THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS
Charlotte Smokler

Almost any serious discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute will turn at some point to the subject of Jewish West Bank settlements. This article attempts to relate the history of these settlements since the 1967 Six Day War. We will not discuss settlements in the Golan, in Gaza, and new neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

In July of 2000 there were about 200,000 settlers living in 145 official settlements as well as in a number of smaller, unofficial "outposts" on the West Bank. Hillel Halkin writes: "According to Palestinian figures, the built-up area currently occupied by the settlements constitutes 2% of the West Bank. Another 2.2% has been set apart by the Israeli government for future expansion, and an additional 1.5% has been used for 190 miles of roads leading to, or connecting the settlements. (COMMENTARY, June 9, 2002). (The Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem, has slightly larger figures for the area occupied by settlements. We have reasons, however, for questioning their accuracy. For anyone interested in more details, please contact the editors).

None of this was envisaged by Israel when, as a result of its striking victory in the 1967 Six Day War, it suddenly found itself controlling the entire West Bank of the Jordan river with a Palestinian population of over one million. This territory had been part of the original British Mandate of Palestine but had been seized by Jordan during the 1948 Israeli War of Independence. Its legal status was in limbo as shown by the fact that only Great Britain and Pakistan recognized Jordanian sovereignty over it.

According to Martin Gilbert, "The Israelis were shocked to find how restrictive Jordanian rule had been and how the Jordanians had very much relegated the West Bank to subordinate status within the Hashemite Kingdom, neglecting its economy and failing to encourage its local institutions and aspirations." (ISRAEL, Martin Gilbert, p.397.)

Having achieved a victory of such unexpected magnitude, there was considerable sentiment for the immediate return of most of the conquered territory to its original owners. Thus, BBC correspondent John Simpson (BBC NEWS, June 29, 2001) quotes ex-Prime Minister Ben- Gurion as saying: "Now we must give all this land back at once...Except Jerusalem, perhaps. That we will have to discuss." In the same spirit, on June 16, 1967, a few days after war's end, Israel offered to withdraw immediately from most of the occupied lands, including most of the West Bank, in exchange for Arab recognition and the beginning of peace negotiations. (Gilbert, p.402) The Arab response from the summit meeting in Khartoum was total rejection: "No peace, No negotiation, No recognition."

In November of 1967 the United Nations Security Council passed its famous Resolution 242 whose exact intent has been a much debated issue ever since. Pro-Palestinian commentators argue that 242 demanded Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory while pro-Israeli observers insist that its language deliberately allowed for the possibility of territorial adjustment. The latter view is strongly supported by Eugene Rostow in the New Republic (Oct. 21, 1991): "Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between 1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until 'a just and lasting peace in the Middle East' is achieved. When such a peace is made, Israel is required to withdraw its armed forces 'from territories' it occupied during the Six Day War - not from 'the' territories and not from 'all' territories." For additional details on the Security Council debate on 242, see Abba Eban's autobiography. (PERSONAL WITNESS, pp. 458-459).

As for Jordan, it did not have enough authority among the Arabs to negotiate with Israel on its own (Gilbert, page 402). Over the years, Amman devised many formulas for a "Jordanian option." These included the idea of a United Arab Kingdom unifying the West Bank and the East Bank of the Jordan and later the proposal of a federation between an autonomous West Bank of Palestine and an East Bank State of Jordan. The Palestinians turned down both proposals. (Dr. Ahmad Tell, The Jordanian Option, 5/23/01, www.jerusalemites.org/peace7.html)

Right after the war, Israel undertook no immediate settlement activity. Several kibbutzim which had been destroyed by the Arab Legion in 1948 after fierce resistance were reclaimed (the Etzion Bloc). And in April 1968, a group of religious Jews moved into Hebron, which had witnessed the terrible pogrom of 1929; after much hesitation the government permitted them to remain and later to build the nearby town of Kiryat Arba.

Apart from this reclamation of previously settled Jewish land, the main development of West Bank settlements occurred in 3 stages. As described by Avishai Margalit, each stage involved settling a different long strip of land, and each strip " has a different history, a different ideology, and a different type of settler." (New York Review of Books, August 22, 2001.)

The first strip, settled according to the so called "Allon plan", was only intended to provide Israel with some in-depth defense. These particular settlements, located in the Jordan Valley between the river and the first western mountain ridge, would act as an early warning system and would be built only where there were few or no Arabs. They were established in the traditional Labor Zionist way as kibbutzim and moshavim. According to Margalit, in spite of much effort, none of these settlements have flourished and none have more than a few hundred members.

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a new settler movement appeared, Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful. Since these were years of gloom and isolation for Israel, the movement appeared as an antidote to the bleak national mood. Contrary to the Allon plan, Gush Emunim wished to settle the entire "Land of Israel," which it called by the biblical names Judea and Samaria. Religiously inspired, the Bloc sees Jewish settlement as the beginning of a Messianic era, the beginning of redemption. With the support of the Likud government, which came to power in 1977, this "second strip" of settlement activity grew and flourished further west in the Jordan Valley and often near areas of large Arab population like Nablus. This is the heartland of the radical settler movement.

Margalit describes the third strip, in which most of the settlers live and which is closest to the Green Line (the pre 1967 border), as being populated by three types of settlers. There are those seeking a better quality of life; there are the relatively poor who cannot afford good housing inside the Green Line; and there are the ultra-Orthodox. The second and third categories are often intermingled.

As Margalit puts it, a settlement like Ma'aleh Adumim, near Jerusalem, whose population is 28,000, contains many young families that could not afford to buy an apartment in Jerusalem. With the housing subsidies provided by the government, they can afford to do so here. At present more than 50% of the settlers live close to the Green Line, in sizable towns like Ma'aleh Adumim. Ariel near Tel Aviv has 18,000 people; Betar Illit south of Jerusalem has passed 15,000.

In addition to cheaper and better housing, the settlers benefit also from favorable tax policies and subsidized nursery schools and kindergartens. Over 40% of the population in the settlements is employed by the state (Margalit). Writing in Ha'Aretz (July 2, 2002), Hannah Kim analyzes the settlements as having acted as a form of social mobility for the poorer classes through the perks of livelihood and cheap housing.

Land for the West Bank settlements has been acquired in a variety of ways: Most of the land in the West Bank was not held by title; ownership was a matter of custom. The Israelis have invoked the Ottoman Lands Law of 1855, which was in use in Jordan and continued by Israel in the West Bank after 1967, to declare a particular area "state land." Other land has been expropriated for public needs or military use. Israel has also assisted private citizens in purchasing land from Palestinian owners. (B'TSelem, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank, May 2002).

Those who claim the settlements are illegal rest much of their claim on article 49(6) in the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which states that an occupying military power "shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Israel replies that it has not "deported" or "transferred" anyone to the settlements. Also, because the West Bank in 1967 legally belonged to no government, Israel denies that it is an occupying power any more than Jordan was.

In 1993 Israel and the Palestinians entered into negotiations to resolve their long-standing conflict. The resultant Oslo Accords signed in September 1993 do not deal directly with the settlements. Instead, their ultimate disposition was to be negotiated as a final status issue and would not be discussed during the interim period. Nonetheless, these settlements became an increasingly important issue troubling Israel's relations with the Palestinian Authority during the subsequent years, 1993 to 2001. These developments, and especially as they relate to the Final State Negotiations of 2000 and 2001, will be discussed in greater detail in the next issue ofFOCUS.

Let me conclude this historical survey with two observations:

(1) Recent polls indicate that a majority of Israelis are prepared to compromise on the settlements. This would probably require abandoning all outlying settlements with a current population of over 40,000 residents.

(2) Despite contrary claims, the settlements may well turn out to be one of the least intractable problems separating Israelis and Palestinians. From all accounts, the Oslo Final State Negotiations failed largely because of seemingly irreconcilable differences on the right of return of refugees and the status of East Jerusalem.