A Resident's Perception of the The Lower East Fork Poplar Creek Superfund Site A resident's perception of a Superfund site is undoubtedly biased but not necessarily wrong. The resident's bias originates in a desire to see the land safe but not destroyed in the process. The resident brings to the table years of site observation and whatever other background their life has provided, in this case, chemistry and computer modeling. The resident is motivated and, if retired, has adequate time to study the problem. The purpose of recounting the LEFPC story is to document, from the resident's view, the procedures and methodology used by DOE and EPA to set a remediation goal for a Superfund site. It should be clearly stated that throughout the process and in spite of differences of opinion the DOE and its contractors were both very open and very helpful supplying both data and explanation when requested as well as providing open forums for discussion by their opposition. Later, the EPA and ATSDR were likewise equally helpful. The LEFPC is one of many DOE remediation projects associated with the City of Oak Ridge. The total estimated cost is several billions of dollars. This is not an insignificant sum and already there is talk of a funding shortage. This is occurring against a backdrop of other non-DOE community hazards and shortfalls which cry for funds for amelioration. This raises the question in the taxpaying residents mind: Which of these needs is the most pressing? Which of these hazards are the most significant? The East Fork Popular Creek Watershed ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ EFPC is a small tributary of Poplar Creek which in turn discharges into the Clinch River. The EFPC lies wholly within the City of Oak Ridge which also contains the Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation comprising three major DOE installations including the Y-12 Weapons Production Facility. The latter has produced nuclear weapons materials and components since about 1944. The upper EFPC rises in Bear Creek Valley about one mile west of the Y- 12 Plant, flows easterly in a channel on the south border of Y-12 into settlement basins east of Y-12, turns north under Bear Creek Road and exits the DOE Reservation into the developed portion of the City. The upper creek receives all of the Y-12 Plant discharges as well as the normal runoff of the valley. At the exit from the ORR, it becomes lower EFPC flowing northwest parallel to South Illinois Avenue which is bordered by commercial areas with more remote residential areas. Crossing to the north of the Oak Ridge Turnpike, the Creek turns southwest flowing past the Robertsville Middle School, a low cost housing area, a commercial area and a recreational area. It then crosses to the south of the Turnpike flowing through largely undeveloped land and then through an agricultural area, a recreational area, past a golf course and housing developments. It then re-crosses the turnpike re-entering the DOE/ORR flowing through largely unused land some of which very recently has been leased for private industrial development. The Creek then enters the main branch of Poplar Creek shortly before it enters the Clinch River. The length of LEFPC is 14 miles and the TVA-defined 100 year flood plain is about 650 acres with an average width of about 400 feet. In addition to the runoff and Y-12 outfalls of UEFPC, the lower creek drains about two thirds of the City of Oak Ridge with the usual urban contaminants, many of which are apparent. The average flow rate has been about 7 million gallons per day about half of which was process water from Y12. The stream is subject to yearly periodic flooding which approximates the 100 year limit and during which the effects of soil erosion are apparent. The flood plain is constantly being eroded and renewed. The creek is described by the ecologists as a thriving urban stream and floodplain. Portions of the undeveloped floodplain are wooded, some is pasture and some lies fallow. In addition to livestock there are deer, raccoon, possum, fox, marmot, rabbits, beaver and muskrat as well as the usual rodents and reptiles. The City is a bird sanctuary and there is an abundance of birds including hawks, black vultures, great blue heron, bittern, pileated woodpecker, a few ducks and geese as well as kingfisher. In the stream itself are turtles, crawdads and a variety of small fish as well as spawning carp. All in all when the stream runs clear it is a pleasant valley if the urban debris is picked up. The Mercury Pollution ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In about 1954 as a part of the nuclear weapons program in the Cold War, Y-12 began the enrichment of lithium isotopes by an electrochemical process using mercury anodes. The facility grew into one of the largest users of metallic mercury in the country. The process involved a mercury cleaning step using dilute nitric acid and it was this waste stream which polluted the LEFPC and the flood plain with 70 metric tons of mercury. An approximately equal amount is in the sediments of the deep Clinch River channels or beyond. The process is now shut down but the Y- 12 site has contaminated soils, sewers and buildings. Many people criticize the Y-12 plant for the contamination but the event needs to be viewed in context. The following circumstances appear to have contributed to the situation: The creek and land along the creek were owned by DOE and was largely undeveloped. Due to the Cold War and the international situation, there was a great sense of urgency at least equal to the prior wartime urgency. The process was well run with an annual loss rate of about 3 % compared to industrial experience of 20-30%. Most industrial mercury processes, smaller than Y-12, were on large rivers which minimized the riverine problem while Y-12 was on a small stream. The health of workers was monitored and no great problems were encountered. The world was just beginning to appreciate the danger of mercury in the ecosystem particularly in the marine food chains leading to humans. The project was very highly classified making it difficult to study the down stream effects. The association of the mercury with soils and sediments and the movement of soils and sediments within the flood plain during periods of high flow apparently was not fully appreciated. As soon as the effects of the releases were appreciated the process was modified to reduce the losses, steps were taken to treat waste streams and in about 1960 this remediation dramatically reduced the mercury levels in LEFPC. This work continues and EFPC mercury level is now below that required for drinking water but above the environmental requirements. It continues to drop as the remaining sources are identified, isolated and treated. To complicate matters, many truckloads of soil and sediment had been taken from a region of high mercury content and used as topsoil for a major sewer line installation lying largely in the floodplain. In 1980 as DOE was preparing to release information about the pollution, the story was broken by a summer employee with the usual impact. There was little firm information about the form and concentration of mercury. The headlines were large and scary. There was an immediate negative impact on the utility of the floodplain property. Yet to the long term residents a serious pollution problem did not seem consistent with life on the floodplain as they knew it. Life on the "Floodplain" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Life on the floodplain seemed incompatible with a contamination problem in the following ways: The flood plain floods and you can't live on it, only close to it. The flood frequency is 1 to 5 times a year, the flood depth is 1 to 4 feet and the current is dangerously strong easily washing children or adults down stream. One is tempted only once to recover items while the stream is in flood. It also destroys gardens as those who have tried to plant on the flood plain have found out. Therefore activities on the floodplain are limited to the infrequent clipping of pastures to limit weeds or to rescue mired cows or the occasional walk and other recreations. The floodplain is used for pasturing horses and cattle but there has never been evidence that mercury is absorbed by the animals who spent all day, every day grazing and in some cases swimming in and drinking from the creek. The cattle die at the slaughter house, the horses and dogs die of old age. Thus it seemed improbable that humans who do not live as intimately with the creek could be experiencing a problem. For the most part there are commercial areas and major thoroughfares lying between residential areas and the flood plain. This makes daily access by young children quite improbable and these "trespassers" were almost never seen. One or two boys per year fishing from the bridge and one boat load in thirty years. The number of residences from which the floodplain is readily accessible by young children is small. There is little doubt that some children played on the flood plain but mercury may have been the least of the hazards. There are increasing numbers of wild animals who also live intimately with the creek taking their food from or along it, digging in its soil. It is difficult to accept that this is a situation in which the environment is unduly threatened. As usual, habitat destruction and urban contamination seems to be the biggest threat to the ecology. A recent main sewer installation on a 70 foot right-of-way provided an example of the damage excavation can do to the LEFPC floodplain. The proposed remediation seemed more destined to destroy the ecosystem rather than to improve it. The Pre-Superfund Studies ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In about 1980 DOE initiated a study of the mercury in the flood plain which was carried out by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities[1] .The gross nature of the problem soon became known: The entire floodplain was contaminated with mercury in the range of background (about 0.3 ppm.) up to about 2300 ppm. (later about 3000 ppm.) with a decreasing trend with distance from the Y-12 boundary. There were a few acres near commercial or undeveloped at the higher concentration with many acres at the lower concentrations. In the Clinch River, i.e., the Lower Watts Bar Reservoir, the mercury is buried in the sediments of the deep channel but this is another Superfund site. One significant piece of information was not yet known for LEFPC: What was the form of the mercury - the very dangerous dimethyl mercury or the relatively innocuous mercuric sulfide or something else? Or more to the point, how much of each? During this period the landowners knew how much mercury they lived with but not the degree of hazard. This was cause for concern. During this period many things were sampled: garden soils and garden produce, edible wild plants and associated soils, horses' hair and feces, meat and organs from slaughtered cattle, fish and other creek residents. It became apparent that the problem was limited to contaminated soils and contaminated fish. The creek, not a popular fishing stream, was posted against fishing and water contact. The problem of what to do with the flood plain remained. Crucial to this was how does the mercury get to humans and to other species. During this period before the problem was completely defined, a very preliminary exposure model was evaluated [2] reaching the conclusion that a soil action level was 10 ppm. The allowed dose was based on the World Health Organization values used for the consumption of fish. The published number became established in the public's mind as the "true" measure of the hazard. Unfortunately the assumed ingestion rate of 10 grams per day was high by a factor of 50 to 100 and the assumed dimethyl mercury was high as was the absorption factor applied to the inorganic mercury assumed to be mercuric chloride. It was later known that there was little or no dimethyl mercury in the soil and the remainder was not easily soluble in water and was probably mostly the very insoluble mercuric sulfide. The remedial implications of 10 ppm. can best be described as "Gut the Valley" with unofficial estimated costs as high as $1.6 billion. Needless to say there was a great deal of concern amongst land owners and taxpayers alike. The community had been living with the situation for thirty years and had seen no deleterious effects. As the analytical and feeding studies progressed several things became apparent: The mercury was insoluble and, based on extraction data, was presumably the sulfide although this latter conclusion is now less certain. There was evidence to show that in the presence of sulfate that mercuric sulfide, not diethyl mercury, is the stable reduction product in reducing soils. The EPA soil leaching tests were well below limits and were consistent with the solubility of mercuric sulfide and about 0.025 % soluble mercury. The soil feeding studies using mice when extrapolated to humans gave a soil action level of 722 ppm using an ingestion rate of 1 gram per day which is high by a factor of 5. Again the WHO dosage limit was used. A limited human study [3] showed no substantial elevations of mercury. Garden vegetables and flood plain animal tissues showed no mercury. These results were consistent with the experience and knowledge of the resident's who expected a few acres would require remediation but the remainder of the valley would be spared. As time went by, several of the citizens did not understand why there was not a corresponding dramatic change in the proposed soil remediation level, i.e., 10 ppm. A change in solubility of a factor of about 100,000 and a decrease in inherent toxicity should have some effect on the outcome. Before this question could be fully debated a major change took place: LEFPC had become a Superfund site under the Environmental Protection Agency's rules. The Superfund Site Studies [4] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ As EPA took jurisdiction in 1986, it was back to square zero: everything had to be repeated under EPA guidelines or replaced by EPA approved methods or numbers. The following happened: 1) The site-specific feeding study was discounted and replaced by EPA generic data for dimethyl mercury and mercuric chloride. 2) The mercury speciation data and the EPA leaching data was disallowed. 3) Other evidence of a "non-problem" was set aside. 4) The EPA rules became the orders of the day. 5) The floodplain was resampled and reanalyzed. 6) The WHO dosage was replaced by the more conservative EPA RfDs 7) Worst case EPA scenarios for exposure pathways were developed. 8) The one less conservative change was a reduction in the soil ingestion rate. 9) A Citizens Working Group was appointed by DOE to act as an interface to the public. The soil ingestion pathway was dominant and the computations followed the EPA guidelines using the RfD of 0.0005 mg/kg/day for soluble mercuric ion and a bioavailability factor of 1.0 more characteristic of methyl Hg than the chloride. The resulting proposed remediation goal was 50 ppm at an estimated cost of $270 million. A significant portion of the valley was still subject to a very disruptive process. The public was still concerned and could not reconcile the proposed actions with the information resulting from the prior site specific study. Several technically trained members of the public started to find out what was the cause of the apparent inconsistency. They went at it in the usual manner: studied the reports, read the cited references, searched the literature and did their own modeling and computations. As the public found evidence to support a less costly remediation level, they were answered by statements such as: "The values used are those required by EPA and DOE must use them." DOE also made it known that they had tried to use the site specific information but that it had been rejected. Slowly documents supporting this claim came into the possession of the public. It also became apparent in re-reading the reports that this was true: The remnants of the DOE attempts were still in the reports. While the DOE may have been constrained to follow the rulings of the EPA, the private citizens were not and they continued to develop and press their case. Their case, based in large part on Appendix N of the Remedial Investigation Report, consisted broadly of the following points: 1) The EPA RfD values, having the usual conservative factors applied, were badly biased even for mercuric chloride. This results from the use of sensitive strains of sensitive test species [6] and the application of conservative factors to extrapolate to humans and again to extrapolate to a sensitive subpopulation [6]. 2) There was no evidence that the mercury was present in a soluble form and some evidence to support the presence of the sulfide [7]. The failure to consider HgS as the contaminant was contributing another factor of about 100 or more to the conservative bias. 3) There was evidence in the literature that the absorption of the sulfide in mice was a factor of 50 less than the chloride [8]. The literature also supported an adsorption factor for the chloride [9] in humans of 0.15 not 1.0 as set by EPA. 4) There was one feeding study[10] using cinnabar (HgS) in mice indicating a very low absorption. A very limited test in humans[11] supported this conclusion and the use of cinnabar in traditional Chinese medicine at doses several thousand times the allowed LEFPC dose had not shown any deleterious effects. 5)The exposure scenario was very conservative both in the assumption of residential land use everywhere, in the soil ingestion rate and in the assumption that a child would be consistently exposed to the deeper soil layers when the top 6" layer had only about half as much mercury. Also the concentration of mercury varied sharply over the distance of a few feet requiring that the child consistently eat dirt at the same small spot. The best statistical estimates of the average concentration in 20 by 20 meter plots was no higher than 525 ppm as opposed to 2300 -3000 ppm for spot samples. 6) To the EPA claim that the conservative data used resulted in "always safe errors" the citizens replied: "It is a waste of significant funds to clean up a site that does not need it and there are risks associated with the clean up". Later optimization theory was applied to show that in the face of limited funding for DOE/ORR clean up, the concept of an "always safe error" does not apply. With limited resources any departure from the optimal cleanup is an increased risk. In prototypal optimization computations it was shown the biases of the magnitude claimed could totally exempt an unsafe site from remediation while forcing a safe site to be cleaned up. The EPA pathway models customarily use improperly repeated application of 95 percentile values of input parameters which result in very biased results far beyond the 95 percentile. Prototypal Monte Carlo computations of properly-used probability distribution functions and unbiased input parameters gave rise to far higher remediation goals for the 90, 95 and 99 percentile exposure levels (20500, 15000 and 10700 respectively) even though some of the input data, i.e., the RfD, was still conservatively biased. When the distribution function for the concentration of mercury in the upper layer of the LEFPC soil was included in a random exposure model there was no risk and no remediation required. After considerable opposition from the public [] and as the environmental studies became available the proposed remediation level was changed from 50 to 180 as a result of a new ingestion rate for children and a change to 0.3 for the bioavailability factor. The environmental level, set at 200 ppm, was based on relieving an ill- defined "pressure" on the midlevel predators, i.e., wrens and voles. There was no prediction of the effect on populations and based on the wildlife populations and the acreage involved 12 wrens and 30 voles were involved at a cost of about $50 million per pound. Habitat destruction seemed like a more likely candidate for concern especially for the voles. The public did not oppose the finding of significant mercury in the fish below Y-12 nor the posting of the a fish advisory for that reason. When the citizens including those on the Citizens Working Group stated to DOE that in spite of "regulations" that the analysis of LEFPC was bad science and proposed alternative statistical models and computations, the DOE arranged a public meeting for the EPA to respond to the citizens technical concerns. The EPA Meeting - July 21, 1994 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The meeting comprised citizens and representatives of the DOE, the EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry who are responsible for health consultations on proposed RGOs. After the citizens had presented their technical arguments, the EPA and DOE risk assessors said that technically the citizens were correct but regulations required otherwise. Pressed further on this point the EPA described their position as follows (paraphrased): "The process of reaching a remediation decision has two stages: 1) risk assessment and 2) risk management. In the risk assessment stage, the CERCLA is a mandate to EPA from the people via Congress to propose remediation goals for a Superfund site which would restore the site regardless of cost to an unquestionably safe condition approximating its pre-contamination state. This requires conservative proposed remediation goals which in turn justifies using conservatively biased risk assessment parameters which they have established as regulations and approved guidelines. In the risk management stage, the public can express their support for or opposition to the proposed level for whatever reasons they desire and are encouraged to do so. Further, EPA cannot change as long as the law does not change and it is up to Congress to change the law." The above was surprising since the CERCLA clearly says "substantive health risk" and "cost effective remediation". This combined with the admission that the citizens were technically correct showed that the process was indeed a political one. The EPA went on to encourage the public to exercise their right to protest the proposed remediation in the Risk Management phase and to bring pressure to bear on Congress to change the law stating that private citizens had more influence on the legislative process than did the Agency. The meeting clarified what DOE had claimed: the process was a regulatory one not a scientific one and political pressures should be applied to meet goals even if those goals were founded on technical arguments. The citizens acted accordingly, more letters to the editor and more letters and petitions to Congress (the latter to no avail). At the time of the Risk Management hearing the RGO was 180 ppm. This was opposed by the vast majority of the speakers from the audience on the basis the risk was exaggerated and the remediation both wasteful and destructive of the environment it was to protect. The written comments are said to reflect the same conclusion. Several citizens suggested remediation levels as high as 1200 ppm. No one requested that the earlier lower RGO be restored. DOE with EPA and ATSDR concurrence changed the RGO to 400 ppm reducing the acreage to about 6 and the cost to $30 million. The reason for this concession is not clear but the bioavailability factor was hotly debated and appeared the only parameter subject to any concession. This figure was tacitly accepted by the community as evidenced by no further public protest. David had won at least a partial victory over Goliath. For LEFPC the EPA process can be said to work for the right reasons but a close examination reveals it may have been unique: "the EPA characterized the author as the only person in the USA who lived on a Superfund site and protested its cleanup on the grounds it was not unsafe and presented technical arguments to support it". Oak Ridge has a high percentage of technically trained citizens and even more who are used to contending with the impact of DOE on their community. Many communities have citizens with these characteristics but how many have one who lives on a Superfund site, is technically trained, is vocal, is retired and is very, very stubborn. That these problems are not limited to the LEFPC site nor to mercury nor even to Superfund is documented by an abundance and variety of reports and publications [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. That the process may work but for the wrong reasons is evidenced by the fact the Congress is not ensuring the use of good science in risk assessment to reach meaningful goals but is rather granting exceptions to the environmental regulations for political reasons. This is very, very unfortunate for many of the pollution problems are real. On the positive side, the ATSDR appears to have recognized that truly biased RGOs can be a disservice to society and now take pains to relate their health consultations more closely to the experimental data on which they are based to show the degree of safety accomplished. They have also reviewed the toxicity data related to mercury with a view as to its bioavailability. In Retrospect ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In retrospect it is difficult to understand why, in the face of expenditures of $270 million, DOE did not insist on repeating the animal feeding studies nor why EPA would not have welcomed the addition of the resulting data to their data pool. In fact very little of the studies done under EPA went to define the site specific problem other than to define the location of the mercury. Granted there were very sincere attempts to determine the species of the mercury but in the final analysis they were indecisive due to the complex nature of mercury in clay soils. Animal feeding studies are perhaps the only way to address the problem in a meaningful manner. It is also difficult to understand why in the face of several billions of estimated expenses for many diverse remediation tasks admittedly costing more than was available, the DOE did not nor has not pursued the conclusions to be drawn from optimization theory. Surely it was not from the lack of expertise as the Oak Ridge operations have long used these methods. Similar comments can be made about the proper use of Monte Carlo to more accurately predict reality. One has the feeling that the Superfund process has become so political and embedded in regulation that reality has become virtual. The statement that EPA risk assessment is "more prohibitive than predictive" is certainly correct. It also appears that "measurements" have less validity than "science policy" and the latter is more political than scientific. The problem extends far beyond Superfund. Congress must apportion funds between all manners of competing activities. How can this be done properly if the projected benefits and risks are not real. How does highway safety compete with pollution when the former has the disadvantage of having real data and the latter has "science policy"? Historically when scientific fact has been dictated by tribunals it is the tribunals that have been wrong. In Tennessee the historic past was yesterday, February 27, 1996 when the State Legislature attempted to become an authority on the Theory of Evolution; Mr. Scopes must be smiling. Why should risk assessment be different? From the experience there arises two large questions: 1) To what purposes will the political process distort science or dictate what is correct? and 2) To what extent will the public be required to defend itself against it own government? Lastly, was the fight worth it? Yes, science aided by politics did prevail on LEFPC. Did we correct the way science is used? A little but not much. The Aftermath of LEFPC ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Old problems, like old soldiers, never die, they slowly fade away. Or are reborn again. Subsequent to the closure of the LEFPC debate, Oak Ridge is still faced with a massive DOE remediation and waste management problem in which the EPA risk assessment philosophy plays a significant role, directly or indirectly. And, of course, the larger Superfund problem is ever with us. Currently in Oak Ridge, there is an active environment committee in both the OR League of Women Voters and the Friends of ORNL. The ORR Local Oversight Committee has created a Citizen's Advisory Panel to keep pace with technical questions and to interface to the public. The DOE has formed a Site Specific Advisory Board and continues to address the problem of public participation. In August 1995 the author was asked to participate in an ATSDR workshop to review the toxicity data of mercury. Unable to attend (due to a personal risk assessment problem resulting in a five-way coronary bypass) two papers were submitted. One on the implications of limited funding and the application of optimization theory and a second on the use of Monte Carlo methods to reach percentile based remediation goals. Also submitted was a position on the need for site specific animal feeding studies as the only reliable way around the toxicity problems. While the impact of the two papers is not known, the consensus opinion did favor site-specific feeding studies. Conversations with ATSDR personnel indicate that the technical arguments of the papers are understood and receive some credence. Summaries of the two papers were distributed via an E-mail risk assessment server. The responses varied from irate to thoughtful and the latter can be summed up as: "Surely we can not be opposed to improved risk assessment?" If nothing else several new references and supporting papers were obtained [21]. At a DOE/EPA Mercury Speciation Workshop held in Denver, CO in September 1996, supported financially by both the League of Women Voters and the ORR Local Oversight Committee, Inc., the limited funding model refuting the "always safe error" assumption was presented soon after the keynote speaker said, "Conservatism in the face of uncertainty is logical". The paper discussed how the two models influenced the choice of risk assessment data values in different manners. No one attempted to discredit the logic of the limited resources model and several positive comments were received. During that meeting it was established that the LEFPC regulators were not swayed solely by political forces but were convinced by the public that the creek was safe at the higher RGOs. CERCLA Re-authorization ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ As the re-authorization of CERCLA by Congress approaches, there is a unique opportunity to review the basic assumption EPA has used and to effect the changes deemed necessary. Addressing only the risk assessment issues revealed by LEFPC, the problem can be presented as a choice between the two cost models described below: The Unlimited Resource Model As long as unlimited resources are available to Superfund and hence to each remediation site then the risk assessment model may be conservatively biased and the input data may consist the conservative bounds on the data. The assumption of the "always safe error" is valid, the model admits the error of repeated conservative statistical approximations and eventually the sites will be cleaned up to an "unquestionably safe" level. The EPA appears to view the other government agencies as bound by their rules and model. Excessively conservative bounds will lead to unnecessary remediation costs unless the lay public is prepared to contest the expenditures on a site by site basis. Seldom can the lay public refute the complex risk assessment when faced with professionals who are required to defend an assessment they know to be inaccurate and biased. The Limited Resource Model On the other hand with limited resources, optimization theory requires that there be an optimal strategy for which the maximum remediation is obtained and that all other strategies are less effective and thus riskier. This model considers all the sites together, demands a lack of bias in the risk assessment data such that it reflects reality insofar as possible. There is no such thing as an "always safe error" and statistics must be properly applied to avoid errors and less than optimal solutions. The resources will be allocated to each site in order to reduce the collective risk as much as possible. The lack of suitable data does not negate the conclusions drawn but reduces the ability to accurately approximate the optimal solution; deliberate large conservative biases in the data lead to increasingly poor solutions. This model, giving rise to realistic alternatives, allows the public to make well-founded input to the process. Concerning the major premise: Limited vs. Unlimited Resources. If unlimited resources are available for Superfund, why is the Federal budget so hard to balance? Why not universal medical coverage? Why not a lot of things? While unlimited funding may have appeared plausible at one time, it no longer seems tenable in the face of existing Federal fiscal problems. CERCLA now says "significant health risk" and "cost effective remediation". This sounds more like limited resources than unlimited resources. What wording in the new legislation must Congress employ to change the models used by EPA to reflect the funding realities of the present and the intent of Congress? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Footnotes: ~~~~~~~~~ [1] Revis, W.N., etal.: a) An Assessment of Health Risk Associated with Mercury in Soil and Sediment from East Fork Poplar Creek, Oak Ridge, Tennessee(Final report); Oak Ridge Research Institute, Oak Ridge, TN; April 1989 b) Distribution of Mercury Species in Soil from a Mercury-contaminated Site; Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 45, 105-113, 1989 c) Quantitative Method for Determining the Concentration of Mercury(II) Sulphide in Soils and Sediments; Analyst Vol 114, July 1989 d) Mercury in Soil: A Method for Assessing Acceptable Limits; Arch. Environ. Contam. Toxicol. 19, 221-226(1990) [2] Bashor, B.S. and Turri, P.A.; A Method for Determining an Allowable Concentration of Mercury in Soil; Arch. Environ. Contam. Toxicol. 15, 435-438(1986) [3] Rowley, D.L., Turri, P., Paschal, D.C.; A Pilot Survey of Mercury Levels in Oak Ridge[Residents], TN; 9/85;Div. of Env. Hazard & Health Effects, CDC,Public Health Service,USDH&HS,Atlanta, GA 3033 [4] East Fork Poplar Creek - Sewer Line Beltway Remedial Investigation Report; DOE/ORO by SAIC; April 1993 and Addendum May 1994 [5] Abelson, Phillip; Editorial: Flaes in Risk Assessments; Science, Vol 270,1995/10/13 p. 215 [6] Toxicological Profile for MERCURY (Update); TP-93/10; U.S. Dept. of Health & Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; May 1994 [7] Willett, K.L., Turner, R.R. and Beauchamp, J.J.; Effect of Chemical Form of Mercury on the Performance of Dosed Soils in Standard Leaching Protocols: EP and TCLP; Hazardous Waste & Hazardous Materials, Vol 9, No. 3, 1992 [8] Sin, Y.M., etal., Uptake and Distribution of Mercury in Mice from Ingesting Soluble and Insoluble Mercury Compounds, Bull. Environ. Contam. Toxicol. 31:605-612 [9] Rahola, T., etal., Elimination of Free and Protein-bound Ionic Mercury 203Hg2+ in Man, Ann. Clin. Res. 5:214-219 [10] Yeoh, T.S., etal., Absorption of Mercuric Sulphide following Oral Administration in Mice, Toxicolgy 41:107-111, 1986 [11] Yeoh, T.S., etal., Gastrointestional Absorption of Mercury Following Oral Absorption of Cinnabar ind a Traditional Chinese Medicine, Asia Pacific J. Pharmacol. 4:69-73, 1989 [12] Minutes & Notes of the LEFPC Citizens' Working Group, Information Resource Center, DOE/ORO [13] Reilly, W. K.; Risky Business: Life, Death, Pollution and the Global Environment; 94/01/12; Institute for International Studies; Stanford University, 200 Ecina Hall, Stanford, CA 94305-6033 [14] Ray, Dixy Lee; Environmental Overkill: Whatever happened to common sense; Regnery Gateway, Washington, DC; 1993 (distributed by National Book Network) [15] J. D. Graham etal.; A Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, March 1994; Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, 718 Huntington Ave., Boston, MA 02115 [16] Reform of Risk Regulation: Achieving More Protection at Less Cost - Report of the Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform (Att'n: Dr. J.D Graham); March 1995; Harvard Center for Risk Analysis; 718 Huntington Ave.; Boston, MA 02115; Ph: 617 432 4497 [17] CURE, Risk Assessment: Resolving the Controversy, Nov 1994; Coalition for Uniform Risk Evaluation, 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC 20006, Ph: 202 833-5055 [18] Abelson, Phillip; Editorial: Reflections on the Environment; Science, Vol 263 1994/2/4 p. 591 [18] Breyer, Hon. Stephen, Testimony at Hearing on Use of Risk Analysis and Cost-Benifit Analysy in Setting Environmental Priorities, Comm on Energy & Natural Resources, 11/9/93 Johnson, Sen. J. Bennett, Congressional Record-Senate May 18, 1994 S5859-5909 and Press Release Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources 3/25/1994 [20] Sagan, Leonard; A Brief History and Critique of the Low Dose Effects Paradigm; BELLE Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 2, Dec 1994; School of Public Health; Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 [Author's Address: Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA] [21] Seiler, Fritz A., Alvarez, Joseph L. (et al); IT Corp, 5301 Central Ave NE, Albuequerque, NM 8718; T:JFI = Technology: Journal of the Franklin Institute a) The Scientific Method in Risk Assessment; T:JFI, Vol 331A, pp. 53-58, 1994 b) Definition of a Minimum Significant Risk; T:JFI, Vol 331A, pp. 83-95, 1994 c) NORM and The Minimum Significant Risk; Proceedings of the 1996 HPS Midyear Meeting, "NORM/NARM and Risk Assessment", Scottsdale, AZ, Jan 7- 10, 1996 d) Toward a New Risk Assessment Paradigm: Variability, Uncertainty and Risk; T:JFI (in print)e) On the Selection of Distributions for Stochastic Variables; Risk Analysis (in print)