from her car to Bush's car, passing the message to Bush. [See - Catholic Telegraph, 12/7/01, AP, 11/26/01] However, apparently Bush already knew (See - Between 8:46-8:55 AM ).

8:55 AM       A PA was broadcast inside the WTC South Tower, saying that the building was secure and that people can return to their offices. [See - New York Times, 9-11/02]

These announcements continue until a few minutes before the building was struck. No one knows exactly what was exactly stated (although many later recalled the phrase "the building is secure" ); or who gave the authority for that message. [See - USA Today, 9/3/02]

Additionally, security agents inside the building reportedly repeated similar messages. One survivor recounted hearing, "Our building is secure. You can go back to your floor. If you're a little winded, you can get a drink of water or coffee in the cafeteria." [See - New York Times, 9/13/01 (G)]

Despite the messages, approximately two-thirds of the tower's occupants evacuated during the 17 minutes between the attacks. [See - USA Today 12/20/01]

8:55 AM       Barbara Olson, a passenger on American Airlines Flight 77, "allegedly called" her husband, the Solicitor General, Ted Olson at the Justice Department. She reportedly said, ''they have box cutters and knives. They rounded up the passengers at the back of the aircraft.'' She reportedly asked him, "What should I tell the pilot to do?" She was reportedly cut off. Ted reportedly called the Justice Department command center to alert them to the hijacking. Barbara reportedly called back, saying that the aircraft was turning around. She appeared to have been the only person on American Airlines Flight 77 to call someone on the ground. Why was she the only person who "allegedly called" from American Airlines Flight 77?"

SEE:

911 Planes Exceeded Their Software Limits / Cell Phone Calls Could Not Have Been Made

http://www.sianews.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=48

Ghost Riders In The Sky An Alternative 9-11 Scenario

by A. K. Dewdney

http://feralnews.com/issues/911/dewdney/ghost_riders_1-4_1.html



http://feralnews.com/issues/911/dewdney/media_release_030304.html



Operation Pearl

by A. K. Dewdney

http://www.physics911.org/911/index.php/articles/2

8:56 AM       Flight 77's transponder was turned off. [See - 8:56, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:56, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 'six minutes before" Flight 175 strike WTC, Newsday, 9/23/01]

According to the 9-11 Commission, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controller in charge of the flight had seen it go off course and head southwest before the signal disappeared. He looked for a primary radar signal along the projected flight path, as well as in the airspace where it first had started to turn. He reportedly couldn't find the aircraft. He reportedly tried contacting American Airlines, but got no answer. The controller reportedly had not been informed of the other hijacked aircraft. He reportedly assumed Flight 77 had experienced electrical or mechanical failure. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The New York Times recounted the controller's attempts, " "American 77, Indy," "American 77, Indy, radio check. How do you read?" By 8:56 AM, it was evident that Flight 77 was lost." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

This version adds to the bizarre. Another flight with three indications of a hijacking – with totally inappropriate response. In this case it borders on ludicrous that any controller in the country would not have heard of the WTC strikes. Few Americans didn't know of the WTC strikes, within minutes.

Flight 77 was off course with its radio and transponder inoperative. Once again, NORAD was supposedly not notified, even though an attempt was made to notify American Airlines headquarters (See - Before 9:00 AM ); the Pentagon's NMCC was apparently notified, as well (See - After 8:50 AM ). Other centers were notified of the Flight 11 hijacking over twenty minutes earlier (see 8:25 AM ).

Beyond the assigned controller, a supervisor should have been notified. That supervisor should have been aware of the hijack potential; prepared to follow protocol. The same protocol violation in different centers is off-scale for the element of probability.

Following 8:56 AM       The New York Times reported, 'during the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 [was] under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in [the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (see )] [were] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do." [See - New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

8:57 AM       The FAA formally notified the military that American Airlines Flight 11 had impacted into the WTC. Until that notification, the two F-15's from Otis did not know that the aircraft had impacted - however at 8:47 AM, NORAD had been notified. Why could it take over 10 minutes to inform the F-15's of this, with United Airlines Flight 175 now headed directly for New York City?

CNN coverage was just beginning to appear of the burning tower shortly after the impact. NORAD would appeal for an understanding, pleading "fog" and "friction" of war. NORAD, by implication, needs to have someone watching the newswires, as well as the radar scopes.

8:58 AM       Brian Sweeney, on United Flight 175 reportedly called his wife but can only leave a message. "We've been hijacked, and it doesn't look too good." Next, he called his mother; to tell her what was happening onboard. [See - Hyannis News, 9/13/01, Washington Post, 9/21/01]

She recalled him saying, "They might come back here. I might have to go. We were going to try to do something about this." She also recalled him identifying the hijackers as Middle Eastern. The 9-11 Commission later concluded that the Flight 175 passengers planned to storm the cockpit but didn't have time before the aircraft impacted. [See - CNN 3/10/04; New York Daily News 3/9/04]

Following 9:00 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, shortly after 9:00, the Indianapolis ATC Center started notifying other government agencies that American 77 was missing, possibly having impacted. At 9:08, Indianapolis reportedly contacted the Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, advising them to look out for a downed aircraft. They also reportedly contacted the West Virginia State Police, asking whether or not they have any reports of a downed aircraft. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

With three indications of a hijacking, against the immediate WTC history, the ATC version is absurd, nigh unto criminal; factual, or otherwise.

9:00 AM       Richard Clarke was reportedly at a conference three blocks from the White House when he was alerted to the crisis, by phone. He ran to his car, ordering, "Activate the CSG on secure video. I'll be there in less than five." The CSG was the Counterterrorism Security Group, comprised of the leaders of the government's counterterrorism and security agencies. Clarke hurriedly drove to the White House.

Between 8:55 and 9:00 AM       Just after the WTC impact, the pagers of the politicians' aides were sounding en masse, with the news of the first WTC impact. Bush was just entering Booker Elementary School, in Florida. According to reports, Karl Rove rushed up, took Bush aside, and told him about the calamity. Rove reportedly stated that the cause of the impact was unclear. Bush reportedly replied, "What a horrible accident!" Bush also suggested the pilot may have had a heart attack. [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02]

Dan Bartlett, the White House Communications Director, also stated that he was present when Bush was told: "[Bush] being a former pilot, had kind of the same reaction, going, was it bad weather? And I said no, apparently not." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

One version explicitly stated that Rove told Bush that the WTC had been struck by a large commercial airliner. [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Bush later remembered Rove saying that it appeared to be an accident involving a small, twin-engine aircraft. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

In yet a later recollection, Bush recalled that it was chief of staff Andrew Card who first told him, saying, " "Here's what you're going to be doing; you're going to meet so-and-so, such-and-such." And Andy Card said, "By the way, an aircraft flew into the World Trade Center." " [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02]

Prior to 9:00 AM       The fire department commanders at the WTC Tower No. 1 advised the Port Authority police and the building personnel to evacuate Tower No. 2. There is no evidence that the advice was effectively communicated to those personnel in Tower No. 2. When Tower No. 2 did make the announcement to evacuate - 9:02 (one minute before it was impacted), the message was ambiguous advice, stating that everyone may wish to start an orderly evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 5/19/04]

8:59 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 supposedly completed a180 degree turn over southern Ohio / northeastern Kentucky; starting directly back to Washington D.C. , 330 miles away.

9:00 AM       United Airlines systems operations issued a system-wide warning to its pilots, citing a potential "cockpit intrusion." United Airlines Flight 93, flying over Pennsylvania replied "Confirmed."

9:00 AM       The last radar contact on United Airlines Flight 175 was observed at an altitude of 18,000 feet, descending, at a ground speed of 480 knots.

9:00 AM       The FAA began contacting all airliners, warning them of the hijackings.

9:00 AM       The Pentagon moved its alert status up one notch from "normal" to Alpha. It stayed on Alpha until after the American Airlines Flight 77 purportedly struck the Pentagon.

9:00 AM       (B) The National Reconnaissance Office had planned a simulation of an aircraft accidentally impacting into its headquarters, located four miles from the Washington -Dulles airport. The NRO was described as "operating many of the nation's spy satellites; drawing its personnel from the military and the CIA." The simulation was run by John Fulton "and his team at the CIA." An agency spokesman claimed, "It was just an incredible coincidence that this happened to involve an aircraft impacting into our facility. As soon as the real world events began, we canceled the exercise." [See - AP 8/21/02; UPI 8/22/02]

9:00 AM       National Security Advisor Rice later claimed that she was in her White House office when she heard about the first WTC impact, just prior to 9:00. She recalled, "I thought to myself, what an odd accident." She reportedly spoke to Bush at 9:00 on the telephone; telling him that a twin-engine aircraft had struck the WTC tower. She reportedly said, "That's all we know right now, Mr. President." Despite her position as National Security Advisor, she seems to have been oblivious that NORAD knew that there were at least two hijackings in progress for over 15 minutes. She continued her national security staff meeting (See - After 9:03 AM ). [See - Newsweek 12/31/01]

9:00 AM       The NORAD headquarters in Colorado, was at "full "battle staff" levels for a major annual exercise, which was designed to test every facet of the organization. The exercise was named "Operation Northern Vigilance." The exercise had begun two days earlier, deploying fighters to Alaska and Northern Canada to monitor a factual Russian air force exercise in the Russian arctic. Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek was one hour into his shift, overseeing the Colorado command center, when he learned that the FAA believed there was a hijacking in progress, asking NORAD for support. "Northern Vigilance" was called off. As the Toronto Star reports, "Any simulated information, known as an "inject," was purged from the [radar] screens." [See - NORAD, 9/9/01, ]

The "inject" was digitally simulated radar 'display" data, added to the "normal" displays. This data would ordinarily be used to simulate targets for the participating fighters to intercept.

Thus, many minutes into the factual 9-11 attack, there could have been false radar blips causing confusion. However, that data would have been programmed, allowing for later isolation of the factual data. (Not seen to the present day.) According to Jellinek, the cancellation of Northern Vigilance came just a minute or two prior to the second WTC impact at 9:03. The Russians, having also observed the second WTC impact on television, quickly communicated that they were canceling their Russian arctic exercises. [See - National Post 10/19/02]

It is interesting to note the role of public television, amidst the crisis of the day.

Most overlook another bizarre circumstance; a Canadian, Major General Eric Findley, was supposedly in charge of NORAD that day. He reportedly had his staff immediately order as many U.S. fighters into the air as possible. [See - Ottawa Citizen, 9-11/02] Two Canadians had charge of NORAD. Nowhere is there a suggestion of an American officer jumping in, to assume "American" control. Why would a Canadian be left at the helm of American defenses?

Between 8:55 - 9:00 AM       Just after Bush arrived at the Booker Elementary School, having been briefly told of the WTC impact, he was reportedly taken into a holding room; updated on the situation via telephone by National Security Advisor Rice. [See - Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/01, Time, 9/12/01]

Rice later claimed, "He said, what a terrible, it sounds like a terrible accident. Keep me informed." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

The school principal, Gwen Tose-Rigell, was summoned into a room to talk with the President: "He said a commercial aircraft has struck the World Trade Center, and we're going to go ahead and go on, we're going on to do the reading thing anyway." [See - AP, 8/19/02 (D)]

That briefing also gave him every avenue needed to leave, then or later. At a minimum – given the "93 bombing history - he should have delayed the event, to speak with