The Ultra-Orthodox and The Draft
by
Charlotte Smokler

Though the Second Intifada has caused many social issues to be set aside for the duration of the conflict, there is no doubt that Israel will soon have to confront  some of the serious problems afflicting relations between its ultra-Orthodox community and the rest of Israeli society. This paper focuses on one of these problems --the draft deferment for thousands of young ultra-Orthodox men and women. 

The opening of the ghettoes in nineteenth century Europe split the Jewish community along generational lines, with many of the young rejecting the traditional way of life in favor of such secular ideologies as Socialism, Anarchism and Zionism.  Understandably, this development alarmed the more conservative elements and moved them to found in 1912 the political and cultural organization Agudath Israel.

Though based upon such diverse groups as the Polish hasidim, the Lithuanian mitnagdim (study-oriented orthodox Jews who had been historically opposed to hasidism) and the neo-orthodox but more assimilated German Jewry, Agudath Israel nonetheless succeeded in representating the common interests of its religious constituency.  It was staunchly anti-Zionist up until the Second World War, opposing the Zionist enterprise on the grounds that Jewish exile was mandated by divine decree and could be only reversed by divine intervention. (1)  The attempt to create a Jewish state in Palestine was therefore condemned as sinning against God's will.
 
This changed after the second World War.  Except for a few small groups like the Natorei Karta, the Israeli ultra-Orthodox, called Haredim (a Hebrew word denoting 'those who tremble,' i.e. fear God) adopted a more positive attitude towards Zionism and the Jewish state.  And for good reason.  As the Jerusalem Letter puts it: Haredi Jewry found itself to be a small and weak minority, entirely dependent on the Zionist Jewish community. It could not continue therefore with its historic isolationist approach and decided to participate through Agudath Israel in the country's political life.  (2)
 
Determined to use the state to build a network of religious educational and social institutions, Agudath Israel and later on, other religious parties, like the Sephardic ultra-orthodox party Shas, entered the government to compete effectively for funding and power.  But even though participanting in the country's political life, the religious parties maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the state.  They viewed it is a fait accompli which could not be ignored but saw their primary role as protectors of the Torah and other religious interests. (3)
 
As for the Natorei Karta, it has stood its ground as a small, intensely anti-Zionist Haredi faction.  Natorei Karta represents a particular ideology -- it is not a formal organization or hasidic sect.  Neither does it have one national leader, and precise numbers are hard to come by.  Some of its members joined the recent pro-Palestinian rally in Washington, D.C. and were active during the anti-Israel demonstrations in Durban, South Africa. One of their number, Moshe Hirsch, is minister of Jewish affairs in Arafat's cabinet. (4)
 
Let us now examine Israel's "scholar society" as it was built by the Haredim in the post-war period.  Since the great Eastern-European yeshivot had been destroyed by the Nazis, the yeshiva bocher (religious student) was viewed with some sympathy as remnant of a vanished world, a kind of endangered species in need of protection.  Hence, even before the establishment of the State of Israel, David Ben Gurion proposed that a certain proportion of yeshiva students should be exempted from army service. (5)  The ultra-Orthodox defended such exemption on the grounds that Torah study was the most important duty of any Jewish male while secular Israelis consoled themselves with the thought that since ultra-Orthodoxy was incompatible with the modern age, it would soon vanish.
 
Ben Gurion's special provision, when implemented in 1954, involved only 400 selected men, and by 1975 it had only reached the still modest figure of 800.  But in 1977 the Begin government, as a concession to the ultra-Orthodox parties in its coalition, lifted the cap on deferments.  At present about 30,000 Haredi yeshiva students are covered by army deferment.  Indeed, to quote "Policy Dispatches", "The number of yeshiva students in Israel far exceeds the total number of full time students in all the pre-war European yeshivot combined." (6)
 
The system works as follows: To avoid army service, students must stay in a Yeshiva until age 35 or 41, depending on the number of their children.  As a consequence, many young men pursue religious studies even if they are not intellectually suited for them.  They are supported by their wives, receive small stipends from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and from Social Security, get state housing assistance, and allowances for each child.  In the ultra-Orthodox world, the kollel, a post-yeshiva school, has become the dominant Torah study framework for married young men and all married yeshiva students are accepted into kollels for periods of at least five to ten years.  This Haredi world has become known as the  "scholar society." By contrast, in the Diaspora only the most gifted students have such an opportunity and most have to go to work after finishing their yeshiva education. (7)

This draft deferral policy had had many consequences, for the Haredim as well as for the larger Israel society.  Some of these are economic.  Although the Israeli economy sustains large losses caused by the absence of the ultra-Orthodox from the labor market and by the necessary extension of army service for non-Haredim, the greatest damage to the economy is caused by an ultra-Orthodox educational system which does not prepare the young men for work.  Since the Ministry of Education does not enforce its curriculum in Haredi schools - a curriculum which mandates study of subjects like English, civics, history, and science - ultra-Orthodox students are deprived of an education fitting a modern industrial society.  A study by two economists, one in Boston and one at the Hebrew University, found that the expected wages for an adult yeshiva student who enters the labor market is 30 percent lower than the average Israeli salary.  On the other hand, Haredi women (probably because there is not the same pressure to concentrate exclusively on religious studies) receive a relatively broad general education and have better employment opportunities. (8)

This policy of draft exemption has had the unhappy consequence of leading to the pauperization of the ultra-Orthodox community.  The creation of large families headed by a non working man is a guaranteed recipe for poverty. Bnei Brak, a center of the Haredi population, has the largest percentage of residents living below the poverty level in Israel. (9)
 
But perhaps the most serious consequence of the draft exemption policy is the lack of Haredi connection to the army - the state's most fundamental institution - and to Zionism itself.  And that goes both ways.  During a recent student strike, "the student leaders trumpeted the fact that they as military veterans receive less than the yeshiva boys who have not served their country." (10)
 
It should be noted that many of the ultra-Orthodox (especially from the Lubavitch sect, who have a more positive attitude toward Zionism than most Haredim) do some kind of non-combat military service.  And sadly, we have all seen on our television screens the Haredim who pick up body parts of suicide victims, a gruesome and heroic task. Still, the divide between people who send their children off to army service in a beleaguered society, and others who do not have to, has to be huge. It is the source of much bitterness among the secular and of an attitude of defensiveness among the ultra-Orthodox. (11)
 
The strongest challenge to this system of draft exemptions was made by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1998 when it ruled that the arrangement had led to a growing sense of inequality in Israeli society and ordered new legislation to remedy the situation.  The Tal Commission, which is the outgrowth of that ruling, has proposed that yeshiva students be given a "trial year" between the ages of 23 and 24 to experience life outside the yeshiva.  Anyone who decides to continue "on the outside" would then be inducted for a short period of military service or other national service without being subject to the draft, and would also have the annual reserve duty of 24 days a year for 10 years. (12)
 
Of course, this can only be a beginning. The head of the commission wrote ".even those members who oppose the deferral in principle believe that the change they want to see will come about only by means of gradual and moderate steps....that will facilitate the haredi community's partial and gradual involvement in the economy and in national service."  The mayor of Bnei Brak, a member of the Tal Commission, signed on to the report. The report had a mixed reception. (13)
 
The recommendations have not yet found their way into legislation. The Supreme Court's deadline is spring 2003.
 
 ENDNOTES
 
1) "Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, July 15, 1990, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
2) ibid
3) ibid
4) International Jerusalem Post, "Forsakers of Zion," October 11, 2002
5) "Policy Dispatches, No. 37, December 1998, World Jewish Congress,
6) ibid
7) ibid
8) "The indirect cost of ultra-Orthodox education," February 23, 2000,Ha'aretz,
9) "Jerusalem Letter," op. cit.
10) "Policy Dispatches," op. cit
11) ibid
12) "Soldiers in Black," May 2002,Hadassah Magazine,
13) "IDF's automatic exemption could end for yeshiva students," April 21, 2000,Jewish Bulletin of Northern California News,