Could
Firestone and Ford Have Known?
by Larry George, March 30, 2001
http://www.equipment-reliability.com newsletter 2, March 2001 and Society of Reliability Engineers Lambda Notes
On August 2, 2000, Firestone recalled “…all ATX and ATXII tires
of the P235/75R15 size manufactured since 1991 and all Wilderness AT tires of
that same size manufactured at Firestone’s Decatur, Illinois, plant.” On August
30, 2000, the NHTSA recommended that Firestone expand the recall. Firestone
declined. Investigation continues. As of February 2, 2001, the NHTSA was aware
of 174 fatalities “alleged to be related to a tire failure.” Firestone tires
were original equipment on some Ford and Mazda SUVs, light trucks, and pickups.
The NHTSA Firestone complaints database [1] includes the
tire failure date and the vehicle make, model, and year. The difference between
failure date and vehicle year is the age of the vehicle at tire failure. The
complaints database also indicates whether the failed tire was an original one.
Using vehicle production data [2], I made the nonparametric estimates of
age-specific tire reliability in figure 1. The last data point for each year is
the estimated reliability in the year 2000.

Figure 1. Age-specific tire
reliability estimates of recalled tires by year of production
Reliability got worse in tires manufactured in 1996, but
you’d have to wait to see the evidence of that. That is because you can’t
estimate reliability at age five until tires are at least five years old. The
NHTSA collected almost all the complaints in the year 2000, so the NHTSA
couldn’t have made the estimates in figure 1 until late in the year 2000.
Table 1. Fatalities by Year
of Tire Failure
|
Year |
Fatalities |
|
1991 |
0 |
|
1992 |
2 |
|
1993 |
0 |
|
1994 |
4 |
|
1995 |
2 |
|
1996 |
7 |
|
1997 |
9 |
|
1998 |
15 |
|
1999 |
34 |
|
2000 |
39 |
Presumably, lawyers contacted Firestone and Ford regarding
these fatalities, so both companies would have had this data, perhaps in the years
in which the tire failures occurred. Shouldn’t that have prompted corporate
concern?
The risk management department of a major medical company
told me, “Just don’t kill anybody.” They explained that their concern was risk,
the number of opportunities for failure times the probability of failure per
opportunity (unreliability) times expected cost per failure.
Firestone and Ford were probably concerned about the ominous
trend in fatalities, at least in 1999. Would it have been possible to recognize
problems earlier?
Imagine that you were working for Firestone in the 1990s.
Firestone knows its ships and warranty returns, because generally accepted
accounting principles require that data. Ships and returns are statistically
sufficient for estimating age-specific field reliability [3], forecasting
returns, and providing early warning.
In 1991 you would have had the data from 1991; in 1992, you
would have had data from 1991 and 1992; and so on. You could have estimated
reliability each year. Figure 2 shows the nonparametric least squares
estimates, as if they had been computed each year from 1994 through 2000. (I
used Ward’s vehicle ships and the NHTSA’s annual failure counts, for original
equipment tires.)

Figure 2. Age-specific tire reliability
estimates by year from ships and returns data
In the year 2000, problems were obvious, but could they have
been recognized earlier? In 1997, the figure would have ended at the sixth year,
with a reliability decrease from six nines (0.999999) to five nines (0.99999).
That would have gotten my attention. That decrease in reliability could have
been because
·
Tires produced in 1991 started failing in 1996
·
Tires produced in 1996 started failing in 1996
·
Something in between occurred
That reliability decrease should have called for sampling,
more analysis, and possible corrective action, if Firestone had been estimating
tire reliability from ships and returns data. Firestone would have saved half
their costs if the recall had been made in early 1997.
Imagine that you were working for Ford in the 1990s. Ford
knows its own production figures, and it tracks warranty repairs by VIN and
symptom, which yields age data sufficient to make the estimates in figure 1. It
is not necessary to track warranty repairs by VIN. That requires 1000 times as
much data and incurs at least 1000 times as many errors.
Suppose some warranty repairs were due to tire related problems. You could have made the estimates in figure 3, which shows estimates made from ships and NHTSA complaints, year by year.

Figure 3. Age specific tire reliability
estimates by vehicle make and model from ships and returns data
The last data point for each vehicle model is the estimated
reliability in the year 2000. The Mountaineer went into production in 1996, and
tire problems became evident in its second year, 1997. The Explorer began
production in 1990, and tire problems became evident in its sixth year, 1997.
These reliability estimates should have encouraged Ford to investigate tire
related problems in 1997, if Ford had been estimating age-specific reliability,
even from ships and returns data.
Age-specific field reliability can be estimated without tracking parts and products by serial number. It also helps detect exceptions, process shifts, improvement, or deterioration attributable to calendar intervals. It helps separate the effects of vehicle, make, model, tire type, or plant.
If you’re trying to control risk like that experienced by
Firestone and Ford, estimate age-specific field reliability by calendar
intervals. Make actuarial forecasts of returns and put upper confidence limits
(UCL) on the forecasts. Use them like control charts. If returns in some
calendar interval exceed the UCL, take a sample, estimate reliability from
age-at-failure data, search for root causes, and evaluate process improvements.
Revise forecasts, estimate risk under alternatives, and act accordingly.
·
Http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/complaints.xls, Feb.
2, 2001 version. The analyses reported in this article are based on the Dec. 6,
2000, version.
·
Ward’s
Automotive Yearbook, annual publication of Ward’s Communications.
·
L. L. George, “Measure Field Reliability With Statistics,” Equipment-Reliability
Newsletter, Jan. 2001.
Mark Felthauser, CCI/Triad, helped
with the statistical analyses. Eva Langfeldt, Text Support, edited the article.
I am grateful to them for their thoughtful contributions. Contact them through
Larry, pstlarry@yahoo.com or eva@textsupport.net.