Yet Another Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion
Featuring:
Heidi Hochenedel as DEMEA SARAH TO BOB Bob, do you remember our undergraduate
university days when we so hated those long boring lectures to which we were
subjected term after term, and later, during graduate school, how we listened
to yet more dull and pedantic lectures in the form of interminable conference
papers and colloquia? How our beloved Philosophy seemed to have been transformed
by our professors into a series of insufferable monologues! Don't misunderstand
me, there is a place for monologue in the dissemination of ideas: if one is
presenting a system of some sorts, it is probably best that it be presented
in a coherent and univocal narrative. Yet so much of philosophy deals with obscure
and uncertain subjects about which it is nearly impossible to achieve total
solidarity of opinion. This is especially the case in the philosophy of religion.
This is why (and I'm sure you will agree) that such matters as the existence
and nature of the deity and the origins of religious belief are best presented
in the form of a lively conversation or dialogue, which can combine the pleasure
of good company with the serious sobriety of academic study and debate. To this end I pass on to you a
transcript of what transpired between three of my scholarly friends over a few
pints in a local pub. I've typed this from a tape of the conversation I found
on my pocket tape recorder, which spontaneously began to register when, early
on in the conversation, voices hit extreme decibel levels. So as not to embarrass
my friends, I have given them aliases with which you will, no doubt, be familiar.
The tape starts in mid-sentence with Philo's remarks on the current state of
religious belief. And please remark, Bob, on the carefree but rigid scepticism
of Philo, the unorthodox pragmatism of Demea, and the accurate if somewhat jovial
philosophical turn of Cleanthes. Philo:
...well, come on now, Demea, it strikes me that you want to have your cake and
eat it too. How can you realistically claim that modern science hasn't had a
deeply corrosive effect on religious belief? Or at least made the popular notion
of god so thin and diffuse that it amounts to little more than a warm and fuzzy
feeling in the breast of the believer? Demea:
My dear Philo - obviously religious belief is alive and well in the western
world. There is a church on every street corner and religious issues such as
the death penalty, and abortion continue to be hotly debated. Despite the advances
of science, many people abide in their faith. Perhaps you think that given the
progress of modern science, religious belief should be breathing its death rattle.
This is because you mistakenly assume that scientific and religious belief have
the same function - to explain the mysteries of the universe. This is not true.
The vocabularies of science and religion fulfill completely different needs
in the human psyche and as a result many people continue to find religious vocabulary
useful. Don't you agree Cleanthes? Cleanthes:
Philo, you do have some philosophical background which should be sufficient
to realize that you should support some of your claims before uttering them
as self-evident truths. Instead of asking how religious belief could be compatible
with modern science, perhaps you should begin by explaining exactly how "modern
science" has corroded religious belief. With such an explanation we may then
see why religious belief, as a "warm and fuzzy" feeling, is so terrible! As for your thoughts on the subject
Demea, while I agree with your position over the different functions of religion
and science, my philosophical training raises suspicions with your first remark.
I am not sure what we can assume from the prevalence of churches (and one should
add temples, synagogues, and the like) and the fact that many people hold to
religious beliefs - some of which are clearly weird. Although interesting from
a sociological point of view, it is difficult to say what this phenomena proves.
(By the way Philo, don't take what I've said to mean that this manifestation
is unimportant. We merely have to be clear about how it is to be interpreted.) Demea:
The prevalence of churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, sacred circles, and
other places of worship, weird or mainstream, proves merely that in spite of
the progress of science, many people continue to find a use for religion. The
claim that God is dead can be dismissed as a humanist fantasy. This fact should
surprise no one because religion does not have the same function as science
- the two do not serve the same purpose. Cleanthes:
I agree, for the most part, with your criticism of a scientism that
too easily brushes aside religious belief. My point is only that the prevalence
of religion in society says little about the justification they have for holding
to their religious beliefs. Simply because a lot of people believe something,
it does not necessarily mean those beliefs are true. Philo:
Let me intervene here. What I meant to say with my "sociological" point is not
that many people no longer gather together in churches, but that the meaning
of this gathering has radically changed in the last generation or so. These
gatherings are becoming less and less expressive of a coherent and monolithic
Christian community of belief. There are indeed large numbers of old-fashioned
believers; but there are even larger numbers of vaguely spiritual non-dogmatists
and of total non-believers. But let's not dally too long within the earthy realms
of sociology, but move on to the larger historical phenomena of decline and
fall of the Christian hegemony of belief to the point where Nietzsche could
declare in the 1880s that God is dead. Demea:
Both of you are quite right. Cleanthes, it is absolutely true that the prevalence
of religious institutions in no way justifies religious belief. Philo, one cannot
deny that the face of religion has changed in the Western world and that the
religious climate is considerably more liberal than it was say, in the Middle
Ages. Many twentieth century Christians are tolerant of science, homosexuals,
and infidels, although many remain steadfastly conservative and intolerant. Cleanthes:
I think, Demea, if you are speaking about the Canadian scene you would be quite
right. But this description is not very accurate when it comes to describing
current American religious sentiment. Conservative Christianity still has a
powerful voice in American society, whether massing men together as "prayer
partners," fighting for "family values," or fighting against rights for homosexuals
and open access to abortion. While American religious sentiment remains tied
to conservative Christianity (with high church attendance in the evangelical/fundamentalist
churches, belief in traditional creeds), Canadian religious sentiment is quite
different. Although the majority of Canadians believe in some sort of supreme
being, our churches are emptying, and new sources of spirituality are being
explored. Demea:
I think it is true that the trend in Canada is toward liberalization,
whereas in the U.S. one faction of the population is becoming more liberal,
while other groups have become much more conservative. The obvious question
to ask at this point is why have so many in North America abandoned traditional
religious beliefs? Why have so many Christians become less insistent on a literal
reading of scripture? Why is there a greater tendency to read holy scripture
metaphorically? Surely much of this is the result of the Enlightenment and the
progress of science. The success of science in explaining the mysteries of the
universe and predicting the behavior of the world has forced people to integrate
both their scientific and religious faith into their general web of beliefs.
Religious people who believe in evolution, for instance, will typically read
Genesis metaphorically such that it coheres with their literal belief in evolution.
Others, of course, will reject evolution and continue to read Genesis literally. Cleanthes:
What we need to do is understand why religious belief, on the one hand, is reverting
to a reinvigorated conservatism, and yet on the other hand, to a significant
extent, is evolving into a new sense of spirituality.
Philo:
Cleanthes' point is well taken. But if I might be allowed to steer our discussion
somewhat away from the sociology of religion toward its justification (or lack
thereof), my dear Demea, once again you are trying to make the weaker cause appear
the stronger. You're lucky there aren't any Athenian statesmen present to make
you sip the hemlock for your heterodox beliefs. Sensible people don't believe
in creationism because they can hop in their cars, drive to the Alberta badlands,
and see with their own eyes million-year-old dinosaur skeletons. Regardless of
what theory of truth you adhere to, this sort of evidence counts so strongly against
the creationist's "narrative" of the history of the world that it simply can't
be ignored. The biblical account of the Deity's six days of hard work at global
genesis simply cannot be squared with the bones of Albertosaurus.(1)
Demea:
Philo, although it is true that the discovery of dinosaur bones and theories
about the big bang seem to fly in the face of creationist theories of human
origin, let me remind you that the creationist and the scientific narratives
do not do the same kind of work. They are essentially written in two incompatible
languages for different purposes. The creationist narrative addresses questions
that deal with meaning and purpose, whereas the scientific narrative describes
the physical state of the world. The creationist narrative answers questions
like "Why are human beings here?" and "What explains our current state of unhappiness?"
and "What can be done to achieve happiness?" Moreover, the use of parable and
metaphor abound in holy scripture. It can be read as a long poem. The scientific narrative cannot address such questions. Rather
it asks: "What kind of creatures were roaming the earth millions of years ago?"
"What was the earth like before life emerged?" "Given what we know about the
earth's past, what can we expect in the future?" The scientific narrative exists
not so much to explain history, but to control and describe our present and
future. Questions about meaning and purpose, are irrelevant to its project.
The grammar of the scientific narrative is radically different from that of
the creationist narrative. As such, terms in one narrative cannot be translated
successfully into the other. It is as misguided to translate "God created the
world in 6 days" into scientific terms as it would be to look for scientific
translations for concepts like "grace", "love", and "redemption". There is no
scientific equivalent for these ideas, but this does not invalidate them or
make them unrepresentative of human experience. Likewise, it is idiotic to attempt
to find religious terms to accommodate ideas like nuclear fusion, relativity
theory, or electronic charge. Yet this does not dissuade Jews or Christians
of their inherent usefulness in modern life. Philo:
Your account of the advantages and disadvantages of these two forms
of narrative may convince the hardened postmodernists in the audience, but will
be less effective on the vulgar masses. When comparing the mutual advantages
of "scientific" and "religious" talk, we have to be careful not to fall into
a false dichotomy. There is, on the one hand, scientific theory, such
as Einstein's Theory of Relativity, which seeks to explain the universe on a
macroscopic level, and for which they may indeed be no hard and fast proofs
or unshakeable ontological ground. But then there's also low-level empirical
observations, which in a loose sense can be called "scientific"; for example,
that ducks quack, that the shortest distance between two points is a straight
line, and that balls dropped from towers fall down, not up. The existence
of those Albertan dinosaur bones belongs in the latter category; that they prove
that creationism is mistaken falls in the former. When too many empirical facts
that seem to disprove a theoretical account accumulate, common sense (and hopefully
science too) concludes that it must be abandoned. This is the case with biblical
accounts of the creation and miracles. Cleanthes:
I am beginning to feel like a mosquito at a nudist colony. I don t quite know
where to begin. Philo, I think that much of the problem
here is that, when it comes to the theory of evolution, you take both
creationists and scientists too seriously. By taking the creationists too seriously,
you make the mistake of thinking that because you show their thinking on creation
to be flawed, you have shown Christianity, en totale, to be flawed.
Put another way, just because creationists may be wrong about the origin of
the universe and Albertan dinosaurs (perhaps they were Manitoban!), it hardly
follows that they (or other Christians who are not creationists) are completely
unjustified in having their belief about the existence of God. By taking what scientists say about
evolution too seriously, one can overlook the importance of theory. Fair-minded
scientists, despite the good evidence for evolution, still point out that evolution
is a theory. Simply put, one sees skeletons, but most certainly not millions
of years. The latter is added by the story-tellers employed by the Bad Lands
Department of Parks and Recreation. To be sure, such a belief is based on good
evidence, but it remains theory, not incontestable fact. There are still large
problems to be sorted out over the theory of evolution, problems that make the
debate between the creationists and evolutionists something everyone should
see. Having witnessed a few debates between the so-called Scientific Creationists
and various scientists, it was always interesting to see the frustration the
scientists had trying to respond to the creationist's questions. It was as if
suddenly they had an unruly, but knowledgeable student who dared to question
the professor s authority. Successful kibitzing, from a creationist or otherwise,
is always fun to watch. It, as well, provides an important social function.
It helps us to not get too carried away with our view of who holds the Truth. Demea:
I must agree with Cleanthes. Although I have been defending the use of religious
vocabulary, both evolutionary and creationist accounts of history are equally
oppressive and arbitrary. They both assume that reality has an essence to which
descriptions of it can correspond. Postmodernists no longer believe this for
a variety of reasons, for example, paradigm shifts in ALL AREAS OF science (not
just physics), the advent of quantum mechanics, and Godel's incompleteness theorem.
Even within the systems of science and mathematics it is recognized that the
ideal of complete, unified, and consistent knowledge is an Enlightenment fantasy
- which yields little in terms of performativity. Philo (interrupting
timidly): ...Yes, but you miss the importance of my distinction between
theoretical and local knowledge... Demea:
Hold on a minute Philo - as for your precious Albertosaurus, Cleanthes is quite
right - what we have are a pile of bones, not a transparently objective account
of millions of years - no definitive once-and-for-all proof of the way things
"really are." We have a narrative, which isn't any better than what we've got
in the Bible. Humanists and Christians are equally deluded; they both claim
to describe the essence of reality when it clearly doesn't have one. Both narratives
serve a purpose, however, and (as I have shown) those purposes are different.
One tries to control and predict the physical world, while the other attributes
meaning to human existence. We don't need to completely do away with scientific
or religious vocabularies - they are both useful. We must, however, eradicate
the discourse of absolute TRUTH, which is the source of all social oppression. The notion of any sort of absolute
TRUTH is precisely the problem - this is why my arguments will not appeal to
the "vulgar masses," as Philo so poetically describes non-postmodernists. The
"vulgar masses" are uneducated AND they are silenced when they question the
truth structures to which they are subjected. They have been brainwashed into
believing that reality has an essence to which their descriptions can correspond.
They have been brought up to worship scientists and doctors because these people
have so much power within our society. Some have been raised Christian, Islamic,
or Jewish. Not surprisingly, many god- and science-worshiping people are racist,
classist, homophobic, intolerant, self-righteous, and hateful. This is so because
they adhere to rigid (but unjustified) truth structures (scientific, religious,
or moral), which they are not free to question or ignore. Any system which incorporates
rigid truth structures (basically any social system) is terroristic. One who
questions them is either silenced or gives his consent to its claims - not because
he has been refuted, but because he has been threatened with the punishment
of being silenced altogether.(2) Philo:
But surely they are bones of something! And thus evidence of
something! What sort of a world would we live in if everyone went about totally
ignoring the reports of their senses? In an insane asylum, perhaps! Demea
(waving aside Philo's interjection à la Camille Paglia):
As a postmodern revolutionary I advocate resisting those who would impose their
rigid and unjustifiable truth structures on me or anyone else, be they religious,
moral, or scientific. Truth is an idea that must be eliminated - the answer
is education, education, education. We need to show people that scientific theories
do not "correspond" to the way the world "really is" - all they can do is cohere
with a given discourse or theory, which may change over time. Likewise we need
to question the authority of those who wrote the 10 Commandments or those who
enforce bizarre local customs like compulsory clitorectomies. Such beliefs are
simply WRONG - not morally wrong, but factually wrong; based on ungrounded and
unjustifiable truth structures. Only when people are free to question these
truth structures, can we be free from the Hitlers and David Dukes of the world
who would tell us that Blacks, Jews, and women are inferior, that religious
people are stupid, and that science and mathematics are the only worthwhile
human activities. Philo:
Such a volley of arguments! I feel like the Spartans at Thermopylae, defending
the narrow pass of unbelief against the Persian hordes, the sky black with arrows.
But I prefer to fight in the shade.(3) First, let me brush back Cleanthes'
skirmishers. You're absolutely right that showing Creationism to be false is
not logically equivalent to defeating Christianity. I never dreamed
that it was. However, if I might further my cause by kicking out one of the
many foundation stones of the Christian world view, I can at least force believers
to move from a literal to a figurative interpretation of their
holy book, thus undermining the solidity of this foundation. As far as unruly
creationists in the classroom go, I again am forced to agree: they are indeed
the source of much entertainment. Bring them on, I say, to amuse us in our idle
hours when we are too weary to think seriously. Cleanthes:
All I can say Philo, is that I think you are somewhat misinformed about
what makes up the foundations stones of the Christian world view. I would say
that today most Christians find Christianity compatible with the theory of evolution
- the Catholic theologian Teilhard de Chardin is perhaps this century's most
notable example. And remember, evolutionists have come up with some zingers
too. One example is the so-called, "hopeful monster," theory. To explain the
sudden jump in transitional forms, one scientist postulated that one day a reptilian
just gave birth to a bird! Philo:
Yes, but let's finally lay aside our empirical eggs and evolve beyond
such questions. I feel forced to now repel the wild assault of Demea's postmodern
charioteers, whose battle strategy is all the more dangerous thanks to its general
lack of foresight and coherence. First, you say that the point of religious
language is not to describe and predict the physical world, but to give meaning
to life. But surely there are checks on what this language can evoke in the
service of this mission of signification? If I propose that a beneficent and
invisible Lizard God named Osmosius follows me around, licking my ear lasciviously
with his long reptilian tongue whenever I behave well, and hissing in fury when
I behave badly, surely you would think me mad. Yet it goes without saying that
people have all sorts of religious delusions, although usually not as strange
as the case of my invisible lizard friend. Needless to say, these delusions
are usually shaped by the images and parables of the religious sect to which
they claim allegiance. Demea:
I find your "religious belief" no more preposterous than the notion
that our Lord Bumba vomited out the cosmos or that the local volcano god is
hungry for virgin blood. Surely you realize that there are no checks on signification
provided that one can get together enough people to buy into one's particular
narrative. Consider that most Americans really believe that Christ ascended
into the heavens and is the offspring of a virgin birth. Madness is nothing
but a belief system that does not conform to the dominant narrative. Galileo
was thought mad in his day. People of competing religions and ideologies kill
each other every day over differences in their belief systems. Are you saying
that religiosity is a form of madness? But scientism is no better grounded.
The fact is, you can't prove a relation of correspondence between theory and
the real world. Philo (determined
to forge on): Secondly, it turns out that we more or less agree on the
question of truth - I too have little use for absolute truths (hence my opposition
to the greatest absolute of all, religious belief). You seemed to have missed
the force of my distinction between grand theory and low-level empirical facts:
I would speak of truth in the "absolute" sense (if at all) only when speaking
of clear and presents facts, not theory. Further, you say that things like the
Ten Commandments and the morality of compulsory clitorectomies are factually
wrong. But how can you say this unless you believe in a clear distinction (much
clearer than any I believe in, by the way) between theory (which you distrust)
and empirical perceptions unpolluted by theoretical constructs? Aren't
they to some degree intertwined? Have you become a phenomenologist sunk deep
in the epoché? Demea:
Not at all! You falsely assume that there are transparent facts that
require no interpretation. But even notions like "things fall down when you
drop them" are only "facts" because there's so much solidarity of opinion on
the subject that we trick ourselves into believing that they are transparently
true, that they don't require a linguistic lense through which we attribute
meaning to them. This is an illusion. All truth is a function of language, and
thus of interpretation. It used to be thought that men were smarter than women
and that the sun went around the Earth. But these so-called "facts" are now
considered false, and have been replaced by other facts that work better for
our current purposes. Philo:
Ah, so in essence we agree that theory and fact are intertwined. In any case,
my last point is perhaps the most telling: I was astonished by your pronouncement
that truth "must be eliminated": I thought I heard in the background the muffled
thumping of jackboots on the pavement, the click-clack of railcars en route
to death camps. Is it absolutely true that the Truth must be eliminated?
And that those who refuse to accept this must be liquidated? Even I am willing
to extend more charity to those living in darkness than you are, preferring
gentle suasion to inflammatory rhetoric. Some of your wild charioteers, hungry
for blood, appear to have turned their steeds around and started attacking their
own troops. Demea:
I admit that I let myself get a bit carried away. It's just that I feel that
true democracy will be impossible until we adopt a radically postmodern world
view that dispenses with all unjustifiable truth structures. Cleanthes:
I think we need to stand back and refocus what is at stake here: what is it
that we are in disagreement? I think, Demea and Philo, that you both agree that
our philosophical evolution has brought us to the place where strong claims
to truth and objectivity are not only suspicious looking characters, but perhaps
even linguistic phantoms induced by the old magician Plato. Although some would
still take the three of us to task over this, at least we share this position.
So far so good. But then where does this really leave the status of religious
belief? And it is here I'm a bit mystified
with you Philo. You seem level-headed in most musings (especially when we speak
of Athenian heroes and villains). Yet, when we turn to the status of religious
belief, you seem to think that such belief must stand up to the old standard
the three of us have left behind in the brashness of our youth. The question
is, how do we come to evaluate the sense of someone's Weltaunschuung?
How the three of us respond to this would be most telling. And I think that
if you hold true to unbiased assessment, Philo, you may admit that while you
find religious belief to be outside of your own sentiment, there is
little justification to rule it out in its entirety. In a world that is either
postmodernist or high modernist, religious belief merits at least provisional
inclusion. Philo:
Yet if we live in a High Modernist world, then we are obliged to take the poet
seriously: Things fall apart; the centre cannot
hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed,
and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while
the worst Are full of passionate intensity. And yes, I am forced to admit that my
sentiments move me toward lacking all conviction, to swim madly away from the
blood-dimmed tide of anarchic Weltanschauungen, including religious
fundamentalism, that is drowning the Western logos as we speak. Yet
I would never want to defend reason as the ground of our most general systems
of belief, whether they're noble or banal. Reason is a slave to greater internal
powers, of which we are all too often only dimly aware. But the key point here is that our
sentiments are not arbitrary collections of whims, but indicators of
how the world is, and of our place in that world. I admit that I cannot reconcile
the mere anarchy of a world full of troubles with the notion of a benevolent
creator Deity. This is not a logical dilemma: our fundamental way of being in
the world conflicts with the sublimely ridiculous narratives given us by the
great monotheistic traditions. In short, Epicurus was right: if evil exists,
then God must either will it (in which case he's evil himself), or be powerless
to stop it (in which case he's not really a god at all, but at best a sort of
super-human cosmic engineer). Cleanthes:
My dear Philo! Such oratory skill exemplified with such humility! "Swimming
away from bloody tides!" My head, I fear, is beginning to spin, trapped in its
own whirlpool of demands and challenges brought by a formidable foe! But in all honesty, I am as one who
has come to play dice on the marble stone steps with an opponent intent upon
upsetting the Coliseum with a manly tournament of chariot races. You've come
to fight the lions - this lustful desire is not necessarily wrong - it is just
bad taste! But lion fighting you are - where both
man and beast have no choice but to do battle or die. And yet our challenge,
those of us pitiful mortals who believe, is not to defeat man or beast
in violent defense and offence, but merely to speak, if asked, of why we believe
what we do. As believers we are justified in our
beliefs. As long as we respect the Republic, do no injustice to the pagans (such
as you), and live in peace with our fellow-citizens, we do not transgress any
rules of musings. Believe your own dreams and delights - and I will not demand
of you proof. I will simply try to understand how you think, with all its most
complex meanderings and subtleties. For it is here, in the labyrinth in your
most noble and intricate thought, where I will find meaning.(4)
How such thought corresponds to "the real world" is a demand more fanciful than
the cherished metaphysic of the most imaginative of believers. Demea: Yes Philo, come now, be reasonable.
How can our sentiments possibly reflect the way the world really is, or indicate
our place in it? Obviously the world is not any particular way. It's plastic,
lacking an essence. The only thing human beings can do is describe it, and more
often than not we can do this usefully in more than one way. We cannot seize
its essence with our sentiments any more than with our logic or with our science.
In any case, sentiments are the guiding light of the religious narratives you
so haughtily repulse, which explains their timeless appeal in the face of current
narratives that appear to be so much more useful. As for religious narratives
conflicting with our fundamental way of being in the world, I have only this
to say: in a world without essence, conflict in and between our world-views
is bound to arise. Inconsistency and incompleteness is a basic human trait:
we must learn to accept that. These are also features of all mathematical systems.
Just ask Godel. Now certainly I agree that some descriptions of the world
work better than others for some purposes, and so your preference for the scientific
narrative when applied to SOME problems is perfectly reasonable, and not arbitrary
at all. I find your position so reasonable that I think faith healers who withhold
necessary medical treatment from ill children in favor of prayers should be
drawn, quartered and hanged. This position is absurd - prayer just doesn't combat
disease as effectively as Western medicine. To withhold medical treatment is
to harm the child, which we have (arbitrarily) agreed is wrong. On the other
hand, the "sublimely ridiculous narratives" of the worlds' religions do their
job, which is to infuse our life-experience with hope and meaning, although
they don't cure disease. They are useful too, but not always more useful than
other narratives for every purpose. Philo:You rascals!
You're trying to befuddle my brain with images of sweaty Amazon warriors and
faith healers practicing their absurdities on the vulgar. Yet my challenge remains,
unanswered - how do you theists account for the existence of evil? Both logic
and sentiment suggest a discrete number of answers: either this supposed "evil"
doesn't really exist, and is nothing more than the product of human thought;
or the Deity has given us free will to practice good and evil as we see fit;
or the Deity's plans for the cosmos are far too sublime for we poor mortals
to comprehend them. Which is it, friends? Come now, don't play the politician
and answer a simple question with a torrent of misleading rhetoric. Demea:
First, how dare you call me a theist? I only claim that religious meta-narratives
are as defensible as scientific ones in terms of their correspondence to the
essence of reality. I don't claim that God exists or that dinosaurs never roamed
the earth. Second, it seems to me that you are making inappropriate demands
for consistency in religious world-views. It is a well-known fact that most
religions abound with internal contradictions, but secular world-views are equally
inconsistent, especially those inspired by modern physics. Extremely useful
mathematical descriptions of the world, like: "anti-matter moves backwards through
time," "electrons travel from point A to point B without crossing the space
in between," and "time slows down at speeds approaching light," do not cohere
with our ordinary experience. Nevertheless, the fact that we cannot translate
these ideas into our linear, visual world view, in no way suggests that we shouldn't
take them seriously. And obviously we do. But very few of us understand them.
Some of us may be able to manipulate the mathematics that suggest them. But
to wrap one's mind around modern physics is impossible, even for a physicist.
Why should we expect religious descriptions of the world to cohere better with
our expectations than physical and mathematical descriptions? The problem of
inconsistency in religion in general and that of evil in particular is completely
irrelevant to our discussion. Who are we, the lowly faithful (religious zealots
and physics students) to understand the mind of God- or the movement of an electron
for that matter? To follow the Lord or to take cutting edge-physical descriptions
of subatomic matter seriously, one must only have faith. Remember, it's when
Eve ate of the forbidden fruit of KNOWLEDGE that everything went to hell. Best
not to ask questions. Cleanthes: "Best
not to ask questions"? I'm afraid Demea that this is a bit much to
ask - isn't this, in fact, where problems begin between believer and nonbeliever?
Reducing faith to fideism understandably rankles the pagan.
In our own, fast fading century, this was brought to a head by the Fundamentalists
who were embarrassed at the Scope's Trial. Believing that higher learning and
science were antagonistic to religious belief, Fundamentalists turned the meaning
of faith into an inward religious experience which no philosophy or science
could harm. But by doing so, they made their belief epistemologically irrelevant.
If one makes a claim that cannot be falsified, even hypothetically, then the
belief is of little meaning to anyone. The one holding the belief may feel himself
or herself bound to the belief (due to its strong experiential character), but
she or he should keep quiet about it. And so I am sympathetic to Philo's question. As a
believer, what ever that means, at least it means that one must always ask -
as long as it is remembered there may not always be an answer. The "problem
of evil" is such a question. If the gods are all good, and all powerful, then
why do they allow evil? Righteous Job asked such a question. Indeed, all creation
has asked it too - believer and unbeliever alike. But it is important to remember
that whether on the side of the gods or not, there are no easy answers. Philo
may think this is a problem for us. Not so. For Philo, where does such
a question arise in your materialist informed brain (note my able foe: brain
not mind or soul)? That is, from whence does evil arise?
Do you believe there is evil out there in the world? Or perhaps you should admit
that the gods have written their laws upon your heart? And now your conscience
condemns you?! Demea:
Fundamentalist Christians embarrassed? That's a new one. Usually they're just
embarrassing! Clearly, from an empirical point of view, religious claims can
be neither true nor false because they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable.
This may make their belief epistemologically irrelevant to philosophers, but
not to the faithful, and certainly not to those who have had a meaningful religious
experience. And why should they keep their beliefs to themselves? Are they not
useful to some people for some purposes? My dear Cleanthes - what about the story of the FALL which
is clearly an attempt to account for evil in the world. Jews and Christians
claim that suffering is our fault. We deserve it. We are born guilty because
of the fall, which is why we need to be redeemed. The problem of evil is really
a non-issue for Jews and Christians. Now it may be a problem for other religions,
but not ones that concern us here. Also, many Christians think that bad things
happen to good people because our suffering here on earth is insignificant compared
to the rewards that await us in heaven. But such rewards can only be understood
in terms of faith and cannot be rationally grasped. Philo:
Cleanthes, you overestimate the power of the gods, just as you underestimate
that of alliteration. But it appears that you've joined with the spirit of common
sense and I in a holy trinity of clear thinking against Demea's appeal to blind
faith. Shall we philosophers go down on our knees and abandon our reason, our
experience, and our more level-headed emotions in favor of a whole train of
monkish virtues admired by gloomy, hair-brained enthusiasts, which, as someone
once said, may admitted into religious calendars, but are rightly rejected by
all people of good sense? Or should we stand up like men and not be afraid to
ask the questions that life puts before us? In short, Demea, are you not trapped
inside a divine paradigm? I offer you the key to unlock the doors of your deistic
misperceptions. Please take it, and sapere aude - dare to
know. Demea:
So you, Philo, refuse to entertain cutting edge theories in physics
because they contradict your reason, judgment, and good sense, making you question
everything you ever took for granted to be true? I rather doubt it. You're as
faithful to the priests of science as any zealot is to religious dogma. You
have no more insight into these matters than you do into the supposed mind of
God. Yet you believe, as do most people, including myself. My point is this:
we routinely have faith in notions that contradict many of our beliefs. On this
point at least, religious people are no different than the most rigorously scientific
people in our community. Philo, no one is asking you to fall to your knees and
find Jesus, only to recognize the fact that His existence can't be falsified
- although it could, one day, be verified. In any case, stand up like a man,
storm about, flex your pecs and ask the questions about modern physics, but
you'll never understand the answers. No one does. Modern physics flies in the
face of everything we hold to be self-evident. Theologians claim the same scenario
for explanations of our suffering here on earth - it is beyond our grasp to
understand the ways of God. To be religious one must have faith, period. As
for the problem of evil, for my part, I'll sit down like a lady, cross my legs
and paint my nails. And then I think I'll yawn. Can anything epistemologically
relevant be said about claims that are neither true nor false? Cleanthes (continuing with
Demea's assault on Philo): Philo, my dear young
nimble Greek lad, do you really think now that all "evil" is but "natural evil"
- produced by volcanoes, earthquakes, and hurricanes? Ah, I see you include
the capacity for humans to do bad things to others, but are all the human monsters,
such as the Hitlers, Stalins, and Caligula "bad"? After watching Schindler's
List do you feel that such Nazi's were merely naughty? Maybe really nasty?
But if you say "evil" - which they most certainly were - then how do you account
for such a deep penetrating sensation of revulsion? Evolutionarily conditioned?
Or do you now sense the law of the gods awakening in your bowels? And Demea (while you both are still catching your breath),
about the faithful keeping their beliefs privatized - yes, they should keep
them such. If no information or state of affairs can count against their beliefs,
then, logically, no state of affairs count for their beliefs. They are still
within their rights to hold to such beliefs, but not when it comes to deciding
matters in a public forum. For example, their belief that we should pray a Christian
prayer in the classroom as our national moral and spiritual obligation - this
belief, based on "faith", is no different than the madman who claims to be divinely
inspired. In other words, their silence is required because believers have all
sorts of ethical beliefs that supposedly inform their lives. Again, I do not
wish to take away this right. But the rest of us are not interested about an
"ethic" that comes from a wider view of the world that allows for no circumstances
to count against their beliefs. Demea: I think, Cleanthes
that describing Hitler or Stalin as "really bad," "super-naughty," or "evil",
comes down to a matter of taste, and is of little relevance to our discussion.
As for your second point, I entirely agree. This is why we (attempt to) maintain
a division between church and state in the US. When you said religious people
ought to "keep their beliefs to themselves", I misunderstood what you meant.
Cleanthes: Whether
these sorts of guys were evil or just bad is relevant to the discussion.
That is, if all that there is, is matter, then all I can really say about guys
like this is that are just bad people - a little worse than naughty. If so,
my revulsion and feelings of horror, being privy to their actions, is really
no different than the feeling I have when liver and turnips are put on my dinner
plate - a sort of aesthetic, consistent with evolutionary materialism. Others, however, recognizing that these actions are indicative
of something more repugnant and horrific, ask how they can have such a reaction
if it is only a matter of taste, as you put it. These same people believe that
they "feel" such revulsion because of the inner law written on their hearts;
a "conscience", if you will, that condemns their behavior. This is exactly what
Philo doesn't have. After seeing what such moral monsters do, he is
taken back in horror. Trouble is, such a reaction isn't consistent with the
materialist limitations he has placed on himself. Am I not right Philo?
Will you now give the gods their due? Shall I run for the high priest at the
temple to bring the anointing water? Philo:My dear Cleanthes,
I am no simple materialist, and I do have a conscience. Rather, I'm a sceptic:
I bracket claims to knowledge about things we can't possibly know. However,
I feel no compunction in calling mass murderers "evil", if the term is to have
any meaning at all. And yes, evil is clearly a quantum leap away from things
that merely offend my taste. But our sense of the utter evil of the mass murderer's
actions doesn't require any metaphysical guarantee in the structure of reality
or in a moral law prescribed by the Deity and recorded on some ancient stone
tablets. We can "feel" moral evil just as we can feel anything else (for I would
claim that such a conclusion cannot be result of some reasoning process). If
our moral concepts refer to the world in some significant way, then evil exists.
And this, I say once again, is a powerful barrier to religious belief, assuming
that our idea of God is of a supremely good, all-knowing, all-powerful entity
(an idea that I don't believe we can avoid if we see the Deity as an object
of worship). Demea: Philo is right
about one thing. Whether or not our notion of evil is a matter of taste and
social conditioning (as I suggest) or a physical sensation (as Philo believes)
the existence or illusion of evil tells us nothing about the metaphysical structure
of reality. But Philo, I do disagree with the assertion that the deity must
be all-good in order to merit the worship of the faithful. The Jewish and Christian
deity has shown arbitrary preferences among his people, passed out brutally
harsh punishments, even to the most deserving of mercy, and has routinely committed
genocide throughout the ages. Even if a gifted theologian could argue that God
is good and that every human being is born guilty, deserving punishment for
the misdeeds of our ancestral mother, no one can persuade me that He is very
nice. To the contrary. And it is precisely God's intolerance for human nature
and behavior that persuades the faithful to worship and fear Him, for if they
don't, God only knows what He is capable of. An all-powerful, merciless deity
is as much or more deserving of worship than an all-good, all-forgiving God... Sarah to Bob: At this point the tape in my pocket recorder
ran out. However, the debate soon ended, the interlocutors going their separate
ways, leaving the issue of the existence and nature of God unsettled. We'll
have to have a go at it ourselves one day, but hopefully with more success at
the end of our endeavors than that achieved by my three friends.
G. Elijah Dann as CLEANTHES
Doug Mann as PHILO
1. Unless, of course, the Deity is a prankster among whose chief delights is the planting of false evidence. See http://www.bindonillustrations.on.ca/5.htm.
2. See J. F. Lytotard's The Postmodern Condition (1979).
3. Philo refers, of course, to Herodotus' account of the battle.
4. See Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967).