Review of
“Out of Control — On Purpose, DOE’s
Dispersal of Radioactive Waste
into Landfills and Consumer Products”
Mike Mobley
July 2007
Introduction
The following comments are based on review of the Nuclear
Information and Resource Services’ (NIRS) report “Out of Control — On Purpose,
DOE’s Dispersal of Radioactive Waste into Landfills and Consumer Products”
dated
General Comments
1. Although NIRS states that it “is mandated to work in the public interest,” the “Out of Control” report seeks more to alarm and persuade than to inform or instruct the public and clearly reflects the anti-nuclear bias of the authors. Many of the authors’ claims are poorly supported and when references to documented or published studies are provided, the conclusions of these studies are not always thoroughly or accurately reflected.
2. Because of the unbalanced approach taken by the authors, it is difficult for the reader to identify those issues within the “report” that are of legitimate concern and should be given further consideration.
3. The authors presuppose that the public is unwilling to
accept any release of man-made radionuclides, no matter how small the risk, and
the “report” implies that risks associated with man-made radionuclides are
unique and should not be discussed in the context of naturally occurring
background exposures. However, man-made radionuclides do not represent unique
radiation risks, and the risks represented by the clearance and disposal issues
that are the focus of the “Out of Control” report are typically, as
acknowledged within the report, only “a millirad or a few millirads per year.”
Dose levels of a few millirads (or millirems) represent only a small fraction
of the mean natural background radiation exposure to individuals living in the
4. For man-made radionuclides, NIRS argues that “since there is no safe exposure level the goal should be preventing release of any contamination.” Although clearly not achievable, the goal of no releases of man-made radionuclides may, at first glance, appear to be sound public health and environmental protection policy. However, in practice it could prove to be the opposite. Such a policy would require the diversion of significant resources (e.g., financial resources (taxpayer dollars) and limited burial ground capacity) to address what are in many cases trivial risks when greater public health protection would be achieved by utilizing these resources to address the more substantial sources of risk.
5. The report does not accurately distinguish between Department of Energy (DOE) operations which are self-regulated under the Atomic Energy Act and commercial, nuclear energy related industries which are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and State Radiation Control Programs, known as “Agreement States.”
6. The “Out of Control” report authors seek to discredit the regulators through their use of language that is inflammatory and at times slanderous. For example, the report focuses heavily on the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regulatory programs:
A. “The generators pay the processors (and the processors
pay TDEC for the licenses) to take their waste and the processors utilize a
computer code to deregulate the waste and send it to regular trash landfills in
The implication that the
Additionally, the implication that the wastes are no longer regulated is false. Rather, it has been determined that—because the low levels of radionuclides present in the wastes represent only a negligible risk (even when a worst case exposure scenario is considered) —the wastes can be disposed of safely in a TDEC regulated and permitted, municipal solid waste landfill. (See general comment #7 below for a more thorough description of the evaluations that are performed relative to these types of disposals.)
B. “DOE is taking advantage of the favorable attitude or
lack of oversight in some states toward nuclear activities.
The “report” does not provide any support for the claim that
there is a lack of oversight in
7. As stated by the authors, “the report is illustrated with
a special focus on
BSFR Landfill Disposal Process:
1) Acceptable radionuclide concentration limits are established using the dose assessment process outlined below at a dose limit of 1 mrem/year for a future resident farmer who lives and farms on top of the landfill. For perspective:
Natural background radiation dose in
2) Limits are for single radionuclides and when more than one radionuclide is present the sum-of-the-fractions for all radionuclides present in the BSFR waste cannot exceed “one” to ensure the 1 mrem/year total projected dose limit is never exceeded.
· Must assume the BSFR waste represents 10% of total volume of waste in landfill
o Percentage of total will in reality be significantly less
o When more than one BSFR processor is using the same landfill the total percentage from all waste streams cannot exceed 5% (the State controls this by establishing limits on the mass of waste)
· Site-specific dose assessment is performed for the landfill in which disposals will be made for a future resident
o Calculate annual dose for a resident farmer who is assumed to live and farm directly on top of the landfill:
§ Do not take credit for the landfill liner, leachate collection system, or engineered cover
§ Pathways include: external radiation, inhalation, food ingestion (milk, plant, meat), drinking water ingestion (source is groundwater from well located under the landfill), aquatic food ingestion (source is pond that receives groundwater), inadvertent ingestion of soil
§ Maximum annual dose to the resident farmer must not be greater than 1 mrem/year from 20 years to 1000 years post closure.*
3) The evaluation process is designed to ensure compliance with the 1 mrem/year dose limit from all radionuclides in all BSFR waste streams that enter a landfill:
· BSFR waste is assumed to represent 10% of volume of waste in landfill when actual percentage will be significantly lower (mass limits are established to ensure that the total percentage does not exceed 5% even when more than one BSFR processor is utilizing the landfill)
· No credit is taken for engineered features of the landfill (cover, liner, leachate collection, etc.)
· Exposed individual is assumed to be a resident farmer living on the landfill
· Doses to individuals residing in the vicinity of the landfill would be expected to be significantly less than 1 mrem/year
*Standard practice for NRC and state dose assessments is to look at doses out to 1000 years. TDEC’s current draft “Licensing Requirements for Evaluation and Acceptance of Licensee Requests for the Disposal of Materials with Extremely Low Levels of Contamination in Class I (Subtitle D) Landfills” specifies dose calculations for a resident farmer from 20 to 1000 years post closure, for current landfill workers, and for post closure maintenance workers during the required 30-year post-closure maintenance period.
Specific Comments
Comment 1: p. 5, Executive Summary, first paragraph: “Are they winding up in unregulated landfills…”
This statement is misleading. Landfills are not “unregulated.” Solid waste landfills are regulated under federal and state laws. These regulated facilities must be permitted and inspected and are designed to meet very specific regulatory requirements such as liners and leachate collection systems and engineered covers. As noted above, the BSFR evaluations take no credit for liners, leachate collection systems, or engineered covers when demonstrating compliance with the 1 mrem/year dose limit for an individual who is assumed to be a resident farmer living and farming directly on the landfill.
Comment 2: p. 5, Executive Summary, last paragraph: “This dispersal of supposedly small amounts is being done without comprehensive complex-wide tracking, without routine public reporting of the releases from each site and processor and usually without independent verification that it is within the self-imposed limits.”
Tracking and verification are inherent in the BSFR process
in
Comment 3: p. 8, The Radioactive Metal Recycling Bans, first full paragraph: “Some mixed radioactive and hazardous wastes are being disposed at hazardous waste sites with no controls or regulations to protect from radioactivity…DOE has determined that some amount of radioactive contamination is acceptable and can be sent to hazardous waste sites not designed to receive or isolate it.”
This statement is misleading in that it implies that the controls required for the disposal of hazardous wastes would be substantially different from and less protective than those placed on disposals of radioactive materials. Hazardous wastes include wastes that are ignitable (i.e., burns readily), corrosive, or reactive (e.g., explosive). In addition to these characteristically hazardous wastes, EPA has developed a list of over 500 specific hazardous wastes. Hazardous waste takes many physical forms and may be solid, semi-solid, or even liquid. The goal in treating and disposing of hazardous wastes is to isolate these materials and minimize the extent to which they are available for transport within the environment primarily through groundwater—a process that is governed by the chemical nature of a material (not the presence or absence of radioactivity). Therefore, provided potential external exposures to the workers handling the wastes are considered, the protective measures required for the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes would be adequate for addressing wastes that also contain some level of radioactive contamination. In addition the risk from the radionuclides disposed will go down over time (due to radioactive decay) while the hazardous wastes will remain hazardous forever.
Comment 4: p. 10, Ionizing Radiation, sixth paragraph: “Uranium is bound in rocks and typically lies underground.”
Uranium is a part of the natural background environment and is present in all environmental media including surface soils, rocks, water, and vegetation. Uranium ores “typically lie underground.” In fact natural uranium is a problem in drinking water and the reduction of it in drinking water may create a radioactive waste (see http://www.epa.gov/safewater/radionuclides/pdfs/guide_radionuclides_regulatorsguide.pdf). It is interesting to note here that uranium is naturally occurring and NIRS claims that naturally occurring radioactive material doesn’t represent the same hazard as manmade radioactive material. Thus all the uranium contaminated materials possessed by the DOE could be free released without regard to the radiation impact according to NIRS.
Comment 5: p. 10, Radiation Units sidebar: “Studies now indicate that cells that are not directly hit can also be damaged. This additional injury is not included in dose calculations.”
The potential implications of this “additional injury,” known as “bystander effects” are unclear at this time. “Views differ on whether bystander effects might increase, decrease or have no influence on cancer risk.” (Report of the Committee Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (CERRIE), p. 46, www.cerrie.org). Furthermore, because the current risk coefficients are derived from epidemiological data (i.e., effects observed in exposed individuals), the potential consequences of these effects are most likely addressed within current risk estimates. Additionally, the Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE) have concluded that “Those who know most about this work agree that the implications are complex and it would be premature to come to any conclusions, a view that is shared by COMARE and the majority of members of CERRIE.” (Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE), Ninth Report, Advice to Government on the review of radiation risks from radioactive internal emitters carried out and published by the Committee Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (CERRIE), p. 13). Note: As described on their website (www.comare.org.uk), COMARE is an independent expert advisory committee with members chosen for their medical and scientific expertise and recruited from Universities, Research and Medical Institutes. Members have never been drawn from the Nuclear or Electrical Power Supply Industries. The Committee offers independent advice to all Government Departments and Devolved Authorities, not just the Health Departments, and is responsible for assessing and advising them on the health effects of natural and man-made radiation. It is also asked to assess the adequacy of the available data and advise on the need for further research. Comment 6: p. 11, last paragraph, One Dose Is Never the Same as Another, “Many documents describing radiation assume that all radiation doses are the same. A classic assertion is that “radiation is radiation” or “a rem is a rem.” Dr. Donnell Boardman, a physician who treated many radiation workers during his career, made the case that it is physically impossible for any two radiation doses to be ‘the same’.”
The assertion that “radiation is radiation” or “a rem is a rem” is valid, and is useful for communicating the fact that the origin of a radioactive material or radiation (i.e., naturally occurring or man-made (x-ray or radioactive material)) does not increase or decrease the associated dose/risk.
Comment 7: p. 13, first paragraph: “Peer-reviewed research
suggests that current official values for “biological effectiveness,” (damage)
are not accurate, that radiation is more damaging than currently acknowledged,
and therefore even our fundamental units of dose may not accurately reflect
what is really happening.1 (Footnote 1: Committee Examining Radiation Risks of
Internal Emitters,
This statement misrepresents the conclusions of the CERRIE Report. The report concluded “that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to uncertainties in dose and risk estimates for internal emitters,” p. 115, Report of the Committee Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (CERRIE). However, as stated in the press release that accompanied publication of this report, “…the Report finds no clear evidence to date that current radiation risks are substantially wrong.”
The press release also states that “The Committee agreed with the standard view that epidemiological evidence is compelling for there being a raised risk of adverse health effects in those exposed to moderate and high levels of internally incorporated radionuclides. For low level intake of radionuclides, all but one member of the Committee accepted that there was probably some increased risk of adverse health effects as a result of the internal irradiation of organs and tissues, although this increase may be undetectably small.”
Comment 8: p. 13, RADIATION RISK sidebar: “Even though radiation causes myriad more health effects than cancer, radiation risk typically is expressed as the number of cancers or fatal cancers in a population exposed at a given dose or dose rate…”
The statement that “radiation causes a myriad more health
effects” is misleading given the focus of the report on activities that are
associated with low dose exposures. There are a variety of deterministic
effects associated with very high, acute radiation exposures, but at the low
level exposures that are associated with the disposal and clearance activities
discussed in this report, cancer induction is the endpoint of concern.
According to BEIR VII, “there is no direct evidence of increased risk of
noncancer diseases at low doses…” (Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2. www.nap.edu.
National Research Council of the National Academies. The National Academies
Press.
Comment 9: p. 15, fourth paragraph: “Causing cancer by such preventable exposures has been called the “perfect crime.””
This type of inflammatory language, which is used repeatedly within the “report,” demonstrates the bias of the authors and is clearly intended to alarm rather than inform the public about radiation risks.
Comment 10: bottom of p. 18, top of p. 19: “The government and industries that make and have liability for radioactive wastes have an unfair advantage in choosing a path other than public protection—it is difficult to catch illegal release and dispersal. “
The language is misleading and inflammatory and the authors provide no evidence to support the implication that government or industries are involved in “illegal release and dispersal.” It is also not clear how radiation is different from many other materials that exhibit a hazard to people, e.g., many hazardous or biological materials are not as readily detectable as radiation.
Comment 11: p. 19, end of section: “A release or clearance level, especially expressed as a dose limit, is not enforceable. It is impossible to identify the actual doses we receive; therefore there is no real ability to enforce any ‘legal’ level of exposure.”
These statements are misleading. Although the dose level cannot be directly measured, in practice the dose limit is used to calculate an acceptable radionuclide concentration, which can be directly measured and therefore enforced.
Comment 12: p. 19, item 2, last paragraph: “…We are being asked to trust the same nuclear weapons and power producers and promoters that created the waste to release it at or below some specified levels they choose, using their own methods, equipment and statistical sampling, if any.”
This statement is misleading. NRC and state regulated industries are not permitted to “choose” the levels at which they release materials nor are they permitted to release materials without adequate sampling and characterization and if they use a waste processor there is a second entity (one whose business is focused on assuring the material meets the criteria for release or disposal) involved that decreases the chance that something inappropriate might get through the system.
Comment 13: p. 20, The Wrong Questions, fourth paragraph of this section: “The right question is “How can radioactive releases be prevented?” not “How much can be released?” or “How much risk are we willing to accept to save money on radioactive cleanups?””
Radioactive cleanups at DOE sites are done at taxpayer expense and the funds available to achieve these cleanups are not infinite. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the amount of risk reduction achieved for a given expenditure and to limit the extent to which resources are used to address very low risk materials. In fact this is exactly what the CERCLA process does for chemical, biological and radiation hazards. It assesses the hazard presented by all the pollutants using risk indicators and establishes a goal that must be met by the cleanup, usually the goal is between the range of a risk of 1 in a 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000 based on costs and other factors.
Comment 14: p. 20-21, bottom of 20, top of 23: “People
offsite could be exposed to multiple, additive, cumulative and synergistic
radioactivity from various parts of
It is possible that an individual could be exposed to material from more than one source. However, the description of possible exposure as “multiple” and “additive” and “cumulative” and “synergistic” is redundant, unrealistic, and to a large extent meaningless.
Comment 15: p. 21-22, More Wrong Questions: Excuses, “…while DOE, the nuclear industry and the nuclear ‘regulators’ confuse the radiation discussion by making unsubstantiated claims and implications.”
This statement is clearly intended to discredit the regulators by grouping them with DOE (which is actually self-regulating) and the nuclear industry that they regulate (as well as by the use of quotes around the word regulator). Furthermore, this statement falsely accuses regulators of making unsubstantiated claims such as:
(p. 22, item 5) “Claim that low levels of man-made ionizing radiation are harmless or even beneficial while dismissing statistically significant findings from population studies which show that low levels of radiation exposure are more damaging and dangerous per unit of dose than higher levels.”
The authors provide no examples to support their assertion that the regulators claim “that low levels…are harmless or even beneficial…”Additionally, they provide no evidence or references to support their claim that there have been “statistically significant findings from population studies” indicating that low levels of radiation are more damaging than higher levels. There are studies that have shown a positive effect to low doses of radiation but I am not aware of any regulation or standards setting activity that has used this information in its deliberations. Further, there are a number of theories that predict different levels of significance for low level exposures but none are definitive and the linear no threshold theory remains the model of choice. See Comment 16 below.
Comment 16: p. 22, last section: “From the January 1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle: When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and- effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”
The use of the linear, no threshold, dose response model for estimating risks from low levels of radiation exposure (which is the basis for the current radiological protection standards) is “precautionary.” It assumes that there is some risk even at very low exposure despite the fact that no health effects are observable at these levels. As stated by COMARE in their response to the CERRIE report, “COMARE concurs with the majority view on CERRIE, that the biological evidence presently available does not imply a need for immediate changes in radiological protection standards. We believe that in the field of radiological protection in general, the precautionary approach has been standard practice and models have been refined as new information has become available” (p.14).
Comment 17: p. 29, Regulatory Guide 1.86, second to last paragraph, “Regulatory Guide 1.86 was Atomic Energy Commission guidance published in 1974 for the release of parts of buildings from the need to be cordoned off with yellow tape. It was never intended to define a level for the free release of radioactivity to the public, but after Congress revoked the NRC’s Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) policies in 1992, both DOE and NRC appear to have expanded its use as guidance for free release, decommissioning and…”
The assertion that Regulatory Guide 1.86 was initially developed for use in releasing portions “of buildings from the need to be cordoned off” is not correct. The regulatory guide as issued in June 1974 by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was clearly intended to establish surface contamination limits below which buildings could be released for unrestricted use. In addition in the early 90’s the EPA evaluated releases using Reg Guide 1.86 and found that for most radionuclides the levels for release assured that doses to individuals exposed would be less than 1 millirem under their conservative assessment. Thus they deemed the guidance to be protective of public health. See Comment 18 below.
Comment 18: p. 30, DOE Order 5400.5, second full paragraph: “Policies and procedures for the release of materials contaminated with residual radioactivity are promulgated in DOE Order 5400.5, where “residual radioactive material” means contaminated soils, radon decay products in air, external radiation and surface contamination…The projected doses resulting from the surface contamination guidelines are expected to be well below the primary dose standard, which is stated at a total of 100 millirems/year or up to 500 millirems/ year on a temporary basis. These levels allow an effective doubling of (or up to 5 times more than) ongoing daily radiation exposure since the level is over and above naturally occurring background that has been assessed as anywhere from 100–360 millirems a year.”
The DOE surface release criteria are consistent with (and
nearly identical to) those contained in the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86. Based on
evaluations performed in the development of the ANSI/HPS N13.12-1999 clearance
criteria, the doses associated with these surface contamination levels would be
closer to 1 mrem/year than the 100 to 500 mrem/year dose limit discussed here.
(ANSI/HPS N13.12-1999, American National Standard, Surface and Volume
Radioactivity Standards for Clearance, American National Standards Institute.
Comment 19: p.33, Health Physics Society ANSI / HPS N-13.12-1999, end of second to last paragraph and last paragraph: “It was recognized that there were several complex issues that would make it difficult to fully implement the clearance standard. As a result, some of these issues were defined to be beyond the scope of the standard, including: naturally occurring radioactive materials, radioactive materials in or on persons, release of a licensed or regulated site or facility for unrestricted use, radioactive materials on or in foodstuffs, release of land or soil intended for agricultural purposes, materials related to national security, and process gases or liquids. The commentary here recognizing complexity in projecting outcomes reveals another interesting angle on releasing radioactivity: if deregulated radioactivity were to be consumed, and become an internal dose emitter, it would no longer “count” toward the annual dose limit of 100 mrem/year – precisely when it would be most potent and contribute the greatest amount of dose to the “receptor” possible!”
The statement at the end of this paragraph (shown in bold) is misleading in its claim that the exclusion of certain materials from the scope of the ANSI standard was in response to the “complexity of projecting outcomes.” However, in greater question is the second part of this statement regarding the possible consumption of internal dose emitters, which is not only false, but also nonsensical. In every dose assessment of which I am aware all possible pathways of exposure are always included unless it can be shown that it is not a credible pathway. Certainly, if a radionuclide is inhaled or consumed its internal dose to the individual is considered. This statement is so egregious it causes one to wonder if they actually read the report, as there are extensive discussions in Annex B on internal dose issues. In fact if internal dose were not considered there would be no limits for tritium or carbon-14, other low energy beta emitters and all of the alpha emitters.
Comment 20: p. 40, Using RESRAD Computer Code to permit radioactive releases to landfills and public, second to last paragraph: “To assist DOE in claiming that groundwater would be protected, the DOE and NRC contracted the DOE Argonne National Laboratory to develop the RESRAD computer code. It provides a tool to claim doses are being calculated as acceptable and justify dumping nuclear waste in solid waste landfills.”
These statements do not accurately reflect the history of the RESRAD code. Furthermore, the authors are attempting to discredit the RESRAD code with the implication that its only purpose is to allow the user “to claim that doses are being calculated.”
Comment 21: p. 43, second column, third paragraph: “One of the troubling aspects of “clearance” is that the material is no longer recorded as, labeled or considered radioactive. The more important issue is not the mass of the material being released that is of concern, which the TDEC Solid Waste Division is supposed to keep track of for each landfill receiving deregulated or “special” radioactive waste. It is the radioactivity and the resulting undisclosed radiation exposures to unsuspecting individuals that is of real concern.”
The statement is misleading. The BSFR program is designed to control both the total mass of waste and the amount of radioactive materials that enter the landfill such that the radiation dose to a hypothetical, maximally exposed individual (a resident farmer who lives on top of the landfill, grows crops in the garbage, and drinks the water that has infiltrated into the groundwater from the garbage, etc.) will not exceed 1 mrem/year. The doses to individuals living near the landfill would be expected to be significantly less than 1 mrem/year.
Comment 22: p.44, last paragraph: “Another change in the regulations under 10 CFR 835 could be made in the definition of some controlled areas that have the potential to affect the bans on commercial recycling of metal in those areas.”
It is unclear whether thought is being given to making this change or this potential change is pure speculation on the part of the authors. It is not clear how changing the definition of controlled areas would impact the release of contaminated materials in any event as any material that had previously been in a controlled area would still have to be treated as potentially contaminated until it was demonstrated otherwise. It is true that one can tighten up the controlled areas to reduce their size/scope so that areas that are not necessary to assure protection of the public, workers and the environment from radiation are not unnecessarily controlled. This is actually a good practice as it allows more focus on potential concerns and less wasted effort on areas that are not of concern.
Comment 23: p. 45, second column, end of first paragraph: “It becomes even more worrying when independent radiation experts find risk of fatal cancer from this level of radiation to be as much as 10 times higher than NRC’s projection.”
The authors do not provide references to support their claim that “independent radiation experts find risk of fatal cancer…to be as much as 10 times higher…” The NRC projections discussed were made in 1990 and were based on the International Commission on Radiological Protection’s 1990 recommended risk value for fatal cancer of 0.05 per Sv (5 x 10-7 per millirem). The BEIR VII (2006) updated risk value of 0.1 per Sv (1 x 10-6 per millirem) would result in an estimate of lifetime risk that is 2 times (not 10 times) higher than that previously estimated by the NRC.
Comment 24: p. 46 last paragraph: “It is just as troubling
to trust the State of
The TDEC regulatory body whose primary focus is the protection of the public and environment from the potentially harmful effects of radiation exposures is the appropriate agency to determine what levels are acceptable for release.
Comment 25: p. 54, second to last paragraph, column 1: “TDEC records were reviewed in 2003 and 2004 and with information gathered from 1999 until 2007. In approving the streamlined releases, no requirement appears to have been made to evaluate for the synergistic effects of radioactivity and hazardous chemicals that could be in the landfills.”
At the low levels of radioactive materials that could be present in materials approved for such disposals, synergistic effects would not be expected. The UNSCEAR 2000 report concludes that “…there is no evidence that low level exposures to multiple agents yield combined effects far from additivity or above the estimates resulting from linear extrapolation of single agent effects at controlled occupational or environmental exposure levels.” (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly, “Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation.” Annex H “Combined Effects of Radiation and Other Agents.” United Nations, New York., page 217).
Comment 26: p. 55, Clearance, Release, Bulk Survey For
Release (BSFR), first paragraph: “As previously stated, since at least the
early 1990s, companies in
This assertion is false and intentionally misleading. The release of materials must be in accordance with state and federal criteria and the release levels are not decided on by the licensee. Not only can they not make the decision as to what is clean themselves, even the process they must use is specifically dictated by the regulator.
Comment 27: p. 56 second paragraph: “TDEC was affirming that an additional millirem a year to Tennesseans for every accepted release to state approved landfills was permissible. They made this decision while knowing there would be more than one waste stream, since the backlog of requests motivated the accelerated process for approvals.”
The assertion that Tennesseans would receive an additional 1 millirem a year “for every accepted release to state approved landfills” is false. The 1 millirem dose limit is calculated for an individual who is assumed to live, as a resident farmer, directly on top of the landfill with no credit taken for the engineered features of the landfill (cover, liners, etc.). Furthermore, mass limits are established to ensure that in the event that more than one BSFR processor utilizes the same landfill the total dose limit of 1 mrem/year is not exceeded. Therefore, the actual dose to Tennesseans even from multiple disposals to a single landfill would be significantly less than the 1 millirem limit. Additionally, releases to different landfills could not reasonably be expected to be sources of multiple exposures to a single individual. As discussed in general comment # 7, the potential for multiple waste streams to go to a single landfill is accounted for in the BSFR evaluation process. Acceptable concentrations for disposal are based on the assumption that the BSFR wastes will comprise 10% of the total volume solid waste within the landfill, but the actual percentage is expected to be significantly less. In the event that more than one BSFR processor is using the same landfill, the mass limits for each stream are adjusted to ensure the total percentage from all BSFR wastes remains less than 5%.
Comment 28: p. 56, second to last paragraph, column 1, “For a fee, nuclear waste can be more economically buried in potentially leaking solid waste facilities, potentially increasing the risks those landfills pose from leakage,”
As discussed in general comment #7 above, the BSFR program takes no credit for the liners or leachate collection systems that are required for regulated municipal, solid waste landfills. The BSFR dose evaluations specifically include the assumption that the landfill will leak and that radioactive materials will reach the groundwater and be consumed by the resident farmer assumed to be living directly on the landfill. The combined dose from this pathway and all others must be shown to be no more than 1 millirem.
Comment 29: p. 56, second paragraph, column 2: “It is common knowledge, but not part of the so called acceptable risk calculation, that health effects are greater than additive for exposures to chemicals and radiation together.”
It is neither “common knowledge” nor commonly accepted that “health effects are greater than additive for exposures to chemicals and radiation together” when dealing with low doses of radioactivity. (See comment #25)
Comment 30: p. 56, second paragraph: “To speed up approvals of deregulated disposal in landfills, a hypothetical (“worst-case”) scenario was set up and any waste stream that was less contaminated was allowed to be released if some conditions were met.”
This statement is misleading and does not accurately reflect the approval process for landfill disposals of BSFR waste (see general comment #7 for more information). The waste stream is not approved on the basis of it being less contaminated than a “worst case scenario.” The worst case scenario just establishes some basic conservative criteria as to how the assessment must be made. Then site specific, radionuclide specific data is used to model the impacts. From that the permitted concentrations are established.
Comment 31: p. 56 to p. 57: “According to landfill groundwater expert, Dr. G Fred Lee, ‘There is no reliable way to properly predict when high density polyethylene liners in an MSW [Municipal Solid Waste] landfill or Class C landfill are going to fail. They are going to fail. There is no question they will fail. The issue about that is not if but WHEN and that is unknown. It relates to the fact that there are a whole host of reasons they fail including free radical attack. It can take hundreds of years but that is extrapolating beyond any reasonable approach.’ He did not believe RESRAD or any code can reliably predict when any doses would be delivered.”
No credit is taken for these liners in the BSFR assessments
and it assumed that radionuclides in the landfill are available for transport
to groundwater from 20 to 1000 years post closure. This clearly demonstrates
that the authors did not care to assure their facts were correct. Any
protection a liner may provide because it is there simply adds to the
protection already built into the assessment. There is no need for RESRAD to
predict the failure of the liner because it is assumed to fail as a basic
premise of the assessment. Essentially assuming that the liner is leaking at
all points from day one! The same is true for assuming that there is no cover
on the landfill. Every landfill in the
Comment 32: p. 57, second paragraph: ”The underlying equations
for the various assumptions are not revealed publicly even though the code was
developed primarily with
This statement is misleading. Although the computer code may not have been “revealed publicly,” the equations used within the code to calculate radiation doses are provided and discussed in detail in the RESRAD user’s manual (available on the RESRAD website, http://web.ead.anl.gov/resrad/documents). See Comment 33 below. It is not clear how much more public this code could be.
Comment 33: p. 57, third paragraph: “There are several RESRAD codes and the one used for landfills has not been validated, to the best of our ability to ascertain. We researched and inquired directly with the authors but got no information on validation of the code used for landfill dose calculations.”
The primary RESRAD code (the current version is 6.3), which is the code developed to evaluate doses from residual radioactive materials in soils, is the one used for landfill evaluations. The code contains pathways models that estimate doses associated with the following exposure pathways: external exposure, inhalation, plant ingestion, meat ingestion, milk ingestion, aquatic foods ingestion, drinking water ingestion, inadvertent soil ingestion, and radon. With the exception of radon, the RESRAD results for these exposure pathways were benchmarked against five other computer codes and one dose assessment methodology that was not available as a computer code (NRC NUREG 5512). The results of this benchmarking exercise were published as an Argonne National Laboratory report (ANL/EAD/TM-24) and are available through the RESRAD website at (http://web.ead.anl.gov/resrad/documents/benchmarking.pdf)
Comment 34: p 57, third paragraph: “The RESRAD website indicates that the metal recycling code RESRAD RECYCLE was validated but we would urge caution on accepting that assertion as there appear to be flaws and invalid comparisons in that validation effort.”
The authors offer no examples to support their claim of “flaws and invalid comparisons.”
Comment 35: p. 58 end of second paragraph: “DOT and NRC deny this step toward deregulating nuclear wastes, but brokers do use these levels, perhaps unofficially, and illegally to deregulate waste for customers and dump as if not radioactive.”
No supporting evidence is provided to back up the authors’ allegations of criminal activity.
Comment 36: p. 66, Join International Allies in Rejecting
International Recommendations, first paragraph: “...The international nuclear
groups such as ICRP, IAEA and Euratom are nuclear promoters whose members stand
to gain economically if their waste can be let out of control. They like to
claim some levels are trivial and acceptable to let go. They are not
independent and NRC uses their recommendations to overcome
The authors use inflammatory language and provide no supporting evidence to back up their controversial assertion that the ICRP and IAEA should be considered “nuclear promoters.”