The information here is based on writings in 1991 and is dated but still generally correct
N-1 Booster (drawing)
Until 1989, existence of the N-1 (G type) booster was never admitted by the Soviets and there were still people in the West that doubted it ever existed. Most books on spaceflight never even mentioned the Soviet lunar landing mission or the large booster built for that mission. U.S. intelligence agencies knew positively about the existence of the booster using detailed photography of the launch center by 1964, and the booster was later publicially reported to Congress by then NASA Administrator, James Webb. The very large assembly building which was three miles from the Soyuz launch pads and was seen on the ASTP (Soyuz 19) roll out film, just visible over the hills, from along the rail lines to the Soyuz launch pads. The CIA publicly confirmed the boosters existence in 1976. The booster was named retroactively by the U.S. Department of Defense with the SL-15 designation.
Photos of the Baykonur cosmodrome Energia booster launch facilities also show remnants of the outsized N-1 facilities that were modified for the Energia booster in the 1980s. In the early 1980's, Soviet spaceflight observer C.P. Vick used drawings of the N-1 launch facilities published in a Soviet book to estimated that the shape of the booster and its general configuration. The next significant information came in 1989, when cosmonaut Lebedev confirmed the configuration of the G-type and that it was nicknamed Carrier. He also confirmed three failures, but strongly denied a lunar landing program ever existed. Then in late 1989 and 1990, the Soviet articles on the booster slowly made it to publication, usually on or near Cosmonautics Day (April 12).
In 1960, at the Korolev OKB, Korolev and his staff of scientists and engineers began long range plans for rockets larger than the Soyuz without an officially acknowledged goal or mission although the possibility of lunar missions were obvious. Korolev's actions were similar to some projects in the US during the 1950's when the USAF funded pure reserach into very large rocket engines that eventually became the Saturn V F type engines.
With an ultimate goal of a 60-80,000 kg. payload to LEO, the Korolev OKB decided to develop two different boosters, one with a payload of 40-50,000 kg. called the N-1 projected for flight test in 1963, and the N-2, a 60-80,000 kg. booster by 1967. Since the OKB's largest rocket to date was the 7,000 kg. payload Soyuz booster, it was deemed to risky to try to extrapolate current designs to the size needed for the N-2 booster without developing an intermediate size booster. These schedules were later called optomistic and result of the years of relative success of the Soviet space programs. But, without solid funding or other support from the government, the N-1 project was delayed until 1965 and the N-2 was limited to preliminary design only.
Cheif rocket engine designer Glushko also promoted a lunar rocket in 1960 and obtained government approval in 1960 for large rocket engines for large boosters, (probably for Chelomey designs) but significant funding for large engines for lunar rockets did not materialize until 1966 when design matters had been finalized after long fights between Glushko/Chelomey and Korolev.
During the initial design of the N-1, Chelomey and Glushko convinced Premier Nikita Khrushchev that the large rocket should be built by the Chelomey OKB (named the UR-700) using Glushko 600,000 Kg. thrust engines in cooperation with the Korolev and Yangel OKB's in secondary positions as sub-contractors. The project was to be complete in three years.
In April 1961, a government decision was made to favor the development of a manned circumlunar mission and the project was given to the Chelomey OKB. The governments new support for Chelomey to develop manned space missions caused friction in the aerospace industry. Some officials believed that the support hurt the Korolev OKB, the main manned spaceflight design organization, and Yangel OKB's by limiting their funding for advanced projects. Probably coincidently, Krushchev's son worked as a designer at the Chelomey OKB.
The Chelomey OKB proposed a series of boosters to satisfy the needs for future lunar missions and other uses consisting of the UR-200 with a payload of 3-4,000 kg. (an ICBM), followed by the UR-500 with a 20,000 kg. payload. The UR-500 would be the booster used for the circumlunar mission. The OKB also projected the next in the series would be the UR-700 with a payload of 90-130,000 kg. (launching the LK-700 direct ascent spacecraft), this was later changed to 150-230,000 kg.. Later, more boosters were proposed including the UR-700M with a 240,000 kg. payload for planetary missions and the UR-900 for direct ascent lunar missions. Some of these boosters were developed to reuse components. Prasumabably the UR-500 was planed to be used as upper stages for the UR-700.
The UR-200 and UR-500K (Proton) were as far as the Chelomey OKB got with flyable rockets of this series. Both boosters were flown within 3.5 years of the assignment. It is claimed that 28,000 model and full scale tests were performed and 16 test stands, and computer simulations were used before flight testing began resulting in flight testing savings. The UR-200 was cancelled around 1964 as part of the general CPSU rejection of some of Khruchev's projects.
Around this point, personnel of the Korolev OKB wrote to Minister S.A. Afanayev, and Korolev used his influence with individuals within the government and party to protest the Chelomey project award. A power struggle ensued with Korolev the winner and the UR-700 was terminated, although the UR-500 and its manned circumlunar mission was continued. Among the arguments used against the UR-700 project were the technical problems with Glushko's large engine design and the danger of using toxic propellants planned for the UR-700 in the large quanities it would require.
As a result of the cancellation of the UR-700, Korolev's N-I rocket was finially approved by a government decree, but the payload for the rocket was not decided. The N-1 project was planned to last until 1965, but sufficient funding was never made available. The N-2 was still planned to be developed from 1963 to 1970, but the N-2 became redundant as the N-1 design grew over the coming years of increasing requirements due to low funding levels which resulted in program stretch-outs.
In 1961, Korolev made his first attempt to win the approval of a manned lunar landing mission to counter the NASA Apollo program. He proposed to use an N-1 booster with a 75,000 kg. payload to launch 2 cosmonauts to land on the moon, but the proposal similar to what eventually was later accepted by the Soviet leadership, was rejected at the time.
In 1962, the fact that Korolev's proposal was not approved caused him frustration since his N-1 project had yet to be assigned a mission or payload. From Korolev's viewpoint, with Chelomey already working on a manned lunar mission, it was more likely that Chelomey could eventually win the inevitable manned lunar landing mission. But, Korolev had many friends in high places and may have prasuaded the highly respected and politicially influential Head of the Soviet Acadamy of Sciences M. V. Keldysh, who chaired a commission studying the issue, to make recomendations in favor of Korolev's plan.
In July 1962, the Keldysh commission's report recommend that the N-1 payload be increased to 75,000 kg. (as proposed in 1961 by Korolev) and flight tests begining in 1965. This change and support for Korolev's project apparently started a long lasting argument between two of the Soviet Unions leading Cheif Designers, Korolev and Glushko, over the best method for propulsion of the large booster.
In normal situations, Korolev would use Glushko designed rocket engines in his rocket designs since both bureaus were controlled by the same parent organization, the Ministry of General Machine Building. But, Glushko and Korolev had a fundamental disagrement over the propellants to be used on the N-1 booster. Korolev wanted to develop Hydrogen-Oxygen propellant technology as the US was doing for the Saturn family of boosters while Glushko wanted to use hypergloics or Oxygen-Flourine.
In 1990, Korolevs deputy V. Mishin sumed up Glushko's published views on propellants by citing Glushko in "Chemical Sources of Power" saying, "liquid oxygen is nowhere near the best oxidizer, and liquid hydrogen will never be of any practical use in rocket equipment.". In the early 1960's this may have been a valid viewpoint, but it was later proven wrong. Hydrogen-Oxygen rocket propellants were developed by NASA and other organizations and was found to be especially practical for upper stages in conventional multi-staged rockets. Glushko believed that liquid oxygen increased problems of vibration and combustion instabilities in large rocket engines. He believed that the only way to develop engines to avoid these problems was to use nitric acid.
In 1963, Korolev had to get on with development of the N-1 without the help of Glushko. Without the Hydrogen technology obviously tested by Glushko, Korolev was forced to use proven Kerosen as the fuel becuase there was no time left to develop the Hydrogen engine from scratch. In fact, no booster had ever flown without large engines developed by Glushko and Korolev had to find a new designer and factory to produce the engines he needed for the N-1.
The only design bureau with any relevant experience was Kuznetsov's factory at Kuybyshev, a region with 28 related factories and 500 departments which also produced the Soyuz booster and piston and jet aircraft engines. Korolev's successor, Chief Designer Mishin later admitted that the firm was not experienced or equipped for the task, but Korolev had no choice.
Kuznetsov and his subcontractors were not within the military-industrial complex ordinarily used in rocket work (the Ministry of General Machine Building), but was instead a part of the Ministry of Aviation. This only complicated project funding and priority among other programs between the two Ministries. Schedules were not met and services had to be begged by Korolev when funds were not available. Korolev wrote harsh letters to Kuznetsov concerning the lack of necessary equipment in his factories, and at the same time pleaded with the regions CPSU party secretary V.I. Vorotnikov and V.E. Dymshits of the Council of Ministers for material assistance. According to Mishin, Vorotnikov and V. Orlov, and sovnarkhoz chairman V. Litvinov did their best to aid the development, however funding was not forthcomming at high levels of the government until 1966. Kuznetsov was to make all the engines for the N-1, and he began in 1963. The mid-sized engines turned out to be more technologicially advanced of any perviously developed by the Soviets. The size of the Kuznetsov engine was determined by an analysis of the largest unit which could be developed for the least money.
By April 1963, conceptual design for the N-1 and lunar landing payload were underway at the Korolev OKB. In 1964, Korolev again made a mission proposal for the N-1, but it was again rejected. At the same time, the Chelomey circumlunar project was made more detailed by a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet of Ministers to build twelve spacecraft by the second quarter of 1967.
Even with Korolev's continued efforts to win all lunar mission development, other bureaus continued significant design efforts like M.K. Yangel's R56 90,000 kg. payload rocket and V.N. Chelomey's UR-700 booster all using Glushko designed engines but enither with significant funding.
In Oct. 1964, after the successful flight of Voskhod 1 and the satisfaction of another political prestiege flight, Korolev and Kaminin agreed to joint work toward Korolev's N-1 lunar mission plan. Of course, Kaminin could only try to influance those in control by adding his voice to Korolevs. Korolev had discussed the plan with the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, and tried to show that Chelomei's UR-500 was not capable of a manned lunar orbit mission without utilizing an Earth orbit rendezvous (EOR) scheme. Chelomey responded by proposing the UR900 booster for this mission to eliminate EOR.
Despite the fluidity of plans for the N-1 and its unapproved mission, launch facility construction at Baykonur probably began in 1964. The new launch facilities included two large launch pads, and a hugh tank farm for storage of the massive quantities of liquid oxygen and kerosene needed to fuel the hugh rocket. An assembly building capable of housing two assembled boosters was built, and railway networks linking the buildings with the two launch pads, static test stands, tank farms were eventually built.
In early 1965, Korolev's N-1/L-3 project was still in the conceptual design phase. In February, Titov was quoted saying dogs may be sent on the first lunar landing test before sending men, but Keldysh later said this was only one of the proposals being debated at the time. In March, NASA Administrator James Beggs testified that Soviet moon program had been closing the gap and progress in the last year had been much greater than in the US. He testified that the $5.012 B NASA budget was not going to close the gap with the Soviets. In April, General Kaminin noted that Korolev and Glushko had begun cooperating again when it was in both their intrests, but they still argued and probably struggled over control of the manned space program.
In the middle of 1965, Korolev finially got his chance to take over all manned lunar missions when development Chelomei's circumlunar spacecraft for the UR500 was falling behind schedule. Korolev proposed using the UR500K with a Block-D stage and a modified LOK (lunar orbiting Soyuz) spacecraft from Korolevs N-1/L-3 plan. This plan was called the UR500/7K-L1, and after presenting this to the head of the Council of Minsiters Industrial Commission L.V. Smirnov and General Maching Building minister S.A. Afanasyev, the plan was adopted and became eventually became known as the Zond missions. Korolev put Yuri Semenov in charge of the project to prepare the spacecraft. The Block-D was developed for the lunar missions by the Korolev KB. It was said that the Block-D engine was tested 6 times for N-1 project, and 900 units built and ground tested for quality control accurance. The UR500/7K-L1 (Zond) program proceeded until Jan. 1969 when a manned mission were cancelled after Apollo 8 had superceeded it, but test flights continued, until Zond 8, as engineering test flights for the lunar landing mission.
In August 1965, Kaminin's diary noted that Korolev was still angry that Chelomey was continuing design work on manned lunar spacecraft. Korolev wanted to have complete control of manned spacecraft work. At the same time, work on the N-1 was continuing slowly, and the payload had increased to 90,000 kg.. Plans in September called for the first test article was to be ready by the end of 1965. Already there were plans for increasing payload to 130,000 kg.. The installation of a center cluster of 6 engines on the first stage, in addition to the 24 planned. Meanwhile the payload was still undefined. On Sept. 20 at the IAF congress in Athens, Leonov said that the USSR would not attempt a moon landing until many space laboratories with crew exchanges had been accomplished, and that the lunar lander would be larger than the Apollo LM. In Oct. Leonid Sedov denied that he had said at the IAF congress that the USSR would land men on the moon by 1969. He restated that there were difficult problems to resolve before they could launch a manned moon mission.
In discussions with Kaminin, Korolev speculated that the first flight could carry several Soyuz into orbit, but a unidentified 90,000 kg. payload was under development and due for production in early 1966.
The N-1's components were built at the Kuznetsov factories and at Kuybyshev where Korolevs Soyuz booster was built. With stages 12 meters wide, several methods for transportation to Baykonur were considered including new carrier aircraft, dirigables, a canal from the Caspian to Baykonur, a wide highway, moving factories to Baykonur and moving 'Baykonur' to the factories. In the end, all components were shipped by rail from the factory in Kuybyshev to Baykonur for final assembly in the large Assembly and Test Building at Baykonur. The L-3 payload of booster stages and spacecraft were assembled and tested in the Space Vehicle Assembly and Testing Building.
By Nov. 1965, the circumlunar mission was still expected by Nov. 1967 for the 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution. A lunar landing was expected to follow within 2-3 years as a prelude to permanent habitation. But, General Kamini stated in his diary that he no longer was confident that the Soviets would beat the Americans.
Leonov later explained that the first time the cosmonauts were involved in training for lunar missions was after 1965. The cosmonauts were also lectured by Korolev on his N-1/L-3 proposal. Leonov described his understanding of Korolevs ultimate plans, "At the time, we thought that the lunar program was designed to span many years. Plans for the creation of lunar settlements and for flights to the planets of the solar system were being debated."
Even before declassification of the lunar program, hints about crew training were made by the Soviets. For example, Gagarin was training extensively for a mission in 1968, before his death. However, after he had served as back-up to Komarov on the ill-fated Soyuz 1, in 1967, he was apparently not assigned to another Soyuz Earth orbit mission, and cosmonaut Tereshkova, during a trip to Cuba, said that Gagarin would command the first lunar landing mission.
On January 14 1966, Korolev died in surgery during a bungled routine operation. Korolev had been in poor health for many years which is simetimes attributed to his years in labor camps in the 1930's. Others often noted his poor health which included low blood pressure, high stress and very long hours of work. Deputy Chief Designer Vasily Mishin assumed the top post of Korolev's Design Bureau after meeting with Brezhnev. He was ordered to finish the development of the Soyuz, Salyut, Zond and N-1 rocket.
The N-1 project draft was finalized in mid-1966, with the N-1 baselined to launch 95,000 kg. to low Earth orbit. Shortage of funding had forced Korolev to order all-up testing of the N-1 which was also adopted by NASA for testing the Saturn 5, and Mishin also continued the policy. The reasoning was that the cost of the giant rockets was so high, that piece by piece testing of progressively larger rockets consisting of 1, then 2 and finally all 3 stages was abandoned in favor of testing fully outfitted 3 stage rockets from the very first flight. This turned out to be a paticularly unsound choice because Korolev and Kuznetsov had no facilities for extensive ground testing of components like assembles stages of the N-1, due to cost constraints. The reason that NASA was able to do all up flight testing of the Saturn 5 was extensive test stands across the USA for firing engines and stages repeatedly.
In the case of the N-1, only individual engine tests were performed, or small engine clusters, before being assembled onto the booster and committed to flight. This also complicated prelaunch preperations because when engines were shipped to Baykonur for installation on the stages they required major work to integrate them the the stage. Korolev's plan did not meet the prerequisit for all up testing by performing extensive enough ground testing, and the fate of the program was sealed.
Also in 1966, the L-3 lunar orbiter and lander spacecraft were finialized and production began. The government also approved subcontractors for the project. In October, the time table for moon flights had been set and the first landing was scheduled for the third quarter of 1968, which was clearly unreasonable according to Gen. Kaminin, who estimated this goal would demanded work rates of 2 to 2.5 times actual sustainable rates.
In 1966, N-1 test stands and launch complexes were being constructed at Baykonur, the first engine tests were performed and the problems of unstable combustion were solved. From 1964 to 1967, there were to have been four N-1's assembled, but only one and a half were complete.
In Feb. 1967, the first launch of the N-1 was planned for late 1967, and an agreement to speed the development of the N-I and L-3 was signed, but support was not made available and test stands were not built as required. Again, like the decision to do all up testing to meet the schedule, it was proposed to work out design problems in flight tests. The first landing was penciled in for late 1968.
The first L-1 test flight was Kosmos 146 on March 10, 1967. This was followed by the second L-1 test flight was Kosmos 154 April 8, 1967.
During the first quarter of 1967, the conceptual design of the N-1/L3 project was completed. Korolev's lunar landing plan had evolved into the N-I booster with a 100,000 kg. payload to orbit. The N-1 had changed from 75,000 kg. payload to 90-92,000 kg., and later 95-100,000 kg.. Methods used to increase performance included using supercooled oxygen and kerosene to allow more propellant to be carried in the same tanks.
More or less the final design of the N-1
The N-1 design, also designated 11A52, had stabilized in the form of the following. The first or A stage (A) had 30 synchronized Kuznetsov engines developed specially for the N-I. Six engines making up the center group were added in the upgrade from 75 to 92,000 kg.. Each Kerosene-Oxygen fuelled engine had a main nozzle, turbopump and combustion chamber. The 24 perhiperial engines also had a steerable turbopump exhaust nozzle for roll control. Individual engine thrust was about 154,000 kg.. The first stage could sustain the failure of any 2 perherial engines, which would be offset by the KORD system by shutting down the matching engine on the opposing side since directional control was dependant on symetrical thrust from the perhierial engines. Unfortunatly the KORD system could not make perdictive engine shutdowns. Only a engine failure would cause the KORD to activate, however the failure such as an exploding turbo pump could easly destroy adjoining engines. The Kord system was developed for the N-I as a way to provide an 'engine out' capability.
The second or B stage (B) had 8 engines similar to the first stage units but with high altitude nozzles with a vacuum thrust of 179,000 kg.. Directional and roll control was by the same means as in the A stage. The third or V stage (V) had 4 engines with a vacuum thrust of 41,000 kg.. The engines of the V stage were fully gimbalable for directional and roll control.
The first three stages utilized a spherical tank construction, ranging from the top of the 6 spherical tanks at 4.9 to the bottoms 12.8 meters in diameter. The design of spherical tanks and a conical supportive structure was the lighter than was possible with a single tank/skin srtucture with current Soviet technology. Based on the Soviet launch pad drawings, the booster was 100 meters long and about 17 meters in diameter at the base. The payload shroud was 6 meters in diameter. The upper stages and payload were about 33 meters long. Each stage was seperated by an open framework common on Soviet rockets. Lift-off thrust was between 4,500,000 to 6,350,000 kg.. The N-1 was intended to have a 100 to 135,000 kg. payload to low Earth orbit, or 45 to 50,000 kg. payload in translunar trajectory.
In Feb. 1967, the first flight of the N-I was optomisticially scheduled for middle 1967. Some flight tests of the N-I were to include a mock-up L-3 lunar lander as payload, but the first flight carried L-1 spacecraft for lunar fly-by. Even with the N-1 nearing flight, the Soviet leadership did not approve the N-1/L-3 system for full development. On January 27, 1967, the US had suffered its first astronaut deaths directly due to mission hardware in the Apollo 1 tragady. It would take NASA over a year before the first Apollo flight, in the process scrapping the Apollo Block 1 CSM spacecraft (in some ways similar to the Soviet L-1) and this certianly reinforced the Soviet leadership belief that hast was not needed. Others associated with the project did not have the same confidence, but the Korolev Bureau was still looking beyond the N-1 by internally planned that in future versions of the booster high energy propellants would be used in the upper stages as Korolev had always wanted. Future missions for such a booster were also being studied by the Soviets including performing year long lunar mission simulations in mock-up laboratories on the ground.
By 1968 most of the N-1 booster infrastructure was complete or in advanced stages of construction. The booster was raised vertically on the pad, which was set over three flame ducts. To one side of the booster was a 140 meter tall rotating service tower. The tower rotated 180 degrees away from the pad during launch. A 100 meter tall fueling tower was placed to the side of the rail lines next to the booster. The booster, fueling and service towers were protected from lightning by four 183 meter towers placed around the complex about 150 meters from the launch pad.
During 1968, the structural and dynamic test vehicles were also being tested. The first test article booster which was not a flight version, was taken to the launch pad in April 1968, for launch pad system tests and fit checks. At the same time, testing of the first and second stages engines was continuing. In July 1968, first flight article booster was rolled to the pad for fueling tests. The booster was repeatedly taken off the pad for modifications and static firings.
On October 14, Leonid Sedov explained in New York that manned flight to the moon was not on the agenda, and lunar exploration was not a priority, but that lunar exploration depended on the success of unmanned flights of the Zond spacecraft. Gherman Titov in a statement in Mexico City, was sure that the Soviet Union would still be the first to send men to the moon.
Finially after years of political and engineering dispute and hardship the first N-1 was launched with an L-1 spacecraft as payload (3L, N1/L3S) on Feb. 21, 1969. In the hours prior to the launch, Cheif Designer Mishin went out to the launch pad during tanking or propellants to cristen the rocket traditionally by braeking a bottle of champaign against the chilled hull of the booster. The N-1 booster lifted off and flew for 70 seconds when it was destroyed by range safety due to a fire in the tail section near the engines that activated the KORD system which shut down the first stage engines. Despite the failure, many of the developers were happy with the results and anticipated the next flight would be better. After the failure, Mishin mandated that all engines and stages must be test fired on a test stand, but the orders were rejected and funds not made available.
Another booster was taken to the pad in late spring 1969, and was prepared for a launch on July 3, 1969 (5L, N1/L3S). The N-1 booster lifted off and rose 100 meters at which point an oxygen pump exploded, the Kord system had failed and shut down all engines causing the booster to fall back onto the pad. The fire heavily damaged the launch pad and damaged the other launch pad nearby. The emergency tractor rocket successfully carried the capsule away from the booster.
After the second launch, the Kuznetsov engines were susepected as a major problem area. Mishin in 1990 said that the origional requirments did not provide enough safety margin in engine operations and a new development effort with Kuznetsov was started to improve engine quality and robustness. A new test stand was built and by the end of the program in 1974, Kuznetsov enignes were operating for 10-12,000 seconds without removal from test stands.
On Oct. 24, Keldysh told a journalist that the USSR was concentrating on orbital space stations and "We no longer have any scheduled plans for manned lunar flights.".In what would be repeated many times as the official Soviet line, he later contradicted himself in 1970 by saying that the Soviets had never announced a manned lunar landing program, and there was no such program.
The third N-1 booster (6L) was undergoing engine tests, in winter of 1970, in the static test stands. The booster was rolled out in March or April to the secondary launch pad that was damaged in the second launch attempt in 1970. It is also reported that the launch was attempted once before July, 1971, but was aborted while still on the launch pad due to engine failure during the engine start sequence. When it was eventually launched, the N-1 rose from the pad and started to pitch. The booster rolled 10 degrees and lost control in the roll axis. The engines were shut down and the booster fell back onto the pad causing great damage, 7 seconds after lift-off., A booster testing supervisor B.A. Dorofeyev said that the failure had an opressive effect on the workers at the cosmodrome, but they continued to work hard on the young rocket.
The fourth booster (7L) reached the launch pad in May or June 1972, and remained there until its launch on November 22. It too developed a fire in the tail section near the engines and after 107 seconds was destroyed by range safety command to prevent impact outside of the launch corridor, just before staging and second stage ignition.
In the Spring of 1972, the Korolev bureau got approval for the N-1/L-3M project. This insured continued development of the N-1 even if the L-3 landing mission was cancelled. The N-1 next launch attempt (using booster number 8, for flight 8L) was set for August 1974. The N1/L3M program proposed that by 1978 oto 1980, the USSR would develop the necessary infrastructure for creating a lunar base and for conducting lunar missions of average duration of up to three months.
In 1974, the Soviets were observed moving N-1 boosters around the launch complexes and the launch pad destroyed in 1969 was repaired. In April of 1974 everything changed. Kuznetsov and Cheif Designer Mishin delivered a detailed report to Brezhnev on the lag in space technology with the US and proposed development of a space infrastructure of industrial complexes in orbit. After this, D.F. Ustinov relieved Mishin from his post and Brezhnev's favorite candidate, Glushko was appointed new Cheif Designer of the Korolev Bureau. Glushko retained his bureau and took over the Korolev bureau incorporating it and other organizations into the NPO Energia. One of Glushko's first actions was to suspend work toward new launches of the N-1 after the approval by Ustinov. Mishin later complained that no consultation was made with those working on the project and the program was shut down on short notice. Mishin and Dorofeyev and others appealed to the 25th CPSU congress to launch the two remaining improved boosters but they could get no support, but the 4.5 Billion Rouble development of the N-1, lunar lander and Zond was scraped in favor of future Energia and Buran development top match current US developments.
Selected readings on the Soviet manned lunar landing mission.
Lebedev, D.A. "The N1/L3 Programme", Spaceflight, Vol. 34. Sept, 1992, pp. 288
Oberg, James "The Moon Race and the Coverup in Hindsight", Spaceflight, Vol. 35, Feb, 1993 pp. 46
Yasinsky, Alexander "The N-1 Rocket Programme", Spaceflight, Vol. 35, July 1995, pp 228
Filin,V. "At the Request of the Reader : The Nl-L3 Project", Aviatsiya I Kosmonavtika, No. 12, Dec. 1991, pp. 44-45; No. 1. Jan 1992 pp. 28, 29, 40; No. 2, Feb 1992, pp. 40, 41
Chernyshov, M. "Why Were Soviet Cosmonauts not on the Moon?'', Leninskoye Znamya, Aug. 1, 1990, pp. 3
Mishin, V.P., "Why Didn't We Fly to the Moon.", Kosmonavtika Astromomiya, No.12, 1990, pp. 3-43
Afanasyev, I.B. "Unknown Spacecraft", Kosmonavtika Astronomiya, No. 12, Dec. 1991
McDugall, Walter, ...the Heavens and the Earth, A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1985, pp. 289
Khrapovitskiy, Dmitriy; "Absolutely Unclassified : The Ground Waves of Space Politics", Soyuz, No 15, April 1990, pp. 15
Leskov, Sergey; "How We Didn't Fly to the Moon", Izvestiya, Aug. 19, 1989, pp. 3
TASS, Moscow, 1744 GMT, Aug.18, 1989
Tarasov, A. ''Missions In Dream and In Reality", Pravda, Oct. 20,1989, 2nd Ed, pp. 4
Col. M. Rebrov; Vetrov, Georgiy; Mozzhorin, Yuriy; Vakhnichenko, Vladimir; "But Things Were Like That-Top Secret: The Painful Fortune of the N-1 Project", Krasnaya Zvezda, Jan. 1, 1990, 1st Ed, pp. 4
Pikul, V. "The History of Technology": "How We Conceded the Moon: A Look by One of the Participants of the N-l Drama at the Reasons Behind it", Izobretatel I Ratsionalizator, No 8, Aug. 1990, pp. 20-21
Kamanin, L.N. "N. P. Kaminin Diary", Ogonek, No. 7, Feb. 9-16 , 1991, pp. 28-31
Mishin, V.P. "The development of the booster-launhcers in the USSR", IAF-92-0197, Aug. 28, 1992
Col Gen N. P. Kamanin, "I Would Never Have Believed Anyone..." Sovetskaya Rossiya, Oct. 11, 1989 pp. 4
Vick, C. P. "The Soviet G-1-e Manned Lunar Landing Program Booster." Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 38, No. 1, Jan., 1985, pp. 16, 17
Covault, Craig, "Soviets Manned Lunar Mission Plan Used Modified Soyuz Spacecraft." Aviation Week & ST, Jan. 8, 1990, pp. 44
Pauw, H. "Soviet Scene." Spaceflight, Vol. 28, No. 6, June, 1986, pp. 251
Hooper, Gordon "USSR's Secret Race to the Moon", Space Flight News, Dec. 1990, pp. 9
Space: From Gemini to the Moon and Beyond, Ed. Robert Peterson, Facts on File, Inc., New York, 1972, pp. 74
Clark, Phillip S. "Topics Connected with the Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Programme.", Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 40, No. 5, May, 1987, pp. 235
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Maj. I. Kuznetsov, "The Flight That Didn't Take Place: Maj. Gen. Avn. A. Leonov, USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Talks About the Soviet Lunar Program and Current Problems of the Space Program" Aviatsiya I Kosmonavtika, No. 8, Aug. 1990 pp. 44-45
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