Every War Must End
By Fred Charles Ikle
Notes, Quotes and Opinions
Why Nations fight longer then they should
Notes, Quotes and Opinions
There is an interesting story to this book and its author. First published in 1971 as America muddled through Vietnam, the book was intended as a guide to successfully ending (and thus waging) war. The book was reprinted in 1991 just in time for the Gulf War, and a third edition in 2005.
Ikle worked for Weinberger directly during the Reagan years. He may have substantially influenced the development of the Weinberger doctrine, which became the Powell doctrine. Powell coincidentally also worked for Weinberger.
Ikle went on to become a member of the PNAC, but did not sign the infamous Iraq letter from 1998. The PNAC was home to the neocons who went on to launch the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
So the question: Why did Ikle hang out with people who openly dissed Powell and implicitly dissed the Weinberger doctrine? Weren't they dissing Ikle's work?
The answer can be seen at the end of the preface to the 2005 edition. To quote:
"In the turbulent era ahead, crises will occur that threaten national survival and utter destruction might not be averted without the prompt use of military force. It is crucial, therefore, that the United States and its friends relearn the rules for ending a war with strategic foresight and skill so that the hard-won military victory will purchase a lasting political success."
Ikle is not calling for caution over the decision to go to war, he is calling for political leaders to get better at conducting them. He does not consider the possibility that some wars should not be fought because there is no way to do them right. Whatever the circumstances, America gets what it wants.
That is the ideologue's fib- reality is what we want it to be.
1991 version of lessons:
-American forces should have a clear strategy for achieving our objectives
-Forces should not be used for 'demonstration' purposes, i.e. demonstrating resolve.
This flies against McNamara and Albright doctrines.
-'Punishment' is not a useful strategy or objective, especially against non-democratic nations or groups.
-Don't expand wars. The inability to formulate a coherent and effective strategy against one enemy is NOT a good reason to create another.
2005 version:
-Revenge is not a good strategy or objective.
-Surrender matters. A formal ritual of surrender implies submission on the part of the defeated, and submission implies co-optation by the victors. Recognizing the defeated brings them onto the victor's side, they become part of the new regime rather then outsiders and rebels. Winning is about more then doing the victory dance on an aircraft carrier.
-Maintaining Authority matters. Ikle calls it 'dignity and respect', but that seems ambiguous. Authority means a monopoly control over the use of force. America lost its authority when looters rampaged and soldiers watched. Given the number of troops on site in Baghdad, maintaining order may have been physically impossible. That's probably another reason why SURRENDER MATTERS.
Why Nations fight longer then they should
Nations fight way past the point of rational aims. Rationally, a country would stop fighting as soon as they knew that settling at a later date would be no better then settling now. Reasons they do not do this:
1) Maximalist aims. Once countries engage in war, there objectives magnify. Risks they tolerated in peace time become unacceptable in a war settlement. An example is the tendency to destroy an enemy country's war making capability for all time, that is to seek a settlement that removes the possibility of nation taking up arms again. Franco Prussian War, WWI are examples. Also, when a country has achieved success, the objectives tend to grow. What seemed fanciful becomes possible. Put another way, people rarely will talk about settlements when they feel like they are winning.
2) The balance of power within governments changes. Wars are typically preceded by a 'breakdown in diplomacy' and the recall of ambassadors. Settlements are achieved through diplomacy, but war shifts power to the military which is less adept and motivated at diplomacy.
Ikle cites two theories of command: unitary and factional.
Unitary command implies nations function as an organic whole. The decision to go to war is based on a rational calculation of interests and abilities of the nation as a whole. A unitary command would be as quick to end wars as to start them.
Opposing this is the factional command, in which government is composed of numerous discrete bodies acting in their own interest. Weapons manufacturers want to make weapons, officers want to command, protestors want to protest, and politicians want to look like they know what they are doing. A factional command is incapable of making choices in the national interest and consequently will fight longer then it should.
Ikle observes that no command structure is completely one or the other, they are a blend of factional and unitary styles.
One might theorize that a weak leader will have a more factional government. Actually, that is a pretty good definition of a weak leader: Someone who fails to make integral decisions and allows factional interests to dominate.
"Fighting a war can cost more in blood and money than any other undertaking in which nations engage."
- Fred Ikle, page 1
Ikle cites Japan as a nation that went to war with incomplete or ill-conceived strategy. As Ikle says of their strategic discussions, "It is not that the Japanese military had forgotten that the war they proposed to start must have an ending. The question was there, merely the answer was missing."
I've heard the fog of war in reference to bureaucratic screw-ups, or as an excuse for friendly fire and other tactical mishaps. Here Ikle uses it to refer to the uncertainty at the top.
Strategic decisions have to incorporate a ton of data: friendly and enemy troop strength, reserves, and the potential for outside parties to intervene. Obviously a great deal of this information is unknown, it must be estimated based on a variety of sources. That layer of interpretation is the true fog, data interpretation follows self reinforcing assumptions. If we are tired they must be tired because ultimately we must win, therefore we will win. This ties in with the tendency for politicians to be to aggressive (if they lose a war they lose office- whether they leave their country intact or in ruins). Tyrants are actually more likely to make rational decisions about ending war then democracies’, assuming the tyrant stays in power. Saddam Hussein in the first gulf war provides an apt demonstration.
Ikle makes the point that relatively little attention is paid to big picture strategy. When Rumsfeld talked to himself about whether we were creating more terrorists then we destroyed, that was taken as exceptional. Actually it was a very rational and very rarely asked question: Are we achieving our objectives?
I wonder how they process and present decision making information within the military? Any better then an insurance company?
"If a statesmen or general commits a mistake that proves disastrous for his nation, he will require great moral strength to avow his error. Where that strength is lacking, blaming 'the stab in the back' often provides the convenient self-justification that moral cowardice demands."
Ikle, page 50
Escalation is not a good description of policy. It implies a single dimension of action which is either increasing or decreasing. States have at their disposal multiple dimensions by which to pursue objectives. Diplomatic pressure can be applied instead of military, the military can shift focus between an enemy's military forces, military economy, the civilian economy or civilians themselves. Hence the term implies a change in tactics or strategy more then an absolute increase or decrease.
There are three risks to initiating an escalation. One is that the effect on the enemy is uncertain. If not forced to surrender, the enemy will likely initiate their own escalation. It may impose unbearable costs on the supporting population. And it may draw allies to an enemy.
Example:
I've heard Germany's decision in 1917 to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against Allied shipping described as one of the worst blunders of WWI. That was not a decision made in ignorance, the general staff prepared a rigorous analysis of the effects on British shipping and industry. In fact their estimates were conservative. They even predicted it would cause the US to enter the war. There was one problem in their analysis: They thought Britain would surrender within six months. That bold assumption underlay all their strategic forecasts unquestioned.
An ill-considered escalation can be as disastrous for your own side as any enemy action.
Seeing metaphors in a strategic analysis should make your skin crawl. They obscure the true dynamics of a conflict; a cheap cover for ignorance.
Ikle makes the point that every government is divided to a certain extent. Different departments, different branches of the military have different interests. The extent of division is a function of where the government falls on the unitary-factional scale.
The fractured interests mean that war will not end until maximalist aims have been achieved, such as unconditional surrender. Until then someone will have an interest in claiming the war is unfinished, regardless of the marginal costs and benefits of continued fighting. To them, anyone advocating peace in the here and now is a traitor. Its unfortunate there is no equally negative word describing those who prolong war to the disadvantage of the nation in pursuit of their own interests.
The English language is without a word of equally strong opprobrium to designate acts that can lead to the destruction of one's government and one's country, not by fighting too little, but by fighting too much or too long. "Adventurism" - much too weak a word - is perhaps the best term to describe this "treason of the hawks."
…
Treason can help our enemies destroy our country by making them stronger; adventurism can destroy our country by making our enemies more numerous. Treason can bring us defeat by retreating in the face of the enemy; adventurism can bring us defeat by advancing till our forces are overwhelmed on distant battlefields. Treason can force us into capitulation by treating secretly with the enemy; adventurism can force us into capitulation by failing to treat soon enough with the enemy. Treason can enable an enemy to break our alliances apart; adventurism can enable our allies to pull us down into disaster. It is hard to say whether treason or adventurism has brought more nations to the graveyard of history. The record is muddied, because when adventurists have destroyed a nation they usually blamed "traitors" for the calamity.
Ikle, page 61
Ikle makes a strong point that Britain failed as a democracy in WWI, that it uncritically pursued war and prevented any discussion of national aims and objectives. That effectively stifled any peace overture, and prolonged the war by perhaps as much as two years.
In reviewing the calculus employed by nations in evaluating peace, Ikle praises some odd figures. Marshall Petain and Lenin figure prominently as leaders who recognized defeat and cut their losses. When was the last time you read a kind word about them?
This short book is an outstanding analysis of how nations end wars, or accept peace. Ikle shows how governments prefer obviously self-destructive courses rather then accept compromise peace terms. The problem is most acute when factional interests dominate strategy rather then a rational unitary interest. In such a circumstance, factions that benefit from continuing the war will accuse those pursuing peace of treason. Sadly, there is no equivalent derogatory word in English for those who pursue war to the detriment of their country.
The book was first written in 1971, and most of the examples are from the two world wars. The work is still extremely relevant, and at 130 pages it's well worth the time.
Highly recommended as a first book to read on ending war.
Presidential Power- the Politics of Leadership
By Richard E. Neustadt
- More on unitary and factional (or bureaucratic) command structures.
England's Holy War
By Irene Willis
- From 1928, on the jingoism in Britain during WWI.
The thoughts and opinions expressed here are solely my own. I apologize in advance for any errors, omissions, or typos in the text above. I make no claim to any authority save that granted by my ability to read and think.