2002-09-22 --The Dangers of ANTI-bioterrorism

How we should react to the risks of domestic terrorism is a complex
question.

We know that US presenting itself as a victim of terrorism flies in
the face of its own assaults on mass populations. The US is the only
country to ever use nuclear weapons, against a civilian population at
that. More recently, US actions in Panama caused so many civilian
casualties in the capital that the US took over the bus system to
remove the dead. US actions in Afghanistan killed some 4,000
civilians.  US bombing of Iraqi water treatment facilities and embargo
on water treatment chemicals caused over a half million civilian
casualties, mostly kids, and the Secretary of State justified those
casualties when balanced against American interests. Currently, the US
not participating or is backing out of international nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons controls that could reduce the risk
of terrorism, and instead is actually developing new nuclear weapons
systems.

We also know the US is trying creating mass hysteria and paranoia
about terrorism to stampede the public into supporting open-ended
foreign war and domestic repression.  Eighteen thousand die
prematurely every year from lack of health care with virtually no
media attention, yet five anthrax deaths dominated media headlines for
weeks and played for months.  Level Orange terror alerts are issued
giving us no idea of what to expect, where to expect it, or what to do
except keep buying consumer goods so the terrorists don't disrupt the
economy.  The US tried to convince us we were in such danger that we
needed a TIPS program with 1 in 24 of us informing on our friends,
neighbors, or clients.  The Bush/Ashcroft rhetoric that if you're not
with us you're against us tries to convince the public that terrorists
are in their midst while simultaneously threatening and isolating
those who oppose the government's program of war and repression.

On the other hand, the threat of terror in the US does have aspects of
reality.  It is true that US wars and other interference in the
under-developed world to control the production and distribution of
oil have caused rage in millions of working people suffering misery
and early death.  These policies have caused enduring
warfare/terrorism that has intensified and gradually spread through
the Mid-East, to Africa and Europe, to US military and diplomatic
stations abroad and finally to the shores of the US.  More attacks
will come.

It is also true that the US's own weapons programs have increased the
risk of those weapons being used against those in US.   This is
particularly true of bioweapons, as the following article explains.
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg chairs the Federation of American Scientists'
(FAS) Working Group on Biological Weapons, a core group of ten
professionals with expertise ranging from technical to medical to
legal to political, and, in addition, dozens of collaborating
consultants on specialized issues. She was one of the main scientists
to furnish information on how the FBI had mismanaged the anthrax
investigation.

Whether you agree with her conclusion that the anthrax attack was done
to increase anti-bioterrorism funding is not as important as her
conclusions that:

*  The US bioweapons program was the anthrax source.

*  Protection of the general public against bioterror is impossible
even with "good" planning.

*  Protection of the general public against bio-weapons is not even
the object of anti-bioterrorism programs, instead, the object is to
enable the military to operate where bio-warfare is being used.

*  Anti-bioterrorism, by its nature, is about limiting post-attack
damage, meaning that it must focus money, attention, and research on
few organisms, limiting responsiveness.

*  As more facilities acquire organisms and weaponization equipment
and expertise, the risks of accidental or intentional diversion of
bioweapons and their use here will increase.

The Los Angeles Times, Sep 22, 2002

By Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

BIOTERRORISM; Anthrax Attacks Pushed Open an Ominous Door

On this first anniversary of the anthrax attacks, a number of
conclusions can be drawn even without an arrest by the FBI. First, the
strain and properties of the weaponized anthrax found in the letters
show that it originated within the U.S. biodefense program, where the
necessary expertise and access are found. Government officials
recognized that the anthrax source was domestic less than two weeks
after they learned of the letters, and nothing in their investigation
has led them to say otherwise since.

One can also conclude that, given the origin of the anthrax and the
warnings contained in the letters, the perpetrator's motive was not to
kill but rather to raise public fear and thereby spur Congress to
increase spending on biodefense. In this, the attacks have been
phenomenally successful.

Paradoxically, however, by breaking the taboo on using biological
weapons, the attacks have engendered a threat that could dwarf Sept.
11. Modes of successful attack and public responses have now been
demonstrated for the instruction of future terrorists. What's more, it
seems to have been easy to hide incriminating evidence, and, after a
whole year of FBI bumbling, it looks likely that the attacker will get
away with the crime. Although the death toll was relatively low, the
strikes crippled business, government and postal services.
Contamination in buildings has proved difficult, costly and
time-consuming to remove, with some facilities still not restored; the
public health system was strained beyond capacity.

Although biodefense has gotten a shot in the arm, it is important to
understand that the goal of defending against bioweapons is not
primarily public protection--which is largely impossible, as last
year's attacks demonstrated. It is rather "to allow the military
forces of the United States to survive and successfully complete their
operational missions ... in battlespace environments contaminated with
chemical or biological warfare agents," according to the annual report
of the Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense
Program.

Biological weapons are preeminently anti-population weapons. But it
would be impossible to provide the entire country with protective
suits, masks, detectors, shelters, training and vaccinations against
the large and growing array of potential agents. In any event,
vaccinations can have serious side effects and can be overcome if the
dose of the pathogenic agent is large or if the agent has been
engineered to evade the vaccine.

Instead of protection, the civil defense response is entirely
concerned with limiting the damage should an attack occur. There are
also paradoxes here. Because of the rush to "do something," large
amounts of government money are being thrown, without sufficient
forethought, at research involving potential biological weapons
agents. Scientists go where the money is, and we're now seeing a crowd
of biologists lacking in relevant experience trooping to the trough.

The number of research laboratories and personnel handling dangerous
pathogens is about to mushroom, making oversight and adequate safety
and security control much more difficult to impose-- particularly with
the increased emphasis on secrecy. Ultimately, the very problem that
made the anthrax attacks possible will be magnified.

One can confidently expect the U.S. to squander resources that could
far better be used to extend the modest improvements being made in the
public health system. Natural outbreaks of disease, including rapidly
emerging new diseases for which we are unprepared, are a far more
likely hazard for most people. Improving the public health system's
ability to respond would help combat these diseases as well as
biological attacks.

The anthrax probe has disclosed an astounding degree of
irresponsibility and lack of security at Ft. Detrick, Md., home to the
nation's premier existing biodefense laboratory. The problems stretch
back for decades and extend beyond the anthrax attacks. In spite of a
security crackdown there following the attacks, two incidents have
occurred this year at Ft. Detrick in which spores escaped from a
high-containment laboratory and were found in hallways, offices and
locker rooms. One case was recognized only when an unauthorized
employee took swabs outside the laboratory to check for anthrax
contamination--something no one had thought of doing there before.

The anthrax investigation has raised questions about the nature and
value of the work at Ft. Detrick and has brought to light the granting
of security clearance and free access to highly dangerous biological
agents to someone with falsified credentials--very disturbing whether
or not he turns out to be the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks.

Even more serious concerns have been raised by the discovery of secret
biodefense projects that push against the limits of international
prohibitions. It was recently revealed that an Army laboratory in Utah
has been secretly making weaponized anthrax for some years. Another
secret project involved the construction of bomblets designed for
dispersion of biological agents, although the Biological Weapons
Convention explicitly prohibits developing, producing or possessing
"means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile
purposes." Such projects have raised suspicions abroad that the U.S.
continues to develop biological weapons--suspicions that, even if not
true, are likely to spur a new biological arms race.

Experts agree that a significant bioterror attack today would require
the support of a national program to succeed. But for two years now,
the U.S. has opposed every international effort to monitor the ban on
the development and possession of biological weapons by states or to
strengthen the toothless Biological Weapons Convention in any way.

The anthrax attacks have not altered that stance. Two weeks ago, I
attended an informal meeting in Geneva where diplomats from six
continents struggled in the face of U.S. intransigence to map out a
joint strategy for combating the global biological threat. The United
States had demanded that a formal Biological Weapons Convention
conference, scheduled to take place during two weeks in November,
should instead disband in one day with only an agreement not to meet
again until 2006. To make sure that the American resolve prevails in
this setting where international consensus is de rigueur, the U.S.
demand was accompanied by an overt threat to disrupt any further
proceedings with accusations that would make productive international
action impossible.

At that Geneva meeting, the assembled diplomats, representing the
political spectrum from our closest allies to declared enemies, were
uniformly frustrated. They find it hard to comprehend why a country
that has just been the victim of bioterrorism should stand in the way
of peaceful efforts supported by all its allies to deter bioterrorism.

It is surprising how quickly public terror in response to the anthrax
attacks turned to public indifference. But the story isn't over. The
likelihood of bioterrorism is increasing, and the American public is
still the preferred target. Government decisions will be critical in
determining the sequel. The preservation of public health and safety,
like freedom, will now require public vigilance.