WHAT CAUSED INTIFADA II ?
(continued)
by
Arthur Bierman

Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount Plaza:

Given such a Palestinian position, the Oslo negotiations were clearly doomed. Only one thing was lacking -- some dramatic event which would justify a Palestinian withdrawal from the peace process. As it so happened, this was provided General Sharon. On September 25 the Hebrew daily Maariv reported an announcement by Rubi Rivlin, chairman of the Likud Knesset faction, that Sharon and other right-wing MK's intended to tour the Temple Mount on September 28th, "in order to underline Israel's sovereignty of the Temple Mount." (21) The same article also reported some hostile Palestinian reactions. It thus cited an unnamed Palestinian officials who urged Sharon and Olmert to "stay at home;" other officials called it "unnecessarily provocative" and Fatah activists warned that such a visit would not pass quietly and advised the Israeli police to prevent the visit from occurring.

Similar warnings were published in the Arab press. Thus Ramallah's Al-Ayyam reported on September 27th that PLO Executive Committee member Faysal al-Husayni had issued a statement warning Israel of the "serious consequences of Sharon's visit" and claimed that Sharon's attitude "lacked the minimum level of responsibility;" and Palestinian officials in charge of the Mosque noted the "grave dangers inherent in this visit" and called upon the Israeli government to cancel it. (22)

It is interesting to note, however, that, except for Faysal al-Husayni, a well known moderate, no high ranking Palestinian leader publicly warned Barak against Sharon's visit. Thus Arafat, Abu Mazen, Saeb Erakat, Hanan Ashrawi and Abu Ala were all strangely silent between September 25 and 28. (A Palestinian source later asserted that Arafat had urged Barak in a private September 25 meeting to prevent Sharon's visit, but I have seen no confirmation of this claim. But even if true, this would not explain Arafat's failure to issue a public statements condemning Sharon's anticipated visit.)

It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the Palestinian leadership actually welcomed Sharon's visit for providing them with a splendid opportunity to launch their long desired second intifada. What, after all, could be more suitable than an Israeli action which could be interpreted as desecrating a religious icon sacred to the world's 1.2 billion Muslims?

Which still leaves the interesting question as to why Barak had not attempted to prevent Sharon's visit. After all, the Israeli Prime Minister was an astute enough observer of the Palestinian scene to realize its dangers, and, unlike Sharon, was thoroughly committed to Oslo's successful conclusion. When asked some weeks later if he regretted his earlier hands off policy, Barak made three points, none of which answered the question: That the Sharon visit had only been an "excuse" for the outbreak of the intifada, that the Palestinian head of security had agreed to the visit as long as Sharon did not attempt to enter the Mosque, and that the Temple Mount was "in the middle of the Israeli capital". (23) Barak did allow himself the wry comment that Sharon's visit had not been "the most brilliant idea of the month."

I can think of two plausible explanations for Barak's passivity: That he believed it politically impossible to restrict Sharon's movements on Israeli territory and that he believed himself lacking a legal basis for such a prohibition. To understand more fully the political constraints, we must remember that Barak was heading a minority government, commanding only 42 Knesset seats out of a total of 120. He had also been fiercely accused of having been much too amenable to Palestinian demands at Camp David; given the sad outcome of that event, the last thing he needed for his political standing was to appear to submit to Palestinian threats of violence. (Knowing little of Israel's legal system, I have no opinion on the legality of Barak prohibiting Sharon's visit.)

I suspect that Barak thought himself trapped in a true lose-lose situation.

I have already mentioned the strange, and, I believe, revealing silence of the Palestinian leadership. But this did not mean that all Palestinian activists accepted Sharon's visit with folded arms. In particular, the more radical elements of the PLO and of the Tanzim, took the initiative in preparing protests against it. The earliest such effort seemed to have occurred on Tuesday, September 26, when Jerusalem's Fatah Youth organization distributed leaflets urging all students to come to the Temple Mount court two days hence to "bar the extremist racist Ari'el Sharon from entering the gate of the Al-Haram al-Sharif and desecrating it." (24) And on September 27, Marwan Barghouti, head of the Tanzim, began his preparations to protest the Sharon visit. Here is his account as printed in the September 2001 issue of the London based Arabic daily Al-Hayyat:

"I knew that the end of September was the last period (of time) before the explosion, but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada....The night prior to Sharon's visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning, for it was not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram al-Sharif just so, and walk away peacefully. " (25)

How effective were these preparations? According to two independent eyewitnesses, journalists Joel Greenberg of the New York Times and Charles M. Sennott of the Boston Globe, the visit turned out to be a disappointingly low key affair.(26) This conclusion was confirmed by Barghouti himself, who told an interviewer that "we tried to create clashes without success because of the differences of opinion that emerged with others in the al-Aqsa compound at the time..." (27).

Here is what actually happened. Accompanied by a few right-wing Israeli legislators and protected by approximately one thousand police officers and security men, Sharon appeared on the Temple Mount Plaza, walked around the court for about half an hour, listened to explanations by an Israeli archeologist, made a number of soothing comments about Arab-Israeli peaceful coexistence and the right of Israelis to "visit every place in the Land of Israel", and departed, taking his entourage with him.

There were some disturbances during and shortly after the visit. Both Greenberg and Sennott describe Sharon being trailed by Israeli Arab legislators who shouted 'Murderer, get out' and 'Al-Aksa is Palestinian'. One of the legislators, Ahmad Tibi, assailed Sharon for being "a man of blood' and 'not interested in peace' " A few hundred Palestinian youths, shouting "God is great" and "With soul and blood we will redeem you, Al Aqsa", tried to reach Sharon, but were held back by the police. After Sharon left, " dozens of youths hurled stones, chairs and metal objects at the police who responded with rubber coated bullets and riot sticks. At least four Palestinians were later reported to have been treated for injuries. " More than two dozen policemen were also injured, none seriously. Later there were some clashes in the Old City, with some youths hurling stones at police and Israeli vehicles. Total casualties: a few policemen and Palestinians lightly injured -- but nobody was killed or even seriously hurt. As riots went, it had been a mild affair. It should also be noted that only a few hundred young men came to protest Sharon's visit - and this despite the efforts of Barghouti and the Fatah youth movement,. It would seem that the old General, despite his terrible reputation, was unable to draw a large crowd of Arab protesters.

Given this rather pedestrian outcome to the Sharon visit, the Palestinians could easily have ended the whole affair at this point. But such was not Barghouti's intention, nor, as we shall soon see, Arafat's. Thus Barghouti tells us that after the protest he "remained for two hours in the presence of other people, (that) we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities (bilad) and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions." (28)

Barghouti then "prepared a leaflet in the name of the Higher Committee of Fatah .... in which we called for a reaction to what had happened in Jerusalem." And to link the planned confrontation to popular religious sentiments, the leaflet urged Palestinians to rally at the Temple Mount the next day "in defense of the Al-Aksa mosque."

It was at this point that Arafat broke his silence. For the first time since Monday, the Palestinian leader issued a statement, which (retroactively) described Sharon's visit as "very dangerous", and called upon the Islamic world "to move fast" to protect the shrine. (29) Like Barghouti, he did not explain why the Temple Mount shrine needed protection.

Having finally taken a public position on the Sharon incident, Arafat now devoted himself to encouraging a confrontation. He thus authorized The Voice of Palestine, the PA's radio station, to broadcast Barghouti's message urging "all Palestinians to come and defend the al-Aksa mosque." He also ordered the closing of Palestinian schools so that students could be bussed to Jerusalem. (30)

It was also at this same time, on the evening of September 28th, that Arafat received a phone call from an alarmed Secretary of State Albright asking him to calm the volatile situation. We do not know what Arafat told her; however, according to Dennis Ross, the Palestinian leader did nothing "to prevent or contain the violence." (31)

***

We have now reached Friday, September 29, 2000, the day real violence began. Due to Barghouti's and Arafat's efforts an estimated 30,000 worshippers gathered that morning for Friday prayers in the Al-Aqsa Mosque. (32) The service concluded with a sermon by the Mosque's imam, Sheikh Hian Al-Adrisi, which contained the following inflammatory statements:

"It is not a mistake that the Koran warns us of the hatred of the Jews and put them at the top of the list of the enemies of Islam. Today the Jews recruit the world against the Muslims and use all kinds of weapons. They are plundering the dearest place to the Muslims, after Mecca and Medina ...the third holiest city after Mecca and Medina. They want to erect their temple on that place...The Muslims are ready to sacrifice their lives and blood to protect the Islamic nature of Jerusalem and Al-Aksa." (33)

At the end of the sermon, around 1:30 PM, worshippers streamed out onto the plaza and some of the young men began to hurl stones at the police post at the Mohgrabi Gate as well as upon Jewish worshippers who were praying at the base of the Western Wall. The police, who had been assembled below, responded, some by evacuating "screaming (Jewish) men, women and children" from the Western Wall compound, others by storming up the stairs to the plaza where they were met by a barrage of stones. (34). According to the Israeli police, during the first few minutes of this encounter, some 35 officers were injured some of whom had to be hospitalized.(35) The police reacted by first firing into the air with rubber coated bullets, then at the rioters' feet and finally directly at them.

At this point most of the Palestinians retreated into the Mosque where they waited until the disturbances had ended; but a few hundred young men poured from the Plaza into the Old City where shops were overrun and vendors' carts overturned. The clashes between police and rioters continued near the Damascus Gate where rioters hurled stones and Molotov cocktails at the Israeli police who responded with rubber bullets. An empty Israeli ambulance was overturned at the northeast corner of the Old City and hit with a Molotov cocktail which burned it to a smoldering heap of metal.(36) Altogether 5 Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire, an estimated 200 were injured as were 70 Police officers.

It should be noted that while this had been a significantly more serious confrontation than that of the day before, the number of actual rioters had been about the same, namely a few hundred. It is also not unreasonable to speculate that most of these men were Tanzim members who had come to the Temple Mount to create as much violence as possible. In other words, the violence of September 29 had probably not been a spontaneous eruption of popular wrath, but a highly organized affair executed by a fairly small number of activists.

Meanwhile, in the West Bank city of Kalkilya, a Palestinian police officer on joint patrol with his Israeli counterpart opened fire upon his colleague, killing him. And in Ramallah, the Palestinian cabinet met and declared the following day a day of mourning. It was on that day, Saturday,September 30, that demonstrations and riots erupted all over the West Bank and Gaza. Particularly active was the Al-Bireh checkpoint where hundreds of stone throwers, many of them children, confronted Israeli forces. (37) That day's clashes resulted in 6 Palestinian dead, 4 of them minors, and 550 injuries, of whom 175 were between 9 and 18 years old.

With the obvious blessing of the Palestinian leadership, the second intifada, now revealingly names the Al-Aqsa Intifada, had finally been launched.

***

We gain further insight into Arafat's role in creating the second intifada by examining the Palestinian press of Saturday, September 30th and Sunday, October 1st, 2000. What we discover are a large number of inflammatory articles, many appealing to Islamic sentiments supposedly violated by Israeli actions and clearly intended to transform the initially localized violence into a nationwide uprising .

Here is how the Palestinian press reported the Friday events on the Temple Mount plaza and East Jerusalem. They contain a number of exaggerated or outright untrue assertions which were clearly designed to arouse popular wrath against Israel.

They claimed, first, that the Israeli police had assaulted helpless Palestinian worshippers without any provocation whatsoever. Here is a particularly egregious example of such reporting:

"Before worshippers made the last bending from the upright position during the Friday prayers yesterday, occupation troops opened fire on them at the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque. ....It was a bloody scene resembling the crime the terrorist Goldstein committed ...several years ago. It was the occupation army itself that opened fire on people kneeling down before God." (38)

There was no mention of the well documented fact that the violence had been initiated by young Palestinians hurling rocks, and later Molotov cocktails, at Jewish worshippers and Israeli police.

Secondly they claimed that Sharon's Thursday visit to the Temple Mount plaza as well as Friday's bloody confrontation had been a "massacre" committed by "child killer Sharon" and Barak intended to "subdue" the Palestinian people and "dictate solutions that undermine their sovereignty over their sanctities and Jerusalem." (39) .

And thirdly they asserted that the Palestinians had rallied on the Temple Mount to defend their "sanctities" against unspecified Israeli aggression. Thus, "our people rise heavily and lightly armed to protect their sanctities and sacrifice their blood against the aggressive onslaught." (40)

These inflammatory messages were reinforced on Sunday, October 1, 2000 by an extended published Commentary by Hasan Al-Kashif, Director General of the Palestinian Ministry of Information. After claiming that there was "no difference ..between General Sharon ...and General Baraq," both of whom had committed the "widest act of murder against the sons of our people," he denounced them as "racist murderers (who) lay in wait for Palestinian worshippers in Al-Aqsa" and "ambushed the marches of the people......at each obligatory intersection and at the far gates of their settlements.." Al-Kashif then called for a new Intifada, for which "all necessary conditions are favorable." His call to arms concluded with the following passionate exhortation:

"We have enough anger overflowing in our heads and hearts to bring about the all-out explosion Generals Baraq, Sharon and Mofaz want ...We have enough anger to blow up the occupation all over the land. This is our will and capability ....Our only option is to be or not to be." (41)

***

What then caused the outbreak of the second intifada. Certainly, the long-standing Israeli occupation had generated much of the required hatred. As I demonstrated, however, the PA played a significant role, from the very beginning of the Oslo Peace Process until September 28, 2000 in encouraging hostile Palestinian attitudes towards Israel. It thus allowed the terror network of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to operate in PA controlled territory. Instead of "fostering mutual understanding and tolerance" as prescribed by its Oslo commitments, the PA taught anti-Israel sentiments and hatred to young and old alike. It encouraged unrealistic demands and then wrecked the Camp David summit by insisting upon this same unacceptable package. It demonized Israel in the summer of 2000, prepared the public for a violence and then used the Sharon visit to create a confrontation which turned into the second intifada.

Let us ask, finally, how important Sharon's visit really was in causing the intifada? As I showed, while he provided the spark that determined the time and place of the initial explosion, Sharon did not supply the necessary fuel nor was it his hand that ignited the volatile mixture. In fact, given the elements enumerated earlier -- the Palestinian desire for independence, the long frustrated dream of a million refugees in the West Bank and Gaza to return to their lost homes in Israel, Arafat's sustained demonization of Israel, his well documented preparations for such an uprising and his open incitement to violence at the end of September -- given all these, I contend that the intifada would have erupted in the fall or winter of 2000, even if Sharon had never set foot on the Temple Mount Plaza.

***

Endnotes:


(1) Cited in University of Chicago Magazine, February 2003, Vol. 95, No. 3, p. 4
(2) Article XII.1, "Agreement On the Gaza Strip and The Jericho Area; May 4, 1994".
http://www.jcrc.org/main/gazajer.htm#article ix
(3) For an extensive listing of PA violations of its Oslo obligations, see Israel's November 20, 2000 "white paper". http://www.imra.org.il/whitepaper1.php3
(4)Ari Shavit, "Lesson of the Blood Curve"; Haaretz, December 17, 2002
(5) Arthur Bierman,"Why Camp David Failed"
(6) Hasan al-Kashif, "Two National Missions Now", Ramallah Al Ayyam, July 24, 2000; FBIS-NES-2000-0724;
(7) Khalil Shikaki, " Survey Research Unit: Public Opinion Poll # 1", 27-29 July, 2000. See, in particular, responses to questions1, 3, 4, 19, 20, and 21.
Shikaki as well as Shikaki again
(8) "Rape, Murder, Violence and War for Allah Against the Jews: Summer 2000 incitement on Palestinian Television." Palestinian Media Watch Special Report # 30, September 11, 2000;Marcus
(9) Khaled Abu Toameh, "How The War Began;" The International Jerusalem Post, October 4, 2002, p.10;
(10) "Rape, Murder, Violence and War for Allah Against the Jews: Summer 2000 incitement on Palestinian Television." , op. cit.
(11) "One Year of Yasser Arafat's Intifada: How It Started and How It Might End." Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 1, No.4, 1 October 2001.Intifada
(12) ibid
(13) October 6, 2000, No. 132.
MEMRI
(14) Ibid
(15) Hasan al-Kashif, "Two National Missions Now", op. cit.
(16) MEMRI, October 6, 2000, No. 132, op. cit. .
(17) Ibid
(18) "One Year of Yasser Arafat's Intifada: How It Started and How It Might End." Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 1, No.4, 1 October 2001., op. cit.
(19)Peacewatch, Number 275, September 5, 2000; Kenneth Stein
(20) Peacewatch, Number 276, September 12, 2000;
David Schenker
(21) "Sharon Intends to Visit Temple Mount Day After Tomorrow", Tel Aviv Maariv, September 26, 2000; FBIS-NES-2000-0926
(22) "Palestinians Warn of Consequences of Sharon's Visit to Al-Aqsa", Ramallah Al-Ayyam, September 27, 2000; FBIS-NES-2000-0927
(23) "War & Peace in the Middle East: An Exclusive Interview with Barak"; Time Daily; October 14, 2000;
(24) "Palestinians Warn of Consequences of Sharon's Visit to Al-Aqsa", Ramallah Al-Ayyam, op. cit.
(25) "Marwan Barghouti, Fatah-Tanzim, and the Escalation of the Intifada" Jerusalem Issue Brief , Vol.1, No.16 ; 24 January 2002 ; Barghouti
(26) Joel Greenberg; "Sharon Touches a Nerve, and Jerusalem explodes." The New York Times, September 29, 2000; Charles M. Sennott, The Body and the Blood, (Public Affairs, New York, 2001, pp. 333-337
(27) "Marwan Barghouti, Fatah-Tanzim, and the Escalation of the Intifada," op. cit.
(28) Ibid
(29) Charles M. Sennott, op. cit., p. 335
(30) "The 'al-Aksa Intifada"; Myths and Facts Online.
Mitchell G. Bard
(31) "From Oslo To Camp David To Taba", The Washington Institute, August 8, 2001. interview with Dennis Ross,
(32) "THE AL AQSA INTIFADA; A Photographic Journal of the Palestinian Struggle", containing both Photographs and text. It is distinctly sympathetic to the Palestinian uprising.
(33) Mitchell G. Bard, "The 'al-Aksa Intifada"; Myths and Facts Online. op. cit.
(34) Deborah Sontag, "Battle at Jerusalem Holy Site Leaves 4 Dead and 200 Hurt.", The New York Times, September 30, 2000; p. 1A
(35) B'Tselem, " Events on the Temple Mount - 29 September, 2000"; Researched and written by Yael Stein. Ostensibly neutral, this report shows its bias by omitting any mention of the initial Palestinian assault against Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall. It directs all of its criticism at the "excessive force" used by the Israeli police, but levels no criticism at the rioters, who hurled stones and Molotov cocktails at police.
B'tselem
(36) "THE AL AQSA INTIFADA; A Photographic Journal of the Palestinian Struggle", op. cit.
(37) ibid
(38) "The Al-Aqsa Mosque.." Editorial , Ramallah Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, September 30, 2000; FBIS-NES-2000-1001
(39) "Commentary by hafiz al-Barghuthi", Ramallah Al-Hayah al-Jadidah, September 30, 2000; FBIS-NES-2000-1001
(40) Ibid
(41) Hasan al-Kashif, "Commentary", Ramallah Al-Ayyam, October 1, 2000, FBIS-NES-2000-1001