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One-fourth of the evacuee population in the centers is of school age, and is in school. This is substantially larger than the proportion of school children in the normal population. Moreover, as has been suggested above, a disproportionately large part of the school population is of high-school age. Virtually all of the school children in the population were born in this country and are citizens. Virtually all were being educated prior to evacuation in American public schools.

Kids and comics, Tule Lake, 1942
"Four little evacuees from Sacramento, California, read comic books in the newsstand at this War Relocation Authority center." (Tule Lake, 07/01/1942)

The War Relocation Authority believes that one of the best means by which to continue the process of Americanization among the school children of Japanese descent, and to counteract some of the bad effects of evacuation and relocation, is to provide a sound educational system. It is our policy to provide elementary and high-school facilities, meeting the minimum standards of the States in which our centers are located, and providing education which will permit the students to return to public schools outside the centers after the war, without loss of credit for the time spent in the centers. Our educational programs have been developed and curricula planned in cooperation with the State school authorities of the States in which the centers are located. All teaching is in English. No Japanese language schools are permitted in the centers.

The entire evacuee population has expressed a keen interest in the educational program. When our basic educational plans were being made, we were asked expressly by leaders of the evacuee population to provide as large a proportion as possible of Caucasian teachers. They felt that prior to evacuation, schools had been the biggest single force for Americanization, and they expressed the hope that their children would continue to have contact with qualified Caucasian teachers. Because of this fact, and because there are relatively few qualified teachers among the evacuees, our original plan called for the employment of at least three-fourths of the teaching staff from outside the centers. We have not, as a matter of fact, been able to secure as many teachers as we need, and have been forced to use a larger number of inexperienced evacuees than had been intended. At the present time, slightly more than half of the teaching staff is from the evacuee population.

Appointed Caucasian teachers are employed under civil-service regulations and are paid salaries established under the Classification Act. Because of the administrative necessity of keeping children occupied in the relatively crowded confines of the relocation centers, schools are to be operated 11 months out of the year. Even on such a basis it will be more than a year before the school time lost during evacuation and relocation is made up.

Exercise, Jerome
["View of 5th and 6th graders going through their exercises on elementary school grounds." (Jerome, year unknown)

Schools are now operating in space originally constructed for barracks. Facilities for scientific and vocational work at the high-school level are inadequate. In most centers, living quarters have been crowded to make barrack space available for schools. To relieve this situation, the War Relocation Authority has undertaken to build school buildings of a temporary character similar in construction to the other buildings of the centers. Plans have been completed and priorities secured for the construction of elementary and high schools on all centers. It now appears, however, that changes in the centers' population, resulting from the release of persons on leave and a reduction in the expected evacuation from Hawaii, may make it possible to use some barrack space permanently for schools. In view of this possibility, we are building initially only those parts of the school plant for which barrack space is not adaptable. A careful check is being maintained to insure that only those school buildings are constructed which are absolutely needed.


Recognizing the possibility that the process of evacuation and relocation might increase the susceptibility of the evacuee population to disease, and that the likelihood of serious epidemics is greater in camp communities than in normal communities, the Army made provision in the basic construction program of the centers for a fully equipped hospital on each center. Because the barracks type housing is entirely unsuited to home care of the sick, even minor illnesses are considered hospital cases in the relocation centers. This consideration caused the Army to provide a higher ratio of beds to the population (about 18 to the 1,000) than is customary in most normal communities.

The War Relocation Authority provides an appointed medical director in each center, appointed under Civil Service and paid according to the Classification Act. All other medical positions, all dental positions, and such technical positions as X-ray technologist, pharmacist, and laboratory technician are filled with evacuee personnel. Because there are relatively few qualified nurses among the evacuee population, the Authority planned to provide a relatively complete appointed nursing staff. We have been able to employ only a small proportion of the nurses needed, however. In fact, the most serious problem of health administration on the centers is the very small number of qualified nurses available. We are using a much larger proportion of nurses aides from the evacuee population than is desirable from a point of view of sound medical practice.

Evacuees are provided medical care, hospitalization, and medication without charge. Up to the present, health conditions on the centers have been remarkably good. The quality of medical care available to the evacuees, through the use of evacuee personnel, except in the field of nursing, appears to be entirely satisfactory.


Except in the field of education, the great majority of positions needed in the operation of the centers are filled with evacuee personnel. Only key supervisory positions are filled with appointed civil-service employees. In fact, it is the policy of the WarAdministrative office, Topaz, 1943 Relocation Authority, so far as possible, to provide useful, productive work for all employable evacuees. At the present time, out of 106,638 evacuees, 48,483 are employed. Work in the administrative offices, the transport and warehousing systems, and other essential administrative operations employs about a third of this number. The remainder are used in productive enterprises in the fields of agriculture, industry, and public works. [PHOTO: "A general view of the Administrative Office in this War Relocation Authority center." (Topaz, 1943)

Evacuees are selected and assigned to their work under a systematic program of employment administration; they are paid at the rate of $12, $16, or $19 a month according to the nature of their duties. This compensation is not considered a wage commensurate with the work being performed, rather it is a cash allowance, intended to enable the evacuees who work to purchase such things as haircuts, shoe repairs, tobacco, confections, and other goods and services that are not provided by the Authority. Evacuees who work also receive a cash clothing allowance for themselves and their dependents. Clothing allowances, depending upon the age of the dependents and the location of the centers, range from $2 to $3.75 per month per person. Unemployment compensation is provided eligible evacuees who are temporarily unemployed.


When initial plans for relocation centers were being made the Authority did not anticipate the great demand which subsequently arose for evacuee labor outside the centers. It was expected that extensive programs of agricultural and industrial production and public works would be needed to provide useful occupations for the evacuees. The possibility of establishing industries not only to produce goods needed in the centers but also goods required in the war effort was extensively explored. Similarly, care was taken to locate all centers on relatively large areas of potential or developed agricultural land. On a number of centers a substantial program of land development was planned. On all centers a number of buildings, roads, and other community facilities were omitted from the basic construction, and left to be built by evacuees.

Outside demands for labor, however, have reduced the labor forces on the centers substantially below what was anticipated. It is now evident that there will be little opportunity or need for industrial development. A few small industrial projects contributing to the subsistence program of the centers will probably be initiated. A few enterprises contributing to the war effort were established in some of the earlier centers, and will be continued. The extensive industrial program, involving the establishment on the centers of industrial plants under private management paying prevailing wages which was at one time contemplated has been abandoned as unnecessary.

On centers having developed agricultural land, production will be largely limited to crops needed in the subsistence of the centers. It has appeared wiser in every way to release evacuees for work in private agricultural enterprises than to attempt to develop agricultural production for the market. On centers on which there is no developed agricultural land at present, we propose now to develop only sufficient acreage to provide subsistence crops and livestock. All evacuees engaged in such activities will be compensated in accordance with the established employment program of the Authority.

Even this restricted program will provide work for substantial numbers of evacuees, and in the field of agricultural production particularly, will contribute substantially to the maintenance of the centers. When all of the centers are fully developed, a large part of their food requirements will be met by their own production. During the calendar year 1942, with most of the centers in operation only a portion of the year, approximately $800,000 worth of vegetables and other crops were produced at four relocation centers. It is expected that $2,750,000 worth of vegetables will be produced during the calendar year 1943. Livestock fed and slaughtered on the centers will provide an additional contribution to our subsistence program. It is estimated that during the fiscal year 1944, the value of livestock and livestock products produced on the centers will reach $2,000,000.

In addition to land development on certain centers, the Public Works program will be confined largely to the development and construction of buildings needed in project operations. These include, on most centers, schools, community store buildings, churches, agricultural buildings such as swine and poultry sheds, maintenance and repair shops, and additional quarters for appointed personnel.


Since the evacuee population is a complete cross-section of our general population, it inevitably includes a proportion of socially maladjusted people, the bad along with the good. Moreover, the process of evacuation and relocation has introduced various strains and dislocations into the population. For example, eating in mess halls, bathing in community bathhouses, and utilizing community laundries and toilet facilities have already greatly strained the normal ties of family life, and threaten to weaken if not destroy the authority of parents over their children. At the very least, center conditions make much more difficult the teaching manners and morals which are ordinarily learned in the home. These problems are intensified by the relatively crowded and inadequate living conditions.

The War Relocation Authority is attempting to counteract the bad social effects of relocation by such administrative means as are at its disposal. Considerable can be accomplished through the educational system, but in addition the Authority has found it necessary to provide a qualified social welfare staff on each center. This staff is particularly concerned with the problems of family relationship, and of the old, the sick, and with orphans and delinquent children. The welfare staff determines family composition for the purposes of granting clothing allowances, and is responsible for administering a program of cash grants to persons who, because of health or for other reasons, are unemployable.


The War Relocation Authority has undertaken to provide as much evacuee participation in the governments of the relocation centers as is consistent with the responsibilities performed by the administrative staff of the centers. In the first place, the director of each center has selected in each block a block manager to represent the administration in the transmission of information and instruction of requests and proposals to the administration. Block managers are also responsible for seeing that block buildings are adequately maintained and that block services are kept up to standards.

In the second place, regulations of the War Relocation Authority provide procedures under which members of the evacuee community may select a community council and other agencies of community government to advise and assist the project director in administering community aspects of the center's activity. While all residents of the centers 18 years of age and older may vote in community elections, only citizens are permitted, by regulation of the Authority, to hold elective office. The authority of the community council, and such other agencies of local government and administration as may be established, is founded entirely upon the legal authority of the project director, as administrative head of the relocation center. It is the policy of the Authority to delegate to the evacuee representatives as much authority as is consistent with the sound administration, and as the governmental organization of the community appears qualified to assume. The community organizations of the several centers, naturally, vary somewhat in the degree of their development and in their capacity to assist the project director. This is particularly true at the present time when in most of the centers permanent forms of community government are only now being developed. Consequently the degree of responsibility delegated by the project directors varies from center to center, and will continue to be modified as the maturity and competence of the governmental organization increase or are altered by local circumstances.

Evacuees in the relocation centers are governed by three general categories of law and regulation:
1. The general law of the United States and of the State in which the center is situated;

2. Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and the project director.

3. Regulations made under the authority of the project director and with his approval by the community council. Enforcement of these laws and regulations is the responsibility of the project director, who utilizes in the exercise of his responsibility both the agencies of community government and the internal security staff of the center.
The internal security staff on each center is headed by a qualified appointed internal security officer. He is provided from two to a dozen appointed assistants, the exact number depending upon decision by the Authority as to requirements in the center. In addition, the internal security officer directs a staff of evacuee internal security assistants. The evacuee officers are selected because of their previous police experience or other special qualifications for the work. They are trained particularly in the preventive aspects of police administration.


By agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Army, the exterior boundary of each relocation center is guarded by a military police detachment. During the day the military police patrol the perimeter of the entire project area; at night they maintain a patrol around the immediate boundary of the relocation center. In addition, they are available to assume responsibility for policing the interior of the center upon request of the project director. The Authority has experienced only one case in which it was found necessary to ask the military police to assume responsibility for maintaining order within a relocation center. This was in the Manzanar Relocation Center in California early in December. Experience at that time indicates that the present military policing arrangements are entirely adequate to maintain the external security for which they are intended, and to assume responsibility when necessary for maintaining order within the centers.

Attached to this statement as exhibits 1 and 2 are a copy of the memorandum of understanding as to the functions of military police units at the relocation centers, and areas administered by the War Relocation Authority, approved by Mr. E. R. Fryer, War Relocation Authority, and Col. Karl R. Bendetsen of the Western Defense Command, and a copy of circular 19, dated September 17, 1942, issued by J. W. Barnett, brigadier general, G. S. C., chief of staff, Western Defense Command, outlining policies governing the use of military police in war relocation centers.


Ever since the relocation program was initiated we have been confronted with the necessity of making evacuees available for outside employment, and of developing procedures for releasing evacuees on both temporary and long-term leave under conditions which will provide adequate safeguards both to the evacuees and the general public. The War Relocation Authority first took the position that evacuation should be completed, the relocation centers built and staffed, and all evacuees transferred to the centers before expending a major effort on private relocation. However, the need for labor in agriculture, especially for the production of sugar beets, became so great that the Authority was compelled to make recruitment for farm work immediately effective. Jointly with the Army, the Authority developed a program of group work leave under which nearly 10,000 evacuees were made available for outside work in 1942, chiefly in the sugar-beet fields.


Recruitment of evacuees under the group leave policy and their release from both assembly centers and relocation centers was permitted under the following terms:
1. Evacuees must proceed at the expense of the employer to a designated locality, usually a county.

2. Evacuees are released only to areas in which the United States Employment Service has certified that labor is needed.

3. Evacuees are released only to accept employment under the terms of a written contract. (Evacuees are permitted to move to other employers in areas to which they are released, and, with prior approval of field representatives of the Authority, are permitted to move from one designated area to another, as the need for labor shifts. Thus, many evacuees released in the spring were kept in continuous employment throughout the summer. Out of the 10,000 released throughout the year, about one-fifth are still in outside employment under the group leave policy.)

4. Evacuees are released to go only to States in which the Governor has given written assurance that he will maintain law and order and to counties in which similar assurances have been provided by local authorities.
This group leave procedure has undoubtedly given the evacuees an opportunity which, for the most part, they welcomed, to work as free labor, and to assist in the agricultural program of the country. It contributed substantially to the production of sugar in the United States. Representatives of the sugar-beet industry have indicated that during the coming season they hope to secure even larger numbers of evacuees, although they prefer to group leave a system which will permit the individual relocation of families on farms on a crop-lease basis.


On October 1, 1942, the War Relocation Authority published in the Federal Register leave regulations embodying the present policies of the Authority on the release of evacuees from centers. These regulations outline three general types of procedure under which leave from relocation centers may be granted:
1. Group work leave under terms of the procedure outlines above.

2. Short-term leave for a period not to exceed 60 days, under which evacuees may be permitted to attend funerals, visit sick relatives, attend court, or take care of other important business justifying their temporary release from the centers.

3. Indefinite leave, under which evacuees subject to the conditions outlined below are permitted to leave the centers to take up permanent residence.
Any resident of the relocation center is eligible to apply for indefinite leave, but before leave is granted, the following conditions must be met:
1. Evacuee must show that he has a definite offer of employment or other evidence that he can take care of himself at some point outside the areas from which persons of Japanese descent are excluded by military order.

2. The War Relocation Authority must secure reasonable assurance that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without incident.

3. An investigation of the evacuee, including a check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Office of Military Intelligence, indicates that release of the evacuee will not constitute a danger to the security of the United States.

4. The evacuee must agree to keep the War Relocation Authority informed of his location at all times.
At the present time some 1,300 evacuees, approximately 500 of them college students, have been released on indefinite leave.

Indefinite leave, Tule Lake, 1943No phase of the relocation program has been given more careful study and thought than the leave policy of the Authority. On the one hand, we have kept always before us the problems of national security which gave rise to the evacuation. On the other hand, we have recognized from the outset that a relocation program which stopped with the transfer of evacuees to relocation centers would create more national problems than it would solve. [PHOTO: "A large group of friends wish bon voyage to a group of eleven evacuees, who are leaving the center. Of this group, seven were students and workers going out on indefinite leave, and the other four were transfers to the Central Utah Project. Mixed emotions were displayed as these people boarded the bus." (Tule Lake, 01/28/1943)

The leave policy was discussed with both the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before it was announced. The leave regulations were approved by the Department of Justice before they were issued. The leave process requires continuous, close cooperation between the War Relocation Authority and the Department of Justice. The leave policy has also been approved by the War Manpower Commission from the point of view of its contribution to the manpower supply of the country. Through cooperation with the War Manpower Commission, relocation offices established by the Authority at appropriate locations throughout the country are endeavoring to place evacuees in occupations which will contribute as effectively as possible to the war effort.

Under the sponsorship of the National Student Relocation Committee, a non-governmental organization, several hundred evacuees have been released from relocation centers to attend college in institutions outside the evacuated areas. For several months students were granted special educational leave under temporary procedures of the Authority. Under present regulations, attendance at college is one of the purposes for which indefinite leave is granted. All students now on educational leave are subject to the same investigation and restrictions as are applied to other evacuees granted indefinite leave.

Granting leave to college students brings squarely to the fore the question of military service for Japanese-Americans. It does not seem just nor wise nor fundamentally American to deny Japanese-Americans, who have the ability and the resources, the right to secure a college education. On the other hand, we do not feel that it is just or wise to relieve them of their obligations to fight for their country. At the time of evacuation it became the policy of the Selective Service System to suspend the operation of selective service so far as the Japanese-Americans are concerned. Nearly 5,000 persons of Japanese descent, about half of them from the continental United States and the remainder from Hawaii, are, however, now serving in the United States Army. Most of them were inducted prior to evacuation, although during the past 6 months more than 300 Japanese-Americans have been recruited for special Army service.

The War Relocation Authority believes that Japanese-Americans, like all other Americans, should be subject to the obligation of fighting for their country. We know that many Japanese-Americans are willing and eager to serve in the armed forces. We are convinced that success of the present relocation program, and in fact solution of the entire Japanese problem in this country after the war, will be seriously jeopardized if Japanese-Americans remain through the remainder of the war exempt from the obligation of military service. Since July 1942 the War Relocation Authority has actively urged that selective service for Japanese-Americans be reinstituted. I am glad to state that we have found support for our position among a significant number of Army and Navy officers, who are qualified by experience and contact with Japanese-Americans, to judge the effectiveness of Japanese-Americans in the military service.


Determination by the Army that persons of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated from certain Pacific-coast areas was accompanied by a recognition that responsibility for the conservation of the property and property rights of evacuees must be assumed by the Federal Government. Respect for this principle was dictated not only by standards of equity, but by ordinary business sense.

On March 15, 1942, the Army announced the formation of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Treasury Department, acting through the Federal Reserve bank, was asked to take over the conservation of urban evacuee property, including real and personal, both business and residential, and intangible assets. The Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture was assigned the task of accomplishing continuity in the agricultural operations and obtaining credit. Where usual channels of commercial and governmental credit were not open to substitute operators, the Farm Security Administration received from the War Department $1,000,000 for a lending program. Subsequently, an additional $5,000,000 from the President's emergency fund was made available to them. Some 650 loans, totaling approximately $3,500,000, were made from these funds.

Prior to the departure of evacuees to assembly centers, they were passed through one of the 64 control stations established in military zone No. 1 in cooperation with the United States Employment Service. In these control centers three-man teams, composed of representatives of the Federal Security Agency, Federal Reserve bank, and the Farm Security Administration were available to assist evacuees in settling their affairs before the evacuation deadline, and to check to determine whether arrangements for handling of their property had been completed by the evacuees.


This agency rendered assistance to evacuees in the leasing or otherwise disposing of their urban properties, and on March 29, 1942, provisions for the storage of personal property and effects of evacuees in warehouses were published, and evacuees were urged to take advantage of this service. This activity was administered by the Federal Reserve bank through its set-up designated as the evacuee property department. As evacuees were transferred to assembly centers, those who availed themselves of the service afforded by the Federal Reserve bank placed their household good and personal belongings in warehouses leased by the bank for this purpose. A considerable percentage, however, preferred to place their goods in private storage, either in warehouses of their own selection, in Japanese churches and meeting halls, or with non-evacuee friends.

Pursuant to an agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the property of 2,867 evacuees was assigned by the above bank to the War Relocation Authority. These goods totaled over 2,000 tons in weight. It is estimated that there remains outside of warehouses under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority some 32,500 tons of commercial property, household goods, and personal effects.

The records of the Federal Reserve bank indicate that there were referred to them some 5,000 properties of either residential or commercial character. The list included all those activities normally engaged in by business and professional people with a high percentage of the total being in cleaning establishments and laundries, hotels, nurseries, and residences. Food markets also held a high place in the statistical summary.


The records of the Farm Security Administration indicate that some 6,664 pieces of agricultural property, totaling 258,000 acres, were involved in the evacuation process. Practically all this land was intensively cultivated and devoted to the production of the food requirements of the area.

The farm machinery used on these properties was disposed of in one of several ways:

(a) Outright sale; (b) by a leasing arrangement; (c) as a loan to the lessee of the evacuee's farm, the only requirements being maintenance and upkeep.

Some was placed in storage. It was usually insisted upon by the Farm Security Administration that where the equipment was required for the operation of the property, arrangements should include this provision.


On July 6, 1942, Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, in a letter to the Farm Security Administration stated in part as follows:
"Upon completion of the evacuation of areas No. 1 and No. 2, the responsibilities of the Farm Security Administration relating to the protection of evacuees' property will be accepted by the War Relocation Authority, exclusive of cases wherein loans were made to substitute operators."
In response to a memorandum dated July 8, 1942, from Colonel Bendetsen, the regional director of the War Relocation Authority at San Francisco on July 16, 1942, wrote Colonel Bendetsen as follows:
"Answering your memorandum dated July 8, it is the intention of the War Relocation Authority to assume the responsibilities in connection with the management of evacuee properties following the completion of the evacuation of military area No. 2.
"We assume that all pertinent records will be turned over to this Authority by the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration."
Since the exchange of the correspondence quoted above, both the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration have taken the position that responsibility for the future handling of evacuee property should rest with the War Relocation Authority.

Scrutiny of the statistics presented above clearly indicates the importance of maintaining production of farm lands and of maximum possible utilization of all other property, both in the national interests and to preserve the equities of the owners thereof. Failure so to do would have a detrimental effect in several ways. The impact upon the tax structure of the communities involved would be serious. The food supply of the areas wherein the properties are located would be affected. There would be marked reduction in the housing facilities in certain defense areas -- notably in Seattle where 206 out of a total of 325 hotels (63 percent) in the city were operated by Japanese.


It was recognized that the evacuees, having been removed from the areas indicated, were no longer in a position to personally operate, manage, or otherwise care for their property. The War Relocation Authority accordingly established the Division of Relocation Assistance. This division has a Pacific coast evacuee-property office at San Francisco. There are field offices in Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. In addition, provision has been made for evacuee-property representatives at each relocation project.


Evacuees are free to choose the manner in which they desire to have their properties cared for. They may select a person or concern to act as attorney-in-fact, they may choose an agent to act for them, or they may deal directly with persons having transactions with them. The services of the evacuee-property office are made available to evacuees if they prefer to use them. The functions of this office include acting upon the request of evacuees to determine if property is being properly maintained; securing tenants or operators of both agricultural and commercial property; negotiating leases or sales; adjusting differences; checking inventories of goods and equipment, and similar activities. The policy guiding the activities of the evacuee-property office are predicated upon the national interests and a recognition of the need for preserving the lawful interests of evacuees.


Each of the 11 relocation centers (including the newly established isolation center at Moab, Utah) is administered by a project director, who is responsible for supervising all activities within the center and for cooperating with the commander of the military police company assigned to exterior patrol. Each director is provided with a staff of from 125 to 200 appointed assistants who head all the branches of community and project administration. At the present time more than a third of all project appointed personnel are employed in the educational program.

Each project director is immediately responsible administratively to the Director of the Authority. He is vested by the Director with appropriate authority to expend and account for Government funds alloted to the project, to employ appointed personnel under civil-service regulations, and to purchase and to utilize necessary supplies and equipment. Subject to regulations and policies of the Authority and the general laws and regulations of the Government service, he is in full charge of the relocation center.

The office of the Director of the War Relocation Authority is maintained in Washington, D. C. The Director is appointed by the President, and, within the framework of the Office for Emergency Management, of the Executive Office of the President, is administratively responsible to him. The Director is assisted by two Deputy Directors and a staff in Washington, organized into the following divisions.
1. Reports;
2. Administrative Management;
3. Office of the Solicitor;
4. Relocation Planning;
5. Relocation Assistance;
6. Community Services;
7. Employment;
8. Agriculture and Engineering;
9. Industry.
Three Assistant Directors of the Authority are maintained in field offices: one in Little Rock, Ark.; a second in Denver, Colo.; and the third in San Francisco, Calif. Each field Assistant Director has from one to three principal assistants and a small clerical staff. The field Assistant Directors are responsible for assisting the Director in inspection and supervision of relocation centers and other field activities of the Authority, and for representing the Director in contacts with other governmental agencies and with the public.

To perform the functions of the War Relocation Authority in the field of evacuee property management, a property office, under the direction of the Relocation Assistance Division in Washington, is maintained in San Francisco. Branches of this office have been located in Seattle and Los Angeles. To assist in the relocation of evacuees outside centers, and to maintain contact with those who have been granted leave, a series of field offices is being established under the direction of the Employment Division of the Washington staff. At the present time key relocation offices have been established in Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, Chicago, and Cleveland. A number of subsidiary offices, concerned particularly with the use of evacuees in agricultural work are operating under the direction of the Salt Lake City office. Other subsidiary offices will be established as they are needed.


In addition to work connected with the relocation of the Japanese-American population, with which the War Relocation Authority is primarily concerned, we are responsible for providing assistance to individuals excluded from military areas. Removal of the Japanese-American population from the Pacific coast is the only wholesale evacuation which the Army has ordered under Executive Order 9066. It has for some months, however, been engaged in the removal of designated individuals, both aliens and citizens, from restricted areas along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. Under the present procedure, individuals, after appropriate investigations and hearings, are ordered by the military authorities to leave the restricted areas. Pursuant to Executive Order 9102, the War Relocation Authority has developed procedures under which it interviews individual excludees, and undertakes to provide them with such financial and other assistance as they may require to comply with the military orders. With such information as is now available to the Authority, we do not expect that the individual exclusion program will ever approach in scope or complexity the work of the Authority arising from the evacuation of the Japanese population from the west coast.


1. Purpose and scope of memorandum.

It is the purpose of this memorandum to prescribe the functions of military police units at war relocation centers and areas within the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and to indicate the relationship between such units and the respective project directors, war relocation areas, and war relocation centers.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Center" or "relocation center" means a community administered by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 9102, issued March 18, 1942.

(b) "Area" or "relocation area" means the entire area which surrounds and includes a relocation center, which is under the general administrative jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority, and which has been designated a military area pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, issued February 19, 1942.

3. Purpose of relocation areas.

Relocation areas have been established for the purpose of caring for Japanese who have been moved from certain military areas. They have been moved from their homes and placed in relocation areas as a matter of military necessity. The relocation centers and areas are not concentration camps, and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Relocation centers are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another purpose and are not related to the evacuation program.

4. Freedom of movement of evacuees.

Japanese evacuees in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within the relocation areas as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees. In general, the evacuees will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation areas from sunrise to sunset. From sunset to sunrise the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center limits without the special permission of the project director. The boundaries of the relocation centers and areas shall be marked, respectively, by signs in both the English and Japanese languages indicating their limits.

Evacuee warning sign

5. Functions of the project director.

Relocation centers are operated by civilian management under the War Relocation Authority. A project director is in charge of each center. The project director will determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions to the commanding officer of the military police. The project director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or area. The project director is responsible for all means of communication within the area.

6. Function of military police.

The military police on duty at relocation centers and areas shall perform the following functions:
(a) They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading into the area;

(b) They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the project director;

(c) They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave the center without permission. The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and during such other time as the commanding officer of the military police units deems advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to sunrise.

(d) They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest.

(e) They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected departure unobserved.

(f) They shall be available upon call by the project director or by the project police in case of emergencies, such as fire or riots. When called upon in such instances, the commander of the military police shall assume full charge until the emergency ends.
8. Conduct of enlisted men.

Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties. A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing.

9. Cooperation between commanding officers and the War Relocation Authority.

Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating instructions issued to Project Directors. The Project Directors and their assistants and the commanding officers will maintain such close personal contacts with each other as will assure the efficient and orderly operation of the area, and the proper performance of the duties of all.

Date, July 3, 1942.
(s) E. R. FRYER, Regional Director
(For the War Relocation Authority.)
Date, July 8, 1942.
(s) KARL R. BENDETSEN, Colonel, G. S. C. Assistant
Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division.
(For the Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.)


Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., September 17, 1942.



1. Under the authority granted the commanding general, Western Defense Command, pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, Japanese civilians have been moved from certain military areas in this command as a matter of military necessity.

2. Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 9102, March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority has been established as a civilian agency to assist the military in the evacuation of certain persons; to provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places; to provide for their needs; to provide for the employment of such persons at useful work; to supervise their activities; and other related matters.

3. For the purpose of carrying out the directions of Executive Order No. 9102, the War Relocation Authority has selected the following sites in the territorial area of the Western Defense Command: Manzanar, Calif.; Tule Lake, Calif.; Poston, Ariz. (Colorado River); Sacaton, Ariz. (Gila River); Delta, Utah; and Minidoka, Idaho. These sites are designated as military areas known as war relocation project areas. The boundaries of such areas shall be marked with appropriate signs in both English and Japanese language. The provisions of Public Proclamation No. 8, this headquarters, require that those Japanese persons evacuated to a war relocation project area shall remain in that area, except as movement is authorized in writing by this headquarters, transmitted through the War Relocation Authority. Violations of these provisions are subject to prosecution as provided by Public Law No. 503, Seventy-seventh Congress.

4. The war relocation project area, later referred to as "relocation area" or "area" covers the entire area and includes one or more "relocation centers." The relocation center includes the populated area and the administrative and industrial area. The relocation centers and areas are not "concentration camps" and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Relocation centers and areas are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another purpose and are not related to the evacuation program. While the relocation program up to the present time has related particularly to the Japanese, the same program may be extended to other civilians as military necessity may dictate.

5. Relocation centers are operated by civilian management under the War Relocation Authority. A project director is in charge of each center. The project director will determine those persons authorized to enter the center or area, other than evacuees being transferred by War Department authority. The project director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or area. The project director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or area. He will transmit his instructions regarding passes and permits to the commanding officer of the military police unit.

6. Civilian police, operating under the project director, will be on duty to maintain order within the area; to apprehend and guard against subversive activities or undercover crimes and misdemeanors; to make such search of the person and property of the evacuees as may be necessary to guard against the introduction or use of articles heretofore or hereafter declared contraband; to control traffic within the center; and to enforce camp rules and regulations. Public Proclamation No. 3, this headquarters, March 24, 1942, designated certain articles of contraband which are denied to all persons of Japanese ancestry within the limits of this command.

7. Each relocation site will be under military police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Certain military police escort guard companies have been assigned to duty at each of the relocation areas in the Western Defense Command.

8. The military police on duty at relocation centers and areas shall perform the following functions:
(a) They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading into the area;

(b) They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the project director;

(c) They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave the center without permission. The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and during such other time as the commanding officer of the military police units deems advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to sunrise.

(d) They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest;

(e) They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected a departure unobserved;

(f) They shall be available, upon call by the project director or by the project police, in case of emergencies such as fire or riot. When called upon in such instances, the commanding officer of the military police unit shall assume full charge until the emergency ends.

(g) They shall inspect parcels and packages consigned to evacuees at those centers where the inspection is directed by the commanding general, Western Defense Command. Special instructions for such inspections and for the confiscation of designated items of contraband will be issued by the commanding general, Western Defense Command.
9. Evacuees in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within the relocation areas as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees. In general, the evacuees will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation areas from sunrise to sunset. From sunset to sunrise the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center limits without the special permission of the project director. Sentry towers, with flood lights, may be placed outside of the boundaries of the center to assist the military police in maintaining proper control.

10. Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties. A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing with evacuees.

11. All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to which their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest standards of duty, deportment, and military appearance.

12. The commanding officer of the military police unit is responsible for the protection of merchandise at the post exchange furnished for the use of the military personnel.

13. In areas where there are black-out regulations, the commanding officer of the military police unit will be responsible for the black-out of the center. A switch will be so located as to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in camp. The commanding officer of the military police unit will notify the project director of his instructions relative to black-outs.

14. Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating instructions issued to project directors. Project directors, their assistants, and the commanding officers of military police units will maintain such close personal contact with each other as will assure the efficient and orderly operation of the area, and the proper performance of the duties of all.

By command of Lieutenant General DeWitt.
Brigadier General, G. S. C., Chief of Staff.
Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General.

(Further discussion at this point was off the record).


Senator CHANDLER. This is, gentlemen of the committee, Col. William P. Scobey, of the General Staff, executive for the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy.

Colonel SCOBEY. I don't know that I have any statement to make, I am here to answer questions, Mr. Chairman. If you want me to make a statement as to the War Department's policy, I can do so on this bill.

Senator CHANDLER. Are you familiar with the introduction of this bill?

Colonel SCOBEY. I am, sir.

Senator CHANDLER. If you will state the War Department's views with respect to it, we will be very glad to have them.

Colonel SCOBEY. The War Department is not in favor of the bill. The War Department looks upon the measure as giving to it a responsibility which it is not particularly qualified to handle, because the objective to be accomplished is of a social nature rather than a military nature.
The War Department has a tremendous job on its hands. It needs all of its personnel on military projects rather than on social projects, as this is looked upon. That, basically, is the reason the War Department feels that it doesn't want to handle this job.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize briefly the initiation of this evacuation. I think I can state the purposes of the evacuation. At the time the evacuation was developed, the commanding general of the Western Defense Command had a serious problem on his hands. >From a military strategic viewpoint it was not clear as to what might happen. No one knew exactly what the Japanese capabilities were, and there were indications, definite indications, that efforts were being made to make forays against the west coast. There certainly had been definite indications of raids, and in a time of danger a military commander, being responsible for the security of his designated area, the people and the facilities of that area and his country, he doesn't want to take any chance whatsoever.

The military authorities were cognizant of the fact that there were dangerous Japanese among us, among those living on the west coast. At the same time they were also cognizant that there were loyal Japanese. Many of those Japanese had evidenced their loyalty to this country in various manners that I think can be best detailed by Commander Coggins. I will not attempt to go into that.

Unfortunately the military had never made a detailed study of these people, 110,000 or more. They were not all cataloged. But time was of the essence in the military situation and it was immediately necessary, under the existing conditions, that some measure be taken to insure that in case of a raid or an attack on the west coast there were no fifth column activities and no collaboration by hostile or pro-Axis Japanese.

We recognize that actually some of the most dangerous of our people out there were not Japanese, they were other agents -- German and Italian agents. They were collaborating with Japan, and with the Japanese.

Another reason, we felt, in view of the killings that had occurred out there, for the safety of the Japanese themselves we should get them out. The Western Defense Command and staff made a study of the situation and planned the evacuation. They set up assembly points and announced to the Japanese that they were to be evacuated. I don't believe we have on record a single instance of active opposition to that evacuation. Certainly, the Japanese collaborated remarkably well with our efforts, and may I say to this committee that the record shows the finest spirit in most instances, in nearly every instance. That was a remarkable thing to the War Department, and that collaboration contributed largely to the success of the evacuation, which caused the Army to get, I believe, a very good record on its processes in the evacuation.

Having evacuated these people from their homes and from their property and assembled them in these assembly centers, they then were turned over to the War Relocation Authority by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of the Civil Affairs Division of the western defense commander's staff. Having done that, the War Department had accomplished its mission in the evacuation and ceased to have further responsibility for the Japanese except by agreement with the War Relocation Authority whereby the War Department agreed to station at each relocation center the necessary military police to insure that the surrounding neighborhood was not molested by Japanese, and that in case of necessity Japanese were controlled within those centers, a security measure which we felt was desirable and which has proved to be of value.

Senator CHANDLER. Do you think it is adequate?

Colonel SCOBEY. We have studied the question from every angle and we think, we believe, that the force we now have present at these centers in each instance is adequate. We look upon these Japanese as being unarmed, and certainly the majority of them having no desire to enter into any disturbances or engagements. The disturbances that have developed have been stresses within the centers themselves, and our records show no instance where there has been any opposition or hostility exhibited toward the surrounding localities.

We are prepared, in case of emergency, to reinforce any particular military police company at any particular center. In other words, our plans are developed to that end by the Povost Marshall General of the Army.

Senator CHANDLER. Immediate reinforcements if necessary?

Colonel SCOBEY. The term "immediate" is a relative term. In some instances it might take 6 hours to get the necessary force there.

Our troops are armed with machine guns, rifles, shotguns, tear gas, the normal complement of weapons that a military force of that size and type would have in its possession. They are prepared to use them; they are trained in them and will not hesitate to use them in case of emergency.

Senator WALLGREN. What have you got to say about the present management of these locations?

Colonel SCOBEY. I would prefer not to mention that. The War Department feels very sympathetic to the War Relocation Authority because they are appreciative of the tremendous responsibility they have.

Senator WALLGREN. They ought to.

Colonel SCOBEY. And we have on every occasion given them every assistance that we could. When they have called upon us for information or for any type of assistance we have gladly collaborated with them and given that assistance. We think that they have a job that we would not like to have.

Senator O'MAHONEY. What about this Wartime Civil Control Administration? How was that formed and where was the staff recruited?

Colonel SCOBEY. Among the military personnel on the west coast, as I understand it, in the main. I don't know, Senator, of my own knowledge exactly how that developed. I was in the field at the time W. C. C. A. was formed.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Were you here this morning when there was some testimony with respect to the employment of administrative officials of W. P. A.?

Colonel SCOBEY. I think they used some civilian personnel along with the military heads in the various centers.

Senator O'MAHONEY. But the control was under the Army?

Colonel SCOBEY. The control was definitely under the Army.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And so far as these civilians came in, they were merely cooperating under the direction of the west coast command?

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct, sir. They acted, I think, mostly in policing each assembly center. I am not so sure of my answer. I am not definitely informed on it because it occurred before my tour here in Washington.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Are you definite in your mind that it was not a W. P. A. project in any sense of the word?

Colonel SCOBEY. They may have taken over W. P. A. personnel.

Senator O'MAHONEY. But that would be a very definitely different thing from making a W. P. A. project out of it.

Colonel SCOBEY. The Army controlled the entire operation, Senator.

Senator O'MAHONEY. I think that answers it.

Colonel SCOBEY. I might say the term "Wartime Civil Control Administration" refers to an operative agency of the Western Defense Command. G-2 had made up the plans, or rather the Civil Affairs Division of the commanding general's staff made up the plans for the evacuation, and then organized this subsidiary group to execute the plans. The W. C. C. A. was an operating group.

Have I made it clear to that extent? And it was under their control that the evacuation was conducted.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And all under the direction of the military.

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct, sir.

Senator GURNEY. Colonel, may I ask you, does the War Department feel there is no necessity for policing the camp to the extent of searching men going in and out, as to whether they possess firearms or not?

Colonel SCOBEY. I don't think the War Department has any opinion in the matter because we haven't studied that. We ceased to study the problem after we turned it over to the War Relocation Authority.

Senator GURNEY. You didn't quite turn it over. You left there a company of military police to guard them, and you have to provide that military unit with guns and ammunition, as you have just said. So if you are not controlling whether or not these people on the inside have firearms, and don't know whether they have, you have got to have a larger unit and more equipment.

Colonel SCOBEY. May I state this: Within those camps or centers that lie within the Western Defense Command restricted areas the military police, by virtue of the authority of the commanding general, who has insisted that there be no passage of firearms into those centers, do search all people going in and out.

Senator GURNEY. That's good.

Colonel SCOBEY. With reference to the other centers, for the first time I learned this afternoon there is no search made. But the mission of the military police there is stated in an agreement entered into between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, whereby we agree to supervise the personnel going in and out of there -- who shall go in and out, not what shall go in and out -- upon passes that have been issued by the War Relocation Authority and, in case of emergency, be prepared to take over any particular center.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Counter-intelligence is a function of G-2, isn't it?

Colonel SCOBEY. Yes, sir.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And that includes the investigation and study of enemy espionage and sabotage in this country?

Colonel SCOBEY. That is right.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Does G-2, in that part of its function, endeavor to supervise any possibility of such hostile acts by Japanese as well as by any other aliens?

Colonel SCOBEY. May I say, Senator, that we are collaborating in the counter-intelligence with the F. B. I. I am not prepared to speak for G-2 on this, but I am pretty sure there is a division of authority or responsibility between G-2 and F. B. I. on counter-intelligence activities. The F. B. I. in the main conducts counter-intelligence in the civilian communities, whereas G-2 definitely has its counter-intelligence system set up in all military camps, and if I am not mistaken probably in some highly critical war production plants. But F. B. I. is the main counter-intelligence agency for the civilian community. We wouldn't let our officers go out in the civilian community and conduct the intelligence there.

Senator O'MAHONEY. I assume I am correct in the assumption that the War Department and the Department of Justice have taken every possible precaution to be sure enemy agents are not free to work in this country wherever they may be located.

Colonel SCOBEY. I believe that would be correct. We have an expert in counter-intelligence present in the room who probably can answer that question.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Of course, what I am driving at is whether there is any possibility of any loophole with respect to these Japs. Would you or your expert answer that question?

Colonel SCOBEY. Dr. Coggins, who belongs to the Office of Naval Intelligence, I believe can answer that better than I can.

Senator O'MAHONEY. I will be very glad to have Dr. Coggins answer.

Senator CHANDLER. He is coming over in just a minute. We are going to put him on next.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Since the question is asked, may he not answer?

Dr. COGGINS. The question is whether all necessary precautions have been taken by G-2 and F. B. I. to insure against the activity of these people who may be at large in the United States?

Senator O'MAHONEY. That's right.

Dr. COGGINS. I think, of course, I agree with the colonel, that under the limitation agreement the Federal Bureau of Investigation is given paramount authority over investigation of civilians, but insofar as G-2 can assist, in the same way that O. N. I. assists them in making available files, there must be certainly cooperation, and I know there is on the part of the Navy and I am quite sure there is on the part of the Army, but neither of us can leave our sphere, you see, under the limitation agreement. We have certain well-defined areas in which we can conduct investigations.

Senator O'MAHONEY. I said I assumed that sufficient precaution has been taken by the Government, whether through the War Department or the Navy Department or the Department of Justice to make certain that the country is protected from the activities of enemy agents.

Dr. COGGINS. To say that all precautions have been taken would be to say that our work has been perfectly done.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Are you satisfied that sufficient precautions have been taken with respect to the Japs?

Dr. COGGINS. Not in every respect, sir; no, sir.

Senator WALLGREN. How is this similar situation met in other countries?

Colonel SCOBEY. I can only speak from hearsay on that. I have talked with people who came back from Japan and Italy since the war. I don't think I have talked to anyone from Germany. In Japan, our nationals there, I am advised, were in some instances allowed to remain in their homes and restricted to certain areas.

Senator WALLGREN. Right at that point, I think we should get Ambassador Grew up here.

Senator CHANDLER. We will call him.

Colonel SCOBEY. I think that is a good suggestion.

I might say that in Italy I know of one instance where an individual was allowed to go anywhere he wanted after the war started. He had his own automobile. He turned his automobile over to his guard and he would go for a walk for miles. He was an Army officer.

Senator O'MAHONEY. They are privileged characters anywhere.

Colonel SCOBEY. I doubt it.

Senator CHANDLER. Colonel, if this committee decides to turn the project back over to the Army, you will all undertake it and do a good job of it?

Colonel SCOBEY. We will always take anything the Congress gives us. I think I would be justified in saying it would require us to set up an organization there that would---

Senator WALLGREN. How about that, Colonel? At the present time you have a police force, a military police.

Senator CHANDLER. At every one of them.

Senator WALLGREN. Why can't you have just an additional set-up there that would---

Colonel SCOBEY. We think we have too many military police now.

Senator WALLGREN. But write your regulations and restrictions along military lines.

Colonel SCOBEY. We think this is a social problem, Senator, if I may say so.

Senator WALLGREN. Oh, the social problem -- you might as well farm these people all out and abolish your War Relocation Board. Farm them out. You can get rid of them.

Colonel SCOBEY. We would like to use these people as soldiers.

Senator WALLGREN. Sit around here and spend seventy or eighty million dollars with these people on your hands. Sure we can farm them out.

Senator CHANDLER. You don't think anybody has any objection to their fighting for their country if they will do it?

Colonel SCOBEY. I don't believe they would have any objection, if they will go out and get killed for us.

Senator CHANDLER. There has already been considerable time, and 70 percent of those are citizens of the United States, and if they will go to war there is nobody going to make any objection to that, for this country.

Colonel SCOBEY. We hope to use them, some day, Mr. Chairman, in our military effort. As a matter of fact, Mr. Myer said we have 5,000. I think the figure is about 4,000 that are presently under arms in this country. We have a combat battalion now.

Senator WALLGREN. They had to move them all off the west coast.

Colonel SCOBEY. We did move them all off the west coast, and I intended to explain that, Senator Wallgren, by saying that at the moment we could not differentiate between the men that we knew or thought were loyal and the disloyal. We did not take the time to conduct an investigation.

(Further comments at this point were off the record.)

Colonel SCOBEY. On the question of the loyalty of the Japs, I would rather let Commander Coggins, who has been intimately associated with the problem for a great many years, talk about that.

Senator WALLGREN. I am thinking a little bit about this problem, that day after day these boys are going to be returning from the South Pacific, and we just don't know what the feeling is going to be of our own American citizen to have to see either his son or his brother or some close relative die at the hands of a Jap. It is something I think we should think about. We have got to not only protect our own nation but we have to protect the Japanese as well that live here in this country, and that was the idea of that proclamation of the President, creating strategic areas and moving those people out.

Colonel SCOBEY. A specific instance similar to that you have stated occurred at Tule Lake. It seems there some citizen of the State of Oregon was passed by a Japanese in a car from one of these centers. I don't remember the exact facts, but he was irate about it. It happened that one of the boys from this particular town in Oregon was one of the aviators forced down after that Tokyo raid, [DeShazer?] and the Japanese Government said that they were going to punish adequately and appropriately these captured aviators for bombing Tokyo. Well, these citizens said that they would take adequate action against these Japs here if the Japanese Government did anything to that boy that came from the Oregon town.

Senator WALLGREN. Those are things I am thinking of. Mr. Myer takes the attitude that I am trying to persecute the Japanese when I push this bill. I am just asking better policing. All you have to do is lay down the military law under which they should operate. That is what I think could be done. I think they could still stay clear of that.

Colonel SCOBEY. The War Department feels they should not do that. They feel it is beyond their realm. Certainly it would necessitate a revision of the Executive order to do it, to begin with, or probably congressional action.

(Further discussion at this point were off the record.)

Senator O'MAHONEY. The testimony of Mr. Myer this morning was that the military have complete control of the policing of these relocation centers.

Colonel SCOBEY. Not the interior police, the exterior.

Senator O'MAHONEY. That is a thing that is cleared up. You have the sole jurisdiction over these exterior police, do you?

Colonel SCOBEY. The sole jurisdiction; yes, sir.

Senator O'MAHONEY. It is within your discretion to determine how many or how few they shall be?

Colonel SCOBEY. The military police there? Yes, sir.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And if it should be represented to you -- that is to say to the War Department -- in a particular case or in every case there there were not sufficient military police assigned to a particular camp or to all camps, you have full authority to put as many more on duty as you desire?

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct, sir; within the limitations of our available units.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Yes; manpower.

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Am I correct in assuming that the authority in every instance over these camps is vested in the commanding officer of the district.

Colonel SCOBEY. The authority over the camps?

Senator O'MAHONEY. The authority over the military police at the camps.

Colonel SCOBEY. The commander of that company has the full authority, and he acts directly under the commanding general of the service command.

Senator O'MAHONEY. That's right. The commanding general of the service command in each particular area has jurisdiction over the military police at these camps.

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator O'MAHONEY. What does he do, or what do the officers and men under him do, to determine how many military police shall be assigned to each camp?

Colonel SCOBEY. May I answer that by giving you a concrete case?

Senator O'MAHONEY. Surely. That is the best way.

Colonel SCOBEY. The question came up as to whether or not the military police at Heart Mountain, near Cody, Wyo., was ample.

Senator O'MAHONEY. I raised the question.

Colonel SCOBEY. I thought probably you were familiar with it. The matter was turned over to the commanding general of the Seventh Service Command, and Brig. Gen. Paul B. Clemens made a personal inspection of that locality. The inspection included not only seeing what the general lay-out was, but the training of the military police, the weapons, and he made an evaluation of the entire situation in order to answer, "Do we need more military police?"
That report came back and it came to our office. I saw the report, and he said that, as I remember it -- I can't quote it -- the general impression was that there was no need for any additional military police units for the moment, but he thought it was desirable to send a few individuals up there to increase the size of the military police company.

Senator WALLGREN. How large is it now?

Colonel SCOBEY. I think those companies are around 200, Senator Wallgren, if I remember correctly.

Senator WALLGREN. In any event, you investigated the situation.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And a competent officer was sent to make the investigation.

Colonel SCOBEY. Yes, sir; a brigadier general.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And he evaluated the conditions and made a recommendation, and that recommendation was approved?

Colonel SCOBEY. That is correct.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And you do that in every case?

Colonel SCOBEY. In every case that it becomes apparent an investigation should be made. We leave it up to the service commander who should, on his own responsibility, keep himself advised as to the situation in all instances. And may I make one addition to my statement. Not only is he prepared for the immediate situation there, but he has made plans whereby a rapid re-enforcement of that military police can be made in case of an unexpected great emergency.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Now the commanding officer of the military police at each camp is, I assume, under obligation to report to his superior officer any conditions that might transpire which would lead him to believe there ought to be an increased force?

Colonel SCOBEY. He is required to. He must report.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And I assume that care has been taken to appoint competent officers in charge of each of these camps?

Colonel SCOBEY. We have been careful to try to get the very best officers for those camps.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Is there anything more that should be done, in your opinion?

Colonel SCOBEY. I can think of nothing for the moment, Senator.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Has the Army considered the possibility of having the interior policing of the camps?

Colonel SCOBEY. No, sir; we haven't considered it because we don't want it.

Senator GURNEY. Would you consider it might be necessary to search the camp for weapons, and search people coming in and out for arms of all kinds?

Colonel SCOBEY. The question of searching for arms of personnel going in and out might become a desirable thing to consider.

Senator WALLGREN. Recently they had an incendiary fire out there.

Senator GURNEY. Mr. Chairman, don't you feel we had better recess until tomorrow morning?

Senator CHANDLER. I would like for us to hear the commander while he is here. Colonel, we may call you again. I want to ask you if you think you fellows are sufficient and did do a satisfactory job at Manzanar, when they had the riot. Did you think they handled that situation?

Colonel SCOBEY. The results speak for themselves, the box score. The mob was broken up.

Senator CHANDLER. Not without killing and wounding.

Colonel SCOBEY. They took no chances. They fired when the mob moved toward them. It is not clear whether the mob was charging them to escape the gas or whether they charged them to overrun the police. The indications are that the mob was charging to escape the gas, by reading the report, but the military police, having no knowledge of why they were charging, took no chances and fired. You have the report, I think, Senator. I sent it to you.

Senator CHANDLER. I haven't got it yet. I want every Senator here to see it. It hasn't come yet.

Colonel SCOBEY. May I say one thing about the food? The War Department procures the food for these camps and on a ration less than the soldiers get.

Senator GURNEY. How much less?

Colonel SCOBEY. Just a few cents less. Our ration is between 50 and 60, and I believe theirs is 45.

Senator CHANDLER. Gentlemen of the committee, I want to say that Lieutenant Commander Coggins was at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December and is one of our real heroes who has come back to the country to perform a job here for us. I have heard his story, but I want you to hear it. I take great pleasure in presenting him to the committee -- Lieutenant Commander Coggins, of the Navy of the United States.

(The statement of Lieutenant Commander Coggins was off the record; the reporter was excused at 5:30 p. m.)

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