#

The Oslo Negotiations:
From the Clinton Initiative to the end of Taba.
(cont.)
by Arthur Bierman

Consider finally the daunting issue of Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian delegation entered the Taba conference with a document specifying its solution of the refugee problem. (26) It began by demanding that Israel recognize its "moral and legal responsibility for the forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population during the 1948 war and for preventing the refugees from returning to their homes in accordance ...." It then specified that Israel accept as guiding principle U.N. resolution 194 which demanded that all refugees "who wish to return to their homes in Israel and live at peace with their neighbors have the right to do so." To implement this principle, the document demanded that Israel accept the return of all refugees (who so desire) currently living in Lebanon within two years after signing this agreement and of an unspecified annual minimum number of other refugees. (27)

As to restitution, the Palestinian document demanded that Israel return all property owned by refugees at the time of their displacement, or, if not feasible, that the refugees be compensated for same; that Israel also compensate the refugees for suffering and losses incurred as a result of their displacement; that Israel fund repatriation assistance as well as compensate the refugee host countries (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and the PA) for the costs they bore in hosting the refugees.

The Palestinian proposal elicited a quick , but unofficial, Israeli response. (28) Dated January 23, 2001, this Israeli so called "non-paper" stated that "the State of Israel solemnly expresses its sorrow for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees, their suffering and losses" and, while refusing to take sole responsibility for the creation of this tragic situation, promised to contribute its part "to the attainment of a comprehensive and fair solution to the Palestinian refugee problem." It agreed with the Palestinian document that the issue be solved in accordance with U.N. Resolution 194, but proposed that this be done in a manner more in accord with President Clinton's December proposal. To be specific, the Israeli document proposed that five distinct programs be made available for "return, repatriation and relocation:"

-- To Israel, a limited, but as yet unspecified maximum (annual) number, with priority given to those in Lebanon.

An unlimited number:

-- To Israeli swapped territory.
-- To the State of Palestine.
-- To Arab host countries.
-- To third countries.

Concerning compensation, the Israeli document seemed to accept the relevant provisions of the Palestinian proposal, but with one crucial difference -- that the Fund paying for all expenses be financed jointly by "the international community and the State of Israel." The document did not attempt to specify the respective percentages.

As we can see from these opening documents, the Palestinians proposed a solution to the refugee problem very much in conformity with their long standing insistence that Israel accept all refugees who desired.to return to their homes behind the Green Line. The Israeli document, on the other hand, refused such potentially unlimited return by insisting that Israel, asa sovereign country, had the right to limit the number of refugees so admitted.

Was there any movement on this issue by either party by the end of the Taba negotiations? According to all available documents, there was only one significant change and it was proposed by t he Israeli delegation. Moratinos as well as Ben -Ami agree that the Israeli delegation had proposed, verbally, but not in writing, an (annual) entry of "40,000 in the first five years of the program. " But the Palestinians had refused to even discuss any numerical quota until Israel agreed to accept sole responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem.

That the Palestinians continued to insist upon the Unlimited Right of Return to Israel was made abundantly clear immediately after the Taba conference by two high ranking Palestinian officials. Thus Abu Ala, in a January 28, 2001 interview stated that "no progress was made on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Any bridging of the gap on this issue seems to be impossible because our red line is the right of return while the Israeli stand is based on no return." (My emphasis.) (29)

And on January 30, 2001 journalist Hasan Jabr, reporting on a speech by Abu Mazen, published the following:

"Abu Mazin said that the PA insists that Israel should admit its legal, historic, and moral responsibility for the tragedy of the refugees. He stressed that the essence of the issue of refugees is based on the return of the refugees to his home and not anywhere else in his homeland. " (My emphasis.) (30)

In fact, this same conclusion follows also from the Moratinos document. While listing in great detail the various alternatives offered to the refugees, the report acknowledges that the two parties were unable to reach any agreement. It then summarized the Palestinian position concerning these other resettlement option as follows: "The Palestinian side stressed that the above {other options] shall be subject to the individual free choice of the refugees, and shall not prejudice their right to their homes in accordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194."

In short - despite contrary claims, neither at Taba nor afterwards did the Palestinian leaders ever agree to limit the number of refugees who might choose to return to their homes inside the green line.(31) There is nothing in the Palestinian proposal which would prevent the return of 3.5 millions refugees to Israel proper.

***

Let us evaluate the outcome of the Taba conference by considering the final Israeli and Palestinian offers, respectively.

By the end of the Taba conference the Palestinians had been offered, but had refused the following package: A Palestinian state consisting of the whole Gaza Strip, approximately 96 % of the West Bank with a connecting link between the two contiguous territories, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount, a Palestinian capital, Al-Quds, in East Jerusalem, and a highly limited return of refugees into Israel, but sweetened by a significant compensation package, underwritten by Israel and the international community.

By the end of the Taba conference, the Palestinians had agreed to an Israeli annexation of about 2.5% of the West Bank, the annexed territory consisting of the Jewish settlements in two settlement blocks, but not of the land between the settlements. They had also conceded Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and perhaps also over the Wailing Wall. In compensation forthe annexed territory thety demanded adjacent Israeli territory "of equal area and value." The Palestinians refused, however, to grant any concessions on the two issues which had torpedoed all prior negotiations. Specifically, they refused to concede any historical Jewish connection to the Temple Mount and they insisted upon the unlimited right of return of refugees.

In short, while the Palestinians were offered a viable, independent and potentially prosperous Palestinian state, with a capital in East Jerusalem, the final Palestinian proposal still contained provisions which endangered the survival of the Jewish state.

***

But the story of Taba did not end on January 27th, 2001, when the two delegations issued a joint statement proclaiming that significant progress had been made. For a short period of time -- to be precise, for about twenty four hours-- it seemed that the conference might actually lead to a genuine breakthrough. Encouraged by European envoys who had been trying to arrange a Stockholm meeting between Arafat and Barak (32), by the positive atmospherics of the just ended Taba conference and by the entreaties of some of his political allies, Barak seriously considered meeting Arafat in Davos for a mini-summit which, he hoped, might succeed in narrowing at least some of the remaining differences. (33) This plan was abandoned, however, on the very next day, when Arafat, addressing an elite audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos, harshly attacked the Israeli government for "waging...for the past four months a savage and barbaric war as well as a blatant and fascist military aggression against our Palestinian people." (34) Besides accusing Israel of using depleted uranium, he denounced the Jewish state for violating "all resolutions of international legality, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Human Law and the Fourth Geneva Convention." Completely ignoring the concessions his negotiators had granted at Taba, he called for "the withdrawal of Israel...from all Arab and Palestinian occupied territories, including Holy Jerusalem to the fourth of June [1967] border lines; the dismantling of everything the occupation has built in terms of settlements and settlement structures that have no basis of legality; and the implementation of Resolution 194 on the Palestinian refugees." And he ended his inflammatory speech by calling for international intervention "immediately", for "the lifting of the siege and closure and the ending of this escalated military aggression."

So only one day after the Taba conference had ended in an "unprecedentedly positive atmosphere", Arafat not only denounced his "peace partner" in most vitriolic terms, but erased also all Palestinian concessions by advancing his familiar package of minimum demands.

Arafat's unexpected performance in front of a distinguished global audience had the predictable effect. Not only did the Israeli Prime Minister cancel all plans for a mini-summit; he suspended also all further diplomatic contacts with the PA. (35) Of course, Arafat's denunciation did not help Barak with the Israeli electorate. Appearing more than ever as Arafat's pathetic dupe, Barak was soundly defeated on February 6th -- which not only terminated his political career but also the Oslo Peace process that he had tried to salvage.

***

What can we conclude from this study of the Taba conference?

It demonstrated, I contend, that the Palestinian policy at Taba differed little from the one it had pursued since Camp David. To be specific, the Palestinian negotiators insisted at Taba, just as they had insisted ever since Camp David, upon a peace settlement which, if implemented, would have seriously endangered Israel's future. This gloomy conclusion was dramatically validated by Arafat's astonishing performance at Davos. At the very moment that Barak was preparing to meet the Palestinian leader for serious negotiations, Arafat launched a most intemperate attack upon the Israeli government. Arafat was clearly determined to sabotage any possible peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict.

Epilogue:

Perhaps the most convincing evidence for the bankruptcy of Arafat's strategy emerged 18 months after Taba. Interviewed in late June 2002 by the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Arafat told his interlocutor that he was now prepared to accept "absolutely" the Clinton December initiative, at least as formulated at Taba. The report continued:

"During the interview, a Ha'aretz reporter put the Taba proposals to Mr. Arafat and he endorsed each of them. The main elements of the Taba plan include: a division of Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians; a compromise on the future of the 3.5 million Palestinian refugees; and creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza." (My emphasis) (36)

Of course, by June 2002 the Taba proposal had long been withdrawn by the Sharon government. Revising Abba Eban's famous observation, Arafat had again managed to miss an opportunity for the creation of an independent state. And the victims, as always, were the Palestinian and the Israeli people.

Endnotes

(1) "Transcript of Clinton Remarks at Israel Policy Forum Gala, Jan. 7." Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
(2) "Remarks by Prime Minister Barak to the Council on Foreign Relations, 8 January 2001." Barak
(3)"Statement by Yasir Abd-Rabbuh, member of the PLO Executive Committee and PA Minister of Culture and Information", Ramallah Al-Ayyam, January 6, 2001; FBIS-NES-2001-0108
(4) "Report on an interview with PNC Speaker Salim al-Za'nun.", Jerusalem Al-Quds, January 7, 2001; FBIS-NES-2001-0108
(5) "Contraction of US Ambitions,:", editorial, Jerusalem Al-Quds, January 7, 2001; FBIS-NES-2001-0108
(6) "Risks of a Declaration of Principles on Permanent Status." PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, January 9, 2001; PLO
(7) "Israeli Sees Time Lacking for Pact.", Jane Perlez, The New York Times, January 6, 2001, p. A1.
(8) Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, (Other Press, New York, 2003), pp. 344-345
(9) "US Envoy will try to Forge a Common Position.", Joel Greenberg, The New York Times, January 10, 2001, p. A3
(10) Gilead Sher, Just Beyond Reach - The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001; (Miskal - Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, Tel Aviv, 2001) In Hebrew.
(11) "Mideast Clock Ticks, Perhaps Inaudibly to Some.", Deborah Sontag, The New York Times, January 12, p. A1.
(12) Gilead Sher, op.cit..
(13) See Charles Enderlin, op. cit., p. 347 as well as "Palestinians propose to move negotiations with Israel to Taba.", Arabicnews.com, January 20, 2001; The latter clearly distinguishes between Ben Ami's proposal to have a marathon conference and the subsequent proposal, due to Arafat, to have it in Taba. This distinction seems to have eluded Deborah Sontag, in "Arafat Proposes Urgent Talks; Israelis Don't Actually Say No.", The New York Times, January 19, 2001, p. A6.
(14) "Israeli Position On Three main Points at Taba Talks", January 21, 2001.
(15) "Israeli Position on Three Main Points at Taba Talks Contravenes International Law." Media Monitors Network, January 23, 2001. Arjan El Fassed.
(16) "Israeli-Palestinian joint statement at Taba", January 27, 2001. Le Monde Diplomatique..
(17) See, for example, "Taba Mythchief", David Makovsky, The National Interest, Spring 2001, pp. `119-129
(18) For the Gush Shalon map, see Gush Shalom For the map of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, see FMEP, Vol.11, No.2, March- April 2001;
(19) Foundation For Middle East Peace, op. cit.
(20) "End of a Journey", Ari Shavit. Interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami, Haaretz, September 13, 2001. Interview
(21) A settlement block is an area containing a large number of Jewish settlements, The Israelis proposed to annex three such areas, including all Palestinian villages there located.
(22) David Makovsky, op. cit., p. 122. Since Israel had only 123 settlements in 2001, Makosky's claim of 146 settlements must include some not recognized by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior.
(23) "Quray, Abd-Rabbuh Comment on PA-Israeli Disagreements After Taba Talks.", Ramallah Al-Ayyam, January 28, 2001; FBIS-NES-2001-0128
(24) "Moratinos Document - The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba." Ha'aretz, Akiva Elder February 14, 2002;
(25) "Right of Reply/Ben Ami's occupation syndrome." Hasan Asfour; Ha'aretz, October 21, 2001.
(26) "Palestinian Proposal on Palestinian Refugees," January 22, 20001.Refugees
(27) There are currently roughly 450,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanese refugee camps. While it has been claimed that very few of these refugees would actually wish to return to Israel, this prediction ignores the very real possibility that Israel's agreement to the right of return would lead to significant efforts by Palestinian organizations, and especially by extremist organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to generate the largest possible Arab immigration into Israel. Given such contingency, it is worth noting that this provision could compel the Jewish state to accept half a million or more refugees just during the first two years after signing the agreement.
(28) "Israeli private response to Palestinian refugees.", January 23, 2001. Le Monde Diplomatique, Israeli response
(29) Ramallah Al-Ayyam, January 28, 2001; op. cit.
(30) "Abu-Mazin: We will Continue Negotiations With Either Baraq or Sharon.", by Hasan Jabr, Ramallh Al-Ayyam, January 30, 2001, FBIS-NES-2001-0130
(31) See, for example, "The Day Barak's Bubble Burst,", where the author Uri Avnery, claims, without proof , that "At Taba...it was agreed in principle that the number of refugees allowed to return to Israel would be limited by an agreement.
"Avnery
(32) "Arafat Calls Israel Fascist; Barak Scraps Meeting With Him." Deborah Sontag, The New York Times, January 29, 2001., p. A4
(33) "Mideast Talks End With Gain But no Accord.", Deborah Sontag and William A. Orme, Jr., The New York Times, January 28, 2001, p. A1.
(34) "President Arafat's Speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos," January 28, 2001; PLO Negotiations Affairs Department; Davos; See also, Gilead Sher, op. cit.
(35) "Israel suspends diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Authority, 28 January 2001." Suspension.
(36) "Arafat approves Taba plan too late." The Guardian, June 22, 2002.