Why Camp David Failed, I
Palestinian Intrasigence
by Arthur Bierman

Introduction:

On July 11, 2000 President Clinton, Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Barak met at Camp David to initiate, and - it was hoped - complete, the Permanent Status negotiations of the Oslo Peace process. Three major issues had to be resolved : The borders of the anticipated Palestinian state, the status of East Jerusalem and the long standing problem of Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

Despite Clinton's sustained efforts the summit failed to achieve its objective and adjourned without agreement on July 25. Negotiations continued for another six months, but prospects for a peaceful resolution diminished greatly with the outbreak of Intifada II in early October. The last negotiations were held at Taba at the end of January 2001 but were again unsuccessful. Barak's defeat by Sharon in Israel's February 2001 elections can be said to mark the end of the Oslo Peace process.

We all know what has happened since collapse of the permanent status negotiations -- more than two thousand dead, many more thousands wounded, a large amount of property destroyed, and, perhaps most distressing, the eruption of the most vitriolic intercommunal hatred. Not surprisingly, each side has blamed the other for Oslo's failure. Thus Prime Minister Barak, upon returning from Camp David, regretfully stated that "we did not find a partner prepared to make decisions on all issues. We did not succeed because our Palestinian neighbors have not yet internalized the fact that in order to achieve peace, each side has to give up some of their dreams; to give, not only to demand." (1) This judgment was reinforced by Clinton's July 27 interview on Israeli TV where he combined lavish praise for Barak's performance with barely concealed criticism of Arafat. (2)

These reports were soon countered by Faisal Husseini who had headed Arafat's Jerusalem negotiating team. (3) Interviewed by Israeli journalist Amira Hass, he argued that while "world public opinion ....is stuck on the perception of far reaching Israeli generosity at Camp David", Barak's proposals, far from offering a generous compromise, would have perpetuated Israeli control over the Palestinians. Specifically, he claimed that the Israeli solution for Jerusalem would have split the new state of Palestine into three "cantons, with their links being always at the mercies of Israel, the IDF and the settlers". And a few weeks later, Yasir Abd-Rabbuh, minister of culture and information charged Barak with trying to "replace the independent state (of Palestine) with a form of protectorate and ....eliminating our national identity and character." (4)

In the summer of 2001 two members of the U.S. Camp David team began to air their versions of the summit. Thus, Robert Malley published an article which blamed both sides for the collapse of the negotiations. (5) And less than a month later, Malley's revelations were challenged by Dennis Ross, who had been Clinton's top Middle East assistant and very much shared the President's views about the Camp David events.(6) We can therefore identify three major explanations which can be summarized by the following propositions:

(a) Barak (and Clinton) had made Arafat a number of reasonable (and, according to some, even exceedingly generous) offers which the Palestinian leader had intransigently rejected and, most dishearteningly, rejected without even deigning to make a counteroffer. Explanations for Arafat's "passive" behavior ranged from the political — he was unwilling to accept Israel's legitimate existence — to the psychological — given his historic role as revolutionary warrior, he was unable to truly terminate the conflict. (7) It follows in either case that Arafat was solely responsible for the Camp David fiasco and should therefore be replaced by another Palestinian leader more inclined to be a genuine peace partner to the Israeli government.

(b) Barak's offer had not been quite as generous as claimed by his supporters. In the words of Robert Malley, it had not been a "dream offer". Malley also argued that all parties had made numerous errors, both before and during the summit -- errors which had aroused unnecessary suspicions and hostilities and had contributed to dooming the summit to failure. Thus, while granting that Arafat had made no counteroffers, Malley noted that the Palestinians had been greatly offended by Barak's refusal to implement some of Oslo's prior commitments, also by his 1999 decision to first pursue the Syrian track, and finally, by his subsequent insistence upon convening the summit despite Arafat's demands for more preparations. Most importantly, Malley denied that Arafat had been unwilling to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute in a reasonable manner. This second account has no real culprits -- both parties are seen as equally guilty and hence also as equally innocent.

(c)The third account argues that Barak's offer had not only NOT been a "dream offer" but had actually been intended to perpetuate Israeli domination by creating a cantonized Palestinian mini-state totally subservient to Israel. Given this severe judgment of Israeli intentions, Arafat was therefore fully justified in rejecting the Israeli proposals. (8)

It is clearly of more than academic interest which of these explanations is accepted. So we ask: What really did happen during the permanent stage negotiations - and, since Camp David played such a large role in these proceedings - what really did happen during that fateful July summit in Maryland? To answer this question -- not as a partisan of one side or the other but with a sincere commitment to objective inquiry -- is not an easy task; and not only because of one's unavoidable bias but also because the summiteers produced no transcripts of their proceedings. This means that there exist no documents which contain the texts of Barak's offers, Arafat's responses or Clinton's mediation efforts. All that we have are reports by some of the participants, a few produced during the summit but most of them afterwards, summarizing what had presumably been said, offered, modified, retracted or rejected. It is an unsatisfactory situation for anyone interested in the truth, but unhappily, that is all that is available.

Given the absence of crucial documents, one would think it difficult to determine what really happened at Camp David. In fact, I have come to the surprising conclusion -certainly surprising to me, and, I suspect, surprising also to many readers - that while some features of the negotiations can indeed be known only incompletely, the cause of the summit's failure can be established with reasonable certainty by a careful examination of Palestinian accounts. And what follows from this evidence, interestingly enough, is that it was Arafat's intransigence, or, if you prefer, Arafat's steadfastness, which led to the collapse of Camp David.

To prove my claim I shall first present the Palestinian position as enunciated by leading Palestinian officials before, during and immediately after the summit. I will then indicate how this position, when rigidly defended, could not but guarantee the failure of the permanent status negotiations. Now, I could have stopped at this point - but since other commentators have offered very different, and quite contrary, explanations, I thought it desirable to demonstrate their inadequacy by subjecting them to a critical examination. This first part of my study will therefore offer my explanation for the summit's failure, while contrary explanations will be discussed in Part II of this article.

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A summary of the Palestinian account of Camp David

Let me begin with an interview of Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, who was secretary general of the PLO's Executive Committee and member of the Palestinian delegation at Camp David. The July 28, 2001 article containing the interview opens with Abu Mazen recounting the Palestinian mindset shortly before the summit: (9)

"We traveled to Washington several times and presented our position to the American side; the essence of which was the implementation of 242, 338 and 194.... From that moment on both the Americans and the Israelis attempted to get concessions from us. We made clear to the American and Israeli sides several times that the Palestinian side is unable to make concessions on anything, since this is the minimum that it is willing to accept, and because the Palestinians had taken the difficult decision when they recognized Resolutions 242 and 338 in 1988...and will not agree to anything short of Resolution 242, and 338 together with Resolution 194..." (10)

Prime Minister Barak was also informed of the Palestinian position:

"I told him (Barak) that if you have illusions that the Palestinian side can make concessions on land, borders, settlements, Jerusalem, or on refugees, you are day dreaming, since the official, real, and rational Palestinian position is what I tell you: 'We demand a return to the 1967 borders; in full.' If there is a need to make minor adjustments and [land] swaps that are equal in value and size then we will be ready to discuss it. We cannot agree to settlements on our land. We want Israel to recognize its responsibility for the refugee problem and for the right of return, and following that we will agree on ways to implement this right. Regarding Jerusalem, it is clear that East Jerusalem should return to us, and that West Jerusalem will be an open city........This is our position, and you should absolutely ignore anything else"

In other words, the Palestinians had approached the summit determined to gain a well defined "minimum settlement" which was based upon three United Nations resolutions, numbers 242, 338 and 194. But they soon discovered in their pre-summit negotiations that neither the Israelis nor even the Americans, were prepared to accept such a "minimum settlement". Believing that this doomed the negotiations to failure, the Palestinian tried to delay the summit by demanding time for additional preparations. However, both Clinton and Barak insisted upon holding the summit before the upcoming American electoral campaign, and Arafat found it difficult to refuse their invitation. Abu Mazen explained this predicament.

"When we asked: 'What about the preparations?' They [Israelis] replied: 'The preparations can be done in two or three days.'""So there were reasons for our hesitation since we clearly knew that the failure of this summit is certain, and that it is impossible to reach a resolution for an issue that has been ongoing for a whole century in one, two or three weeks… We knew all that, however,to prevent him (Barak) from claiming that the Palestinians refuse to enter negotiations or that the Palestinians are afraid of the summit, we [agreed to] enter this summit and to go through with this experience. "

So the Palestinians went to Camp David, pessimistic about its prospects but also determined not to compromise their "minimum settlement" -- and, once there, did precisely that.

" We did not yield to any pressure put on us since what was offered to us did not fit at all to the minimum of the Palestinian aspirations."

But this Palestinian position guaranteed the summit's failure since Arafat's "minimum settlement" contained two provisions, on Jerusalem and on refugees, which rendered it unacceptable to any Israeli government: By insisting upon returning ALL of East Jerusalem, including the Western Wall, Judaism's most sacred site, to Arab hands, it not only offended Jewish religious sensibilities but denied also the Jewish people's historic connection to the Holy Land. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, by demanding the Right of Return of three to four million Palestinian refugees it endangered the Jewish character of Israel, if not immediately, then within a few generations. (This follows from the fact that Israel's population consists of five million Jews and over one million Israeli Arabs. Given the significantly higher Palestinian rate of population increase, the Jews would soon have found themselves a minority in their own country. )

How accurate is Abu Mazen's account? In the remaining sections we shall present substantiating evidence.

The campaign supporting the Right of Return of Refugees.

In January 2000, the Palestinian leadership launched a world wide campaign to gain support for the Right of Return of Refugees. As already noted, this Right was justified by pointing to UN General Assembly resolution 194, which asserted the right of all refugees who so wished to return to their homeland and receive compensation. " It was a development which surprised, and alarmed, many observers who had been hoping for a successful completion of the Oslo Peace process. Let me explain:

After seven difficult years the Oslo Peace process seemed finally to be heading towards the prescribed Permanent Status negotiations which would settle, among other issues, the fate of between three and four million Palestinian refugees. This was probably the most contentious issue dividing the two parties, since, unlike its territorial demands, the Palestinian insistence upon the right of return of all who so desired, posed an existential threat to Israel's very survival. Arafat's decision, therefore, to launch such a campaign at this delicate moment raised fears that he was not really interested in achieving a peaceful resolution of the century long Arab-Israeli dispute.

Let me list some major events of this global campaign:

— At the end of 1999 the Palestinian leadership created a new organization, the International Observatory for Palestinian Affairs, which soon launched " a campaign of information, meetings, international contacts and liaisons.." intended to guarantee the inclusion of the refugees issue in the up and coming Permanent Status Negotiations.

— On April 8, 2000 a First Right of Return Conference in the U.S. was held in Boston, and was attended by more than one thousand supporters, including such well known Palestinian sympathizers as Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Ilan Pappe, Alain Gresh, and Robert Fisk. The Conference decided to marshal global support for the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

— On April 21, 2000 the Council For Palestinian Restitution and Repatriation held a news briefing at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. to publicize the right of return movement.

— On April 26, 2000 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People convened a conference at UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Yasir Arafat was the keynote speaker. Its purpose? To marshal support for the Palestinian effort.

— On May 30, 2000, the Britain based "Palestine Right of Return Coalition" announced that it planned to organize a march and rally on September 16 in London to implement the above mentioned right.

The Palestinian mindset prior to Camp David:

By March 2000, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, initiated at the end of 1999, had clearly failed, and Barak resumed his active pursuit of Permanent Status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Intent upon completing the Oslo process during the Clinton administration, he began a campaign to persuade Clinton to convene a tripartite summit by the middle of May. At this point, however, the Palestinian leadership began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of such a meeting and tried to postpone its implementation by arguing that it needed more time to prepare for the negotiations. Bowing to Arafat's objections, but painfully aware of the short time left to his Presidency and pressured by Barak to convene a summit before the fall election campaign, Clinton postponed the meeting from May only to July 11.

During those early months of 2000, Palestinian newspapers published a number of articles presenting the Palestinian attitude towards Israel and the Palestinian vision of a final peace settlement:

-- On February 26, 2000, Hani al-Masri, Director General of Publications at the Palestinian Ministry of Information, published an article in the Ramallah Al-Ayyam which began as an extended commentary on a speech by David Levi, Israel's foreign minister, warning Lebanon that Israel would retaliate, "blood for blood, soul for soul, and child for child", if Lebanon's Hizbollah attacked northern Israel. (11) Al-Masri called Levi's threat an "aggressive and racist statement" and then proceeded to the following description of Israel:

"From the start, Israel was founded on a racist, barbaric and bloody policy. The cornerstone of this policy is the Zionist theory "a land without people to a people without land". From the beginning and throughout the whole past century, the Zionist gang exerted all their efforts to realize this theory with fire, blood, wars and massacres starting with the massacre in Dayr Yasin and al-Tanturah and ending with the Hebron massacre. (12) The purpose was to annihilate the Palestinian people and disperse them from their homeland to the diaspora. "

He then listed the following requirements for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

"Israel must recognize the existence of the Palestinian people and their national political rights, including their rights to self determination and establishment of their sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Israel must solve the refugee problem in a just manner that would allow those who want to return and be compensated or to compensate those who choose not to return."

In late March 2000, Ahmad Quray, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and member of the Fatah Movement's Central Committee, expressed very similar sentiments:(13)

"We eventually accepted a historical bargaining according to which we conceded three fourths of the land and agreed to a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital. We, however, are not ready to again bargain over this bargaining. ..."

He then proceeded to spell out his vision of the ultimate outcome of such negotiations:

"..... it is impossible to normalize relations with Israel unless negotiations on the Palestinian track reach their final destination and unless a free, independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty over the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 is established, and unless the refugee issue is resolved in a just way that secures the refugees' right to return to their homeland and property in accordance with Resolution 194."

On May 22, 2000, Colonel Muhammad Dahlan held a news conference where he spelled out the "three red lines to which the (Palestinian) negotiating delegation adheres, namely, the return to the 1967 borders, considering east Jerusalem a capital of the Palestinian state, and ensuring and guaranteeing the individual, collective and political right of the Palestinian refugees." (14)

On May 28, 2000 Abu Mazen outlined the main Palestinian negotiating position to a Gaza conference. (15) It contained the following crucial items:

"International Resolutions must be fully implemented: U.N Resolutions 242, 338, 194, 465, and all other related resolutions. "....

"By accepting the above-mentioned international resolutions, the Palestinian people made their decisive and also painful historic compromise. Therefore, such acceptance is regarded from a Palestinian prospective as the minimum requirements for a solution. In no circumstance will the Palestinians accept less than the international legitimacy.".....

"Settlement in Palestinian territories is illegal in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Lahai Treaty, and at least 15 other Security Council Resolutions, most noted, Resolution 465 that considers settlements as illegal, and the annexation of Jerusalem also as illegal. Israel therefore must vacate all settlements and reimburse our people for the use of their land and resources for over a 30-year period. "...

"In regard to refugees, there is no choice but to recognize the right of return for all refugees. Their right to return to their homes from which they were uprooted, meaning inside Israel and not to return to any other location. They are also entitled to compensation. Returnees are also included in the compensation as a result of the use of their properties for nearly half a century in addition to compensation for all the hardships they endured during this period. Countries hosting Palestinian refugees are also entitled to compensation. These countries include Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine."

"We cannot even discuss return of the refugees to the territories under the rule of the Palestinian Authority (PNA) since these refugees were not uprooted from homes inside the PNA territories; they were uprooted from their homes that fall now under the control of Israel."

These statements confirm Abu Mazen's description of the Palestinian mindset prior to Camp David.

The Palestinian description of the summit proceedings, July 11 - July 25, 2000

Due to an agreed upon news black out, little information emerged from Camp David except for some brief reports by the three parties. The Palestinian delegation distributed a daily bulletin through the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department. They were brief and uninformative until July 18, when that day's bulletin announced that "Jerusalem is the main sticking point." (16) This same message, stressing the difficulty encountered by the Jerusalem negotiators, was reiterated in the bulletins of July 19, 20, 22,23 and 24. Finally, the July 25 bulletin reported that though "no agreement has been reached on any issues, the deal maker or breaker remains Jerusalem. Israel ...insists on keeping the city under occupation while allowing for Palestinian administration of the Muslim and Christian quarters in the Old City and Palestinian administrative rule in parts of Jerusalem that are far from the Old City such as Hanina and Shufat."

The very last Palestinian bulletin, dated July 26, announced the summit's failure and blamed Barak for failing to yield on two issues - Jerusalem and the refugees..

"It was the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to keep East Jerusalem under Israeli occupation and Israel's refusal to accept legal and moral responsibility for turning more than 3 million Palestinians into refugees that brought the summit to an end."

Besides issuing these daily bulletins, one of the negotiators, Hasan al-Kashif, Director General of the Ministry of Information and Culture, transmitted a message to the West Bank which was published in the July 24 issue of the Ramallha Daily Al-Ayyam. The article announced that the negotiations had entered "a decisive stage" with only two possible outcomes — an agreement or a failure "for which Israel will be responsible through its no's." (17) The Palestinian negotiators were described as adhering to "firm principles", but facing "difficult days" which will "witness peak pressure and tough political bargaining." To win this "current political battle at Camp David" , the Palestinian masses, in the "homeland and the diaspora" were assigned two missions:

(a) "..To escalate the popular activity affirming ....the ...national rights to return, liberate the land, secure sovereignty, and declare the establishment of a state with Jerusalem as its capital." This campaign should focus on Jerusalem and the right of return of refugees, and should "take place simultaneously with the issues discussed at Camp David."

(b) ..To launch a national campaign to prepare the people... to defend the State in the event it is declared on 13 September and to snatch the rest of our rights to our land and sovereignty." (18) "Preparing ourselves to face the breakdown of the summit caused by Israel is legitimate. Our preparation will be defensive opposite the aggressive Israeli military preparations now under way."

Al-Kashif called upon each Palestinian household of "storing basic food supplies for several months. Each house has a place to store sacks of wheat, rice, sugar and a quantity of candles and lamps working on gas or kerosene." As to the military requirements, he rejected a strategy of 'fixed positions". Instead , he called upon the Palestinians to return "to our natural instincts as a fighting people that are expert in the art of the intifadah..........Every house in the homeland is open and ready to become a command center."

In other words, two days before the summit ended, at a time when active negotiations were still proceeding, the Palestinian delegation had already begun preparing its people to launch a second Intifada. (19) Apparently forgotten was Arafat's commitment to those provisions of Oslo which prohibited the use of violence in settling disputes between the two parties.

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