Our group's mission was to land on the beach, link up with the other groups and move toward the middle of the island [where] we were to link up and surround a compound believed to hold the captured Mayaguez crew," explained Dale L. Clark, a Marine fire team leader during the Koh Tang assault "We were told to expect the operation to be easy and with a quick withdrawal," Clark said. "We were told not to `lock and load' our weapons until told to do so because combat was not expected I saw the KR open up on the first four helicopters that attempted to land. I saw an aircraft gun emplacement near the edge of the island. I also saw a lot of smoke coming from a tree line we flew over ... from rifles being fired at the helicopters. I remember hugging the bottom of the helicopter as we began evasive maneuvers to get out of the kill zone. I looked up and saw fuel spraying all over the inside of the front of the helicopter. I could not believe what I was seeing." Being told not to expect resistance and having the opposite experience ... tells me it was an intelligence disaster," he said. Lots of the guys were fresh out of boot-camp or like myself had just been in about a year," recalled Koh Tang survivor Larry Barnett. I guess a fair general term to describe our company was `greenhorns "The intelligence that [the US military] had on the island was good ... but it did not make its way into the proper hands," Barnett explained. "Our company commander and company gunnery sergeant received a photo of the island's gun emplacements and bunkers the night before [the assault] ... but elected not to tell the troops for fear of making us more nervous than we already were."


  1) YOUR PICTURE OF THE CRASH CH-53 LOOKS LIKE THE ONE THAT HAD CRASH LAND ON CAMBODIA MAINLAND
  2)  3 CHOPPERS ONLY MADE IT,TO KOHTANG ON FIRST WAVE-#1 EASTSIDE REAL HOT LZ HIT WITH 1 OR 2 RPG --16 MARINES AND CHOPPER CREW MAKE IT THEY WERE TRAP ALL IN SAME AREA-EAST SIDE LZ UNTIL AROUND 1600 HOURS-CHOPPER #2 MADE HARD LANDING ON WESTERN -LZ AREA BUT CHOPPERS LOST A FUEL LINE BUT WAS ABLE TO TAKE OFF, #3CHOPPER TRIED WESTERN LZ , BUT TOO HOT- ABORT WHEN SOUTH ABOUT 1200 TO 1300 METERS BEFORE LANDING AGAIN HOT LZ WITH ALOT OF SMALL ARM FIRE AN 1 RPG THAT MISS THE CHOPPER- I WAS ON THAT CHOPPER WITH COL. AUSTIN AND 81 MORTAR CREW AND A CAPT. BARRY L CASSIDY-AIR CONTROLLER OFFICER-I WAS HIS RADIOMAN FROM 3RD SHORE PARTY UNIT. WE HAD TO MAKE ARE WAY NORTH TO THE WESTERN LZ ZONE
  3)  DEPARTING IS NOT CORRECTED LT. DAVIS AND NO ONE ELSE WALK THE LZ ITS WAS TO DARK TOO MUCH ENEMY FIRE COMING IN-WE TOLD THE CHOPPER CREW THAT MORE MARINES WERE ON THE ISLAND.AND ALSO COL AUSTIN THAT NIGHT THAT MORE MARINES WERE LEFT BEHIND ALIVE.
WE SHOULD HAD BEEN RE-SUPPLY AND STAY THE NIGHT ,-WE HAD ENOUGH AIR FIRE POWER, BUT FOR POLITICAL REASONS THEY    WOULD NOT LETS US STAY, I FEEL IF WE STAY THERE WOULD ME NO MIA ,S COUNT OR LIVE MARINES LEFT BEHIND ENEMY LINES.
  4     )PLEASE LISTEN TO THIS AUDIO AND VIDEO TAPE DONE BY CBS-
  5)    KNOW WHAT IS FUNNY IS THAT THE SHIP AND CREW WHERE NOT EVEN ON KOH TANG INLAND
SEMPRE-FI
JERRY  
 
CBS NEWS
   

wikipedia has more here

By Phelim Kyne and Chea Sotheacheath
TAIPEI TIMES CORRESPONDENT IN PHNOM PENH


The otherwise routine voyage of the Sealand container ship Maya-guez to the Thai port of Sattahip was brought to an abrupt halt on the afternoon of May 12, 1975, by a pair of Khmer Rouge patrol boats and their heavily-armed crews.
Accused of violating Cambodian territorial waters, the ship and its 39 member crew were diverted toward the nearby island of Koh Tang.
Coming just 12 days after America's humiliating retreat from Vietnam, the hostage-taking became the focus of American government efforts to salvage a superpower reputation tarnished by the recent twin Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam.
"The National Security Council was convened and [then-US Secretary of State] Kissinger argued that much more was at stake than the seizure of an American ship ... [that] American credibility was more involved than ever," the British journalist William Shawcross wrote in his 1979 book Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia. "Throughout the crisis the Secretary insisted that for domestic and international reasons, and particularly to impress the North Koreans, the US must use force."
Although the Mayaguez crew was transferred by fishing boat to the port of Sihanoukville on the afternoon of May 13, American military intelligence believed that at least half the crew remained on Koh Tang and plans were laid for a rescue attempt by American Marines based in Thailand.
The plan went quickly wrong.
The KR vessel carrying the Mayageuz crew to Sihanoukville was repeatedly strafed and tear-gassed by American planes unsuccessfully seeking to force the craft back to Koh Tang.
A group of the Mayaguez crew later unsuccessfully tried suing the US government for chronic health problems incurred as a result of those aerial attacks.
On the evening of May 14, 23 US servicemen became the Mayaguez Incident's first fatalities after their helicopter crashed en route from Thailand's Nakhon Phanom airbase to the operation's departure point of U Tapao air base.
A US government memorial unveiled in Phnom Penh in 1995 by visiting American Senator John McCain makes no mention of those men.
At dawn on May 15, 170 Marines in eight Knife and Jolly Green Giant helicopters approached Koh Tang in the first stage of a rescue attempt in which little or no resistance was expected from what American military intelligence had described as an opposition force of 35-40 KR "irregulars."
Instead, they entered a firestorm orchestrated by a well-armed and well dug-in platoon of battle-hardened veterans of the April 17 "liberation" of Phnom Penh, who brought their newly-acquired American guns and ammunition confiscated from losing Lon Nol forces to bear on the invading force.
Within minutes, three helicopters had been shot down and for the next 24 hours US forces fought for their lives in a battle that eventually killed 16 KR combatants and additional 18 American servicemen, their remains the focus of intensive searches by US government MIA retrieval teams on Koh Tang that continue to this day.
In a bitter irony unknown to the Marines on Koh Tang until after their harrowing escape back to the US aircraft carrier Coral Sea on the morning of May 16, the crew of the Mayageuz had been released by their captors onto a Thai fishing boat several hours before the attack had commenced.
At 10:08am on May 15, while US helicopter gunships perforated with small arms fire struggled to land reinforcements and evacuate wounded personnel from Koh Tang, the crew of the Mayaguez was picked up by the US navy in the Gulf of Thailand.
As Shawcross noted in Sideshow, US President Ford was quick to describe the Mayaguez mission as a success in that "...it did not only ignite confidence in the White House ... it had an electrifying reaction as far as the American people were concerned. It was a spark that set off a whole new sense of confidence for them, too."
Calculating the costs of the battle -- 41 dead servicemen in return for the safe return of 39 American seamen and the loss of life and property of Cambodians unaware of their position in American foreign and domestic policy objectives, Shawcross is unequivocal in his condemnation of Ford's upbeat assessment of the results of the Mayageuz Incident.
"In the attacks on [Sihanoukville] the railroad yard, the port, the oil refinery and the airfield were virtually destroyed. At Ream naval base, 364 buildings were flattened. Nine Cambodian vessels were sunk at sea. In order to rescue the Marines on Koh Tang, the island was heavily bombarded ... [ignoring] the August 1973 ban on bombing Indochina as well as the 1973 War Powers Act. The principal purpose of the bombing seem to have been to punish the Cambodians and to reassert a concept of American bellicosity, which the collapse of Phnom Penh and Saigon was seen to have damaged."
Even more disturbingly, the battalion commander of the Khmer Rouge forces on Koh Tang admitted during an interview with the Taipei Times last week that, contrary to long held Pentagon assertions to the contrary, American servicemen had been abandoned on Koh Tang during the confusion of their withdrawal.
"Ten days after the American soldiers left Koh Tang, a tree-cutting detail sighted a figure taking water from a well," Mao Run told the Taipei Times. "When they investigated, they found boot marks which we knew had to belong to an American soldier because our men only wore sandals."
According to Run, the abandoned American Marine was found and executed shortly after.
Run's admission 25 years after the fact adds credence to the belief held by many Marines who participated in the Koh Tang operation of a "lost machine-gun team" inadvertently left behind on the island.?
"We were told on the US Coral Sea that a machine-gun team was killed by the KR as we withdrew from the island, but years later I suspect that they were left behind," Koh Tang marine veteran Dale L. Clark told the Taipei Times. "I believe the US government knew the team was alive on the island because I heard and saw preparations made on the USS Coral Sea to return to the island, [but] no attempts were made to travel back to the island for their recovery ... I suspect the US government canceled the plans not wanting to have any more Marines killed during the recovery."
Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Childress, Public Affairs Officer of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting for MIAs in Hawaii was unaware of Run's allegations, but assured the Taipei Times that MIA investigators were still pursuing rumors that US Marines had been left behind on Koh Tang.
"The case of the three-man machine-gun team is still under investigation," Childress said. "There are still places to investigate and places to be excavated [for MIA remains on Koh Tang]."

http://www.taipeitimes.com/


Mao Run, platoon commander of the KR forces on Koh Tang. Dispatched to the island the week before in advance of an expected Vietnamese invasion, a landing by US Marines was the last thing on his mind.
"I met those men [from the Mayageuz] and we were friendly and kind to them ... I had no idea they would be the cause of fighting between Cambodia and America," the disabled veteran explained from his rural village in southern Cambodia. "I think the Americans attacked us out of revenge because they had lost the war and they used [the Mayageuz Incident] as an excuse."
While post-battle American estimates of the size of the KR force on Koh Tang range as high as 200 men, Run insists there were no more than forty fighters on the island during the operation.
"We had 40 men, but only 20 men took part in most of the fighting," he said. "But those American troops were not professionals like the Khmer Rouge ... they spoke loudly, laughed and smoked so it was easy to monitor their movements."
In the air above Run and his fellow KR defenders, American planes and AC-130 Specter gunships subjected their positions to withering cover fire that continued uninterrupted throughout the operation. At the height of the fighting the KR positions were targeted with a 15,000 pound BLU-82 cluster bomb, at the time the biggest non-nuclear weapon in the US arsenal, carving out a huge crater still clearly visible on the island 25 years later.
"We lost six men on the island, and another ten when their boats were sunk when approaching Koh Tang," Run recalled. "But many, many more people were killed by bombs in [Sihanoukville].
While Clark and Barnett both express interest in someday meeting with Run and his fellow Koh Tang defenders in an effort "to bring closure" to the painful lingering memories of the battle, Run makes it clear that any such reunion is unlikely.
"[Koh Tang] was just like a training exercise ... the real battle and the real victory was the liberation of Phnom Penh on April 17," he said. "People say now that the Khmer Rouge killed one million people [between 1975-1979] but another million people must have been killed by American B-52 attacks on Cambodia ... I saw whole villages destroyed by B-52s and I'll never forget that."
URL=[http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/05/15/story/000003]


Back