|[NOTE: Undecipherable text is noted by "-----." "Trans." =
Translated. For more pre-war messages and background on MAGIC, see Counterintelligence
in World War II, Chapter 2, Magic. For books on MAGIC, see Hitler's Japanese Confidant by Boyd, Intelligence,
Internment & Relocation by Robar, and Magic: The Untold Story of U.S. Intelligence by Lowman. For some very interesting TIME
Magazine articles on MAGIC from Dec. 1945, see They
Called It Intelligence, Magic
Was the Word for It, and Secret
January 30, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
Foreign Office secret.
Heretofore, we have placed emphasis on publicity and propaganda work in the United States. In view of the critical situation in the recent relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of being prepared for the worst, we have decided to alter this policy. Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our disposal, we have decided to de-emphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead, to strengthen our intelligence work.
Though we must give the matter of intelligence work our further study -- in this connection we are at present conferring with the intelligence bureau -- we have mapped out a fundamental program, the outline of which is contained in my supplementary cable No. 44.
Please, therefore, reorganize your intelligence set-up and put this new program into effect as soon as possible.
Cable copies of this message, as "Minister's orders" to Canada, Mexico, (a copy to be relayed from Mexico to Mexicali), San Francisco, (copies from San Francisco to Honolulu, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver), New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.
January 30, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
(In two parts -- complete).
(Foreign Office secret).
(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs (see my message to Washington #591 and #732 from New York to Tokyo, both of last year's series).
With regard to this, we are holding discussions with the various circles involved at the present time.
(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided into three general classifications: political, economic, and military, and definite course of action shall be mapped out.
(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or secretly oppose participation in the war.
(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of Negroes, and labor movements.
(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.
These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments, (laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters, factories, and transportation facilities.
(6) Utilization of our "Second Generations" and our resident nationals. (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must be exercised).
(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear this in mind and in anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international intelligence route. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.
(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved.
Please get the details from Secretary Terasaki upon his assuming his duties there.
Please send copies to those offices which were on the distribution list of No. 43.
May 9, 1941
FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
(In 2 parts -- complete).
Re your message #180 to Washington.
We are doing everything in our power to establish outside contacts in connection with our efforts to gather intelligence material. In this regard, we have decided to make use of white persons and Negroes, through Japanese persons whom we can't trust completely. (It not only would be very difficult to hire U.S. (military?) experts for this work at the present time, but the expenses would be exceedingly high.) We shall, furthermore, maintain close connections with the Japanese Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the newspapers.
With regard to airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments in other parts, we plan to establish very close relations with various organizations and in strict secrecy have them keep these military establishments under close surveillance. Through such means, we hope to be able to obtain accurate and detailed intelligence reports. We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area, who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war materials, and report the amounts and destinations of such shipments. The same steps have been taken with regard to traffic across the U.S.-Mexico border.
We shall maintain connection with our second generations [Nisei] who are at present in the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the Army. We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes.
With regard to the Navy, we are cooperating with our Naval Attache's office, and are submitting reports as accurately and as speedily as possible.
We are having Nakazawa investigate and summarize information gathered through first hand and newspaper reports, with regard to military movements, labor disputes, communistic activities and other similar matters. With regard to anti- Jewish movements, we are having investigations made by both prominent Americans and Japanese who are connected with the movie industry which is centered in this area. We have already established connections with very influential Negroes to keep us informed with regard to the Negro movement.
May 11, 1941
FROM: Seattle (Sato)
(3 parts -- complete).
Re your # 180 to Washington.
1. Political Contacts.
We are collecting intelligences revolving around political questions, and also the question of American participation in the war which has to do with the whole country and this local area.
2. Economic Contacts.
We are using foreign company employees, as well as employees in our own companies here, for the collection of intelligences having to do with economics along the lines of the construction of ships, the number of airplanes produced and their various types, the production of copper, zinc and aluminum, the yield of tin for cans, and lumber. We are now exerting our best efforts toward the acquisition of such intelligences through competent Americans. From an American, whom we contacted recently, we have received a private report on machinists of German origin who are Communists and members of the labor organizations in the Bremerton Naval Yard and Boeing airplane factory. Second generation Japanese ----- ----- -----.
3. Military Contacts.
We are securing intelligences concerning the concentration of warships within the Bremerton Naval Yard, information with regard to mercantile shipping and airplane manufacturer, movements of military forces, as well as that which concerns troop maneuvers.
With this as a basis, men are sent out into the field who will contact Lt. Comdr. OKADA, and such intelligences will be wired to you in accordance with past practice. KANEKO is in charge of this. Recently we have on two occasions made investigations on the spot of various military establishments and concentration points in various areas. For the future we have made arrangements to collect intelligences from second generation Japanese draftees on matters dealing with the troops, as well as troop speech and behavior. ----- ----- -----.
4. Contacts With Labor Unions.
The local labor unions A.F. of L. and C.I.O. have considerable influence. The (Socialist?) Party maintains an office here (its political sphere of influence extends over twelve zones.) The C.I.O., especially, has been very active here. We have had a first generation Japanese, who is a member of the labor movement and a committee chairman, contact the organizer, and we have received a report, though it is but a resume, on the use of American members of the (Socialist?) Party. ----- OKAMARU is in charge of this.
5. In order to contact Americans of foreign extraction and foreigners, in addition to third parties, for the collection of intelligences with regard to anti-participation organizations and the anti-Jewish movement, we are making use of a second generation Japanese lawyer.
This intelligence ----- ----- -----.
June 2, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Rome, Washington, Berlin, Moscow, Berne and Rio
(3 parts -- complete) (Washington Circular #126)
In various countries the science of cryptography and cryptanalysis is being practiced more and more. To tell the truth, no absolute confidence can be placed in the secrecy of a code. We, ourselves, in this office are worrying about drawing up a set of new codes, so we would like for you to give us some suggestions from time to time as to suitable procedures. Please pay the strictest attention always during the transfer and tenure of codes and heed the following points on the maintenance of the security of codes, independent of reliance on safes alone.
1. Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than by reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail or some other method equally as safe.
2. I am having an official in charge of this work keep the various offices informed. Each time you get a list, keep one copy of it only and burn the preceding list immediately.
3. Hereafter, as a matter of principle, code messages in ----- are not to be sent anywhere except to this office. As a matter of fact, all other code messages, except those to this office, save in cases of necessity, are to be stopped.
Please see to it that there is no misunderstanding to the effect that after abolishing this sort of dispatches it is not our intention to increase the difficulties of those in charge of telegraphic work through the necessity of safeguarding dispatches, or the sudden complication of our codes, but that I am merely trying to make our dispatches in general more safe and facile.
June 10, 1941
(To San Francisco, Los Angeles, & Seattle, Cir. #121)
Because of the suppression exercised against our Naval representatives (Language Officers) by the United States authorities in a series of recent incidents, our Navy has, for the time being, stopped stationing these officials by limiting the personnel. Inasmuch as in the light of the relations at present prevailing between Japan and the United States, observation of the movements of the American Navy is one of the most important matters, will you observe the movements of ships and gather other information that may be of interest to our Navy and wire us the required information as it comes to you?
July 10, 1941
Secret outside the Department.
(To be handled in Government Code.)
Re #18 from New Orleans and #244 (?) from Mexico to this Foreign Minister.
We wish Consul ITO to go to Mexico City. Lately the offices housing the German and Italian Consulates were closed and their intelligence net broken. Intelligence activities in the Americas and suitable liaison are now essential, so we wish Secretary TERAZAKI also to go to Mexico to confer with our Minister there, in order to realize our plans in a concrete fashion based on the policy described in previous messages. We want Secretary TERAZAKI, and him only, to stop off at Quito, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc. In this connection the points which we would like to bring to your attention are as follows:
1. We will have three routes to Mexico from the United States, consisting of Laredo, Ciudad Juarez and Mexicali. Mexicali in particular is a convenient point for us on the west coast. In case we need more personnel, we can get them from our Ministry in Mexico.
2. We will establish a Chile route from Mexico to Manzanillo and a Brazil route by way of Vera Cruz.
3. Various officials in the United States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own espionage nets, correlate them, and develop a concrete plan for making contacts and exchanges on the border.
4. In order to succeed in the objective, ways and means for keeping in contact through telegraphy, telephones, memoranda, and word of mouth will be decided upon and put into effect.
5. These routes are to be established against the day of evil and, while all is calm, nothing must be done which would jeopardize their security; therefore, at present investigate only the feasibility of circulating over them.
6. The expenses are to be paid by the several offices.
Because of its geographical position, Mexico is the main point for intelligence work in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, as well as in the United States. Therefore, before we think of relying too much upon Brazil, Argentina and Chile, let us concentrate on Mexico. However, the other three bases are different. In case the United States joins the war, they would inevitably come under her control, but so long as Mexico does not officially join the war, we can continue our intelligence schemes there. Paralleling these plans of ours, if you can also work out a plan for establishing a liaison net with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, it would be excellent groundwork for the establishment presently of an intelligence net. Please transmit this to Mexico City and take with you to New Orleans.
July 19, 1941
FROM: Mexico City
Re your message #144 to Brazil.
In accordance with the contents of my message #251, I summoned the more influential people in Mexico City and representatives from the various areas in Mexico, to my office. I relayed to them your instructions with regard to our giving guidance to our nationals residing in Mexico. Following this up, I warned them of the things they as Japanese should be prepared to face, and asked them to consider ways and means of making the best of them.
The various points listed below were decided upon as being the best way of meeting the present situation. All those present assured me that our nationals would understand them, and would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions.
1. In view of the times, it is of the utmost importance that there be an efficient system of liaison with this once so that we may act in unity. We decided that we could best accomplish this by, first of all, strengthening the Federation of Japanese Associations. At the same time, we divided the country into nine areas, taking into consideration its geography, transportation facilities, and the distribution of the population of our nationals. In each area a liaison officer will be installed who will offer guidance to our nationals residing in his area as well as to report, at suitable intervals, the general conditions of his area. He will, also, relay in the most effective manner instructions issued by this office to the Japanese population in his area.
2. As a means of protecting our nationals in the event of unfavorable developments in the future, we shall endeavor to at all times promote better feeling toward the Japanese people among the Mexicans. Towards this end, we should urge the members of the Japanese Associations and more particularly influential Japanese persons, to make an even greater effort than heretofore. When and if worse comes to worst, each area will put into effect the most appropriate means of protecting the people therein. Funds to be used in such an emergency will be collected within the areas themselves.
3. Means of protecting Japanese businesses in the event of unfavorable developments as well as steps which shall be taken if there are indications that Japanese assets in Mexico will be frozen, were decided upon along the lines contained in my message #174.
*Mexico City wires Tokyo that a great majority of Japanese residents will probably remain in the U.S. in the event of a break with the U.S. That Mexico would probably not permit Japanese from U.S. to enter that country. A conference of Japanese representatives from various parts of Mexico will meet shortly in Mexico City to formulate plans for mutual help among Japanese districts.
September 17, 1941
(Circular.) (In 3 parts-complete.)
Santiago to Tokyo # 261.
Regarding paragraphs 1 to 3-a of my message # 231.
All of our offices in North America should give their immediate attention to the selection of spies. They should choose only those who are best qualified for the job and have them go to work on collection of information and, if possible, liaison. The offices in Latin America shall accept those reports from them in which they can place credence. If it is possible to obtain the services of an informant who has been a seaman, it might be a good plan to try and get him a job in a steamship company. (There is one who falls in this category in New York. It would be very much to our interest if a job could be found for him in some steamship company which has a North American service.)
It must be borne in mind, of course, that it is exceedingly difficult to select individuals who can be reliably utilized. Moreover, it is very difficult to check any information from a foreign country. Therefore, it is of primary importance that we make up our minds to spend vast sums of money.
It is a known fact that the F.I.B. (F.B.I. ?) is making a practice of trying to get its men into the confidence of those in the offices of the Axis nations. Please note this point carefully and exercise the utmost caution in making the selections.
The matter contained in (b) of the above referred to section, would be next to impossible to put into effect. However, if there is one with whom very close relations have been maintained in the past, it may be that he could be utilized.
With regard to (c) of the same section, each office should be equipped with good radio sets of the middle wave band. They shall be used to listen to domestic broadcasts in the United States. The central listening post shall be located, let us say, in Brazil, where one who is proficient in shorthand of English shall be on duty at all times.
The leading U.S. newspapers and magazines shall be subscribed to now in the name of some foreigner. These shall be thoroughly perused (even to the society columns) and carefully analyzed.
The intelligence officers referred to in section 4 of the same message shall be stationed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, (the last mentioned is looked upon as a very important post by our Army and Navy, with a view to obtaining information about Panama, as you are already aware), and Mexico.
To fulfill all of these duties, the telegraphic section of all of those offices concerned will have to be considerably enlarged. This is at present the most important actual step to be taken.
As sources of supplies for the above mentioned intelligence personnel, the present sources of Domei news agencies and others of our special correspondents shall be utilized. We shall also make indirect use of the Spanish and Portuguese language correspondents.
Since it will be of interest to keep abreast of the economic conditions in the United States, we shall maintain close contact with our merchants who in turn will keep themselves advised through local native merchants who have access to the information in the United States.
Should the German and Italian diplomatic officers be ordered out of a country before the Japanese, we shall make arrangements to take over their informants.
The informants referred to above shall not be limited to Latin Americans but shall also include those who reside in Spain and Portugal (Should, for example, Mexico get into the war, our informants in Mexico shall relay their information to those in Spain and Portugal who in turn shall pass it on to Japan.)
Relayed to Washington.
Mailed to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.
September 20, 1941
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
(Part 1 of 2.)
Since taking office, I have made a special study of the attitude of the United States and also of the nature of the people and topography of this section; and as a result have made the following estimate of the amount of money needed for enlightenment and propaganda purposes. This amount is necessary in making contacts for intelligence purposes, and already some expenditures have been made. I know that this will be "hard to take," but beg of you that you will consider the matter carefully and wire me the result (all per month expenses):
The above are for the current fiscal year.
November 18, 1941
Strictly secret. Re your #1098.
l. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786 for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will, at this sailing, have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staff who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applications. The reason, was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.
2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents, and so forth, as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.
3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.
4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.
November 25, 1941
(In 2 parts complete.)
Re your # 1906.
Our investigations regarding the various agencies are as follows:
1. Names of government organs, news agencies and newspapers which receive broadcasts.
A. Japanese affiliations.
The Rafu Shimbun (Los Angeles News).
Kashu Mainichi Shimbun (California Daily News).
Beikoku Sangyo Nippo (American Industrial Daily).
Hokubei Jiji (North American Times).
Taihoku Nippo (North American Daily).
B. Foreign affiliations.
A.P. Globe Press Service and the N.B.C. Broadcasting Company. (Recently a short wave listening station has been established in North Hollywood.) Also the U.P. LERTJV wireless, the New York Times, and the Herald Times, etc. have maintained listening stations from time to time, but at present this has been suspended.
2. Desires regarding improvement of broadcasts, etc.
A. For summer I think that 12 to 13 thousand kilocycles and for winter 7 to 12 thousand kilocycles is the best wave length to use. Reception is impossible for 16000 kilocycles and above.
Washington, 4-7 a.m.
New York, 6-10 a.m.
(Eastern Standard Time)
Pacific Coast, 3-5:30 a.m.
(Western Standard Time)
During the above intervals sensitivity is excellent but during the daytime reception is impossible.
Japanese newspapers, because of economic considerations, employ only one operator so please arrange the schedule so that plain language and English broadcasts do not come during the same hour.
3. Increasing the frequency and word content of broadcasts.
Japanese newspapers, for reasons stated in the preceeding paragraph, have their hands full under present arrangements.
4. Opinions regarding content.
A. While there are traces of improvement in broadcasts, opinion in general seems to be that at present the broadcasts are unnecessarily verbose and not sufficiently accurate.
B. More terse, up-to-the-minute broadcasts concerning conditions in Japan are desired.
C. News regarding the China incident.
A summary of the news gathered in the various quarters about once a week is sufficient.
D. Since the Japanese newspapers on the coast rely on Domei it is desired that Domei take the leadership in keeping the Japanese resident here informed regarding the course of Japanese-American relations in case of an emergency.
5. Conditions of use.
Newspapers utilizing the plain language and English broadcasts are the Japanese papers and also English papers which use their material as background in composing and editing their articles. The Globe offers Domei broadcasts to A.P. and I.N.S.
A.P., U.P., and I.N.S. make joint use of these special correspondents' news or some part of it, however it is very rarely that they give credit to Domei. Of foreign newspapers, the Tribune utilizes these the most.
November 26, 1941
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
Re your #788.
I sent TAKAGI to Chicago and San Francisco to transmit your instructions and he has notified me the result as follows:
1. Japanese residents all over America have already set up a mutual aid system and since in San Francisco they already have a fund of $6,000 there is little need for worry.
However in Chicago and elsewhere the Japanese residents are weaker financially and have practically no funds. I think if it comes to evacuation they will need some aid trom the Japanese consulate. Please let me know what you think of this.
2. Although the F.B.I. on the west coast already have a practically complete register of names of the members of the Japanese Association and the Industrial Council, etc., there seems to be no stigma attached to the list.
December 6, 1941
Re the last part: of your #123.
1. On the American continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
2. In my opinion, the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
December 6, 1941
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ----- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers. 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition, there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
SI FU 2 (All Naval Stations.)
HA FU 6 SA (TOKYO Radio Communications Staff Ashore)
U TU 2111
- SU U
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
From: YO WI 00 (CinC Combined Fleet.)
Action: WA KA 3 (Combined Fleet)
(TOI 6 December 1941 H)
Date time of release of this message: 0000, 7th.
Supplement to Combined Fleet SMS # 775.
I, the Emperor, on the occasion of ordering the expedition, leave the matter up to you, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
The responsibility of the Combined Fleet is indeed a great one as the entire rise or fall of our nation rests on its success or failure.
You, Commander-in-Chief, must prove my trust by summoning all your resources acquired during the many years of training of our fleet towards advancing on the enemy to annihilate it, and to prove to the whole world the greatness of our forces.
Comment: For Combined Fleet SMS # 775, see CZ 0008 Z.
(JAPANESE)JN 5 0004 Z
(edgs) Navy Trans 10/24/45
TOP SECRET ULTRA
December 7, 1941
In 2 parts complete.
In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.
(1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:
(a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.
(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of embassies and legations, for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.
(2) Consular officials.
(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.
(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuation: The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.
(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan: In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However, in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them.
(4) Publicly owned enemy property: Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.
(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisitioning.
(6) While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi-enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.
The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.
23 January 1942
Regarding Rio (?) to Lima #4.
The principle functions of the diplomatic organization in war time are political and informational, and that which particularly applies to our diplomatic organization in Latin America is the latter.
The brilliant success of our armed forces at Pearl Harbor was due, mainly, to the military information based on reports sent by our informers on the spot, whose efforts represent untold sacrifices in blood and tears.
Although we could hardly hope to effect a decisive destruction of England and the United States, the success or the failure of our efforts will depend largely on the information which your office will be able to furnish us. In view of this, the maintenance of neutral attitude by the Latin American countries has a special significance. However, bearing in mind the possibility of the breakdown of relations, please take immediate steps to extend the intelligence net set up by our Legation in Peru (in accordance with Tokyo Lima #7), to include Argentina and Chile.
Please relay Tokyo - Lima #7 to Argentina and to Chile and also this message to Argentina, thence to Chile.
(Secret outside the Department.)(C.O.R.)
JD-2: 790 --- (A) Navy Trans. 1-29-42 (2-TT)
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