• On the 24th of March, 1997, Continental Micronesia flight CS-985 departed from Guam to Hong Kong. The flight was operated with a DC-10. The crew was Captain Ralph Omholt, First Officer, William Lykins; the flying pilot and Second Officer Chris Urquieta. The aircraft and crew were 'leased' By Continental Airlines, Inc. to their partially owned subsidiary, Continental Air Micronesia, which operated under their own certificate.
  
  
• In the First Class cabin were deadheading captain, Charles Menefee and Second Officer, Pat Arter. The scheduled deadheading first officer, Bill Gowder, missed the flight.
  
  
• The aircraft was dispatched to Hong Kong with the No. 1 generator placarded inoperative. The inbound crew reported that they lost the No. 1 AC & DC systems on the last takeoff rotation (nose landing gear 'squat-switch' activation), failing the captain's instruments. The inbound crew indicated that the immediate solution was not to use the No. 1 generator; Guam (Air Mike) maintenance concurred. The generator had been previously placarded and the placard was continued. A conference was held by Captain Omholt and his crew with the on-duty mechanic to discuss the issue. The crew unanimously agreed that the flight was safe. Given the apparent Minimum Equipment List (MEL) compliance, the flight departed.
  
  
• However, with the No. 1 generator OFF, during the takeoff, the No. 1 AC & DC systems failed on takeoff rotation, failing the captain's instruments.
  
  
• The departure phase was in good weather conditions and was otherwise normal.
  
  
• Given that the failure ocurred with the No. 1 generator previously selected OFF, the situation did not conform to any checklist (which presumed the generator to have been operating), therefore, the Flight Engineer recycled the No. 1 isolation switch, restoring power to the No. 1 AC & DC systems, referring to the checklists, as best able. There was no abnormal checklist procedure for this particular combination.
  
  
• After a lengthy discussion among the cockpit crew, the flight was continued on the assumption that the trip was exclusively caused by the activation of the nose landing gear squat-switch. The crew's assumption was that the problem would not recur without the squat-switch activation (another takeoff) and the flight was safe to continue. With the risk of the captain's instruments failing, the crew agreed that the first officer had to fly the trip; Captain Omholt was the monitoring pilot.
  
  
• The enroute portion was normal until approximately one hour out of Hong Kong, when the No. 1 AC & DC systems again tripped, failing the captain's instruments. Again, the Flight Engineer recycled the No. 1 isolation switch, restoring power to the No. 1 AC & DC systems. The crew referred to the abnormal procedures, as best able, for a possible solution. The flight was continued to Hong Kong on the assumption that landing in Hong Kong was the safest course of action (automatically invoking the captain's emergency authority - FAR 121.627).
  
  
• Guam Maintenance was notified of the situation by HF radio phone-patch by the Second Officer. Maintenance concurred with Captain Omholt that the safest course of action was to continue to Hong Kong.
  
  
• During the initial phase of the approach into Hong Kong, the captain tuned and identified the runway 13 IGS (ILS [navigation radio]) frequency, observing normal instrument indications.
  
  
• After being radar vectored to intercept the localizer course (base leg), the HSI (navigation instruments) selectors were switched from the VOR mode to the ILS mode. However, the captain's and first officer's instruments subsequently displayed OFF flags and no other indications of an active frequency. The IGS frequency was re-tuned without receiving an audio identification signal. The ILS circuit breakers were recycled with no change.
  
  
• The crew inquired of ATC as to the status of the IGS, to be told that there were no indications of an inoperative ground facility and that no other aircraft had experienced any difficulties. The crew immediately advised Hong Kong approach control as to their situation (no ILS navigation receivers).
  
  
• Soon after, ATC advised the crew that they had flown through the final approach course. Therefore, the crew broke off the approach requesting vectors to the alternate electronic approach, the VOR-DME approach to runway 13. On the other side of the approach course were the populated hills of Hong Kong.
  
  
• The reported weather was more than adequate for the VOR-DME approach. The ATIS weather report indicated a ceiling of 1,700 feet overcast, with moderate turbulence and significant windshear - actual, not forecast. Additionally, the runway was reported as slippery. The wind was reported as a crosswind from 100 degrees at 15 knots.
  
  
• Moderate or greater turbulence was experienced during the entire approach phase.
  
  
• Due to the approach maneuvering and associated low-level turbulence, it was nearly impossible for the crew to accurately access the fuel status due to the fluctuating fuel gauge readings.
  
  
• After reaching minimum altitude on the VOR-DME approach, (1,040') the crew gained sight of the surface and the first two lead-in lights.
  
  
• Approximately at the "missed approach point", the crew lost visual contact and initiated a missed approach, requesting vectors for their alternate airport, Manila.
  
  
• After five radio calls, the Second Officer was unable to obtain Manila weather from Continental's Hong Kong operations.
  
  
• Once stabilized, after the second missed approach, the crew examined the fuel status to discover that they had consumed their alternate enroute fuel during the low altitude maneuvering and had no choice but to land in Hong Kong. The fuel quantity was approximately 24,000 pounds; the flight plan indicated the need for 22,800 pounds to reach Manila. If the crew continued to Manila, they would have no maneuvering fuel. Obviously there was the risk that they would never reach Manila.
  
  
• The limited approach capability (no ILS receivers) did not afford the risk of going to another airport. The crew regarded Hong Kong as the best choice by virtue of its immediate proximity and having the availability of a precision radar approach to runway 31 (opposite direction).
  
  
• Given that Hong Kong was again chosen as the safest course of action the captain's emergency authority was again automatically invoked (FAR 121.627), independently of the mechanical condition, which also constituted an emergency, by itself.
  
  
• Given all factors, including the weather, the crew elected to request a PAR (precision radar) approach to runway 31.
  
  
• Following the second missed approach, the deadheading second officer came up to the cockpit to offer any assistance he could. Captain Omholt welcomed his presence.
  
  
• Following the missed approach from the VOR-DME approach, Captain Omholt began to feel seriously stressed and tired from the accumulated stress of the current situation and the previous 25 day's flight time (approximately 105 hours flown on a round-the-clock schedule due to short-staffing of the DC-10 base).
  
  
• Three NASA crew fatigue studies, the associated crewmember statements and his March 1997 schedule unquestionably document his fatigue claim in the Hong Kong incident.
  
  
• Subsequent medical exams and reports later documented the stress/fatigue issue.
  
  
• The presence of the deadheading second officer reminded Captain Omholt of the deadheading captain's availability, bringing to mind the UA-232 crash (The captain of that flight brought a deadheading instructor up to the cockpit to fly the aircraft for the duration of the flight). The UA-232 accident was taught as part of the Continental Airlines safety training material.
  
  
• Given the continuous downward trend in the chain of events, Captain Omholt was concerned that their situation could still deteriorate further, consistent with Murphy's law. Captain Omholt was particularly concerned about the reliability of the electrical system and the high probability of windshear, in addition to the reported slippery runway. Captain Omholt was especially concerned as to his timely ability to back up the First Officer in the event of another missed approach, a windshear encounter and the slippery runway condition.
  
  
• The company safety procedures required the application of Cockpit Resource Management [CRM]
  1. Stabilize the aircraft.
  2. Utilize all available resources.
  3. Get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible.
  4. Break the chain of events.
  5. Establish a "bottom line".
  
  
• Captain Omholt decided to request the deadheading DC- 10 captain to take the left seat, knowing the deadheading captain's experience in the DC- 10 was vastly greater than his, that the deadheading captain was far more familiar with the Hong Kong landmarks and that the deadheading captain was well rested.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's intent was to provide the best back-up for the First Officer in all aspects, particularly for the potential windshear condition and slippery runway.
  
  
• Captain Omholt was keenly aware of his accountability if an accident ocurred without his full application of CRM, particularly with the UA-232 example in the background.
  
  
• Knowing that time was extremely short, once the aircraft was stabilized, Captain Omholt quickly excused himself and went to the first class cabin to ask the deadheading captain to facilitate the last approach. The aircraft was in level flight at 13,000 feet, still headed toward Manila, with a request for a return to Hong Kong having been made. Captain Omholt cited his need to quickly use the restroom as his reason for leaving the cockpit.
  
  
• Captain Omholt wanted to preserve the cockpit 'can do' mentality, as opposed to confessing his personal plight and worsen the situation by effecting a dangerous attitude deterioration, should Captain Menefee decline to assist.
  
  
• Captain Omholt requested Captain Menefee's assistance, quickly explaining the situation to to him and advising Captain Menefee that he'd been flying a heavy schedule and that he was exhausted.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's departure from the cockpit was consistent with the provisions of FAR 121.543, both for physiological need and in conjunction with the operation of the aircraft. A 1989 detailed legal interpretation of that FAR further justifies that action, independently of the emergency authority.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's departure from the cockpit did not occur at a critical time.
  
  
• The deadheading captain agreed to give assistance with no hesitation. Captain Omholt initiated the seat switch in the same fashion as though the deadheading captain had been a scheduled relief pilot, or the need for a low-minimums captain was present, as described in the Continental operations manual.
  
  
• Captain Omholt appropriately exercised his emergency authority under FAR 91.3 and FAR 121.557. His action was totally consistent with the company operations manual procedures for dealing with an emergency.
  
  
• The company operations manual mandates that the captain always take the safest course of action. Such is not described as an option; it is emphatically stated as mandatory.
  
  
• Captain Menefee entered the cockpit within two minutes of Captain Omholt's departure.
  
  
• Captain Omholt followed Captain Menefee to the cockpit door. Captain Omholt quickly used the restroom, gave the mandatory flight atttendant safety briefing in the forward galley (the cockpit was full of pilots) and immediately returned to the cockpit.
  
  
• After the deadheading captain took the left seat, ATC advised the crew that a 45 minute holding would be required unless they officially declared a low-fuel emergency. At this point, the aircraft was headed back to Hong Kong.
  
  
• Considering all factors, including the limited approach capability, fuel status and deteriorating weather; the deadheading captain (within minutes of taking the left seat) declared an emergency, with Captain Omholt's concurrence. The crew was then given the PAR (precision radar) approach to runway 31.
  
  
• Moderate turbulence was experienced during the approach in addition to a windshear gust of plus 20 knots at approximately 1,000 feet. The flight broke out of the overcast at approximately 800 - 900 feet; the rest of the approach and landing were normal. Block-in (gate) fuel was 17,400 pounds (approximately 45 minutes flying time remaining).
  
  
• Given the close proximity of the assigned gate to the runway exit, the deadheading Captain taxied the aircraft to the gate, as a seat-switch was impractical.
  
  
• The crew applied their knowledge of the FARs, company policies, complied with all appropriate procedures and employed all facets of CRM. As a result, the aircraft and occupants were never endangered and the situation was brought to a very safe conclusion. The entire event was a text book example of CRM.
  
  
• At the gate, based on his fatigue and stress, Captain Omholt immediately informed the Continental station manager that the return flight would be delayed until adequate rest was obtained. He insisted on a minimum of 8 hours at the hotel, not block-to-block.
  
  
• The Hong Kong contract mechanics' assessment of the generator problem was that Guam maintenance had failed to disconnect the CSD (Constant Speed Drive) on the No. 1 generator, per the required maintenance procedure. Consequently, the Hong Kong mechanics concluded that the No. 1 PMG (Permanent Magnet Generator) was back-feeding voltage into the electrical system, causing the ILS failure. Given the existence of the reverse-current relays, the diagnosis was questioned by the crew.
  
  
• Hong Kong contract maintenance switched the No. 1 generator GCU (Generator Control Unit) with the APU generator GCU & reported that the generator problem was fixed. However, they had not tested the generator reliability with respect to the air-ground logic problem (nose gear "squat switch").
  
  
• The first officer informed Captain Omholt that, based on the mechanic's assumptions, the Hong Kong mechanics signed off both the generator problem and the ILS problem, given their ability to receive the correct ILS audio identification, with a reasonable instrument needle indication.
  
  
• The first officer, who was also formerly a highly experienced DC-10 second officer, indicated that based on his discussions with the Hong Kong contract mechanics in the captain's absence, that he was convinced that the mechanics were not properly trained on the DC-10, as he believed that they clearly did not understand the DC-10 aircraft systems.
  
  
• Captain Omholt advised the mechanics that he also had received normal ILS indications, but the receivers later failed. Captain Omholt refused to accept the aircraft until Hong Kong maintenance tested the ILS with the appropriate ground test equipment.
  
  
• The mechanics stated that it could take up to six hours to procure the appropriate "test box." Captain Omholt maintained his position.
  
  
• The flight crew was subsequently provided with hotel accommodations for the night.
  
  
• The following morning, the Continental station manager called Captain Omholt at his hotel room stating that the subsequent ILS test indicated one failed ILS receiver and the common frequency control head which operated both ILS receivers.
  
  
• Consequently, for lack of parts, the aircraft was grounded and later returned to Guam on a maintenance ferry permit coordinated with Houston Maintenance. The broken aircraft was flown back to Guam by the deadheading captain (Menefee) and his crew.
  
  
• Captain Omholt, and his crew flew another aircraft - with passengers - back to Guam, via Saipan, the evening following the emergency, as flight CS-5986 - without incident.
  
  
• The Hong Kong incident was essentially an Air Micronesia / Continental Maintenance and scheduling matter, preceded by months of poor maintenance & parts shortages, while Continental continuously declared record profits. There was no excuse for either the poor maintenance level or the short-staffing of the pilot base. The FAA was selectively ignoring a dangerous trend.
  
  
• While Captain Omholt felt 'jet-lagged' prior to the flight, he did not feel unfit to fly. He also was aware that two tired pilots had crashed a DC-9 the previous year in Houston and had been fired for their mistakes and failure to practice CRM. Captain Omholt also knew that the FAA Southwest Region office had previously refused to intervene in union complaints concerning crew fatigue and illegal scheduling practices.
  
  
• It should be noted that this same indifference of the FAA to crew scheduling irregularities and CRM set the stage for the AA-1420 crash (eleven killed).
  
  
  
  While there is a certain amount of debate available in this incident, consider:
  
  
• Captain Omholt was on notice that neither the company nor the FAA would enforce the crew rest regulations.
  
  
• Captain Omholt was also aware that termination proceedings had been previously initiated against two pilots who had shut down a trip for crew fatigue. One of the pilots involved was a member of the union safety committee.
  
  
• At the time of the Hong Kong incident, Captain Omholt was also a member of the union safety committee, with the obvious professional obligation to fly by the highest possible safety standard.
  
  
• In the Hong Kong incident, Captain Omholt had flown 105 hours in the previous 25 days, and had become impaired with fatigue after fighting the aircraft over Hong Kong for more than an hour. Captain Omholt cited fatigue at the time he shut down the trip. The written statements of the on-board crewmembers clearly support this fact.
  
  
• During the Hong Kong incident, Captain Omholt "stayed in the loop" the entire time, directing the decision making.
  
  
• Given the nature of the aircraft mechanical problems, on the Hong Kong flight, the First Officer had to fly, therefore Captain Omholt's abilities and competence were not then, and are not now an issue.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's fatigued state and ability to back up the First Officer in the event of windshear were his concern. His concern was later confirmed by a twenty knot windshear which was encountered during the last approach; validating his judgement.
  
  
• Had there been an accident, there was also the additional risk of criminal arrest under foreign law.
  
  
• There is no practical difference between whether a pilot becomes fatigued or ill.
  
  
• The three NASA crew fatigue studies (Dr. Mark Rosekind) additionally substantiate Captain Omholt's claim of fatigue. Other studies also support this claim.
  
  
• According to FAA policies and procedures, the investigation and any enforcement jurisdiction belonged to the FAA Western-Pacific Region. However, the FAA Southwest Region arbitrarily asserted jurisdiction in the matter, filing a malicious and capricious violation against Captain Omholt for leaving his seat in flight - even though common sense, the regulations and legal precedents permitted his actions, independently of the emergency. The FAA violation cited a portion of a sentence in FAR 121.543.
  
  
• According to that practice, no captain could never legally permit his/her first officer to fly an aircraft.
  
  
• The allegations in the violation proceedings were distorted and totally false. The FAA violation proceedings effected a felony, under USC Title 18. The FAA cited part of a sentence as though it was independently a complete regulation.
  
  
• While a violation case can be transferred to another region for valid cause, the Western-Pacific region later claimed (in a Freedom of Information Act request) that they had no reports on the incident, thus, legitimate investigation and enforcement action transfer was impossible.
  
  
• This matter raises the obvious question as to why the Western-Pacific region received no reports, given that it was officially an Air Micronesia flight. Additionally, once informed, why did they not conduct an investigation of their own accord, having been informed that the incident happened in their jurisdiction. (The recent Alaska 506 oxygen mask incident has become a more dramatic repeat of this selective inaction).
  
  
• The Hong Kong incident was both a crew fatigue incident and a maintenance incident. Given the FAA mandates evolving out of the ValuJet 592 accident, the FAA oversight of contract maintenance (out-sourcing) was clearly negligent in regard to both direct normal oversight and the oversight of maintenance out- sourcing (pursuant to the ValuJet crash outcome) in Guam and Hong Kong.
  
  
• The failure of the FAA to investigate the scheduling and maintenance matters involved with this incident is damning testimony as to the biased selectivity of the FAA regulation and policy enforcement.
  
  
• It should be noted that the NTSB had previously cited the FAA Southwest Region's negligent oversight of Continental. In its investigation of the Continental DC-9 crash in Houston, the NTSB also cited crew fatigue as a factor, as well as Crew Resource Management (CRM) failings.
  
  
• Again, previous complaints concerning crew rest violations had been dismissed by the same FAA region without formal investigation. Ignoring the obvious problems in the areas of CRM and crew rest set the stage for the American flight 1420 crash.
  
  
  The pilots in that Continental DC-9 crash were terminated by
  Continental, with the FAA exercising an emergency revocation of
  their airman certificates. Beyond the mechanics of the accident,
  pilot CRM failure was also cited by the FAA in that action.
  
  
  
• Given the FAA complicity in the Hong Kong incident, the FAA Southwest Region should never have been allowed to assert or maintain jurisdiction. This is particularly true, given the fact that Captain Omholt had formally complained to Washington D.C. FAA National Headquarters about the FAA matter, identifying the specific problem areas and also clearly identified FAA complicity in the form of negligent oversight.
  
  
• Captain Omholt had also formally requested a jurisdiction change in the violation proceeding. The jurisdiction transfer was refused by the FAA Southwest Region, citing a "policy" which the office couldn't produce at the time requested. Hence it is obvious that the refusal of the transfer was fraudulent in its inception.
  
  
• During the investigation of his original complaint to Washington D.C., clear and undeniable wrong-doing had been conducted by the FAA inspector which was concealed by the Southwest Region. Captain Omholt had complained as to the actions of the FAA Southwest Region, as opposed to only the FAA Inspector as an individual. That region was directed to investigate itself.
  
  
• The Continental pilot's union failed to provide any significant legal support in the initial stages of the bogus FAA violation, associated with the Hong Kong incident.
  
  
• If Captain Omholt's actions or fitness-for-duty had been a valid question, he should have been grounded in Hong Kong and replaced as captain. He was not immediately drug or alcohol tested. Instead, he was scheduled the very next day to fly two more flights with passengers. The first from Hong Kong to Saipan and another from Saipan to Guam. If there had been a legitimate doubt as to his suitability to continue, Continental should have at least required him to fly the broken aircraft back to Guam on the "maintenance ferry permit," as opposed to two passenger flights. The union didn't make an issue of these matters, when they should have.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's crew had no reservations about flying the return trip with him.
  
  
• In their written statements, Captain Omholt's crew praised his judgement. The comments were unsolicited.
  
  
• Captain Omholt's actions were totally within the confines of FAA regulations and the company policies and procedures - without exception.
  
  
• The emergency authority was unquestionably in full force and effect; that authority was TOTALLY ignored by the FAA.
  
  
• For lack of adequate union legal support, Captain Omholt was ultimately intimidated into settling on the violation, with a 150 day suspension of his certificate (500% of the maximum FAA penalty) being imposed.
  
  
• During the violation process, the union gave only token support of any kind to Captain Omholt.
  
  
• Despite consistent written statements from all crewmembers involved, the union attempted to sway Captain Omholt's personal attorney by peddling a bogus story, implying that Captain Omholt 'lost his nerve,' requiring the deadheading crew to commit mutiny to save the aircraft. When challenged to provide any support or documentation for that account, the union refused to respond.
  
  
• Continental refused to provide any significant assistance to Captain Omholt.
  
  
• Captain Omholt has been grounded for over three years with Continental and the union refusing any legitimate support toward restoring Captain Omholt to the flight line.
  
  
• Captain Omholt is still fighting this matter.
  
  
  
  

FAR 121.627 - Continuing flight in unsafe conditions.

(a) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue toward any airport to which it has been dispatched or released if, in the opinion of the pilot in command or dispatcher (domestic and flag air carriers only), the flight cannot be completed safely; unless, in the opinion of the pilot in command, there is no safer procedure. In that event, continuation toward that airport is an emergency situation as set forth in FAR 121.557.

(b) If any instrument or item of equipment required under this chapter for the particular operation becomes inoperative en route, the pilot in command shall comply with the approved procedures for such an occurrence as specified in the certificate holder's manual.



FAR 121.557 Emergencies: Domestic and flag air carriers.

(a) In an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action the pilot in command may take any action that he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such a case he may deviate from prescribed operations procedures and methods, weather minimums, and this chapter, to the extent required in the interests of safety.

(b) In an emergency situation arising during flight that requires immediate decision and action by an aircraft dispatcher, and that is known to him, the aircraft dispatcher shall advise the pilot in command of the emergency, shall ascertain the decision of the pilot in command, and shall have the decision recorded. If the aircraft dispatcher cannot communicate with the pilot, he shall declare an emergency and take any action that he considers necessary under the circumstances.

(c) Whenever a pilot in command or dispatcher exercises emergency authority, he shall keep the appropriate ATC facility and dispatch centers fully informed of the progress of the flight. The person declaring the emergency shall send a written report of any deviation through the air carrier's operations manager, to the Administrator. A dispatcher shall send his report within 10 days after the date of the emergency, and a pilot in command shall send his report within 10 days after returning to his home base.

1. The emergency must be bone fide [actual threat to life or property].

2. The event may not be of the pilot's own making (bad / careless decision).

3. The pilot's actions must be limited to the solution of the crisis.



FAR 121.543 - Flight crewmembers at controls.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each required flight crewmember on flight deck duty must remain at the assigned duty station with seat belt fastened while the aircraft is taking off or landing, and while it is en route.

(b) A required flight crewmember may leave the assigned duty station -

(1) If the crewmember's absence is necessary for the performance of duties in connection with the operation of the aircraft;

(2) If the crewmember's absence is in connection with physiological needs.

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