Nigeria can be divided into four main regions. The humid coastal belt includes extensive swamplands and lagoons that can extend 15 kilometres inland, and further still in the area around the Niger River delta. Further inland the swamps give way first to hilly tropical rainforests and then the land rises to several plateaux—the Jos plateau in the centre and the Biu plateau in the north-east. Further north, these descend to savannah grasslands and eventually to semi-desert areas. The principle feature of the east-central border area with Cameroon is the Adamawa plateau, which includes the highest point in the country, Mount Dimlang.
Nigeria has Africa's largest population, though the actual size is a matter of some dispute. The government has claimed that the 1998 total was 109 million, though other estimates have it up to 20% higher. As with much else, this is a highly political issue since it has a critical bearing on the distribution of funds between the federal government and the states. The population is likely to grow at an average of 2.2% per year over the next decade or so—and could reach 240 million by 2025.
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states with more than 400 ethnic groups, though more than half belong to the three main groups: the Hausa-Fulani, who are Muslims and live in the north; the Yoruba, who are followers of both Christian and Islamic faiths and live in the south-west; and the Igbo, many of whom are Christians and live in the south-east. Though they largely live together peacefully, there are at times outbreaks of violence. In 1999, for example, there were clashes between Yoruba and Hausa and hundreds of people died in various outbreaks of ethnic violence. Even more alarming were the deaths in early 2000 of hundreds of Christians and Muslims in disputes over the latter's determination to impose Shariah law in northern states in which Muslims are in the majority.
Despite its potential wealth, Nigeria has been slipping backwards. In 1997 half of all Nigerians lived on less than 30 cents per day. The education system is in poor shape and the literacy rate is stuck at around 60%. Those who can afford private education make progress but most children are packed into crowded and dilapidated classrooms. The public health system too is increasingly over-burdened. Maternal mortality is three times the average for developing countries. HIV/AIDS is also taking a heavy toll: in 1999 an estimated 5% of adults were HIV-positive.
Despite rapid urbanization, most Nigerians still earn their living from agriculture, which makes up around 40% of GDP. The vast majority are subsistence farmers who have small plots and use primitive tools. In the south they tend to grow root crops like yams and cassava, while in the north the main crops are sorghum, millet, and maize. With little investment, and over-exploitation of the land, output has lagged way behind population growth.
As a result Nigeria, which used to export food in large quantities, is now a major importer. Small farmers also grow some cash crops, but of these only cocoa now provides any significant export income—and output has halved in the last thirty years.
Agriculture, as with much else in Nigeria, has been pushed into the background by the oil industry. Oil was discovered in 1956 and output grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, helped by the high quality and low sulphur content and also by the location—most of the fields are onshore in the Niger delta and convenient for export. One-third goes to the USA. In 2000, proven reserves were around 25 billion barrels—sufficient for another thirty years. Nigeria also has some of the world's largest reserves of natural gas.
In 1997, oil accounted for virtually all the country's export earnings and around two-thirds of government revenue. So when the oil price falls Nigeria is in serious trouble, and since the mid-1980s Nigerians have watched their infrastructure decay and their public services decline.
The government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company has joint venture agreements with most of the oil companies, including Elf, Agip, Mobil, and Chevron. But around half the oil output comes from one company, Royal Dutch/Shell, which has been coming under increasingly heavy local criticism. People in the Niger delta have seen little benefit from oil production that has often caused environmental damage.
The Ogoni people in particular have been demanding greater control over the oil, and in 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni were executed. Shell was accused of collusion with the government and although it denies this, the company has now accepted greater responsibility for community development in the area. In 1999, when it announced an $8 billion oil investment plan, it also said it would spend around $40 million per year in the 1,500 communities where it works, though that has stopped neither the hostage taking, nor the inter-ethnic violence.
Most of the $280 billion received in oil wealth since the early 1970s has been squandered, either in wasteful development projects, or in graft or theft. Corruption started at the top. Military leaders simply stole hundreds of millions. But scarcely any service is available without the payment of what is know as 'chop'. One of the most ironic effects of corruption is that Nigeria has suffered from chronic shortages of petrol. Local refineries have been deliberately run down so that government officials can get their chop from the sale of lucrative licences to import petrol, much of which finishes up on the black market.
From the early 1970s, the government used some of the oil money to invest in nationalized heavy industry—particularly petro-chemicals, steel, and fertilizers—though such industries have been poorly managed and Nigeria still depends to a large extent on imports. Most productive industrial activity is based on small-scale manufacturing, and a high proportion of the urban populations struggle to survive in the informal sector.
Nigeria's political history since independence in 1960 has been fraught with ethnic conflicts and demands for greater independence for the states, which wanted to seize greater shares of the oil revenue. In 1967 the military governor of the Eastern Region attempted to secede, provoking a bloody civil war that lasted two and a half years and killed 1 million people. Most of the years since then have involved a series of coups with brief interludes of civilian rule.
The most recent military regime, that of General Sani Abacha starting from 1993 was, by general consent, the most brutal and rapacious. Abacha had come to power following the annulment of a presidential election that gave victory to a Yoruba, Chief Abiola. Abacha subsequently imprisoned Abiola and launched ferocious attacks on opposition figures and hanged Saro-Wiwa—an act that drew widespread international condemnation. Abacha had planned to restore 'civilian' rule, with himself as president. But to widespread relief he died in 1998—as did Abiola in prison (of a heart attack).
This led to a presidential election and victory for Olesegun Obasanjo, who took office in 1999. Although a former military ruler, he can at least claim credit for having relinquished power voluntarily in 1979. Now he faces the task of rooting out corruption, fending off the army, and trying to hold the country together in a period of lower oil prices. With a $30 billion debt, the equivalent in 1999 of $250 per person, he will seek and need international aid—which seems likely to arrive less from sympathy and more from donor self-interest. The early indications were positive as he released political prisoners and arrested former military leaders for crimes they committed during Abacha's regime. But it is not yet clear whether he can respond effectively to inter-ethnic violence or build a strong and coherent administration.