CHAPTER 17

DOCUMENT SET 1
The Native American Presence:
The Massacre at Sand Creek

I.  A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE DECRIES THE VIOLENCE AT SAND CREEK, 1865
II.  COLONEL M. CHIVINGTON DEFENDS HIS ACTIONS, 1865
III. CONFLICTING TESTIMONY, 1865
IV.  MAJOR WYNKOOP EXPLAINS INDIAN INTENT, 1864, 1865
V.  GOVERNOR JOHN EVANS RESPONDS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL REPORT
VI. HELEN HUNT JACKSON'S ACCOUNT OF SAND CREEK AND THE AFTERMATH, 1881

    Chapter 17 focuses on the exploitation of the trans-Mississippi West, the last major frontier region in the United
States.  Before the immense resources of the interior could be developed, however, an important residual problem had to be dealt with-the Native American presence. Even before the Civil War, the Indian's fate had been sealed as a result of the federal government's aggressive land-acquisition policy. This action dismissed the original inhabitants of scarce land as obstacles to the march of "civilization."
    The following documents describe an incident that tested American values. As the concentrated tribal reservations policy was implemented, the Plains Indians fought an unsuccessful rear-guard resistance, characterized by bitter hostilities, and as noted in your textbook, atrocities on both sides.One of the most brutal confrontations occurred in 1864 at Sand Creek, Colorado Territory, where the militia attacked a band of friendly Cheyennes and Arapahos in what became a vicious massacre. Within a few hours, nearly 500 were killed, many of them women and children. Public outrage ultimately led to a congressional investigation of the grisly event.
    This incident provides the basis for a challenging exercise in historical analysis. Through an examination of the documents from the congressional investigation, try to make an interpretive judgment of the evidence.  Your responsibility is first to determine exactly what happened at Sand Creek and then to explain how and why thoswe events transpired.  Act as your own historian.
    The documents included in this set are the reportof the Congressional Committee (1865), the response by Colorado's Governor John Evans, Col. J.M. Chivington's defense of his command, several eyewitness accounts,( Lieutenant Connor, Lieutenant Cramer and Captain Talbot) and second-hand reports from Major Wynkoop,Black Kettle's Peace Pledge, and the account of reformer Helen Hunt Jackson.  Your textbook provides background on the subjugation of the Plains Indians, government policy ,and reform efforts undertaken by "friends" of the Indian. Your task is to extract the truth from the evidence.
    As you approach the documents, consider the reliability of the source. Try to decide whether a witness is credible or suspect. Determine what a given document reveals about its author.Does the document contribute to your interpretation of the Sand Creek incident?  Develop a clear picture of the events in question and a hypothesis to explain them.  Then determine how the incident fits into the history of the westward movement.

Questions for Analysis
1. What do the documents reveal about the Native Americans involved in the con-
 flict at Sand Creek? How would you assess the military's understanding and per-
ception of the Indians' intentions? To what extent were Chivington's and Evans's
actions justified?

2. What do the events at Sand Creek tell us about the nature of Indian warfare on
the Great Plains and the status of white relations with the Native American pop-
ulation in the nineteenth century? Do the documents speak to the matter of
human weaknesses or strengths?

3. Why do you think Sand Creek became a political issue in 1864-1865? What do
the documents suggest concerning the search for causes and the assignment of
ultimate responsibility? Were the criticisms in the congressional report justified?

4. Why were Black Kettle, White Antelope, and their followers encamped at Sand
Creek? What does their presence suggest about the Native American situation in
1864 and the white advance? Did the Cheyennes and Arapahos have aright to
I hold any land? What land? Why or why not? What realistic alternatives were
.there to Indian dependency on the white government?

" 5. Define ethnocentrism and explain how it was a factor in the Sand Creek incident.
In what way do the documents demonstrate the inability of whites and Indians to
move toward a successful cultural adjustment?

6. How can the views of Helen Hunt Jackson be best understood? What evidence suggests
that her attitude toward Native Americans prevailed in the white community?  How did the "friends of the
Indians" propose to solve Native Ameerican problems? What was the ultimate result of their
efforts?

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I.  A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE DECRIES
THE VIOLENCE AT SAND CREEK, 1865

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War sub-
mit the following report:

    In the summer of 1864 Governor Evans, of Col-
orado Territory, as acting superintenderit of Indian
affairs, sent notice to the various bands and tribes of
Indians within his jurisdiction that such as desired to
be considered friendly to the whites should at once
repair to the nearest military post in order to be pro-
tected from the soldiers who were to take the field
against the hostile Indians. ...
    All the testimony goes to show that the Indians,
 under the immediate control of Black Kettle and
 White Antelope of the Cheyennes, and Left Hand of
the Arapahoes, were and had been friendly to the
whites, and had not been guilty of any acts of hostil-
ity or depredation. The Indian agents, the Indian in-
terpreter and others examined by your committee, all
testify to the good character of those Indians. Even
Governor Evans and Major Anthony, though evi-
dently willing to convey to your committee a false
impression of the character of those Indians, were
forced, in spite of their prevarication, to admit that
they knew of nothing they had done which rendered
them deserving of punishment. ...
    These Indians, at the suggestion of Governor
Evans and Colonel Chivington, repaired to Fort Lyon
and p.laced themselves under the protection of Major
Wynkoop. They were led to believe that they were re-
garded in the light of friendly Indians, and would be
treated as such as long as they conducted themselves
quietly. ...
    Major Anthony having demanded their arms,
which they surrendered to him, they conducted
themselves quietly, and in every way manifested a
disposition to remain at peace with the whites. ...At
the suggestion of Major Anthony {and from one in
his position a suggestion was equivalent to a com-
mand) these Indians went to a place on Sand creek,
Iabout thirty-five miles from Fort Lyon, and there es-
tablished their camp, their arms being restored to
them. ...
    Upon observing the approach of the soldiers,
Black Kettle, the head chief, ran up to the top of his
lodge an American flag, which had been presented to
him some years before by Commissioner Green-
wood, with a small white flag under it, as he had
been advised to do in case he met with any troops on
the prairies. Mr. Smith, the interpreter, ~upposing
they might be strange troops, unaware of the charac-
.ter of the Indians encamped there, advanced from his
iodge to meet them, but was fired upon, and returned
to his lodge.
    And then the scene of murder and barbarity
began-men, women, and children were indiscrimi-
nately slaughtered. In a few minutes all the Indians
were flying over the plain in terror and confusion. A
few who endeavored to hide themselves under the
bank of the creek were surrounded and shot down in
cold blood, offering but feeble resistance. From the
sucking babe to the old warrior, all who were over-
taken were deliberately murdered. Not content with
killing women and children, who were incapable of
offering any resistance, the soldiers indulged in acts
of barbarity of the most revolting character; such, it is
to be hoped, as never before disgraced the acts of men
claiming to be civilized. No attempt was made by the
officers to restrain the savage cruelty of the men
under their command, but they stood by and wit-
nessed these acts without one word of reproof, if they
did not incite their commission. For more than two
hours the work of murder and barbarity was contin-
ued, until more than one hundred dead bodies, three-
fourths of them of women and children, lay on the
plain as evidences of the fiendish malignity and cru-
elty of the officers who had so sedulously and care-
fully plotted the massacre, and of the soldiers who
had so faithfully acted out the spirit of their officers.
    It is difficult to believe that beings in the form of
men, and disgracing the uniform of United States sol-
diers and officers, could commit or countenance the
commission of such acts of cruelty and barbarity as
are detailed in the testimony, but which your com-
mittee will not specify in their report. It is true that
 there seems to have existed among the people inhab- I
 iting that region of country a hostile feeling towards
ans' the Indians. Some of the Indians had committed acts
of hostility towards the whites; but no effort seems
to have been made by the authorities there to prevent
these hostilities, other than by the commission of i
even worse acts. The hatred of the whites to the Indi-
ans would seem to have been inflamed and excited to
the utmost; the bodies of persons killed at a great
distance-whether by Indians or not, is not certain-
were brought to the capital of the Territory and ex-
posed to the public gaze for the purpose of inflaming
 still more the already excited feeling of the people.
 Their cupidity was appealed to, for the governor in a
to proclamation calls upon all, "either individually or
in such parties as they may organize," "to kill and
destroy as enemies of the country, wherever they
may be found, all such hostile Indians," authorizing
 them to "hold to their own private use and benefit all
 the property of said hostile Indians that they may
capture" . ...
    As to Colonel Chivington, your committee can
hardly find fitting terms to describe his conduct.
Wearing the uniform of the United States, which
should be the emblem of justice and humanity; hold-
ing the important position of commander of a mili-
tary district, and therefore having the honor of the
government to that extent in his keeping, he deliber-
ately planned and executed a foul and dastardly mas-
sacre which would have disgraced the veriest savage
~ among those who were the victims of his cruelty.
Having full knowledge of their friendly character,
having himself been instrumental to some extent in
placing them in their position of fancied security, he
took advantage of their inapprehension and defence-
less condition to gratify the worst passions that ever
cursed the heart of man. ...
    [T]he truth is that he surprised and murdered, in
cold blood, the unsuspecting men, women, and chil-
dren on Sand creek, who had every reason to believe
they were under the protection of the United States
authorities, and then returned to Denver and boasted
of the brave deeds he and the men under his com-
mand had performed.

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II.  COLONEL M. CHIVINGTON
      DEFENDS HIS ACTIONS, 1865

 Answer. My reason for making the attack on the In-
the dian camp was, that I believed the Indians in the
 camp were hostile to the whites. That they were of ,
 the same tribes with those who had murdered many'
 persons and destroyed much valuable property on
 the Platte and Arkansas rivers during the previous
 spring, summer and fall was beyond a doubt. When a
 tribe of Indians is at war with the whites it is impos-
sible to determine what party or band of the tribe or
 the name of the Indian or Indians belonging to the
tribe so at war; are guilty of the acts of hostility. ...
     I had no reason to believe that Black Kettle and
 the Indians with him were in good faith at peace with
of the whites. The day before the attack Major Scott J .
 Anthony, Ist Colorado cavalry, then in command at
 Fort Lyon, told me that these Indians were hostile;
that he had ordered his sentinels to fire on them if
they attempted to come into the post, and that the
 sentinels had fired on them; that he was apprehensive
of an attack from these Indians, and had taken every
precaution to prevent a surprise. ...,;,
    I took every precaution to render the attack upon
the Indians a surprise, for the reason that we had
been chasing small parties of them all the summer
and fall without being able to catch them, and it ap-
peared to me that the only way to deal with them was
to surprise them in their place of rendezvous. ...
    White men who had been trading with the Indi-
ans informed me that the Indians had determined to
make war upon the whites as soon as the grass was
green, and that they were making preparations for
such an event by the large number of arrows they
were making and the quantity of arms and ammuni-
tion they were collecting; that the settlers along the
Platte and Arkansas rivers should be warned of the
approaching danger; that the Indians had declared
their intention to prosecute the war vigorously when
they commenced. ...
    On my arrival at Fort Lyon, in all my conversa-
tions with Major Anthony, commanding the post,
and Major Colley, Indian agent, I heard nothing of
the recent statement that the Indians were under the
protection of the government, &c.; but Major An-
thony repeatedly stated to me that he had at differ-
ent times fired upon these Indians, and that they
were hostile, and, during my stay at Fort Lyon,
urged the necessity of my immediately attacking the
Indians before they could learn of the number of
troops at Fort Lyon, and so desirous was Major Col-
ley, Indian agent, that I should find and also attack
the Arapahoes, that he sent a messenger after the
fight at Sand creek, nearly forty miles, to inform me
where I could find the Arapahoes and Kiowas; yet,
strange to say, I have learned recently that these
men, Anthony and Colley, are the most bitter in their
j denunciations of the attack upon the Indians at Sand
I creek. ...
                                J. M. CHIVINGTON,
 Lieu't Col.. lst Cavalry of Colorado, Com'd'g
 Dist. of Colorado.

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III. CONFLICTING TESTIMONY, 1865
[F]rom the time that Major Wynkoop left this post to
go out to rescue the white prisoners until the arrival
of Colonel Chivington here, which took place on the
28th of November last, no depredations of any kind
had been committed by the Indians within two hun-
dred miles of this post; that upon Colonel Chiving-
ton's arrival here with a large body of troops he was
informed where these Indians were encamped, and
 was fully advised under what circumstances they had
come into this post, and why they were then on Sand
creek; that he was remonstrated with both by officers
and civilians at this post against making war upon ,
these Indians; that he was informed and fully advised
that there was a large number of friendly Indians
there, together with several white men, who were
there at the request of himself (Colley) and by per-
mission of Major Anthony; that notwithstanding his
knowledge of the facts as above set forth, he is in-
formed that Colonel Chivington did, on the morning
of the 29th of November last, surprise and attack
said camp of friendly Indians and massacre a large
number of them, (mostly women and children,) and
did allow the troops of his command to mangle and
mutilate them in the most horrible manner.
        S. G. COLLEY, United States Indian Agent.

Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, January 16,
1865.
    Personally appeared before me Lieutenant James
D. Connor, first New Mexico volunteer infantry,
who, after being duly sworn, says: That on the 28th
day of November, 1864, I was ordered by Major
Scott J. Anthony to accompany him on an expedition
(Indian)as his battalion adjutant; the object of that
expedition was to be a thorough campaign against
hostile Indians, as I was to understand. I referred
to the fact of there being a friendly camp of Indians
in the immediate area and remonstrated
against simply attacking that camp, as I was aware
that they were resting there in fancied security under
promisesheld out to them of safety from Major E.W.
Wynkoop, former commander of the post of Fort
Lyon, as well as by Major S.J. Anthony, then in
command. Our battalion was attached to the command
of Colonel J.M. Chivington, and left Ft. Lyon on
the night of the 28th of November, 1864; about day
break of the morning of the 29th of November we
came in sight of the camp of the friendly Indians
aforementioned, and were ordered by Colonel Chivington
to attack the same, which was accordingly done.
The command of Colonel Chivington was
composed of about one thousand men; the village of
the Indians consisted of from one hundred to one
 hundred and thirty lodges, and, as far as I am able to
judge, of  from five hundred to six hundred souls, the
majority of which were women and children; in
going over the battle-ground the next day I did not
see a body of man, woman, or child but was scalped,
and in many instances their bodies were mutilated in
the most horrible manner-men, women, and chil-
dren's privates cut out, &c; I heard one man say that
he had cut out a woman's private parts and had them
for exhibition on a stick; I heard another man say
that he had cut the fingers off an Indian to get the
rings on the hand; according to the best of my
knowledge and belief these atrocities that were com-
mined were with knowledge of J. M. Chivington,
and I do not know of his taking any measures to pre-
vent them; I heard of one instance of a child a few
months old being thrown in a feed-box of a wagon,
and after being carried some distance left on the
ground to perish; I also heard of numerous instances
in which men had cut out the private parts of females
and stretched them over the saddle-bows, and wore
them over their hats while riding in the ranks. All
these matters were a subject of general conversation,
and could not help being known by Colonel J. M.
Chivington.
                        JAMES D. CONNOR,
                        First Lieutenant First Infantry
                        New Mexico Volunteers.
 

                            Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory.
Lieutenant Cramer sworn:
I am stationed at this post, Ist lieutenant com-
pany C, veteran banalionColorado cavalry. I was at
this post when Colonel Chivington arrived here, and
accompanied him on his expedition. ...Colonel
Chivington moved his regiment to the front, the Indi-
ans retreating up the creek, and hiding under the
banks. There seemed to be no organization among
our troops; everyone on his own hook, and shots fly-
ing between our own ranks. White Antelope ran to-
wards our columns unarmed, and with both arms
raised, but was killed. Several others of the warriors
were killed in like manner. The women and children
were huddled together, and most of our fire was con-
centrated on them. Sometimes during the engage-
ment I was compelled to move my company to get
out of the fire of our own men. Captain Soule did not
order his men to fire when the order was given to c'
commence the fight. During the fight, the battery on
the opposite side of the creek kept firing at the bank
while our men were in range. The Indian warriors,
about one hundred in number, fought desperately;
there were about five hundred all told. I estimated the
loss of the Indians to be from one hundred and
twenty-five to one hundred and seventy-five killed;
no wounded fell into our hands, and all the dead
were scalped. The Indian who was pointed out as
White Antelope had his fingers cut off. Our force was
so large that there was no necessity of firing on the
Indians. They did not return the fire until after our
troops had fired several rounds. We had the assur-
ance from Major Anthony that Black Kettle and his
 friends should be saved, and only those Indians who
had committed depredations should be harmed. Dur-
 ing the fight no officer took any measures to get out
of the fire of our own men. Left Hand stood with his
 arms folded, saying he would not fight the white
men, as they were his friends. I told Colonel Chiving-
ton of the position in which the officers stood from
 Major Wynkoop's pledges to the Indians, and also
Major Anthony's, and that it would be murder, in
every sense of the word, if he attacked those Indians.
His reply was, bringing his fist down close to my
face, "Damn any man who sympathizes with Indi-
ans. " I told him what pledges were given the Indians.
He replied, "That he had come to kill Indians, and
believed it to be honorable to kill Indians under any
and all circumstances"; all this at Fort Lyon. Lieu-
tenant Dunn went to Colonel Chivington and
wanted to know if he could kill his prisoner, young
Smith. His reply was, "Don't ask me; you know my
orders; I want no prisoners. " Colonel Chivington
was in position where he must have seen the scalping
and mutilation going on. ...

 My name is Presley Talbot. I was in the third reg-
 iment Colorado cavalry, and held the position as cap-
tain of company M. I was at the battle of Sand creek;
I was ordered to go into the fight by Colonel Chiv-
ington; ordered to cross Sand creek to the right side
of the bank. There I received so very galling afire
from the Indians under the bank and from ditches
dug out just above the bank that I ordered my com-
pany to advance, to prepare to dismount and fight on
foot. ...I furthermore state that the Indians were
hostile, and acted with desperation and bravery; that
Colonel John M. Chivington, commanding, acted
with discretion and bravery. ...
    [I] had several consultations with Major Colley,
Indian agent, and John Smith, Indian interpreter;
stated that they had considerable sympathy for me,
being wounded; would give me all the attention and
assistance in their power, but they would do anything
to damn Colonel John M. Chivington, or Major
Downing; that they had lost at least six thousand
dollars each by the Sand creek fight; that they had
one hundred and five robes and two white ponies
bought at the time of attack, independent of the
goods which they had on the battle-ground, which
they never had recovered, but would make the gen-
eral government pay for the same, and damn old
Chivington eventually.

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IV.  MAJOR WYNKOOP EXPLAINS
       INDIAN INTENT, 1864, 1865

Wynkoop's Original Report (September 28,1864),
Before the November 29 Massacre
    His excellency Governor Evans asked the
Indians what they had to say:

Black Kettle then said: On sight of your circular of
une 27, 1864, I took hold of the matter, and have now
come to talk to you about it. ...I want you to give all
the chiefs of the soldiers here to understand that we are
for peace, and that we have made peace, that we may
not be mistaken by them for enemies. I have not come
here with a little wolf's bark, but have come to talk
plain with you. We must live near the buffalo or starve.
When we came here we came free, without any appre-
hension, to see you, and when I go home and tell my
people that I have taken your hand and the hands of all
the chiefs here in Denver, they will feel well, and so will
all the different tribes of Indians on the plains, after we
have eaten and drunk with them.

Wynkoop's later report (1865), after the event:
 In conclusion, allow me to say that from the time I
held the consultation with the Indian chiefs on the
headwaters of the Smoky Hill, up to the date of the
massacre by Colonel Chivington, not one single
depredation had been committed by the Cheyenne
and Arapahoe Indians; the settlers of the Arkansas
 valley had returned ~o the~r ranches, from which they ;
51 had fled, had taken 10 their crops, and had been rest-
ing in perfect security, under assurances from myself
that they would be in no danger for the present-by
that means saving the country from what must in-
evitably become almost a famine were they to lose
their crops. The lines of communication to the State
were opened, and travel across the plains rendered
perfectly safe through the Cheyenne and Arapahoe
country.

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V.  GOVERNOR JOHN EVANS RESPONDS
      TO THE CONGRESSIONAL REPORT

    Before leaving this subject, I desire to call attention to
the following significant fact; the part of my proclama-
tion from which the committee quote reads as follows:
"Now, therefore, I, John Evans, governor of Col-
orado Territory, do issue this, my proclamation, au-
thorizing all citizens of Colorado, either individually
or in such parties as they may organize, to go in pur-
suit of all hostile Indians on the plains, scrupulously
avoiding those who have responded to my call to ren-
dezvous at the points indicated. Also to kill and de-
stroy, as enemies of the country, wherever they may
be found, all such hostile Indians."
    The language which I have italicized in the fore-
going quotation shows that I forbade, in this procla-
mation, the disturbance of the friendly Indians and (
only authorized killing the hostile. ...
    I have thus noticed such portions of the report as
refer to myself, and shown conclusively that the com- ,,;
mittee, in every mention,they have made of me, have .
been, to say the least, mIstaken. ~
First. The committee, for the evident purpose of '~
maintaining their position that these Indians have \!
not been engaged in the war, say the prisoners they ~
held were purchased. The testimony is to the effect ~
that they captured them.
Second. The committee say that these Indians
were and always had been friendly, and had commit-
ted no acts of hostility or depredations. The public
documents to which I refer show conclusively that
they had been hostile, and had committed many acts
of hostility and depredations.
Third. They say that I joined in sending these
Indians to Fort Lyon. The published report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and of the Indian
council, show that I left them entirely in the hands of
the military authorities.
Fourth. They say nothing seems to have been
done by the authorities to prevent hostilities. The
public documents and files of the Indian bureau, and I
of my superintendency, show constant and unremit-
 ting diligence and effort on my part to prevent hostil-
 ities and protect the people.
    Fifth. They say that I prevaricated for the pur-
pose of avoiding the admission that these Indians
"were and had been actuated by the most friendly
feelings towards the whites. " Public documents cited
show conclusively that the admission they desired me
to make was false, and that my statement, instead of
being a prevarication, was true, although not in ac-
cordance with the preconceived and mistaken Qpin-
ions of the committee.

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VI. HELEN HUNT JACKSON'S ACCOUNT
OF SAND CREEK AND THE AFTERMATH, 1881

    The Governor of Colorado called for military aid,
and for authority to make a campaign against the In-
dians, which was given him. But as there was no
doubt that many of the Indians were still peaceable
and loyal, and he desired to avoid every possibility of
their sharing in the punishment of the guilty, he is-
sued a proclamation in June, requesting all who were
friendly to come to places which he designated,
where they were to be assured of safety and protec-
tion. This proclamation was sent to all the Indians of
the plains. In consequence of it, several bands of
friendly Arapahoes and Cheyennes came to Fort
rt as Lyon, and were there received by the officer in
'om- charge, rationed, and assured of safety. Here there
1ave occurred, on the 29th of November, one of the
foulest massacres which the world has seen. ...
    In October of the next year some of the bands,
lave having first had their safety assured by an old and
they true friend, I. H. Leavenworth, Indian Agent for
ffect the Upper Arkansas, gathered together to hold a
council with United States Commissioners on the
ians Little Arkansas. The commissioners were empow-
ered by the President to restore to the survivors of
the Sand Creek massacre full value for all the prop-
erty then destroyed; "to make reparation," so far
acts as possible. To each woman who had lost a hus-
band there they gave one hundred and sixty acres ",
of land; to each child who had lost a parent, the
same. Probably even an Indian woman would con-
sider one hundred and sixty acres of land a poor
equivalent for a murdered husband; but the offers
were accepted in good part by the tribe, and there
is nothing in all the history of this patient race
more pathetic than the calm and reasonable lan-
guage employed by some of these Cheyenne and
Arapahoe chiefs at this council. Said Black Kettle,
the chief over whose lodge the American flag, with
.a whi.te flag tied below, was floating at the time of
the massacre, "I once thought that I was the only
man that pe,rsevered to be the friend of the white
man; but since they have come and cleaned out our
lodges, horses, and everything else, it is hard for me
to believe white men any more. All my friends, the
If Indian.s that are holding back, .they are afraid to
come Ill; are afraid that they will be betrayed as I
have been. I am not afraid of white men, but come
and take you by the hand. " Elsewhere, Black Kettle
spoke of Colonel Chivington's troops as "that fool-
band of soldiers that cleared out our lodges and
killed our women and children. This is hard on us."
With a magnanimity and common-sense which
white men would have done well to imitate in their
judgments of the Indians, he recognized that it
would be absurd, as well as unjust, to hold all
white men in distrust on account of the acts of that
"fool-band of soldiers."

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