ANATOMY
OF AN
EMERGENCY
Written by
Captain Ralph W. Omholt
INTRODUCTION
The paradox in modern airline operations is that the aviation
industry has failed to learn the lessons derived from the design,
operation and sinking of the Titanic, in 1912. We now approach 100
years of history, repeating the same formula for disaster,
brilliantly illustrated by a terrific Hollywood movie. Yet, today,
we still see design shortcuts and managerial mistakes being made in
the light as the cost cutting and attempted profit reaping of the
Titanic tragedy. Not surprisingly, the result is the same - tragic
and unnecessary deaths.
We also see the nearly identical failures in the onboard crew
teamwork, resulting in air disasters, instead. Today that teamwork
is a science, referred to as Crew Resource Management, or, CRM,
researched and developed by NASA. Without explanation, the FAA has
gone on record as refusing the National Transportation Safety
Board's (NTSB) pleas to implement the practices of CRM at the
cockpit level; the only place it has any relevance or effect. We
repeatedly witness CRM failings behind incidents and accidents, and
disasters.
The worst disaster in aviation history - the collision of two
B-747s - illustrated the potential for disasters caused by crew
teamwork (CRM) failings; yet the FAA all but refuses to address the
CRM issue in a dynamic manner. Most recently, the combined 99
fatalities in American flight 1420 and Alaska flight 261 punctuated
the desperate need for CRM; yet the FAA still refuses to budge.
Conversely, successful examples of safety, effected by CRM, are
methodically overlooked, almost 'buried.' The UA-232 accident
(Sioux City crash) is the only known exception of any prominence.
Paradoxically, the FAA illustrates the UA-232 accident as an
example of CRM, while refusing to actually implement CRM in the
cockpits. Thus, the FAA creates the illusion that they dynamically
endorse CRM. Few positions could be further from the truth.
Given the mechanical factors, we are thus confronted with the
terrible proposition that we must prepare for more disasters.
Prevention by any means is the only solution. Awareness of the true
reality is required, as then, only a difference can be made. With
short-term profits being an economic fetish, information and
awareness, with the threat of accountability - on a ledger-sheet or
in a courtroom - seem to be the only tools.
The staggering reality is that those paying the 'pittance' fares to
ride a bus across town or across country are entitled to a
radically higher standard of safety than the airline passenger -
anywhere. The bus driver's civil and legal rights as a wage earner
are far superior to those of an airline captain.
Yet, we may be certain, for the moment, that more incidents,
accidents and disasters will continue to happen. Hence, the core of
the following material is intended to give an appropriate in-dept
insight into that time, "when things go wrong." The following
presentation is intended to cover the mechanical, psychological and
emotional aspects of an emergency, so as to render a reasonably
complete presentation of the complexity of airline
emergencies.
AIRLINE EMERGENCIES
Everyone who has a responsibility for airline safety needs a clear
understanding of previous emergencies as well as reasonably
expected human response under stress. That knowledge is needed to
effectively direct the desired response of individuals, control
small groups or possibly to manage a crowd.
Human response in emergencies is highly varied and unfortunately
unpredictable. Aircraft accidents are rare and very little research
has been conducted in the aviation emergency and disaster
environment. It is simply impossible to predict what any
individual, or group is likely to do in a given set of
circumstances. Suffice it to say, that emergencies and accidents
rarely have reliable similarities.
Airline emergencies have a maddening characteristic; they are
extremely mobile. An entire scenario can be played out in flight,
with an imminent disaster avoided in flight, allowing an aircraft
to continuing on to its original destination. An actual accident
can occur en route, involving anything from a mid-air collision to
a bomb explosion. The actual accident can occur on land or in the
ocean. Statistically, most accidents happen within a few miles of
an airport, however, there is obviously no guarantee. The
worst-case scenario is an accident far from civilization, where
survivors must wait for rescue - if it ever reaches them in
time.
An amazing irony confronts the airline industry in that the
pertinence of the popular movie, "Titanic" is technically accurate
to an extreme as a depiction of a program for disaster, from the
contributing background factors, through the depictions of human
responses, ranging from the background to the aftermath. Yet, few
in the aviation industry seem to have learned from that, or any
disaster.
The issues to be explored in this material include -
* The background factors in emergencies.
* The role of passengers in emergencies.
* The four active phases of an emergency.
* The emotional and psychological impact.
* The variability and unpredictability of human response.
* The impact of stress on decision-making.
* The critical requirement for information and effective
communication.
* The importance of leadership in emergencies.
* The dynamics of aircraft evacuations.
EMERGENCY - Defined
For many of us an emergency can be simply defined as:
"An event, or set of events, which disrupts our normal day-to-day
routine." We are all familiar with minor 'road rage' and the tears
and words of anger over the classic tube of toothpaste, squeezed in
the middle.
An emergency, as we normally regard the term in a life threatening
sense, can erupt suddenly, or evolve over a considerable period of
time. An emergency can obviously result in physical damage and
injury to people; possibly leading to the loss of life.
The types of emergencies and their causes vary to an extreme. No
two emergencies are exactly the same. Some emergencies, such as
acts-of-war, are deliberate and man-made. Other emergencies result
from natural causes. For our purposes, we will concentrate on the
airline community with its human error; and systems or mechanical
failure.
The importance of the emergency issue addresses the fact that the
aviation community, particularly the airline industry is quickly
growing. Thus, more people are exposed to flight emergencies.
Despite a good safety record, accidents and major disasters still
happen. Beyond the mechanical factors, it is necessary to
acknowledge the importance of behavioral issues. A large portion of
human behavior knowledge comes from studies in
emergency situation 'crowd management.'
Ironically, maritime studies and safety rules are far ahead of the
aviation community. The maritime environment often provides
additional rules and procedures for dealing with people's special
needs and keeping order, reducing and avoiding panic.
In addition, such maritime codes call for personnel with the
responsibility for the safety of passengers in an emergency
situation, to follow approved training in crisis management and
human behavior which includes, but is not limited to:
* Situational assessment and the provision of an effective
response.
* Leadership during abnormal situations and emergencies.
* Identification of indicators and symptoms of excessive personal
stress, and adverse stress response.
* Identification of the impact of stress on response and its effect
on passenger and crew performance.
* Awareness of passenger and crew response/reactions in
emergencies.
* Recognition of specific responses of passengers and
crew.
* Recognizing the possibility, probability and character of
panic.
* Recognizing and understanding the importance of timely, clear and
concise information, instructions and reports, and the exchange of
information and dynamic feedback.
* Effective communication of instructions requiring crew and
passenger action.
In a sentence, the aviation community is far behind. The amazing
tragedy is that the gap in safety is profit driven, just as in the
Titanic affair. Interestingly, the maritime community learned the
obvious lessons; appropriately applying them.
LEADERSHIP
An emergency can quickly become complex, given the various layers
of leadership involved. An emergency can be as simple as a captain
calling for a checklist, resolving the threat. It can be a
dispatcher's decision to divert an aircraft due to weather, a
mechanical problem or a bomb threat. Leadership can be the
resolution of the final solution or the needed authority. While the
captain is mechanically and legally the final authority, history
proves that a captain's decisions can be swayed by political
threat; another Titanic.
Effective leadership requires the ability to be flexible, the
willingness to adapt one's belief system or style, to accommodate
a unique or rapidly changing situation, and/or set of
circumstances.
The gifted leader might be able to achieve the desired effect
automatically, while others need training and the time to think
before deciding on a course of action. Such courses of action are
usually described as autocratic, democratic, or composite.
In environments such as aviation, teamwork (democratic or
composite) is required. Normally, the captain is the team leader.
Such a role often requires an autocratic or authoritarian style.
Despite normal roles and responsibilities, the role of a good
leader in emergencies is to effect a safe outcome, via teamwork.
The autocratic style or role is often visualized as an extreme
style. Often it is feared out of tradition or prejudice, without
good cause. In recent years, the science of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) has been effected, with great success. Conversely,
most of the accidents which we have recently witnessed, contained
a major failing of that safety teamwork.
Where the individual asserts his/her style will depend on the
immediate requirement, the task at hand, the immediate environment
and the people involved. The inter-relationships will equally
include their perceptions, understanding of the situation,
preferences, prejudices and, of course, the time available.
POWER
Power is the primary resource, which enables a leader to influence
individuals and groups. It is that power which is utilized to
direct the efforts of others toward the achievement of the desired
objective. Power comes in a variety of forms.
PERSUASION
Persuasive or coercive power effects compliance, rather than
creating commitment, by eliminating perceived options and otherwise
motivating people. In an emergency, that form of power creates
action through fear of an adverse outcome such as accountability,
pain, injury or death.
For example, "We must listen to the pilots and flight attendants if
we want to survive. Calm down and just LISTEN!"
ASSUMPTION
Assumed power is based on the immediate leader's actual or
perceived connection with influential or important people.
For example, "The captain has asked me to advise everybody that
..."
EXPERTISE
The effect of expertise is related to a leader's special knowledge
and/or skills. It can be used very effectively to influence those
who are aware that they do not have the same magnitude of knowledge
and/or skills themselves. In most cases, people quickly display
respect for expertise, which gains and facilitates
compliance.
For example, "Attention everybody, I am a policeman. We have a case
of sky-rage, but the individual has been subdued and secured,
everything is going to be okay. Please go back to your
seats."
UNIQUE INFORMATION
Information available to the immediate leader can be a source of
power, if that leader has information that others need or
want.
For example, "Attention please, we have to clear the aisles and the
immediate seat area. My information is that we will probably have
to evacuate the aircraft very quickly after landing."
POSITION
Position obviously wields the authority or rank, which the
particular leader holds. Such position, and its implied power, is
typically legitimized by some form status, backed by either
tradition or a disciplinary code. The power of a unique position
creates a situation where the leader is perceived as having the
legitimate right to command; with the followers having a certain
obligation to obey. Such power can be delegated.
For example, "Ladies and Gentlemen, this is your Captain speaking.
Please give me your attention for a few moments. I'd like to bring
you up to date on the situation. However, I would first ask you to
remain calm, listen carefully and follow the instructions of the
flight attendants..."
PERSONALITY
The element of personal power is a function of the perceived
leader's inherent qualities such as image, charm, integrity and
apparent courage; as well as such traits as decisiveness and
bearing. The power comes from the individual's being liked and
possibly admired. For the perceived leader, those elements will
determine the level of commitment and compliance.
For example, imagine a Hollywood 'macho' hero on board saying,
"Come on folks, we have a job to do. I have a good feeling about
this. Just remember that we're going to have to work together to
get through this thing."
REWARD
The power of reward is based on the leader's ability to give his
followers some tangible outcome. This can be another form of
coercive power, related to gaining a tangible positive outcome, as
opposed to simply avoiding a negative outcome.
For example, "Just listen carefully, follow the instructions and
we'll get through this thing okay. The drinks will be on
me."
HUMOR
There is also power in tasteful and appropriate humor. Imagine the
situation above with the final message being, "The captain's buying
the drinks, but he doesn't know it yet." Those extra words can add
a small, but important, element of positive energy.
ACTION
The final decisions on appropriate action are not often easy as no
one can reliably predict an outcome and the needed action,
particularly in the final seconds. Often no action will be the
appropriate decision. If a safe landing is accomplished out of an
emergency with no remaining threat, the decision can be as simple
as a PA announcing, "Stay seated, stay seated!"
In an emergency, there are no hard rules as to what action is
appropriate when dealing effectively with an individual, group or
crowd. While there is always the risk of hindsight judgments, in
the midst of an emergency, there are no rigid right or wrong
answers, only the 'best judgment,' based on the best analysis of
the situation in the given time frame.
BACKGROUND
In the FAA history, there is a safety poster, which displays a tall
captain looking down at a young boy. The caption reads, "Son, good
pilots don't have exciting stories." While the realists typically
mock the caption, it expresses an admirable and desirable
idealism.
The background of an emergency is typically complex. However, there
are two elements, which particularly affect flight crews, education
and training. While the combination of these two terms might seem
redundant, bear in mind that pertinent flight crew knowledge can
independently operate in the background of the formality of the
training, which focuses on habits. Education serves to prevent an
emergency, training serves the extrication from the emergency, once
danger appears.
'Background' can involve the extremes of formal education such as
an electrical engineering degree in the background of flight
training. Thus, that engineer-pilot is better equipped to deal with
a potential electrical problem. The aircraft manual might cite the
limitation of re-setting a circuit breaker only twice. The
specialized knowledge of the engineer-pilot might recognize that
the 'popped' circuit breaker is a low power 'control' circuit
breaker, which protects current going to a relay which, in turn,
controls a 50 amp circuit.
Background can be as simple as the recollection of a 'rumor,' or a
distant account. Imagine a co-pilot saying, "Captain, if memory
serves me correctly, wasn't that the same circuit breaker that
supposedly started that DC-9 fire that killed 30 people?" Another
example, "Remember "X," he got time off / fired for not ..."
Crew training implies that once an event occurs, the flight crews
quickly identify and accept an abnormal situation as a signal that
something is wrong; needing the crews' action. From that point, the
crews solve the problem, via trained habits, or move on to warn
others or sound an actual alarm.
Passengers also get involved in many flight emergencies, however
their situation is significantly different. As with flight crews,
attitude makes the difference. In the accepted role of the
courteous and compliant passenger, they may tend to deny a problem
exists, or look for convincing reinforcement that something is
actually wrong. To protect their
self-image, passengers may resist communication or action, fearing
embarrassment or refuse to admit to themselves that a problem
potentially or actually exists. Fear may evoke denial, numbing the
passenger to inaction, even when a potential or actual emergency
exists.
There might be extraneous reasons for passenger inaction. For
example, if one passenger is obviously to be classed as a
'minority,' gets drunk and is approaching 'disorderly,' an
observant passenger might keep silent, rather than risk the
accusation of prejudice. Such a situation could ultimately lead to
a very dangerous sky-rage event.
It is common for 'deadheading' or 'commuting' airline employees to
be seated among the passengers, with observation skills or
supplemental expertise to offer. Surprisingly, that may not make a
difference. In one accidental belly-landing, three 'deadheading'
crew members later said that they were sure that the landing gear
wasn't down - yet said nothing.
In many accounts, individuals confess strong suspicions well in
advance of the onset of the threat itself. A copilot might later
confess, "I heard the circuit breaker pop. I didn't approve of the
captain resetting it without looking to see what it was or allowing
a 'cooling' time, but I didn't want to get him mad at me."
In another scenario, "I knew the company was trying to save on
fuel. I knew the weather forecast was bad, I knew the potential for
the airport going to a single runway with a shift in the wind; I
didn't ask for more fuel because I didn't want to create a 'hassle'
with the dispatcher or the chief pilot."
Human psychology plays a major role in emergencies; particularly in
the background. Even where appropriate action is taken to prevent
an emergency, the decisions often involve a requirement for
multiple threats before anything is said or done. The background
becomes particularly fertile for an emergency in cases where the
indicators are seemingly vague and/or ambiguous. A 'local culture'
may induce psychological denial in response to the fear of
potential embarrassment or retribution. This could be as simple as
a copilot wanting the captain's respect or as complex as a
pre-existing personality clash. The denial can potentially be a
"team effort." Imagine the captain saying, "If we keep demanding
more fuel, we're asking to get accused of some kind of union
action." In such a case, the copilot might easily go along with the
decision.
In the background, there are far too many profit-driven forces,
which create and drive an emergency. The obvious deadly combination
is on the order of maintenance or weather problems combined with a
crew-rest problem.
Let's examine some prominent examples from history -
Swiss Air 111
Swiss Air flight 111 is a complex fatal tragedy, which barely
deserves the term, "accident." It never should have been an
emergency, let alone a tragedy. The minute details of the event
itself are not well known, but sufficient information is available
to illustrate a disaster, which should never have happened for many
reasons.
1. The complexity of the aircraft design itself left the
probability that the minimum required crew of two pilots could
become so involved with an imminent disaster that the attendance to
flight control would become minimal to non-existent.
2. The personal knowledge of the pilots as to the aircraft systems
was deficient by virtue of the addition of a passenger
entertainment system which was directly powered from one of the
aircraft main power sources, as opposed to a more remote power
source which could be easily isolated or protected from a
catastrophic failure. Following the disaster, the suspect systems
were immediately deactivated or removed in the surviving fleet of
aircraft.
3. The failure of the company-training program to consider such a
possibility and give supplemental training to the pilots, which
conceivably could have averted the disaster. If current indications
are correct, appropriate knowledge could have led to the early
deactivation of the correct electrical power source, allowing a
safe landing.
4. The ignorance of the Swiss Air pilots as to the background money
politics created by the U.S. White House. Those politics set the
stage for the failure of safety authority. The particular document
is Executive Order 12866. The Order contains a tongue-in-cheek
provision that it is not intended to usurp any existing laws. While
the existing safety laws were and are in full force and effect,
their observance is selectively not observed; favoring corporate
profits over safety.
***************************
Alaska Flight 261
In a similar disaster, the pilots of Alaska Flight 261 were
probably ignorant of the FAA regulations and the effective elements
of Crew Resource Management (CRM). While a serious mechanical
failure created an emergency under the FAA regulations,
independently of pilot judgment, the corporate culture(identified
by the media) compelled the pilots to over-fly several good
airports, until the mechanical situation deteriorated; ultimately
aircraft control was impossible. Basic rule 3 of CRM is, "Land as
soon as possible."
On the heels of that accident, the company had two more
incidents, which included very similar serious CRM failings. After
the third incident, the pilot group apparently became
self-educated, as the life-threatening incidents abruptly stopped.
The Flight 261 disaster produced no significant changes made by
either the FAA or the company.
In these incidents, one valuable and historically validated lesson
had not been brought to the active attention of the pilots, "Land
as soon as possible!"
***************************
ValuJet Flight 592
A serious researcher of the VJ-592 crash will walk away bewildered.
The presented 'facts' don't make sufficient sense for a responsible
researcher to come to a well-defined conclusion. Too many reliable
facts were left out of the official report; many of the presented
'facts' were impossible.
However, the pilots, we can be sure, did their best under the
circumstances. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight (armed with the
history of subsequent similar events), the same lesson is apparent
- CRM rule 3, "Land as soon as possible." While the ValuJet pilots
were attempting to do just that, the reliable data indicates one
tragic fact, they dutifully asked permission and for directions.
The associated time factor probably made the life-death
difference.
We may be certain that the VJ-592 pilots didn't and couldn't have
known the magnitude of the threat they faced. It is well known that
the situation quickly deteriorated with the infamous "Murphy's Law"
catching the crew in many ways. The pilots had to have been totally
bewildered after the first few seconds of the emergency.
In all likelihood, the pilots did not have a historical
appreciation for the potential for rapid deterioration of
situations involving electrical problems; or any form of fire
threat aboard an aircraft. Their ignorance left them abandoned to
fate.
***************************
THE OBVIOUS QUESTION
Interestingly, in the extended background of events such as these,
there was another element lurking which still has not been
adequately addressed. That element being the obvious question, "If
we know that when pilots quickly land, they save lives and
aircraft, why is it that so many pilots still elect to continue to
the extreme of a serious incident or a tragic disaster?"
In a sentence, the answer undoubtedly lies in an accountant's
biased spreadsheet. While it is important to maintain corporate
viability, air disasters do not justify the short-term profits,
which seem to repeatedly enhance the careers of airline executives
and bureaucrats. A spreadsheet simply cannot readily depict safety
as an investment; it's shown only as an expense.
If it can be said in a single sentence, pilots, in general, are
afraid of losing their image due to punishment, rumor and innuendo;
hence they often take unnecessary risks.
Many years ago, the U.S. Air Force produced a training film called,
"The Failing Aviator." The film title was designed to get the
pilots' attention; it did. The film presented an almost humorous
account of pilot sociology. Those who saw it never forgot it. The
film portrayed the pilot fixation on their image, displacing safety
in the process. It is long past time for a similar film to be
presented, entitled, "The Psychology of Safety."
Amazingly, the cost of most common sense safety items can be
readily recouped. If the reality were well known, the traveling
public would have little trouble with the idea of their pre-paying
the costs in their ticket price. The lingering question remains,
"Even if the passengers pre-paid the expense, would the money be
used for the needed changes, or diverted into the profit coffers?"
The Pan Am Flight 103 history leaves that as a valid
question.
It must also be asked, "With the money in hand, will the changes be
made in time?"
Given the high probability of more airline disaster, we must be
aware of the 'real time' human factors involved in an
emergency.
GENERAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Like ocean-going passenger ships and local ferries, airliners also
carry a large number of people - they are also, to a certain
degree, 'crowds.' Thus, we must examine the details of crowd
behavior and why crowds are not just interesting, but sometimes
dangerous in their own right. It is necessary to examine the
details of the human behavior models and the general ideas and the
assumptions held about crowds.
Crowds earn their interest because of the potential tragedy for
something dangerous or deadly happening. Most importantly, because
of the potential number of victims.
In emergencies, crowds are significant because they can be either
'well behaved;' or, they can play a direct causal role, as well as
an incidental role in incidents, emergencies, accidents and
disasters.
The greatest concern with regard to crowds is the element of panic
leading to the crushing of those slow to respond. There is also the
fear that the mass of passengers can fail to properly react or
communicate important instructions to others, so as to effect the
desired action.
Conversely, a non-reactive sub-crowd can play an instigating role.
During an aircraft evacuation, if a significant percentage of
passengers decide to take their personal belongings with them, they
may present an obstruction to the remainder of the evacuees,
inducing a panic reaction. In reality, that is a rather common
occurrence.
The direct 'crowd' role in an emergency requires knowledge,
methods, systems and procedures to ensure that a crowd is unlikely
to cause a disaster. The incidental role played by crowds during an
emergency is a much more complex problem to deal with and
manage.
Obviously, not all groups or crowds are the same. Any crowd is
typically made up of individuals who have come together for a wide
range of different reasons. Their attitudes, roles, actions, and
reactions to any events will differ with a broad number of factors,
including age, status, sex, experience and expectations.
Each setting containing a large number of people is likely to have
certain aspects of crowd behavior in common with other settings.
However, different factors will result in behaviors unique to each
setting. The same people might behave at least slightly differently
when they are on a narrow-body aircraft than on a wide-body
aircraft. Their reaction in the gate area will be different than
when they are seated on the aircraft.
Crowds are complex; each one is somehow different in one way or
another. Despite the identifiable differences, researchers have
identified a number of factors, which influence crowd behavior.
Some of the factors include their upbringing, their every-day
'roles,' how they perceive themselves in relationship to other
people and certainly, their expectations in a given situation.
People in general have certain 'rules' associated with their
personal roles - how they behave, relative to others, and what they
expect, possibly demand, in return.
The key is in controlling the element of fear.
Researchers have also illuminated a number of myths held about
crowds and crowd behavior.
CROWD MYTHS
The concern regarding 'mob mentality' is found in the commonly held
that individuals in crowds undergo a psychological change - they
mysteriously transform, coming to obey some instinctive 'unified
mass mentality law'. In doing so they become somewhat irrational,
childlike and primitive.
Most people have their own concept of the term, 'mob mentality.'
Myth, holds that crowds become a crazy, random and unmanageable
body. The fear is that crowds they are highly suggestible or
anti-social; not wanting to be managed. While there is certain
phenomena associated with crowd behavior, the myth of inherent mob
mentality is simply not valid.
While the concern over 'mob mentality' is founded in fact, valid
facts and history defy any 'laws' regarding the predictability of
crowds, especially in emergencies. However, there remains the fear
that if a crowd were indeed to become crazy and revert to a
'unified mass mentality law,' then under certain circumstances this
would lead, almost inevitably, to lethal panic behavior.
Admittedly, that sometimes happens, even on aircraft.
Managing a crowd isn't to be feared as being virtually impossible.
Fortunately for flight crews, research reveals that people retain
much of their individuality and that they typically abide by their
every-day roles; and the constructive rules by which they normally
live.
Crowds, even in emergencies, have their underlying individual
pre-existing roles and their own associated rules which guide their
behavior. Superimposed on these are those unique 'rules of the
passenger'. That is to say that passengers generally behave exactly
as 'expected.'
The mixture of personal roles and rules continues to basically
guide and direct individual behavior in emergencies, just as in
normal circumstances. Thus, that behavior is worth considering in
more detail.
ROLES AND RULES FOR PASSENGERS
Passenger behavior is a function of a set of pre-determined
'normal' roles, whether wife, husband, mother or soldier. These
roles embody the primary rules, which guide the role, itself. The
combination determines the primary behavior, what the person is, or
is not, expected to do; how they will probably behave. Indirectly,
they define how other people are expected to behave in return. For
example, a large male passenger will get a more rapid response when
he says; "excuse me," than will a frail and elderly lady.
As another example, a married woman in the role of the onboard
'wife' might expect the accompanying husband to make any requests
and decisions on her behalf. Should they be separated, when an
emergency occurs she might stop in place, waiting for his
reappearance, according to the pre-existing rules of their
marriage. If he doesn't appear and if her survival needs are not
recognized, she might not receive the desired guidance, thus she
might remain in place, possibly as an obstruction to someone trying
to make an exit.
We can therefore see that 'normal' rules and associated roles get
superimposed on behaviors related to the normal range of behaviors
of the 'passenger' role, even in a 'crowd.'
Passenger behavior will also be a function of their perceived role
as 'passenger.' This will be, in part, be a matter of the
impression of the crew and the airline. A discount carrier with
dirty airplanes and an unfriendly crew will not evoke the same
response as a larger 'quality' carrier. The passenger attitudes and
opinions, as a group or as individuals, will significantly dictate
their primary actions and interactions. Ultimately the 'confidence'
factor will dictate the response to crew instructions; whether
normal or in an emergency.
Managing passengers who are confident in the airline and its crew
is radically different from passengers with serious doubts. A low
passenger confidence factor is likely to produce a low emergency
response factor. If the flight crewmembers strike passengers as
unhappy, ill informed and impotent under 'normal' circumstances,
the emergency scenario will likely be difficult - at best.
As a variant, the interaction of pilots and flight attendants might
make the difference, if the flight attendants are seen to be backed
up by the pilots. That proposition assumes an overriding faith in
the pilots.
The interactive roles and rules will reasonably guide behavior in
an emergency, just as in normal every-day life. In their own
manner, people will attempt to assess the reality, and then make
decisions as to what to do. People will do this in the light of a
number of things, including how they view the airline and it's
staff.
Within a complex situation there are many who have the unexpected
potential to influence the behavior of other people. In another
disaster scene, the legend of the Titanic's "Unsinkable Molly
Brown" is an example of passenger perception. An aggressive but
sensible passenger took effective charge; out-performing a ship's
crewman.
It is far more productive to think of crowds in ordered terms, as
opposed to allowing one's expected probability to shift to the
extreme notion (fear) that a group of passengers would
automatically react in the fashion of an open-air crowd,
transforming into an uncontrollable mob, liable to blind panic.
Instead, attention should be focused on the important issues
related to the more probable movement of people once an emergency
is underway - inspired and directed by the trained crisis
leadership of the crew. Regardless of its source, such leadership
is critical to safety.
Similarly, it must be asked, "What are the normal operational roles
of the crew, and what is their influence on passenger behavior as
an emergency develops?"
ROLES AND RULES FOR CREWMEMBERS
The crewmembers also have their own roles and related rules on the
aircraft, which guide their behavior. The 'human' behavioral rules
are also directed by corporate mandates in the form of policies,
procedures and cockpit checklists. The crews' response is well
practiced under normal operating circumstances and an unfortunately
limited number of emergency drills.
Actual emergency situations are different. While these events are
rare, the associated special roles and rules, which govern crew
behavior under these circumstances, are typically not well
practiced as an integrated crew. The obvious threat in that fact
still lingers, for lack of meaningful change by the
industry.
The more obvious question asks, "How easy it is to switch from the
'normal' mode to the 'emergency' mode?"
Evidence from available histories suggests that it is far more
difficult than we care to think about. Basically, during an
aircraft emergency, some people will continue to act in terms of
the role they occupy under normal circumstances, as opposed to
immediately reverting to an 'emergency' mentality and role, with an
appropriate and effective response, even trained crewmembers.
With the announcement of an emergency, a flight attendant may
briefly continue an unimportant but routine duty. A pilot may find
a diversion in an otherwise routine cockpit duty or fail to
recognize the demand for an instant and/or desperate response. Any
delay, however brief, can potentially be costly.
The tendency to stay in the safety illusion of the 'normal' role
can be so powerful that in extreme cases people will continue to
ignore obvious warnings that there may be a potentially disastrous
situation rapidly developing. Likewise, communication might be
hindered or prevented by the related psychological denial
mechanism.
Currently, the typical social/professional compartmentalization of
the pilots and flight attendants doesn't lend itself to integrated
teamwork. One of the more entertaining airline stories told is that
of the pilots being interrupted after takeoff by a passenger
banging on the cockpit door, wanting a cup of coffee, as the flight
attendants had been left behind. Surprisingly, that has happened
more than once.
Often, an examination of ditching training reveals that the pilots
have no appreciable idea as to how to inflate and set up a life
raft or manage the survival resources. Thus, pilots are often left
to delegate authority to the flight attendants - in the best
circumstances.
There is the distinct probability of the pilots being seriously
injured, trapped or killed in the cockpit in an accident. Thus the
flight attendants may be 'on their own.' Interestingly, the flight
attendants are typically trained to be autonomous, toward that end,
and will experience difficulty responding to pilot instructions
after the initial accident. In perverse airline humor, it is
commonly remarked that, "Pilots are the first to arrive at the
scene of an accident."
Often, flying incidents and accidents involve fire. The human
response to fire is typically on the borderline of panic. Thus,
crewmembers are faced with ensuring passenger safety; putting their
own safety in second place. Ideally the opportunity will allow all
to escape.
The traumatic nature of an accident can quickly sway anyone's
decision-making and response; crews are no different. Particularly
in the cockpit, head injuries are likely, with unpredictable and
confusing results.
One of the fears of pilots is that the flight attendant autonomy -
due to the status, authority, economic and gender differences -
will result in the pilots being abandoned in an evacuation. History
proves that fear to be valid.
Flight attendants have a clearly defined 'normal' role. It's
possible that they might call the cockpit for assistance, rather
than closely investigate a smoke source as a potential fire; such
an investigation being outside their perceived 'normal' role. In
the meantime, the fire could be actual and growing rapidly. If it
is their habit to personally visit the cockpit, the flight
attendants may walk to the cockpit to make the request for
assistance, costing precious time.
In the normal passenger cabin protocol, a flight attendant may
insist on only reporting safety concerns to the 'lead' flight
attendant, not following through to make sure the message actually
gets to the cockpit, even though a clear threat was perceived.
Worse, when the flight attendant is satisfied that nothing is being
done; he/she might not follow up with an independent interphone
call to insist that a needed response is given.
In many cases, a failure to follow up may be a function of the
flight attendant sociology. A domineering senior flight attendant
may insist on total control of the passenger cabin. With sufficient
fear being generated, that local protocol may be observed to the
endangerment of all on board.
The timing of an event can have a significant effect on the
outcome. If flight attendants are focused on a demanding task, in
order to get them to deviate from their 'normal' role, they might
require detailed, passionate and/or persistent input from a
passenger to be persuaded that something is actually wrong.
In many cases, people will readily switch into their emergency
roles. However, the power of their normal roles can still exert an
influence. For example, a flight attendant may attend to the needs
of 'her' passenger section, ignoring the plight of others in a
different section, out of habit.
The effect of the pilots' routine roles also contains the inertia
to extend into their response in emergencies - even if this is
potentially damaging. For example deferring to a flight attendant's
assigned role, as opposed to intervening by personally directing a
passenger to safety. This is especially true if they do not have
the benefit of proper and adequate integrated crew
training.
A major difference between passengers and the flight crew is that,
passengers need to be informed as to their roles in an emergency,
whereas the crew must be very clear as to theirs; in normal and
emergency situations. Flight crews are assigned the safety
obligations and expectations, reinforced by accountability.
Ideally the crew professional training and responsibility contains
a well-defined and effective breakdown of duties. Only then can the
crew be certain as to which role and associated set of rules to
adopt when coping with the realities of passenger management during
an emergency.
PASSENGER MANAGEMENT
No two groups of passengers are exactly the same, even if they
appear to have come together for similar purposes. Charter flights
are not particularly different from public flights. In spite of
certain expected variables, a number of common problems have been
identified, with respect to passengers.
COMMUNICATION
With large numbers of passengers, some forms of communication
become retarded, becoming increasingly difficult as the numbers
increase. Simply stated, there are more people to effectively
communicate with, in the same time span.
Large groups of people diffuse communication, potentially with the
result that those receiving important information may not be in a
position to act on it. For example, in a panic evacuation,
instructions given to those who are being crushed at the front of
the line may not be able to comply with the necessary instructions
from the passengers/crew at the back who are causing the problem,
in their rush to exit.
MOVEMENT
Larger numbers of people magnify the degree of inertia. More time
is required to get large numbers of people to begin the required
preparations and move toward safety.
Similarly, large numbers demand more time to stop moving and / or
to change direction. This is the same syndrome as the classic 'rush
hour' highway traffic, moving in the fashion of an
accordion.
DISTRACTION
Despite the obvious assumption that emergency warnings will focus
passenger attention to a maximum, there may be serious distractions
such as indications that the situation is about to evolve from a
warning environment to the onset of the actual emergency. Simply
stated, fear will block the reception of vitally important
information.
There can also be 'in-house' distractions such as hysteria or an
angry over-reaction. One of the biggest distractions will be the
leap to personal cell phones to call loved ones, the company or the
media. That particular tendency is likely to be not only
uncontrollable, but possibly dangerous, as cell phone signals are
known to generate signals of sufficient power to interfere with
navigation and warning systems. (Another 'plausible denial'
matter.)
RESPONSIBILITY
A large number of people are susceptible to confusion and
uncertainty as to who has the responsibility for decision-making.
The associated confusion and uncertainty regarding responsibility
will retard movement still further.
Once an emergency is in progress, details become vague, while
interactions become more complicated. Often, passengers and crew
may have to respond in ways which are unique, or beyond any
behavior standard they have previously imagined or experienced.
Their desired behavior, particularly their willingness to follow
crew instructions, may depend to a large extent on how confident
they are that the crew can actually cope with the
situation.
It is elementary that in order for the flight crew to cope with an
emergency, the everyday operation needs to be efficient and
effective. A crew, which does not inherently function well in
normal operations, will probably function even worse in an
emergency. It is reasonable that passengers will entertain that
same suspicion.
In situations containing role ambiguity, new and effective teamwork
will not likely appear. If communication lines are normally poor
they will probably continue to be poor. If the required normal
roles and responsibilities are not well defined, they can be
expected to continue in a similar form, in an emergency. Under such
circumstances, any patterns of confusion experienced by passengers
and crew can only be reasonably expected to intensify.
The complexity of role interaction, with the guidance provided by
procedures for passenger control should take the major issues into
account.
The instructions, help and advice given to groups should consider
the mix of passengers. The selection of 'able-bodied-assistants'
should be made to enhance the safe outcome. The competent
management of passengers will have a dramatic impact on people's
behavior and the final outcome of an emergency.
The roles and responsibilities of the pilots and cabin crew need to
be well defined in advance, understood and accepted. Whenever
possible, the individual's responsibility in an emergency should be
reasonably consistent and compatible with the roles they normally
carry out.
The visibility and importance of authority figures should never be
underestimated. The passengers receiving instructions from the crew
need, and are entitled to, confidence in the crewmembers.
The early stage of an emergency is crucial. Without constant
guidance and updating or reinforcement, people will get mentally
and emotionally 'lost' in the interim time, questioning whether
something unusual or actually threatening is happening. The
'inertia' effect of large numbers of people, and the inherent
difficulty in communicating with them, the quality and thoroughness
of early information is vital to the outcome. The passengers need
all reasonable assurances as to their safety.
All communications should contain sufficient, detailed and
obviously useful information to enable people to make a personal
commitment as to what to do, at the appropriate time. That might be
as simple as patiently waiting for the stairways and buses on the
ramp. Most importantly, if an evacuation is necessary, they need to
know the magnitude of urgency, how rapidly and by which route they
need to exit, along with a contingency plan if things don't go as
expected.
In unique circumstances, it may also become prudent to illustrate
the cockpit as a viable or primary exit route.
THE HUMAN ROLE IN EMERGENCIES
WARNING PHASE
Borrowing from an old philosophy of the Strategic Air Command,
to achieve the ultimate goal of aviation safety, it is prudent to
rely on the idea that accidents are always caused by human beings.
While exceptions exist, they are rare. By always thinking in terms
of accidents being caused, they can best be anticipated and
prevented.
Awareness is the primary element in the warning phase. The
awareness, born of professional knowledge, that a pre-existing
condition poses a threat, is the most crucial element, as disaster
is most easily prevented at the beginning of the operation.
Beyond awareness of the status quo, recognition of the significance
of any actual or probable changes (such as the weather), requires
awareness to assess the significance of such information.
Some emergencies develop quickly, totally overwhelming those
involved, giving the victims little chance to save themselves, cry
for help or issue warnings to others. Other emergencies, however,
develop over longer periods of time, with those responsible for the
safety of others having more than adequate opportunity to issue a
warning.
Warnings are inherently intended reduce the possibility of threat
and/or harm to others. Long-term warnings serve to prevent disaster
from striking unexpectedly, allowing potential victims to take any
necessary or possible actions to prevent or minimize any
consequences. In the aviation environment, the concern is expressed
in terms of "...persons or property." Even with adequate time,
alerting those who are potentially at risk can be
difficult.
Such difficulty can be simply an inability to communicate with the
affected people. The most daunting situations involve warnings,
which meet the barrier of ignorance, or the conscious unwillingness
to communicate warnings, or even to communicate information, which
can act as a resource for the formulation of warnings.
Emergencies are normally either historical or evolutionary.
Earthquakes are typical of the historical type. We can be certain
that they will occur, we can't predict their exact location, time
or magnitude. Historical emergencies are commonly referred to as
"acts of God."
Evolutionary emergencies typically have the hand of mankind
involved. The "Great San Francisco Fire" is an example. The fire
began as a major earthquake. However, earthquakes were bad for
business, so history only seems to focus on the resulting fire.
Hence sufficient business was subsequently drawn to San Francisco
in the earthquake aftermath to rebuild the city. Today, the local
residents are still faced with the uncertainty of the historically
reliable event of catastrophic earthquakes. Yet, the
victims-in-waiting are on location as volunteers. History has
yielded sufficient lessons to create planned emergency responses,
reinforced by actual drills.
In aviation, emergencies are quite similar to actual accidents;
their origins typically exist prior to the crew approaching the
aircraft itself.
If a well-qualified crew can be certain that they have a good
aircraft, good weather and sufficient fuel; the program for a safe
flight is set. That's the intended scenario; the threat enters when
any of those (or other pertinent factors) are changed. Again, the
awareness of the status quo, threat probability and accountability
make the difference.
Normally the human factor is the weak link. Aircraft are normally
well designed; crews are required to be well qualified, sufficient
fuel is mandated by regulation. Airports are required to meet
certification requirements.
Then something changes, with human beings abruptly making local
life-death decisions. The tragedy is that most such occurrences are
profit driven.
The human element is also the difference whether or not the
disaster chain of events gets broken to totally diffuse a threat.
God bless the pilot who maintains, "I'm like Woody Allen, death
doesn't bother ME; I just don't want to be there when it
happens."
Dynamic (as opposed to 'potential') emergencies are normally
evolutionary, with four phases:
* Warning
* Onset
* Reaction
* Aftermath
WARNINGS
Recognition is the key element of an emergency. Recognition can be
the historic identification of a similar circumstance, a change in
the status quo with a reflexive question or the brief illumination
of an annunciator warning light. Following the most subtle warning,
the response makes the difference. It can be an innocuous question,
"Did you see an annunciator light flash?" The other pilot may have
seen it also. If not, awareness is heightened. A change in the
sound of airflow can warn of the inadvertent and imminent
penetration of a line of thunderstorms, which was not forecast or
detected in time.
Human psychology again plays a key role in the warning phase. Even
when individuals accept the fact that something is amiss, they can
be mysteriously reluctant to address the matter, themselves. The
reasonings range from raw denial to fear of embarrassment or even
harassment.
Often, a personal history may play a key role in the warning phase
to either aggressively address the situation, or to allow it to
evolve. Imagine the thought process, "The last time I told a
copilot I thought he looked too tired to fly, I was accused of
implying that he was actually drunk. I'm not going to risk that
again. I've seen tired copilots before. We'll make it, just
fine."
Irrational fear of repercussions can be a deterrent in the warning
phase. Following a disaster, statements are commonly heard to the
effect of, "I just didn't want to be the first one to say
something." On a more local level is a similar fear concerning
being the first couple on the dance floor. However irrational, such
reactions are sufficiently historic to make them reasonably
predictable. Fear-based reactions can be expected of pilots, flight
attendants, ground staff and passengers.
Imagine a captain's frustration when a flight attendant says, "The
other two girls also think the passenger is getting too drunk.
Would you mind saying something to him?" Group denial manufactured
a safety threat - now the captain is 'put on the spot.'
Valid fear serves as a healthy warning. This form of fear could
range from mistrust in the weather forecast, known fatigue,
aircraft condition, etc.
Denial can play a deadly role with respect to the time requirement
of the situation. Many a flight deck crew has been dismayed that a
flight attendant would walk to the cockpit to personally report a
serious condition, with the interphone readily available.
Another element is the crew confidence factor. Flight attendants
often confess a serious problem uniquely being dealt with by flight
attendants, because they didn't trust the cockpit to 'get
involved.'
In sardonic humor, the story is told of a flight attendant who told
a surprised captain after the first landing of a three-day trip,
"Boy, this is obviously going to be a long trip. We used all three
fire bottles on that trash-can fire." The FAA inspector on the jump
seat beat the captain by asking, "Did you think to mention it to
the captain while it was still going on?" Three flight attendants
were reported to have been appropriately fired. Unfortunately, the
issue is not reported to have been investigated in terms of WHY
they didn't they call the cockpit. Hence, the confidence factor
still ranks highly among disaster precursors.
In another instance, the aircraft was accidentally taken off course,
past the destination city by ATC. While the passenger map display
clearly indicated that the aircraft had passed the intended destination
and was obviously off its intended course, the flight attendants said
nothing. Only the pilots were unaware of their actual situation.
EMERGENCY ONSET
Once an emergency is in progress, three elements play a role. The
first is the magnitude of threat, with an associated probability of
disaster. The second is the compounding of events to potentially
guarantee disaster. The third element is composed of the resources
to extricate those involved from the emergency.
RESPONSE
When a situation is clearly an the emergency, the people involved
may react in denial, reluctant to accept or communicate the fact
that a threat actually exists. Someone responsible might detect the
threat, but keep silent to protect their job. The initial response
can dangerously slow. The underlying reasons for such a reaction
are usually discovered to be complex, many and also varied. The
response to threat is most often deeply ingrained in either the
individual or the culture, whether it is trade, corporate sociology
or even gender based. Such factors typically exist in the core of
the individuals everyday life, but certainly before the flight
begins. For example, a mechanic might dismiss a captain's concern
over a mechanical issue, discounting the complaint in the light of,
"another crybaby pilot."
There are also those, for example, who automatically accept risk as
an expected element. These individuals are often the potential
crisis-recovery leaders. This group of individuals often accepts
the element of risk on the assumption that everyone else appears to
accept it. The risk then takes on the aura of being 'acceptable.'
Obviously, that can be unhealthy, to an extreme.
Often such individuals are mentally and emotionally well prepared
for any crisis. Typically, these people have a family history which
leaves them so well prepared to accept and deal with crisis, that
they give little thought to danger, without evaluating the risk
potential in each flight situation. These individuals also carry
the liability of being too willing to accept instigating factors,
which later lead to a problem, such as an intoxicated passenger,
for example. Risk tolerance is typical of those with a military
background.
Another group of individuals, however, may be pre-disposed to deny
that either risk or an actual threat exists. Such denial is often
a very powerful sub-conscious psychological mechanism, which can be
extremely difficult to overcome. The attitudes expressed by such
individuals can have a negative 'contagious' effect, adversely
swaying the concerns of those whom might otherwise be predisposed
to threat alertness.
The magnitude of such denial can also express itself in a
counter-productive 'salesmanship,' during a crisis. The strength of
the associated statements can be inherently dangerous. A smoke
alarm might induce a flight attendant to assert, "Don't worry about
it, it's probably somebody smoking 'pot' in the lav. I've seen this
before." As a consequence, a critical response with an accompanying
call to the cockpit is delayed.
The combination of acceptance and denial can create serious
problems for the pilots and the entire crew. Passengers again play
a key role. For example, during a normal flight, some passengers
might study the safety cards, listen to the safety briefing 'rules'
and in general, pay attention to any printed notices.
Conversely another group of passengers methodically might not.
(Studies suggest that approximately 50% don't study the safety
cards to any degree.) Neither of the groups may be particularly
motivated in their personality 'style.' One group may have simply
accepted the risks involved with something of a passing interest in
them, while the second group desperately doesn't care to be advised
or reminded of the risks.
Should it come to an actual emergency, the risk-accepting group may
be quicker to identify problems, taking any warnings seriously,
while also being well prepared to appropriately act. Conversely,
the second group may have prepared themselves to deny any risk and
be subsequently slower to react, endangering themselves and
others.
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Whether one cares to discuss crew or passengers, the underlying
factors influencing their behavior MUST be considered. In general,
the first reaction to a warning is statistically often not the
desired reaction, rather a defensive avoidance of the possibility
of threat. The individual typically generates a disbelief which
interferes with the requirement for action. When that happens,
appropriate decisions often get transferred to others.
Add the psychological denial of danger to the fear of
embarrassment. If the individual is at risk of being seen to
over-react, the combination can easily result in the conversion of
a problem into an emergency; brewing a disaster. Such is the
particular risk if any warnings are in any way unclear, ambiguous
or perceived to be so. Regardless of the influencing factors, a
mistaken belief in the magnitude of the situation can be very
deadly.
When a warning is perceived in its true sense, the outcome of a
situation will depend on a list of factors. Will the situation be
perceived as to its magnitude? Is the warning clear as to its exact
nature? Will appropriate action be taken? These questions depend on
several factors -
CREDIBILITY
Any obvious signs of authenticity, authority, as well as any known
experience and/or expertise, will lend credibility to a warning.
Crewmembers and passengers are likely to believe someone who is
normally expected to have the best information on the situation.
Ground staff is to be included in this concept.
COMMUNICATION AND CONTENT
The actual delivery, the means and tone by which the message is
delivered, to whom and by whom are important factors. Any authority
gives a message the element of credibility; ambiguity must be
avoided, so as to preclude confusion and / or denial. In one
disaster, the junior flight attendant delivered the message that
they had smoke in the lavatory to the copilot. The message should
have been delivered to the captain, describing "billowing" smoke.
AGE DIFFERENCE
Young people are often more likely to quickly respond to warnings
than their older counterparts. Older people often take past
experiences as an 'immortality license,' being more confident in
all situations and less willing to react quickly. That statement
should not be taken in the fashion of discounting age and
experience. A young, freshly trained pilot might be willing to
quickly shut down an engine - 'per the book.' The older pilot might
delay such a situation, saying, "It's not on fire and it's packing
it's own weight." Hence, age related experience can pays a
significant dividend.
LOCAL SOCIOLOGY
'Isolated' individuals or even those working with peers or work
groups containing an acceptance-approval social 'mechanism' may be
slower to react to warnings and be less likely to illuminate
danger. For example, a single female working with two male flight
attendants.
FAMILY / FRIENDS
Overall, families and groups of friends tend to heed warnings and
take situations more seriously. Out of habit, they tend to be more
trusting, stay together; looking out for each other's interest,
while being more willing to rely on each other for appropriate
advice.
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
People tend to observe others, interpreting others' response as an
indicator as to the exact nature and seriousness of the current
reality. One can imagine the effect of an obviously frightened
captain,
LOCATION AND FAMILIARITY
In familiar locations and situations, people tend to better
interpret warnings. In unfamiliar locations or in unusual
circumstances, it may be more difficult to get individuals to
accept the seriousness of the warning and get them prepared to act;
'denial' re-enters.
TIMING OF THE WARNING
At night it is more difficult to heighten awareness and to effect
a physical response. As a consequence, greater voice volume,
stronger wording and emphasis might be required in such
circumstances.
INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE / CONVICTION
Whether crew or passengers, the 'adaptive' response - people
immediately heeding warnings - is increased with either personal
knowledge or a known history of a recent or similar emergency;
certainly personal experience will contribute to such a
situation.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
People, in general, usually seek more information to support their
individual perception; whether with the intent of either
recognition or denial. Valid and supporting information typically
effects sensible responses during the warning stage of an
emergency.
DECISION MAKING FACTORS
Reaction to events is normally based on the individual's faith in
the presented information. There is the inherent risk that an
individual could irrationally decide that since emergencies are
rare, there isn't one. A correct diagnosis requires a combination
of indicators to aid the decision-making process.
WARNING STYLE
The direct warning conveyance, such as a cockpit warning light or
the odor of acrid smoke in the cabin will produce a decided
conclusion. A radio warning, such as a known in-flight threat
received from the ground staff will likely be taken very
seriously.
RESPONSE OF OTHERS
People will look to the response of other people for a personal
cue. If a crewmember is not taking the information seriously, the
passengers not likely do so. Conversely, a frightened reaction with
supporting information may induce over-reaction.
SPECIFIC MESSAGE AND STYLE
If a clear and serious message is delivered with conviction, but
with a calming style; others will appropriately respond. If a
captain advises the crew, "Dispatch just sent us a weather update.
We have terrific headwinds ahead, so we'll do a short divert and
get more fuel," the crew is likely to respond in a calm manner.
CONSENSUS
Passenger reaction is also a major consideration. People will
process whatever information is given by the crew. Passengers tend
to do this in small groups, especially family, peer groups or
individuals of identifiable equal social status. With the message
above, a family group may set the overall mood with a loud response
such as, "Well, at least we'll still make happy-hour!"
PRESENCE OR APPEARANCE OF CREW
The unexpected presence of a pilot or a clear authority figure will
modify passengers' views of the current situation. For example, a
flight attendant's request for assistance of a deadheading captain
or a uniformed serviceman will lend credibility to the situation's
seriousness.
UNEXPECTED CHANGES
Even if the changes are not directly related to the emergency, any
unexpected changes, such as a significant course change or a
significant change in engine power will have a direct influence on
the cabin crew and passengers.
PHYSICAL INDICATORS / EVIDENCE
Crew or passengers will be alert for noise, radical aircraft
motion, smoke and heat. Surprisingly, smoke alone is often taken as
an ambiguous warning, especially if it is light colored or low in
odor. Crew and passengers may fail to respond if presented with
only one indicator.
CREW INSTRUCTIONS
The physical presence of crewmembers issuing guidance and
directions prompts most people to take warnings seriously. This
includes crewmembers themselves. If the instructions appear to
originate from an established safety procedure or drill, they will
likely receive due attention.
RESISTANCE TO REALITY
Despite multiple indicators, there are those who can persist in
their denial for extended periods of time, refusing to believe that
a situation is, in fact, serious.
Researchers have used historic disaster models to derive a
rudimentary mathematical probability of group response. Researchers
have attempted to get an idea as to what percentage of involved
people might readily accept the idea or fact that something is
wrong, as opposed to how many might deny it. While it is impossible
to make accurate predictions, the result was a least one
'acceptance model' which attempts to predict peoples' reactions to
the first signs of crisis.
According to one such behavioral model:
* 10% of the group might immediately accept the reality of danger,
while mentally and emotionally preparing to take action.
* 30% might be doubtful; possibly curious, and investigate the
situation further.
* 60% might deny, ignore or even neglect highly obvious warning
signals!
Thus, the clear mandate is for early and effective warnings and
leadership.
MAXIMIZING WARNINGS
Logic aside, it is a serious mistake to assume that warnings are
clear. In the case of PA deliveries, it should not be assumed that
everyone has heard and understood previous announcements and are
certain how to react. Warnings and instructions should be given by
the appropriate crewmember as soon as the emergency information
becomes specific. Whether the instructions are intended for crew or
passengers, the instructions should be followed. Later, these will
need reinforcement.
The pertinent instructions should be made by those perceived as
being in authority, trustworthy, and in a manner which inspires
confidence. They should also be specific in their content,
containing pertinent information known to be, or likely to be,
accurate and reliable.
The instructions should also:
* Clearly define what is to be expected and when events will
occur.
* Neither under-estimate nor over-estimate the threat.
* Give the appropriate courses of action, citing their
appropriateness and intended outcome.
* Be made on as personal a level as possible.
* Be in terminology and in the language understandable to the
recipients.
* Be repeated as frequently as possible with short periods in
between, so as to reinforce the required response.
* Never refer to similar or familiar events.
* Not include unnecessary, distracting or other unrelated
information, delivered in any lapses between updates.
* Most importantly, effect acceptance of the situation and create
appropriate crew and passenger commitment to action.
In the background of communication is an industry social norm
that the cockpit is typically not advised of a failed or extremely
low PA volume made by the pilots. Often, flight attendants simply
place no value in the routine cockpit "welcome aboard" PA. As a
consequence of the apathy toward the cockpit, the value of the
cockpit PA capability in an emergency is overlooked. Thus, crew
awareness must be maintained as to the PA effectiveness, with the
mandate that an appropriate advisory is made to the cockpit.
Conversely, the pilots should solicit information as to the
adequacy of the cockpit PA.
The safety PAs from the cockpit should be 'dedicated,' so that
there are no interruptions by unnecessary distractions, such as
normal ATC communication.
If the warning phase becomes prolonged, without updated
information, guidance and instruction, the crew or passengers may
develop a high level of uncertainty and possibly a dangerous level
of anxiety. At one extreme, there will be those who patiently wait,
while mentally and emotionally preparing themselves. That group
also presents the possibility of badly delayed action or inaction
in the end. At the other extreme, uncertainty, tension and fear may
increase to a dangerous level, causing individual anxiety or
panic.
Safety demands early, accurate and clear information, with regard
to crew and passengers. Quality information dictates the success of
each phase of an emergency, if the information is provided in an
effective manner.
Despite the known data pertaining to effective management of
personnel, it is an unfortunate fact of life that emergency
procedures prescribed by some cultures and organizations (such as
corporations) prefer to delay warnings, thus creating an
independant problem. The concern is obviously PR and panic
avoidance; however, it must be acknowledged that surprise warnings
are famous for producing the unwanted panic.
EMERGENCY ONSET
RESPONSE
The onset phase of an emergency implies that the warning signs,
alerts and alarms have been seen, heard and accepted; it is clearly
understood that the threat is real. The term 'onset' can mean
either the realization that an emergency situation really exists or
the actual immediate time frame when the disaster strikes. In
addition to the peaked urgency and requirement for immediate action
by the passengers and crew, the onset can also bring immediate
injury or death. For example an uncontained engine failure can hurl
fan blades into the passenger cabin, causing serious injuries and
damage; while marking the beginning of an extended emergency, as a
consequence.
The onset period may not have any significant warning and last only
seconds. Perhaps it is the ideal 'planned emergency,' lasting from
warning to onset as much as an hour or more.
During the onset phase, people must recognize and accept the nature
and magnitude of the threat, acting appropriately if a potential
disaster is to be averted. If there is a prolonged waiting period,
the time interval can be a very difficult task for people to deal
with.
As an example, a crash or relatively simple emergency landing
evolving into an external fire might result in a delayed
evacuation. A wind condition might blow smoke on one side of the
aircraft, creating the illusion that the fire is on the same side,
when in fact the smoky side is the only viable escape route. Until
the actual threat is ascertained, waiting might be the only
acceptable option.
However short or long the onset period lasts, the most valuable
time is often lost in this phase. Even when people have accepted
the urgency of an emergency in progress, there is a certain risk
that they might resist an appropriate course of action. The
wind/smoke scenario is such an example. Being directed to evacuate
into the smoke may create a panicked response, leading to the wrong
reaction (delay), ultimately leading to a disaster.
The onset phase, along with the warning phase, requires the
passengers and crew to accurately detect changes, collect any
relevant information, interpret that information and evaluate it,
so as to make decisions. Individual perceptions may result in the
same information and warnings yielding convoluted understandings of
the situation. Hence the individual's responses may differ once
they have actually accepted the warnings.
The human response will be strongly influenced by the subjective
interpretation of the situation. The response during an imminent
disaster will be dictated by the actual ability or perception of
the passengers' and crew's ability to cope with the immediate
demands placed upon them, and upon those close to them. With time
available, support and assistance of ground staff is likewise a
factor.
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE
The onset period, however brief, is the juncture of the physical
and psychological aspects of the emergency. Here, the magnitude and
urgency of the reality is discovered. In extremes, imminent threat
or an actual catastrophic event will cause individuals to
experience a broad range of emotions and subsequent reactions.
The Emotions include:
* The effect of shock and a sense of total helplessness. This could
be the dominating effect - regardless of whether or not there has
been any significant period of anticipation and any
preparedness.
* A reaction of numbness, a sense of unreality - accompanied by
fear - with the result that the individual or group is easily
influenced, even to take highly inappropriate action.
* Confusion from a lack of meaningful understanding as to the cause
of the emotional and physical upheaval in their immediate
environment. In turn, this can interfere with their attempts to
identify, interpret and understand what is actually happening.
* Sense of 'injustice.'
* A 'flattening' of emotions, in an attempt to protect themselves
against any more emotional stimulation (overload), further
decreasing their willingness or ability to appropriately
respond.
* A sense of lethargy as the passengers or crew come to believe or
feel that there is little, if anything, they can do to improve
their situation.
* An illusion of 'isolation / abandonment,' causing individuals to
behave as if they are the only ones affected by the events. How
they perceive the situation and how they react can inevitably cause
the individual to become very focused on themselves, to the
exclusion of the welfare of others. Such individuals can become a
threat to others. A common image is the panicked person in the
water, using another individual as a piece of driftwood,
potentially drowning them, in order to ensure their own
survival.
* An overpowering awareness of their frailty, against the sudden
and dramatic impact of massive physical forces which may remove
their sense of personal control, thus dominating their sensory
perception - often with panic resulting.
To indulge in greater detail, the emotional experiences and
reactions have been studied in-depth. Various studies have divided
reactions into five basic categories:
INCREASED EXCITEMENT
An increased excitement and the associated focus lead to extremes
of thoughts. Feelings and fears of dying may become
intense.
The element of survival may become an intense focus with the
affected individuals concentrating on their personal and family
protection.
An intense concern for those for whom the individual has, or
assumes, a primary responsibility may often surpass the
individual's self-concern, particularly if the bonds are intense or
a self-imposed responsibility exists. For example, a passenger
electing to assume responsibility for an unaccompanied child or an
elderly person.
In most cases, people often manage to gain control of their fears,
so that they seem to assist the survival of others - a welcome fact
to be put to good use by those tasked with managing them.
FEAR - Defined
Fear should be expected to be the dominant, rational and an
appropriate response to any emergency situation.
Whether rational or unrealistic, fear produces a racing heart, dry
mouth and a narrowing of attention. These are automatic reactions
and a necessary part of the stress response in preparation for the
classic 'fight or flight' decision / action.
Often, the individual experiences irrational fears, consciously and
subconsciously. These become superimposed on realistic fears. These
fears produces the expectation of loss, injury, suffering and
death.
The human mind will emotionally cycle during a crisis. It is very
difficult to estimate the frequency of the emotional cycles
containing fear. Survival produces predictable emotional
self-protection reactions. A typical reaction is that people
experience the irrational element of shame, consequently denying
the natural emotions. Physical or mental activities, of any kind,
help to combat irrational fears.
With proper leadership, the element of fear can be significantly
controlled by the accurate portrayal of the reality.
SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS
A person may be confronted by their own ineffectiveness,
experiencing a sense of vulnerability or possibly frailty. This is
especially true if the emergency contains obvious powerful forces,
producing that fear. Often that reaction comes from a previous
life-threatening experience.
Fear naturally leads to a sense of helplessness. Without an
apparent and viable solution, the fear can feed upon itself in a
vicious cycle producing a high level of anxiety, potentially to a
debilitating degree.
The feelings of helplessness evoke a subconscious control
mechanism, triggering the irrational element of shame.
Subconsciously the potential victim attempts to understand or gain
control of the situation. It's likely that the elements of
frustration and anger/rage will be directed toward other passengers
and the crew - but the underlying feeling of helplessness can be
expected to dominate.
The sense of helplessness will be compounded if the suspicion of
physical entrapment is probable as an eventual reality. Often,
survival is irrationally assumed to be unlikely. Consequently,
reassurance from the crew is essential to the degree that it is a
vital factor in combating the fear syndrome. The needed message is,
"You are not helpless, your assistance will be needed. We will be
out of this situation soon." The passenger - even the crew - needs
the sense of empowerment.
SENSE OF ABANDONMENT
In emergencies, all 'normal' or 'reasonable' certainties may seem
to vanish. The key element will be the existing feelings of trust,
based on any previously held trust of the company, aircraft and the
crew.
Anyone who senses themselves as being isolated - rationally or
irrationally - will likely experience the feeling of alienation and
loneliness. Often this is fed by previous experiences and
historical feelings of abandonment in those events. There may be a
subconscious argument to the effect of, "It's happening again!"
Familiar assumptions can be expected to produce familiar
emotions.
The sense of abandonment can be a powerful and dangerous element in
an emergency. The result being that the sense of abandonment
compounds any other feelings of helplessness.
Children separated from their parents, particularly the
unaccompanied minor, are likely to be strongly affected by the
missing familiar protective influence. They can be expected to fear
abandonment. If possible, they need to be reunited with a family
member at the earliest possible opportunity. In the case of the
unaccompanied minor, a surrogate parent will be needed, whether a
flight attendant or a passenger.
SHAME
In human psychology, the element of 'shame' plays an intriguing
role. A self-imposed subconscious arguments assert such positions
as, "I should have done X. I didn't; so therefore, I'm being
punished."
To be brief, the irrational subconscious argument is essentially
two-fold:
1. "I know I deserve this; therefore I can accept it." - illusion
of acceptance
2. "I'm responsible for this, so if I do better, this will change."
- illusion of control
The important factor being that acceptance of a threatening
situation won't provide any positive outcome. Those who decide to
"...go down fighting to the bitter end.." are obviously the
individuals needed in an emergency.
DESPERATION FOR RELIEF
The desperation will likely be intense, normally growing with the
duration of the emergency. Survival instinct will focus on the
desired relief / rescue / safety in the manner of a preoccupation.
The associated thoughts and yearnings will often revolve around
feelings of guilt, possibly remorse. Many people focus their
thoughts on lost opportunities, ranging from adventures to saying
"goodbye" or "I love you" to their family.
A highly typical human response is a reappraisal of personal values
and realigned intentions for their future. Most are familiar with
this focus, whether from personal experience or the theme of a
Hollywood movie.
The desperation factor also carries the risk of passengers deciding
to 'self-medicate' with alcohol or, possibly, drugs.
If an emergency is prolonged, the majority of the passengers and
crew will maintain their focus on an escape from the danger or
being rescued. In the human experience, some may become overwhelmed
by the anxiety and give up, wishing for death, as an escape. Thus,
it is vitally important that effective reassurance be given that
the action being taken is appropriate, complete and that it will be
successful.
Depending on the complexity and severity of the event, the material
above is focused on the passenger experience. However, of vital
importance is the expected experience of the crew?
CREW EXPERIENCE
The crew experiences will be different. In the acceptance of their
job, the crew will have assessed the risks to a high degree and
will have been specifically trained to deal with them. In a
sentence, the crew will have a certain degree of expectation of
emergencies actually occuring; being better prepared, mentally
and emotionally, for an emergency.
Actual reports from crewmembers vary, but often have common
statements or 'themes.' What is clear is that crewmembers also
experience a traumatic mental and emotional struggle. The following
statements are relatively common and serve as a good descriptor of
the trauma in an emergency:
"'I just couldn't think; my mind seemed to go blank."
"Someone had to remind me what to do next."
"'I had difficulty catching my breath. There were moments that I
had to tell myself to breathe."
"I couldn't remember where I was. I kept forgetting what I was
supposed to do next."
"'I felt as though we were suspended in time."
"I just kept thinking about my family."
Such examples indicate not only the rising stress levels, but also
their impairing effect on the ability of the crew to properly
function. The required effectiveness of the crew can equally be in
danger of being undermined by stress.
ANXIETY, STRESS & RESPONSE
Breaks in any normal routines and expectations, particularly those
directly conflicting or unusual circumstances, produce some degree
of stress; imagine even a minor degree of
road-rage. In an emergency, the magnitude of stress that crew
members experience, and whether it will have either positive or
negative effects, will partly be a function of the conviction each
individual maintains as to how serious they perceive the emergency
being, or is probable to become.
A key element is the crewmember's conviction as to their personal
ability to meet the demands of the emergency. Equally important is
the crewmember's conviction as to the crews' collective ability to
deal with the emergency. There is the risk that if the individual
crewmember becomes convinced that the demands are too great, and /
or the crews ability to cope is inadequate, the stress levels can
reach an overwhelming magnitude, even if only temporarily. A
continuing electrical fire is an example of this.
Stress remains a complex issue, poorly understood and highly
debated among researchers. However, the history of actual reactions
to stressful situations leave a trail of indicators which can be
considered fairly basic and common, to a reasonably predictable
degree.
Normal operational workload leaves pilots keenly 'in tune' with the
aircraft operation. To a large degree, that leaves the pilots both
physically, emotionally and mentally predisposed to cope with an
emergency. During their normal duties, the pilots are very close to
the desired 'optimum performance level.' In the normal operational
environment, an emergency isn't likely to require a radical shift
of thought process, allowing a certain 'ease' in deciding when and
where to focus their attention.
Within the individual situation, each crewmember's effectiveness
will be subject to the same responses as the passengers, including excitation,
anxiety, fear, bewilderment, feelings of helplessness, and depression. The more
negative aspects of anxiety / stress response are the inability to accept support
and the resistance to the open expression of fear. These factors can be further
aggravated by such factors as pain, body position, distraction and noise. Pilots
will be subject to their unique factors such as actual or perceived status,
accountability, confidence, time pressure and fatigue effects.
The effect of anxiety and stress can be expected to interfere in an abnormal / emergency
situation by reducing the crews' capacity to understand and recall information. Thus,
the crew can be generally anticipated to experience problems in processing information,
affecting their capacity to correctly understand and, thus, to effectively comply with
appropriate instructions, and, consequently, to comply with safety measures such as
checklists and standard operating procedures. Further, anxiety and stress will probably
reduce the crews’ intuitive abilities to deal with unanticipated conditions and situations.
However, it is also important to recognize the history of desperation having also
effected brilliant solutions under stress.
Given the potential debilitating effect of anxiety and stress on flight crewmembers,
it is obvious that stress and anxiety should be anticipated and alleviated as far as
is humanly possible. Accident history leaves a lethal legacy in the form of a mandate
for dynamic prevention, as opposed to operational rationalization.
OPTIONS AND DECISIONS
An emergency increases the demands placed on the pilots.
Accordingly, the neurological system can accommodate such
situations by producing the required hormones for the production of
physical and mental energy. Thus, the pilots, in particular are
better prepared for the classic 'fight-or-flight' response.
However, the neurological response is not exclusively the 'magic
pill.' The subsequent excitation levels can potentially exceed
desired limits with negative impact on the management of the
emergency.
There is a certain amount of risk that the demands of an emergency
can result in
over-excitation. The individual's ability to function effectively
can subsequently decline, perhaps only temporarily. Thus, it is
also important to be aware of the limits of the human response. It
is important to anticipate a normal/typical response under stress,
recognizing when one's own stress response (as well as that of
others) is having an adverse impact. Throughout an emergency,
effective performance is essential. Gaining or maintaining that
performance level is a key element of coping with the situation, in
general.
Anxiety presents itself in a complex manner, requiring anticipation, recognition
and management on the personal, physiological and behavioral level. Anxiety is not
to be treated as a uniquely negative experience, as anxiety is also the key to the
timely anticipation of threat.
The personal anxiety level is the peak of the term, ‘subjective.’ Thus, honest and
clear self-assessment is required to defeat the obvious effects. Education and
self-awareness are required to achieve the desired outcome. The individual has to
be alert to such subjective symptoms as apprehension and fear, ‘dry-mouth,’ muscle
tension, trembling and dizziness.
Of particular note is the difference between the ‘typical’ anxiety level of the
individual, versus that experienced in the immediate abnormal / emergency situation.
This includes a history-based assessment. Such an assessment is required to
establish the real-time attitude, hopefully such as, “I’ve been through worse,
we’re going to be okay.”
In that same sense, the individual needs to be cognizant of effective ‘gut feelings’
expressing themselves as anxiety. Such experience leads to such mental or verbal
statements as, “I’ve got a bad feeling about this.” In consequence of such healthy
responses to anxiety, additional factors may be discovered, leading to a safe outcome.
There is a broad range of differences between individuals responding to anxiety.
There are those who ‘shine’ in emergencies, while there will be those who are normally
‘cool’ but who are incapacitated by the anxiety and fear in an actual emergency.
It is important to be alert for the obvious adverse indicators of
stress, both in the individual and in others.
In an emergency, the effects of stress can be put into four general
areas:
PHYSIOLOGICAL
These are normally short-term effects, which include: dry-mouth,
sweating, increased heart rate, difficulty or irregularity of
breathing. The psychological effects are also seen in the
associated cognitive processes, including concentration difficulty,
confusion and/or forgetfulness, the inability to prioritize or make
timely decisions, difficulty in transitioning between
tasks.
The physiological effects of anxiety and stress are typically viewed in the confines
of the parameters of heart rate, respiration rate, blood pressure and skin condition
(color / sweating).
EMOTIONAL
These include fear, anxiety and a sense of being helpless,
aggression, apathy, tension and irritability.
These effects should be considered 'normal.' For short periods of
time, they need not cause concern. Conversely, they serve as an
indicator that the 'healthy' "fight-or-flight response has been
activated; the individual is in the process of preparing themselves
for the impending extraordinary action.
However, it is important that crew members recognize the reality,
if their own, and others', reactions to the situation are effecting
danger or interfering with their basic ability to cope with the
situation or manage it.
In the absence of extremes, the individuals can then take a few
simple, but effective, steps to get back on an even keel.
A basic understanding of the progression of the impairment process,
however temporary is essential.
1. Acceptance that an emergency exists.
2. Nervous system activity is triggered.
3. Breathing accelerates, becoming more shallow.
4. Muscles tense with the excitation level increase.
5. Information gathering, comprehension and decision making is
impaired.
6. General performance begins to decline.
The obvious requirement is to counter any such effects, restoring
as much balance as possible, so as to return heart rate and blood
pressure to near-optimum levels. As the excitation level drops to
a magnitude near the normal level, energy is conserved, with coping
skills becoming enhanced.
On a personal level, an easy method to restore balance is to
consciously and deliberately slow down the rate of breathing,
taking normal to deep breaths. This requires the conscious tensing
of the related muscles, holding the tension for a few seconds, and
then releasing the tension. The controlled holding of the breath
and slowly and consciously relaxing the muscles leads to a
resumption of normal breathing - as well as other important
functions.
If these adverse symptoms are observed in others, encouraging them
to use the technique, as appropriate, can be effective. The tone of
voice will be important, "Hey chief, do me a favor & just hold your
breath for a second - now let it out. Do that again a couple of
more times." "Feel better now?" The impact that someone else is
aware of the individual's plight and cares enough to provide any
element of relief, while protecting the individual's dignity can be
a terrific boost.
BEHAVIORAL
The more typical and obvious indicators include: trembling,
restlessness or impulsive behavior, excitability or nervous
laughing, performance of 'rituals,' such as tightening and
straightening a tie, perhaps combing one's hair, extended time
taken to accomplish routine or simple tasks.
The behavioral effects of anxiety and stress are expressed in the form of sweating,
cold hands, tremor, rapid speech, voice pitch increase, as well as functional effects
in the form of forgetfulness, fumbling, oversight and avoidance.
It is obvious that imminent threat in an emergency can be
frightening for all, especially if the accident is expected to be
violent or fire is anticipated. The faith in the crew's training,
knowledge and experience provides some sense of protection,
enabling them to cope with the stress of an emergency, allowing
them to keep their emotions under some degree of control.
COMMUNICATION IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The proper management of crew anxiety and stress is a vital part
of effective Cockpit Resource Management. In particular, the function
of communication changes during high anxiety and stress situations.
The expected set of events during an abnormal, or an emergency,
anticipates the very worst of problems to present themselves one
at a time. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Further,
training curriculums typically prohibit ‘compound emergencies.’
Thus, the flightline reality often catches the flight crew short
on resources, while demanding the highest standard of strategy and
communication skills.
A pilot typically expects reasonable changes such as bad weather, low
fuel, go-around, diversion to the alternate or rather simple technical
problems. Even with these events as being deemed, ‘reasonable,’ there
is still a difference in reaction between experienced pilots and less
experienced crews, within these ‘reasonable’ changes. Obviously, this
divergence increases in the event of abnormal or emergency conditions.
Effective communication between the pilots and the cabin crew in an abnormal
situation or a bone fide emergency requires fast paced and dynamic
communication skills. Unfortunately, these skills most often come with
experience, as the industry does not place an emphasis on ‘human factors’
during the course of an emergency. Again, unfortunately, communication
during an actual emergency has a higher probability of breaking down, as
opposed to being enhanced. An actual emergency scenario will typically
contain samplings of breakdowns and enhancements, as well as intuition.
Emergency communication skills can and should be taught, but they rarely
are. Crew humanity is not factored, thus, most actual emergencies depend
on the best skills the individual crewmember can muster in the actual
scenario. It should be noted that listening skills are equally as important
as verbal skills. Emergency communication skills are ideally taught, but
are more often an improvisation or unique abilities of an individual.
The frequency of abnormal situations and emergencies demand that the desired
communication skills be developed through a curriculum of drills involving
classroom delivery on theory and research, practice, and instructor analysis
and guidance. Most importantly, attitudes toward emergencies should be developed,
embodying philosophies as, “The only ‘dumb’ question is the one which is not asked.”
Anxiety and stress affect performance and communication in their effect on
attention-span and the ability to acquire, recall and process information. Performance
and communication are hampered by the production of irrelevant thoughts, reducing the
‘working’ memory. Anxiety and stress can also increase the required amount of effort
required to maintain the ‘normal’ performance levels associated with typical low-stress
conditions.
Anxiety and stress have a particularly negative effect on crew communication. The
associated effects are necessary to anticipate, recognize and manage within the
individual and the crew. In concert with such management is required the attitude
of, “It’s not ‘wrong;’ it’s being ‘human.’”
Although CRM training, including communication skills, is supposed to involve both
pilots and flight attendants, history teaches that the pragmatic effect has been
negated by the non-application and reinforcement in the actual flight line experience.
The dynamics of emergency scenario communication are affected by a long list of
‘human factors,’ such as individual personality and personality conflict,
experience, seniority, gender, age and ethnicity.
From a captain’s position, there are several particular communication mandates:
* Anticipation, recognition and empathy with the crews' fear and anxiety.
* A demonstrated respect for the crewmembers’ competence and identity.
* Avoidance of any discounting statements or behaviors.
* An overt indication of empathy and caring for the crewmember’s
personal experience, including their immediate situation and associated problems.
* Honest and realistic assessment and assurances expressed to the crew, as opposed to
false reassurances or stark reality presentations, whether actual or exaggerated.
* Verbal and non-verbal responses which enhance crew synergy.
PASSENGER RESPONSE
In the case of the passengers, the difficulties become
amplified. With precious little preparation, they must be expected
to accept the threat in terms of their own mortality and make
radical attitude and behavior changes in a small span of time.
Risk evaluation is extremely difficult for some people under any
circumstances. The typical violence of aircraft accidents becomes
the epitome of chaos and confusion, compounded by the fire threat.
It is vitally important that the crew takes charge quickly,
preparing and effecting a constructive attitude and reaction at the
first signal or (forceful) request.
Research only tells us that the complexity of human behavior defies
a reliable mathematical model, permitting reasonable
predictability.
Yet, statistics do offer a small degree of predictability -
Depending on the intensity/chaos of the situation, it is possible
to identify three probable statistical groups:
60% may do very little, they may even engage in inappropriate
behaviors, while awaiting trusted guidance.
25% may act rationally, perhaps attending to the threat or
preparing their next move; they may provide warning, comfort or
guidance to others.
15% may become immobile or even totally paralyzed at the actual or
perceived seriousness of the situation.
INITIATIVE OF OTHERS
Those who strictly await the initiative of others sense their own
limitations, trusting in the notion that others will have the
necessary solution. It is a serious mistake to make assumptions as
to why people become relatively immobilized. Passengers, in
particular, will be affected by a broad range of experiences. The
immobility can range from a strange sense of dignity or discipline
to irrational fear if the next step is taken.
One group of passengers might need only clear directions to take
action. Another might need some sort of 'proof' that the next step
is necessary AND prudent. The second group might need forceful
guidance or physical assistance.
Studies suggest that if passengers trust the quality of information
they receive they are much more likely to react favorably.
Conversely, if they encounter difficulty in obtaining the needed
information, they may quickly become angered, aggressive and
difficult to manage.
Despite standard procedures, the crew can expect the requirement to
make necessary situational judgments to deal with passengers on an
interpersonal level, so as to achieve the desired effect.
There will be those passengers who simply want to be told what to;
they will then immediately comply.
SHOCK EFFECT
In general, time distortion is common among passengers involved in
an emergency, it is common to find little or no agreement of the
crisis duration following an emergency. Similarly, passengers have
difficulty remembering details in general. They may not be able to
cite their own address or phone number. These passengers (and crew)
are the ones in the greatest need of firm guidance and
assistance.
The same behavior will be seen in those who have been drinking.
Alcohol may cause some to become inhibited and sleepy, while others
become excited with their control over emotions diminished. Whether
they require waking, calming or direct orders is something which
can only be judged at the time.
In an aircraft accident, normally fire is the immediate threat.
However, history teaches an important lesson, panic is far less a
major concern, as opposed to inaction or inappropriate actions.
CATATONIA
Catatonia is more than instantaneous disbelief or 'freezing in
place.' It can be a
'shutting-down' process; a form of mental, emotional or even
physical escape. Some passengers may appear to be stunned, being
unable to communicate or express any feelings or emotions, in spite
of obvious signs of sweating, trembling or even nausea. Depending
on the nature and phase of the emergency, some may experience
tunnel vision, impaired hearing and impaired reasoning. Even with
the realization of imminent threat of injury or death, they may be
immobilized or react slowly; almost automatically. For these
passengers, their sense of time is often radically disrupted, in a
'Limbo' effect. There is also the possibility of the individual
fainting into unconsciousness, however briefly.
RATIONAL RESPONSE
The estimated 25% who can be reasonably expected to act rationally
are sometimes referred to as being, 'cool heads'. These individuals
appear calm; they collect their thoughts quickly. Their situational
awareness is intact; their judgment and reasoning are sound. These
individuals assess the situation correctly, make a plan and act
appropriately.
Within reason, this group can be divided into three statistical
ranges:
5% can be expected to act of their own initiative in the emergency.
They will be the ones who will make an attempt to fight a fire if
one is present, or prevent cabin flooding in a ditching
scenario.
10% can be expected to instruct or assist others.
10% can be expected to attempt to aggressively look after
themselves and may, for example, move towards any exit or safe
area. Their actions may serve as an appropriate inspiration for
others to follow.
The three groups compose the desired supplemental leaders who will
rationally attempt to ward off any threat and inspire others to
action. If they can be identified, they represent a valuable
resource for the crew to take advantage of. Often, they will
volunteer unique qualifications or simply their willingness to
assist.
During the onset phase of an emergency, the initial actions of the
'cool heads' also display a tendency toward traditional gender
roles. In general, the women can be expected to be more overtly
concerned with their own and other peoples' safety. They will
attempt to advise or assist others, and certainly quickly evacuate
their family and themselves.
The male 'cool heads' tend to be more in tune with the "action
requirement' of the situation, being more likely to attempt to
fight a fire or open an emergency exit. In general, they will try
to minimize risk and maximize desired action. If their assistance
is needed, they will very likely try to evacuate others before
themselves. Males are more willing to be separated from family, in
their personal risk assessment.
Examining the structural fire scenario in particular, research
indicates that the public seems more willing to fight a fire - if
able - than might typically be expected. In an aircraft accident,
fighting the fire is nearly impossible for passengers. However, the
same population can be expected to take a leadership role in
protecting passengers by ushering them to safety.
The potentially explosive nature of jet fuel is typically
sufficiently famous that these same 'leaders' can be reasonably
expected to act quickly and create the required distance from the
potential or actual fire.
In an aircraft accident, the pilots being trapped in the cockpit
can pose a unique problem. While flight attendants are taught to
ensure the cockpits evacuation, the typical flight attendant may
not have the physical strength to accomplish the task in the small
confines of the typical cockpit. Hence, the same group of leaders
can be utilized as a 'muscle' resource to extricate the pilots - if
possible.
It should never be assumed that a severely damaged cockpit
represents deceased pilots. Accordingly, unconscious or seriously
injured pilots should not be mistaken for deceased.
While passengers, in the capacity of a resource, play a key role,
this trait is not addressed with the intent of creating the
impression that an expected behavior of any group in an emergency
is that which conveniently fits the ideal 'heroic' model.
Certainly, it is a serious mistake to depend upon the emergence of
this type of individual in emergencies.
It is to be easily argued that the most logical behavior in an
emergency is that of rapid escape, especially when faced with
overwhelming threat. Setting aside reflexive judgments on the
issue, the choice of escape is appropriate as a reasoned choice, if
there is the element of self-control and a degree of rationality to
the action. Escape should also be viewed in terms of it's being
social and that it still recognizes the needs of others; certainly
that it is not any form of panic.
Escape behaviors become inappropriate when they are ineffective;
possibly counter-productive or threatening to others. Being the
first through an escape hatch with a pool of fuel awaiting ignition
is hardly to be admired. Beyond self-peril, the resulting open
hatch obviously endangers the remaining passengers if a fire should
erupts.
IRRATIONAL RESPONSES
The estimated 15% of the passengers who may demonstrate a high
degree of inappropriate response during an emergency can be
expected to behave in a variety of ways. The responses can range
from panicked escape attempts to paralyzed anxiety or even local
panic behavior. Again, escape is not necessarily an inappropriate
response. It is necessary to acknowledge the possibility that it
might successfully inspire others to actual safety, however risky.
When the physical and panicked escape is actually fulfilled, or is
physically prevented, passengers might resort to some basic or
primitive behavior such as crawling or crouching under or hiding
behind something. These individuals might cling onto other people,
either for either the illusion of protection or consolation.
A second irrational response is the opposite of escape - paralyzing
anxiety. Here, the element of catatonia plays a role, with a sense
of disbelief as the first reaction. The response might be
accompanied by thoughts such as, "This can't be happening to me,
this can't be real; there's some mistake, nothing bad really
happened."
Such a response might exhibit uncontrolled weeping and overwhelming
immobility. Passengers may stay in their seat, or, perhaps freeze
in the aisle. They may need to be physically led or carried to
safety. Again, some may lose consciousness.
Panic (discussed in detail later), is the extreme the inappropriate
responses. With respect to emergencies, the term is defined as, "An
irrational, fear-based response, which is anti-social, with the
potential for reducing the escape possibilities of others." The
history of aviation emergencies and accidents rarely contains the
element of panic, but sufficient cases have been reported to
reinforce the concern.
Panic in the emergency scenario is irrational and self-serving with
little or no thought for others. Those who panic can make a
difficult situation still worse - for everyone involved.
Panic is not limited to passengers. An interesting news video clip
caught a captain bolting from his sliding side-window after landing
with his left landing gear caught in the retracted position;
minutes ahead of the first passenger egress. Needless to say, the
core of the emergency leadership not only departed, but also may
have undermined the effectiveness of others. In all likelihood, the
remainder of the crew reacted with a rational 'revenge.'
Of those who would panic, it has been found that they may act
without conscious thought for their own, or others', safety. They
might be unaware of their actual surroundings, an immediate threat
and any adverse impact that they might be having.
In another accident, a couple panicked, defying the instructions of
the flight attendants, opened an emergency exit and exited to a
flaming death below.
Unless clearly overwhelming conditions prevail, very few passengers
are likely to panic. In non-aviation studies only 1% to 5% of
people fall into the estimated 'likely-to-panic' category.
Obviously, fire is one event likely to trigger a panic response,
however, the element of fire is inconsistent in that
regard.
Should passengers actually panic; their actions are likely to be
completely unpredictable. They may require physical restraint with
other people needed to look after them. Physical force may be
required to keep them from becoming an additional threat to
themselves or others.
It must be emphasized that the underlying cause is a combination of
their own sense of insecurity, causing them to react to actual or
perceived inadequate information or confidence in the situation or
crew. With sufficient fear, they can lose their ability to think or
act rationally.
The implications to flight crews are obvious - useful and
meaningful information at all stages is of vital importance for the
passengers - and the crew.
During these phases, families and close friends can be expected to
want to be together. They will rely heavily on each other for
advice, especially if the warning sources are uncertain and the
impact, when it comes, is sudden. They should, whenever possible,
be brought and kept together, so as to preclude supplemental
problems.
With some passengers having reached their own personal estimation
of threat, there may be a decision to act and/or to warn others. As
a rough guide only, if left to their own devices approximately 25%
can be relied on to act rationally. Such reactions are more likely
if the individuals have had recent similar experiences, knowledge
of similar disasters, or are with their family or a group of close
friends. This group can be a valuable asset to the flight
crew.
The bulk of passengers may accept the fact that there is a problem,
but either take no action for some obscure reason, or be slow to do
so. If it is fear or uncertainty, which is underlying the
inactivity, they may be experiencing thoughts such as, "This isn't
going to work" "It's too late" "No one can help me" "There's no
point in even trying." Thus, it is apparent that effective command
must be taken early and maintained.
EVACUATION BEHAVIOR
In elementary terms, evacuation is obviously the action of getting
passengers focused on the appropriate instructions and to
physically move away from a threatening environment. It is academic
that they must first become aware, or at least suspect or assume,
that a threat exists, referring to the so-called 'warning' phase.
Next, they must accept it, in terms of the onset phase. Given that
people differ in their ability to accept information during the
first two phases they must quickly decide on a course of action and
follow through with it.
Aircraft evacuations are independently threatening with respect to
an accepted institutional ignorance on the subject. The NTSB has
identified a long list of life-threatening aspects to aircraft
evacuations, from aircraft design through evacuation procedures.
While the NTSB has brought their issues to the FAA and Congress,
little attention is being paid to the topic - by anyone. Typical
behavior in the evacuation phase illustrates why this phase is so
critical to survival.
Human nature dictates that anything, which is unfamiliar and
unexpected, can be inherently alarming; even without an actual
threat. To control or reduce anxiety, people often attempt to
convince themselves, consciously and subconsciously, that what they
are seeing and hearing is actually normal or at least not
particularly threatening, as opposed to being an indicator that
things are rapidly going wrong. The most powerful internal debate
seems to be subconscious.
Such personal arguments assert that an 'apparently harmless and
plausible explanation' is available and leaves them safe. Such
irrational beliefs can be often accepted for considerable time,
despite clear evidence to the contrary. Passengers are no different
than any population in that they also tend to see and hear what
they choose. They typically do not want to be forced to accept a
breach in their safety assumptions.
Aircraft accidents are typically of two categories, planned - with
preparations, and unplanned - extremely abrupt and with precious
little time to act or react.
Aircraft are unique in that the physical angle or 'attitude' of the
aircraft can send a correct or incorrect message to passengers and
crew alike.
Lets examine a scenario -
A wheel brake locks-up with the aircraft taxiing for takeoff,
causing sufficient heat to burst a tire. The sound of the tire
burst might be puzzlement, varying to mild concern. The fact might
easily be that the burst tire tore open the wing, breaking fuel
lines. With the fuel spilling in the vicinity of the hot brake, a
fire is impending.
If sufficient knowledge is available to the cockpit, there might be
an order to evacuate. With no threat perceived by the passengers,
they may sit fast, even though an undisputed evacuation order has
been given. The fact that the aircraft is still upright and
seemingly 'normal' can send an erroneous message to the
passengers.
Now, if the fire erupts, the response is radically different with
the added element of a time shortage. If the wind carries the smoke
over to the safe side of the aircraft with the obvious ambiguity in
the passengers' minds, they may hesitate to exit into the smoke.
Conversely, they may decide of their own accord to go out the
opposite side, admitting smoke and flame into the cabin
itself.
With clear communication, much danger can be avoided. However, the
message has to be clearly understood with the appropriate
instructions and with pertinent detail and no more.
Imagine two PAs -
"Ladies & gentlemen, we seem to have blown a tire. We'll be
evacuating on the right side of the aircraft only. Please leave
your belongings and move to the exits now."
Or;
"This is the captain. We've had a tire burst, rupturing a fuel line
with a high risk of a fire on the left side of the aircraft, flight
attendants, right side only, right side only, evacuate, evacuate,
right side only!"
The two messages are radically different. The second message
carries authority, a command tone, accurate information,
identification of the threat and clear directions (preceding the
evacuation order) and evacuate the order itself, with both the
directions and the action ordered.
In most cases, the second PA would compel a 100% rapid
compliance.
Move to another level. Before the PA can be given, the fire breaks
out with the passengers fully aware. Again, put the wind on the
side of the fire, blowing smoke into the desired evacuation path.
The passengers may have formed their own resolve, possibly
initiating an evacuation on the wrong side. Chaos can be the
result, complete with panic. The over-wing doors are opened on the
wrong side, admitting smoke, the overhead evacuation lights are
obscured.
While the flight attendants might be screaming instructions over
the PA, is there enough volume to communicate over the panicked
voices of the passengers? With overwhelming indicators, the
passengers may become highly autonomous as to the immediate
evacuation. They may or may not, 'get it right.'
Even the most experienced passenger may find the scenario far more
confusing than they could ever have imagined. Without adequate or
timely information, even crewmembers can get badly confused. In one
aircraft accident, the left engine failed with an associated
vibration and ambiguous engine indications. Both pilots came to the
wrong conclusion, shutting down the wrong engine. Amazingly, the
bad engine continued to run, until short final; then quit, with a
resulting fatal crash. Having failed to validate their assumptions,
a highly professional crew shut down the wrong engine, ultimately
causing an unnecessary accident; with fatalities.
Aircraft emergencies often evolve rapidly. The desired time element
may not be available. Waiting for clarification or instructions may
not be an option.
LANGUAGE BARRIERS
From the United States, it's not uncommon to have a significant
percentage of non-English speaking passengers on flights into such
places as Mexico. Although certain limitations must be recognized,
the boarding safety briefing must be orally presented - per the FAA
regulations - with the obvious intent that the briefing is
understood. By the regulations and the FAA procedural manuals, the
seat-back safety briefing cards supplement the primary briefing;
they do not substitute.
Such passengers can only overcome their limitation by guessing
correctly or to follow someone else. With luck, they may have
looked at the evacuation cards in the seat-back pockets, gaining an
elementary idea as to what is expected of them. Ironically, that
action may leave them better prepared than those who understand
English, but didn't bother listening to the briefing or studying
the cards.
Thoughts Expressed from Historic Emergencies
"The little things seemed to make a big difference."
"Most people were concerned about family and friends."
"We just wanted to know what was happening."
"We waited for whoever was in charge."
"Nobody told us anything."
"Everyone was pushing and shoving."
"We desperately wanted to know what to do."
In the event of a violent crash, the cockpit may not have the
ability to communicate due to aircraft damage, injury or their
demise. Such a scenario is not uncommon or unexpected. However, the
command structure will have broken down, leaving the evacuation
command to the flight attendants. In such a threat situation there
is still the obvious need for clear information and a command
structure, so that, as far as may be possible, no matter who is
removed, the next person in the chain of command can, and will,
step into the suspected or known breach, advising and instructing
the evacuation process. Clearly, flight attendants need guidance on
when to self-initiate an evacuation.
Even if the command structure has not broken down, getting the
passengers to move in the required time frame and in the needed
direction by those managing the situation can still be a serious
problem.
Without clear information and guidance many people may remain in
their seats until they are satisfied that they have a very clear
mandate to evacuate. Even with adequate information and
instructions, some may still be reluctant to move when required to
do so. The flight attendant nightmare is when the passengers decide
to take their personal belongings with them, contrary to the
instructions. Between the time requirement and the obvious physical
impediment, such barriers can - and have - killed.
This tendency for human response, during an emergency, to appear
random and chaotic has led to the identification of a number of
common and mistaken assumptions during the evacuation phase of an
emergency.
For example, those responsible for the safe evacuation of people in
an emergency may assume that passengers will start to move as soon
as they, 'hear the order.' Unfortunately, such is not always the
case. Psychological denial mechanisms can still be in place even
after passengers recover from the 'brace' or 'impact' position
(bent over with arms crossed, contacting the seat in front of
them). The aircraft coming to a stop with a relative quiet might
create a false, but welcome, sense of security.
Without overwhelming indicators, some people might still be
reluctant to start evacuation procedures immediately. There might
be those who abruptly elect to wait for 'further' clarity and
'kinder' instructions, or they may decide that it is just better to
wait and see what happens next.
Any background panic or hysteria (screaming) could trigger a
thought process to the effect of, "Well, I'm not joining in THAT."
As a consequence, a different deadly delay could be effected.
Seconds can be very precious in any emergency.
Even when any warnings and threat have been accepted as genuine,
some people still cannot think and act for themselves.
An estimated 10-15% of the passengers may experience the 'disaster
syndrome.' They will appear as being stunned, dazed and bewildered.
Realistically, this response can be expected to be short lived,
ultimately yielding to either hyperactivity or to the desired
appropriate evacuation response. In psychological terms, the
'disaster syndrome' reaction is an 'adaptive' function which nature
seems to offer as a protection for the individual from being
mentally and emotionally overwhelmed by the impact of the immediate
trauma.
Passengers in this group may become immobile, sitting or standing
around in a passive or apathetic manner. They may seem oblivious to
both the danger and the presence or the needs of others. Whether by
aid of the crew or by the assistance of other passengers, they may
need mild-to-forceful assistance to get away from the threat. In
extreme cases they may need to be carried out. Some passengers may
struggle irrationally, unable to remember how or be able to
unfasten their seat belt.
An estimated 60% can be expected to understand the situation, but
without clear instructions and forceful orders, they might be
uncertain as to their plight and otherwise be given to changing
their minds, even if they do make a decision. Fortunately, these
are estimated to be more easily influenced, tending to follow the
lead of the strongest person in their immediate vicinity.
Unfortunately, these individuals also tend to follow such
individuals even if they have made a wrong decision. These too, may
become immobile, until forcefully instructed or until the threat
becomes too great. This group is normally much 'stronger' in all
manners and can render assistance if so instructed.
There is an incorrect assumption that the passenger motivation to
escape will dominate the passenger's autonomous decisions and
consequent actions. Again, passengers can be expected to initially
attempt to take stock of the situation, continuing their 'normal'
activity, as opposed to 'switching' into the 'escape' mentality.
Hence, they must be emphatically instructed to escape. There seems
to be a subconscious argument to the effect of, "control is
safety," in the early portion of any phase. Passengers will tend to
initially investigate, rather than immediately effect their
escape.
To repeat, 10% can be expected to attempt to save themselves,
acting or moving toward safety. Depending on the individual
situation, another 5% can reasonably be expected to act on their
own initiative and attack the problem - if possible.
10% of the passengers may repeat or originate warnings or instruct
others. This group contains the passengers who may emerge as
spontaneous leaders. These passengers will rationally attempt to
ward off any possible threat by putting others to work. These are
the individuals who can be expected to instruct others in the
fashion of, "Hey! Help him get his life vest on!"
There is also the risk that passengers will tune out or simply
forget recent information. The evacuation procedures can be
forgotten. These passengers will tend to revert to any familiar
responses, which have served them in the past, even though those
responses may now be non-pertinent and totally inappropriate.
Stress can also trigger such medical conditions as hypoglycemia,
diminishing a passenger's capacity to respond
appropriately.
These are the passengers who may shift their focus to irrelevant
details with a potential to collect their belongings. Such efforts
will be an attempt to distract themselves from the immediate threat
and, inadvertently, the more important task of escape.
The passenger desire to collect their personal belongings is a
mental and emotional escape mechanism, also characteristic of
earlier phases of an emergency. In psychology, this is termed,
'affiliative behavior' - characterized by passengers directing
their attention toward that which is familiar (safe) and their
attachment to the associated objects and memories, as opposed to
actively evading an obvious threat.
Heroics may occur. Ideally, personal survival instinct dominates,
with passengers and crew successfully escaping. However, there is
a very real risk that altruistic and humanitarian impulses will
create a secondary risk. In a variety of emergencies, people have
demonstrated a reasonably predictable propensity to assist others,
to the point of being mysteriously foolhardy, endangering their own
lives. Thus, some passengers, and especially crewmembers, may need
to be protected from their own heroism.
TIME REQUIREMENT
Perhaps the most dangerous assumption is that the required time to
evacuate depends exclusively on the time required to exit from the
aircraft.
The required time is the total of the warning phase through the
time period in which people are in safe environs or being cared for
by professionals. The 'start up time' - the crew and passengers
reaction to a warning or an alarm - is equally as important as the
time required to physically move to and through an exit, on toward
absolute safety.
The process in total involves crew and passengers becoming aware
that a threat exists, the acceptance of the risk, consideration of
alternative actions, decision on a dependable course of action and
then the execution of that course of action.
In the realm of human nature, discussion and analysis with others
is an automatic and vital component of the process, however, also
requiring the element of time. Unfortunately, a part of the process
is the elevation of anxiety, which invariably interferes; thus
increasing the time requirement to an unpredictable degree.
It is obvious and understandable that unfamiliar and unexpected
events are inherently given to create some form of anxiety or
alarm. Passengers and even crewmembers may attempt to reduce their
anxiety by mentally restructuring the indicators of danger in
familiar ways. As an example, the sighting of smoke may be assumed
to be from food burning in the galley ovens. The assumption being
that it is already known and that something is being done about it
- by someone else.
Strangely, but predictably, the subsequent 'harmless and
plausible' assumptions are often too readily accepted, despite
accompanying evidence to the contrary. In a sentence, as a mental
and emotional safety mechanism, people strongly tend to see and
believe what they want. Unfortunately, this response invariably
leads to inaction. Consequently, valuable time, sometimes
measurable in seconds, is lost. Needed communication is often
delayed or precluded, resulting in many people becoming immobile or
simply waiting for information or instructions; seemingly ignorant
of the imminent threat.
An opposite risk potentially exists in the possibility that
anxiety-driven passengers - or crew - may not be able to bring
themselves to wait for clarification on the situation and
subsequent instructions; instead jumping to conclusions with
inappropriate timing or action. For example, firing an extinguisher
at a galley panel, as opposed to first exposing the opening to the
burning trash bin, itself.
The anxiety, which potentially could improve their performance of
simple tasks, can also paralyze people when coping with
frightening, complex or unfamiliar tasks - such as crawling to
safety under a layer of smoke or opening an over-wing exit.
The element of evacuation time must also consider unaccompanied
children, the handicapped and the elderly. All of these could
require more time to evacuate, with these individuals typically
being more concerned with their personal belongings. This factor
carries the additional implication that if they are part of a
group, particularly a family group, the entire group tends to move
at the speed of their slowest member.
EXITS
The typical airline safety briefing attends to another assumption,
that people are most likely to move toward the nearest exit.
Accidents have proven a liability in this regard.
Logically, an exit choice can be determined by its visibility, it's
appearance as an appropriate choice and its distance from the
individual.
However, remember the typical caveat of a safety briefing,
"..remembering that the nearest exit might be located behind you."
The harsh reality is that in emergencies people are most likely to
move in concert with other people, or toward exits with which they
are familiar (in front of them, as normally seated), unless there
is an adverse compelling reason (fire) or an obvious and serious
obstacle in the way.
It must be anticipated that the passengers will tend to evacuate
through a familiar route (forward cabin entry door), even if it is
not the nearest exit. The gravity of primitive reasoning will tend
to take them away from a well marked and illustrated, but
unfamiliar, escape door. Obviously, the normal cabin entry may not
be the best exit during an emergency for a variety of reasons,
including its proximity to the probable frontal point of impact,
with consequent damage to the door frame itself.
Worse, elevated anxiety levels or fears may cause passengers to
persist in their attempt to use the chosen escape route, blocking
the progress of passengers and crew to the appropriate exit. The
situation can be aggravated if they should somehow inspire a
'following;' the additional cost in time can be critical to the
survival of many, if not all.
Overall, passengers can be more reliably to move as a group, as
opposed to random individual courses of action in the fashion of
'every man for himself'.
DENSITY FACTOR
A different psychology and sociology exists in the modern
'passenger' environment. People are essentially forced to abandon
their normally preferred 'social distance' in favor of tolerating
close proximity to others, for lack of control. The passenger
'crowding' in the Japanese domestic transportations systems is an
example of this. The individual's psychology, background and
tolerance factor will dictate the allowed proximity between
themselves and others. The social relationship makes a difference,
as well, for example whether the individuals around are family or
strangers; social status or ethnicity can play a comparable role.
An obscure statistic is the number of those who refuse to fly for
these very reasons.
The 'density' of the passengers, to a degree, may force passengers
to move as a group. Conversely, on a lightly loaded aircraft, the
passengers may have the physical option to maintain their desired
distance or proximity. Given the element of available time, the
nature of the emergency can induce passengers to seek individuals
to whom they have (or want to have) emotional ties, seeking some
element of safety from them. In the reverse, individuals may
altruistically seek someone to whom they can actively offer advice,
information and support, including physical support. Time
permitting, a lightly loaded aircraft may require passenger
grouping, in preparation for the evacuation.
SOCIAL FACTOR
The response of an organized traveling group or family may be
expected to diverge from otherwise expected behavior. Particularly
in the case of a family, passengers can be expected maintain a
close bond, so as to survive as a unit. The fear and the threat of
the emergency and actual evacuation can reasonably be expected to
intensify bonds between family, close associates and friends. It
can be reliably expected that after the immediate egress from the
aircraft, separated members will try to re-assemble, even at grave
risk to themselves and others. An intense fire may not prevent
attempts to do so. Obviously, the case of parents separated from
their children can be expected to be the most serious event.
Parents carry the potential for even irrationally moving in
whatever direction they perceive as being necessary to re-unite
themselves with their children. Thus, it is vital for the escape of
any children to be effected and averted as early as
possible.
Family / gender roles are also a powerful influence on passenger
responses in an emergency scenario. To a degree, passengers will be
socially aligned with their general routine response patterns. As
cited earlier there is a risk that wives may still wait for their
husbands to take control over events, not moving until he does.
Additionally, it's possible that if a parent is injured, that
children might strongly resist leaving the parent until the parent
is clearly being assisted to the exit.
EXIT MARKING
The role of exit signs in an evacuation plays an important role, as
does the now prominent 'floor-track lighting' as a means to ensure
a safety route. There are two risks associated with these
indicators:
1. Aircraft accidents can be sufficiently violent that major or
obvious exits become unusable, adding a potentially deadly
confusion factor.
2. Passenger psychological mechanisms may interfere.
The general 'narrowing' of attention during a period of anxiety can
result in obvious and peripheral indications escaping passenger
attention. In extreme cases is the effect of 'tunnel vision.'
Passengers may not notice either major indicators or smaller
details in their immediate environment around them - including the
exit signs and the floor-track lighting.
Human nature and associated habit carry the liability of prejudice.
The common temptation is for passengers with an acceptable degree
of awareness looking to the ceiling for such indicators. Aircraft
accidents have the added risk of smoke quickly obscuring those
signs, combined with the failure of attention alternately being
given to the floor locations for such clues. In a violent accident,
add to that environment the cabin being turned on its side or
totally upside down with total obscuration or loss of the
indications from the electrical power loss, damage or
debris.
Studies in building fires offer some valuable statistics. One such
study indicated that over 80% of people didn't notice the lighted
exit signs. Another study included some firemen and policemen among
those who didn't notice the signs.
Even when passengers do notice the signs, the traumatic effects
leave them with limited ability to properly interpret their correct
meaning relative to the actual situation. For example, an overhead
"EXIT" sign might be illuminated with arrows pointing to the left
and right over-wing or aft-aircraft exits. However, if the
blind-faith assumption is that both are viable choices, there is a
risk that a passenger could open a dangerous exit - even after
receiving instructions to the contrary. This is particularly
dangerous in such situations as a fire or ditching.
The same idea applies to both symbols and words. The label,
"EXIT" could be perceived as a verb, as opposed to a physical
location in times of stress. Verbiage in aural instructions must be
carefully chosen as well. A common recommendation for pilots
announcing the evacuation itself, where only one side or exit
location must be used, is to preface the actual evacuation
announcement with the preferred side first, as opposed to the
instruction. For example, "Right side only, right side only, right
side only; evacuate, evacuate, evacuate!" To the best of anyone's
ability, potential ambiguity must be anticipated and
avoided.
In defiance of logic, it must be accepted that prominent exit signs
may not always be noticed; verbal instructions may not be recalled
or understood. There is also the risk that, for extremely complex
reasons, passengers may somehow assume that there is no guarantee
that the exit will actually be available, or that the route will be
sufficiently marked and un-obstructed. Consequently, they may
hesitate to move toward or actually use the exit; simply following
the crowd.
With respect to individual choice, the exit selection is influenced
by many variables, including the preference of a highly familiar
exit - even to the exclusion of closer and more appropriate exits.
In such cases, the individual may not make any attempt to discover
or read obvious exit signs.
As a minimum, it can be hoped that an effective escape can be
achieved by such verbal commands as, "This way!"
The B-747 has presented an interesting paradox. In general, pilots
are afraid of heights (believe it or not). Consequently, a B-747
cockpit crew can reasonably be expected to follow the passenger
route down the stairs, as opposed to using the much faster overhead
cockpit exit with the "escape reels." Such a choice can combine a
mixture of a sense of responsibility to facilitate the exit of
passengers and crew, but may be limited to the simple distrust of
the escape reels (which have no failure history) and their
associated fear of heights. Supporting that idea is the fact that
the B-747 also has a side exit with an inflatable slide, but it is
located much higher and the angle of the slide is much steeper. An
abnormal aircraft angle, high winds or angled terrain can aggravate
the situation.
Another risk phenomenon appears in the form that passengers are not
necessarily guaranteed to automatically evade or escape obvious
danger. Returning to structural fire studies as an indicator,
passengers cannot be automatically anticipated to evade a
smoke-filled perceived escape route. The reliable deterrence
against passengers moving 'into the fire' comes from the heat
evasion of the 'oven effect.' If the aircraft fuselage is angled,
moving toward the fire might be a function of moving into intense
heat, which can be expected to be an effective directional
motivator.
One of the risks, on aircraft, is that passengers might
irrationally elect to hide from the threat in a lavatory.
Thereafter, people become understandably reluctant to expose
themselves to the smoke or to move through smoke to safety by
opening the door. The obvious anticipation is that any such
passengers might open the lavatory door, discover the smoke filled
cabin, then instinctively close it again - and locking it. While
flight attendants are trained to be alert for such, any chaos can
make such a check more demanding of the critical time
factor.
However, there will be those who are well enough mentally &
emotionally prepared to quickly move through the smoke to safety.
Structural fire studies also suggest that approximately 70% are
prepared to accept smoke along the escape route, if they have the
perception that such is necessary. The obvious requirement is to
effect sufficient communication and control that the passengers are
factually moving in the direction of safety.
As another indicator, residential fire departments struggle to get
family members to exit a burning house through their most immediate
window, as opposed to going down a
smoke-filled hallway to either escape or assist others. Fire
departments illustrate that in the case of single-level homes,
exiting through a window allows a person to break the window of
other household members, as opposed to risking their own life in a
flaming or smoke-filled hallway, unnecessarily failing in their
intended rescue attempt. Domestic fire studies again illustrate
gender differences; women seemed less likely to move through smoke
than men.
The basic environment plays a key role as well. An accident
happening in the daytime in clear weather or with an absence of
smoke dictates a timesaving confidence factor. Familiarity adds to
the crew assets. A frequent flier might blossom as an effective
leader, being familiar with the basic environment and the
particular aircraft. Such a passenger is also more likely to
successfully lead others through smoke to safety.
Hence, there is an added benefit to the normal PR process of
pampering frequent flyers. Regardless of the cause or motivation,
in an emergency, appropriate leadership is a vital component in the
process. As a minimum, such 'divine' passengers can reasonably be
relied upon to reinforce the other passengers following of crew
directions.
Another factor during an evacuation is the passengers' physical
capability to move to an exit. Disregarding injuries, the
passengers' ability to move to an appropriate exit obviously can
vary with a number of factors, ranging from age and physical
fitness to mental and emotional limitations.
While younger passengers are assumed to have the ability to retain
information, follow directions and make appropriate decisions, even
they can become mentally and emotionally impaired under stress.
Physical condition can easily enter the picture, as well. A
diabetic or alcoholic might indulge in a personal whiskey flask; a
person suffering from some degree of hypoglycemia may become
disabled by the stress-induced calorie burn-off.
Older passengers may find the process still more difficult. With
sufficient aging factors, such as agility, physical capability and
strength, movement toward an exit can take significantly longer.
Elderly passengers are often more vulnerable to the effects of
toxic fumes. These factors can potentially cause confusion,
ineffective response; possibly death.
Children pose an additional risk, even when traveling with parents.
Young children show a tendency to hide in times of stress, as
opposed to making their way toward an exit. Often, they may become
immobile, choosing to sit and cry. Especially in an emergency,
unaccompanied children require that much more attention to ensure
their safety. On the plus side, these children are typically small
enough to be readily carried out of the aircraft.
The inexperience of passengers, or a fear-of-flying, may hinder
their response, including the successful movement to exits and
escaping supplemental danger such as post-accident fire. Their
handicap will worsen if the aircraft is torn apart, resting at a
bizarre angle or with debris, scattered in their intended exit
path.
Particularly on late or long flights, alcohol intake will play a
significant role. Beyond the obvious limitations regarding the
movement toward exits, the 'drunk,' if you'll permit, can display
a broad range of responses from effective heroics to irrational and
counter-productive behavior. Depending on the circumstance those
'under the influence' may be mentally and physically incapable of
the desired responses.
PANIC
Any emergency, involving people, carries the potential for panic.
However, panic is not high on the list of risk indicators. For the
most part, panic is a function of both surprise and the imminence
of injury or death. Panic normally requires the clarity of
desperation, irrational or otherwise. Alternate and safe avenues go
a long way to protect against the risk of panic. The primary risk
of panic is the injury people will inflict on each other, rather
than the primary threat such as a fire. In emergencies involving
panic, whether people crush each other or mass against an exit, it
is often difficult to assign the cause of injury or death primarily
to the overriding threat. Thus emergency management is again the
key element. A timely warning is the most serious element in panic
concern; appropriate instructions should closely follow.
Personal response is obviously a major factor in an emergency.
Psychologists generally speak in terms of personal response being
either "adaptive" or "non-adaptive."
'Adaptive' behavior is obviously perceived as rational and
productive, assisting safety and survival. Conversely, non-adaptive
behavior is that which we categorize as irrational, with the
potential for hindering safety and survival.
In these concepts, we again have to examine the human
response.
INACTION
It is appropriate to examine the effect of catatonia, sometimes
thought of as total disbelief or 'freezing.' Catatonia can be as
simple as a very brief period of denial and immobility. It can be
as complex as a total shutting down of mind and body. Catatonia is
essentially a bewildered or stunned response to an unusual or
unwanted event or series of events, typical of serious
emergencies.
In the discussion of the onset phase, the so-called 'disaster
syndrome' can be reasonably expected, especially if the emergency
event is sudden, becomes violent, bewildering in it's own right,
and presents clear and imminent or potential danger. The same
disaster syndrome reaction can be reasonably expected during the
early stages of the evacuation process.
This response can be anticipated in terms of both emotion and
psychology. While fear will be the underlying emotional response,
the psychological mechanisms will determine the decision-making, or
lack thereof. The responses will be intended to protect the person
from being completely overwhelmed by the threat of the event.
Inaction can also have a benefit, if for no other reason than an
alternative to panic. It should be noted, however, that catatonia
can be categorized as a panic (irrational) response, as
well.
Inaction, as an extreme response, is evidenced by passengers
appearing dazed, apathetic, stunned or unusually passive. Some
passengers may sit immobile, staring at the seat ahead or at a
single magazine page; they may stare blankly out the window. They
are usually quite oblivious to their surroundings, the potential
threat, as well as the presence or the needs of others.
The obvious risk is that these passengers might remain sufficiently
immobile to the extreme of being overwhelmed by such threats as
smoke and fire; possibly drowning in a ditching.
Such inaction or catatonia can be expected to pass reasonably
quickly, however, it can last for several hours. Often the
passenger will subsequently resort to either hyperactivity or to
some appropriate activity.
Experienced passengers or crew can also be overwhelmed by their
first emergency experience. Inexperienced passengers or crew pose
an additional element of risk.
The element of inaction is not totally understood. Another cause
can be known inadequate knowledge of the appropriate response, as
opposed to being a direct consequence the actual threat or
associated confusion. Especially with crewmembers, there is the
added fear of overreaction, causing the individual to appear
foolish. In a potential ditching scenario, a flight attendant may
be confused as to timing, resisting the urge to advise passengers
to get their life vests at the ready or to actually don
them.
For some, there may be a true paralyzing fear, resulting in
inaction; others may fail to react due to conflicting impulses. In
the event of a post-accident fire, an individual could be faced
with the conflict of whether or not to escape and leave a loved one
who has become separated or to wait, possibly searching for them in
the burning aircraft or moving against the tide of escaping
passengers.
Passengers and crew alike are also subject to a 'mortality
complex,' experiencing no impulse for action, becoming resigned to
their perceived fate. Pilots are subject to the 'captain's resolve'
of "going down with his ship." This is particularly true in a clear
case where the accident was caused by pilot error. In most cases,
inaction is the consequence of either failing to recognize the
seriousness of the situation, or a total uncertainty as to what the
correct response is. While crisis is typically thought of as a
'fight-or-flight' scenario, the element of 'submission' also is
available as a conscious or subconscious choice.
Conversely, as might be expected, the experienced survivors
typically do not typically become victims to inaction, especially
well-trained and experienced crewmembers. However, the degree of
training is still a large variable within the industry. For
example, the faith in modern aircraft may express itself in a
minimum of training or preparedness for a ditching. Hence,
crewmembers remain vulnerable to their humanity.
Background, culture and religion can exert a determining influence
during an emergency. A group of Marines may become active
facilitators of safety. However, some groups might view a potential
disaster as being void of any control. While religious beliefs can
also possibly lead to inaction, inappropriate action or the quiet
acceptance of death.
Conversely, an atheist may become enraged at the whole situation
and effect survival to simply prove a point. Another may believe
that he / she has an unfulfilled mission and either become a safety
facilitator or simply effect their own survival, based on their
religious concepts.
ESCAPE DESPERATION
Escape behavior sometimes can be non-rational in the sense that
normal decision-making processes become suspended, but the
resulting response may not express itself as true panic.
Desperate acts are automatic responses to danger when fear elevates
the survival instinct. Such cases are not to be classed as panic,
as they remain social and retain some degree of organized thought,
however unusual or inappropriate the response might seem to a
detached onlooker.
As part of the escape response, some passengers (even crew members)
may almost automatically move to the rear of the aircraft during
the descent, trying to evade the feared impact or perhaps to seek
the tail section as the statistically greatest point of safety in
a crash. They might elect to 'escape' into the aft lavatory,
despite the absence of a seat belt. Similarly, after a crash, they
may automatically move aft based on the assumption that the tail
offers the best protection or escape route. This action might go
against the judgment, advice or outright orders of an experienced
crewmember, in charge of the evacuation.
Particularly with an aircraft breakup, some may try to flee in
random directions; most often, the first direction which occurs to
them. In other events, passenger evacuation may be held in check by
'normal rules'. For example, passengers might resist evacuating out
the cockpit windows without first being instructed or getting
permission, even with a rapidly encroaching fire.
A rapid escape attempt is often confused with panic, especially
when escapees do not use an obvious 'best route,' or mass near a
single exit creating a bottleneck. This is almost always caused by
lack of direction or the passengers forgetting, possibly not
knowing the best escape route or the existence of their
alternatives. However, there is the possibility of viable unique
knowledge, such as a single passenger spotting daylight coming
through a large breach of the fuselage. Conversely, a passenger
might also discover a threat, such as the sight of flames or dense
smoke.
When the escape process is complete, or becomes clearly impossible,
protective reactions will occur. Passengers may crawl under or
crouch behind something, evading further danger. Passengers and
even crew may cling to each other, enacting an instinctive and
primitive last attempt at comfort, safety security or consolation;
whether productive or otherwise.
PANIC RESPONSE
Panic is an irrational over-reaction with the potential for
endangering the life and/or the welfare the individual or those
around him/them. Again, the treatment of the term "panic" brings
with it a powerful but inaccurate image. Often enough, emergencies
evoke somewhat desperate acts or just the element of chaos. Beyond
a certain point, it becomes irresponsible to arbitrarily
misinterpret any sort of emotionally charged escape behavior as
being that of 'panic,' as opposed to reasonable desperation. The
subsequent misunderstanding can leave people in a mind-set that
disorganized behavior amounting to chaos is 'panic,' thus
uncontrollable. As a consequence, where control is in fact
possible, capable persons might prematurely decide against trying
to effect the needed control.
True panic is characterized by attempts at self-preservation at all
costs, including an abandonment of a family or traveling group.
Panic is highly charged and very obviously emotional. Its intensity
is a function of perceived or suspected immediate and / or severe
threat. Panic can often increase any threat to the individual and
the threat to others, as opposed to effectively evading or
diminishing the threat in any way. For the flight crew, panic can
be a problem if individuals or a group persists in the belief that
there is any form of impending threat, known, suspected, imaginary
or actual which leaves them with the irrational resolve for
immediate protection or escape. As an example, a PA announcing a
reduction in altitude to accompany a procedure for a failed air
conditioning pack might trigger a passenger to start violently
tearing at an overhead oxygen mask panel.
The physical nature of aircraft leaves those who are predisposed to
the panic response with the sense of physical entrapment.
Additionally, those same individuals may react to their limited
courses of action or limited number of escape routes. In the
post-crash scene, there is the automatic risk of panic, given any
limitation of the anticipated escape routes - whether they are
unmarked, obscured, blocked, jammed or simply overlooked. The
precipitating factor, in those who would panic, is their perception
that time is very short, with the opportunity to escape rapidly
fading.
In the confines of an aircraft, another risk is the front-to-rear
communication breakdown or failure. Obviously the primary risk in
confined panic is that of the passengers at the back of the line
pressing forward on those at the front, with the potential of those
in front being trampled, crushed, injured or smothered.
Panic can become still more complex. Passengers have a propensity
for panic if socially connected individuals or groups become
physically isolated by barriers or distance. In the case of true
panic, the perception of threat can become consuming to the degree
that passengers may not notice others around them, becoming
non-communicative and unable to interact with other passengers or
crew. Time permitting; it is advisable to ensure that 'connected'
passengers are united within reasonable limits. While typical
boarding efforts are commonly oriented around this sociology as a
courtesy, that 'norm' can pay a later dividend, should an emergency
arise.
Group panic functions differently. Group panic typically begins
with a benign perception in a crisis when passengers interpret the
recent events as dangerous, elevating their anxiety. Thereafter,
even though their perceptions do not immediately cause an
over-reaction, the actions or reactions of others amplifies their
concern or creates the conviction that the situation is far more
dangerous than they previously believed.
Panic can seemingly be a 'standby' option. Passengers may require
others panicking before taking a situation seriously. However, once
they witness panic, the effect can be instantly contagious,
requiring all possible intervention by crew or other passengers.
Following a panic onset, reassurances or direct orders over the PA
or megaphone are probably the only reliable tool available to the
flight crew, backed up by passenger initiatives. Beyond crowd
control, the crew must ensure their own safety in a panic scenario.
Panic can also be very slow to develop in an evolving emergency,
particularly if the voiced concerns or actions of other people seem
to abruptly illuminate the nature and seriousness of the current
situation - rightly or wrongly. It can be a major mistake for the
crew, or even ground staff, to underestimate the passenger response
resulting from little or no information being presented. The
information presented to passengers should be as complete as
possible, carrying the appropriate authority in an evolving
emergency, so as to best preclude the element of panic. One can
imagine a threatening situation lacking clarity, with one passenger
emotionally commenting, "What's the use; we're all going to burn to
death."
DESIRED RESPONSE
The desired responses in an emergency are those which are vital to
basic safety and survival. These include alertness and awareness,
information gathering, appropriate decision-making and active
mental, emotional and physical preparation for escape.
Remembering the human response, spiritual orientation toward
survival can be a powerful asset as well. The desired responses can
be described as 'adaptive,' they are rational, appropriate and
serve safety and survival. Passengers who resort to silent or
quieted prayer effect a desirable mind/body control. Prayer - in
it's classic form - takes the individual to a meditative state. The
same may reasonably be said of concentrated silent or quieted bible
reading.
The desired response of a passenger is his/her attentiveness to the
safety briefing or instructions; including the safety briefing card
in the seat-backs. This attention is ideally immediately followed
by their acceptance of the situation, appropriate
retention/assimilation of the information, their employment of
available information, self-control, or stress management if you
prefer. Passengers will ideally take appropriate action to minimize
any risks and facilitate the proper response of others. Certainly,
if an accident occurs, the passengers would ideally act
constructively in the evacuation of themselves and others.
Hopefully, the passengers will enable each other.
Studies have been conducted in an attempt to reliably predict a
'typical' response of passengers in an emergency. Once again, the
majority of reliable indicators come from structural disaster /
fire scenarios. The studies can only suggest a response, as each
situation is different, with different crowds and cultures. A very
limited number of studies have been conducted in the airline
environment; these will be discussed later.
The studies did, obviously, conclude that the negative impact of an
emergency can be minimized by the provision of adequate information
and training. While the crews are normally provided with at least
a minimum of both, well in advance, the passengers are not
typically so fortunate. Thus, in an emergency situation, good
leadership is critical. A major portion of that leadership is the
communication of pertinent information to the passengers. No humor
intended, the passengers are often given a 'crash course' in
survival. Typically, the information is delivered in a very short
period of time, possibly in terms of seconds, if the event is
abrupt and unexpected. Given adequate time availability, it would
be prudent to conduct 'brace' drills for practical, as well as
psychological, effect.
In a worst-case scenario, (incapacitated crew) the immediate
concern is the ability of passengers to appropriately and
effectively respond. At best, estimates are controversial. Within
reason, the general consensus estimates that approximately 10 - 25%
of the passengers can be anticipated to appropriately and
effectively respond during the onset phase, through the
evacuation.
For the most part, passengers can be reasonably relied upon to act
with a high, if not surprising, level of sensibility and altruism.
Some heroics may occur, but are not to be relied upon. Most
passengers can be expected to act in a way which is helpful to
themselves, individuals and groups, thus enhancing safety and
survival.
Human nature, again, is largely unpredictable. Even in highly
stressful or threatening environments, people very often respond to
emergencies rationally and even altruistically. The instinctive
panic reactions are simply not the historical norm, particularly in
aircraft. Again, the potential for panic should not be
overlooked.
Altruistic and affiliative inter-personal response can be
reasonably expected to emerge as more of a norm. For lack of a
better term, call it the 'legacy effect.' People have a sense of
their own responsibility in terms of their personal history;
possibly their fear of accountability. Hence, even while suffering
strong fear and a sense of helplessness, people will quite often
act appropriately to protect both themselves and others. This is
almost an 'expected' response in the case of 'primary groups;'
family and very close friends - with strong associated emotional or
social bonds. Altruistic response tends to occur most commonly in
such groups, but is not in any way limited to these groups. For
example, those with any image to espouse or protect, such as a
deadheading captain or uniformed serviceman can be reasonably
expected to react in such a fashion.
The dominant indicators suggest that threat makes pre-existing or
potential bonds grow stronger. Obviously, in the case of a family
unit, the goal will be to congregate and survive, together. Thus,
these family members will typically make every effort to respond to
the benefit of the family, as a unit. If family members are
separated, they can be expected to make a quick effort to rejoin,
if necessary, delaying escape until all members are present, or
otherwise known to be safe.
Altruistic behavior is subject to debate as being a predominantly
positive response. Depending on the specifics of any situation, it
can be questioned whether this response helps or hinders safety and
survival. It may reasonably be expected that family member
separation, particularly in the event of parent-child separation,
response will be dramatically faster. Conversely, any search for
the missing individual(s) could conceivably delay personal escape,
possibly that of others.
The onset phase can be equally difficult for the crew and
passengers acceptance. However, the evacuation phase has the
specific demand for the crews' training and performance to maintain
psychological balance. This balance is a function of both training,
and any similar previous experience. The crewmember mental and
emotional reaction must be superior to that of the
passengers.
If crewmembers are not reasonably aware of the probable or
potential experiences and any responses of their passengers, a
dangerous event can deteriorate into an unnecessary
catastrophe.
It goes without saying that the flight crews must have a good
knowledge of the location and use of emergency equipment, doors,
slides and even life rafts, if appropriate. Additionally, there
must be a comparable knowledge of the evacuation routes,
procedures, defined stations and expected individual duties. The
unfortunate fact is that beyond initial training, typically,
precious little is subsequently done with respect to conducting
actual drills. Consequently individual initiative is most often
required to dynamically expand the primary knowledge in preparation
for practical application of emergency procedures.
The normal passenger safety briefing is vitally important,
providing the minimum knowledge of what is expected of passengers
should an actually emergency occur. That briefing is the point when
the interaction between passengers and crew begins.
The pre-departure safety briefing verbiage is quite scientifically
chosen. While its intent is commendable, there is also the risk of
cynicism at some of the "PR" language. For example, "... in the
event of a water landing.." Unfortunately, judgment is all too
often highly subjective. Such language might be appropriate for a
domestic flight. However in the current environment of twin-engine
ocean crossings, a more thorough safety briefing is much more
appropriate. Sadly, marketing forces (PR) usually preclude such
prudent safety measures.
Remembering that preparation makes the difference in an emergency,
any valid questions, or overt lack of information, creates
insecurity. If the passengers are not reasonably informed, the
'leaders' among them will make a positive effort to gain the wanted
or required information. Such a response could consume valuable
crew time and effort, which would otherwise be better invested in
preparation.
Even informed people will differ in their capacity to absorb or
retain the information. The individual passenger's attention may
become diverted by 'denial' resulting on their attention getting
focused on irrelevant matters or details, defeating otherwise good
communication. In any case, clear information, guidance and
instruction will still be required for the individual to decide on
a realistic course of action. Thus, crew effectiveness is
imperative. Likewise, distractions such as the needs of a family,
may negate information. Assuming that time is available,
reinforcement is required to the end.
If people are left to guess as to what is actually in progress,
they may feel an unbearable uncertainty. Feeling that they have
been abandoned to their own devices, they may attach themselves to
their first (probably false) guess as to their reality and their
self-prescribed solution to the point of eventually inadvertently
effecting their own death.
An additional risk is found in the tendency of some passengers to
repeatedly revise their perception of the situation and its
potential, consequently their decided course of action. The result
may be an inconsistent, mistaken or ever-expanding perception of
the situation. In turn, these passengers could either act as an
interference at any point or require valuable time and attention;
possibly assistance.
Vacillating passengers may also become highly suggestible by others
in distress. In some cases, passengers might become suspicious of
the motives of others, including the crew, or view others,
particularly the crew as being directly responsible for the
emergency. Possibly, the crew may find themselves subjected to an
inappropriate but infectious anger of passengers.
Again, panic is unlikely to be a problem among airline passengers
unless certain overwhelming events or conditions prevail. Often the
first passenger reaction will be to seek family, friends and
belongings. Naturally, parents will seek and protect their
children. Families can be expected to seek their membership,
attempting to stay together. The natural tendency of those in
crisis is to move toward both familiar (trusted) people and places.
Some passengers will try to evacuate via a well-known route and
exit or entry point. The tendency for people to want to leave by an
otherwise obvious route leaves the crew (or surviving 'leaders')
with the burden of getting passengers to move in the direction of
actual safety.
Beyond exiting the aircraft, it will also be required to get the
passengers a safe distance and away from the aircraft and any
rescue vehicles. In many cases, flight crews are not instructed to
aggressively assemble the passengers in a desirable location. The
post-evacuation phase is extremely important, as many passengers
may require immediate medical care. The passengers may also need to
be 'protected from themselves.' This could involve everything from
stopping a passenger from smoking, with jet fuel spilled all
around, to keeping dazed passengers from wandering into the path of
a vehicle or into a river.
An evacuation also takes time. During the evacuation phase,
passengers require the confidence that someone is taking care of
them or enabling them. The potential range of responses leaves the
crew to cope with anything from giving simple directions, helping
passengers frozen with fear, to preventing other passengers from
taking a wrong initiative. Professionalism and tradition leave most
to expect crewmembers to act heroically. However, the primary focus
must be on the preparation and actual management and strong
leadership throughout the actual event.
AFTERMATH
The aftermath of an emergency is basically the very end of an
emergency. This phase carries the qualification that everyone is
now clear of the direct effects of the emergency. The aftermath can
be as simple as the passing of a situation with the relieved
realization that the potential crisis did not evolve into actual
danger or harm. In such a situation the crewmembers can 'stand
down,' reverting to normal duties, while the passengers can safely
resume their former activities - the emergency has passed.
Possibly, a full-blown crisis has occurred and evolved into an
accident. However, in the 'aftermath,' the situation is essentially
'over;' it is not expected to cause any more damage or harm.
Passengers and crew been evacuated from areas of immediate
danger.
During the early stages of the aftermath phase (depending upon the
severity of the emergency), a gradual return to normal reasoning is
expected, with the realization that the incident or accident or
incident no longer carries any direct threat.
It is expected or hoped that the flight crew, in their training and
their experience, are the first realize that the situation has
changed, being able to announce that the basic emergency is over,
providing supplemental information and care. However, there will be
those events extending the emergency with secondary threats or a
new danger. For example, a successful evacuation into freezing cold
or a ditching in a storm.
The crew or spontaneous leaders will then be faced with the
requirement of convincing the passengers as to the 'new' real-time
reality. Depending on the situation this could be either simple or
complex, depending on the severity of the incident or accident,
this task might be a separate challenge.
There is always the chance that some passengers may resist
pacification, still feeling insecure. Whether the feeling is
appropriate or not, the passengers may still feel threatened and
continuing to act as though some immediate danger is still present.
It is unlikely that any great percentage of passengers will share
such feelings.
A strange aspect of human behavior needs to be illustrated to
crewmembers; there may be a desire displayed by some passengers to,
'return to the scene.'
Looking again to structural fire studies, it was observed that
slightly more than 40% of the escapees felt an urge to re-enter the
building - while the fire was ongoing. Only a small percentage of
those questioned cited any desire to either fight the fire or
engage in any life saving. Explanations lacking, it is a phenomenon
worth being alert to.
In a post-accident scenario, passengers may need to be either
counseled as the result of intentions expressed to not to give in
to such impulses. The immediate need is to collect the passengers
in a safe area, clear of any rescue or fire-fighting teams.
Some emergencies are safely dealt with in flight, allowing the safe
continuation of the flight or a diversion to an intermediate
airport. Once the emergency has been resolved, the flight
attendants, in particular may be required to take extra time and
effort to convince some passengers that the danger is in fact over,
and that they can safely return to their former activities. Some
passengers may remain extremely uncertain or even suspicious,
possibly blaming the crew for the event and their current
predicament - even if all are then safe. An example would be a
severe turbulence encounter with injuries. Often, the crewmembers
are quickly threatened with complaint letters, official complaints
or personal lawsuits.
Obviously, the crew must also be prepared with the more serious
in-flight events, as well. The event may create a more serious
aftermath, following the emergency. This is particularly true if
passengers or crew have been injured or possibly killed and radical
damage sustained by the aircraft. In serious 'in-flight'
situations, the passengers may have to be moved from their original
locations to another area of the aircraft. An example would be an
uncontained engine failure with damage to the fuselage or the
interior itself. However, most serious accidents are 'on airport'
accidents, often resulting in shattered aircraft. Thus, external
sheltering is more viable.
In bone fide accidents, evacuation is normally the first priority
after the aircraft has come to a rest. The potential for the
situation to deteriorate will depend on a number of largely
unpredictable factors.
Any physiological effects, including personal injury, burns or
exposure to the elements play a major role in the passengers'
ability to function or survive. It must be remembered that
conditions such as shock or hypothermia are responsible for a large
percentage of deaths in aircraft disasters.
Researchers have long acknowledged that there is also the
psychological or emotional threat. In any survival scenario, there
is a terrific multi-facetted personal challenge. In addition to the
physical survival, it is accepted that the individual's
psychological and emotional response plays an additional and
important role. There is no shortage of accounts where people have
remained viable and survived when their physical experience and
condition should have otherwise resulted in death.
A key part of survival is the classic 'will to live.' Maritime
accounts from the Titanic to Naval and Merchant Marine losses
during World War II describe many deaths not being entirely due to
trauma or exposure. Many accounts clearly indicate that personal
attitudes or psychology have been highly instrumental in many of
the deaths at sea. The strongest seem to have been the older
persons seamen, with pre-existing survival experience.
Thus, the emotional experiences and responses during this phase of
an emergency must be explored.
REACTIONARY PERIOD
Following the emergency outcome, there will initially be a variable
time period of shock, denial and withdrawal for some of the
passengers and crew, even for those who were fully and highly
functional throughout the emergency. The reactions to the emergency
will vary from the extreme of zero impact to serious
reactions.
The period of shock or withdrawal can be healthy, allowing
passengers and crew to keep calm, allowing mind and body to
recover. The period of shock is normally followed by a gradual
return to a state of full awareness, with the expression of
constructive or appropriate emotions and a normal level of
functioning. This will be true for the large majority of
people.
There may be, however, a profound and counter-productive reaction.
For the most part, the reaction will be in proportion to the
perceived threat. If the threat was potentially violent or
otherwise life threatening - particularly where fire was involved,
the reactions can be rather extreme. Some may act very passively
and compliantly with obvious retardation of awareness. There may be
an emotional void, a quest for sleep or partial amnesia in regard
to personal details such as a full name or their address and phone
number. Survivors who come face-to-face with the threat of personal
injury or death typically experience some degree of shock, becoming
partially numb in the mental and emotional sense; they may be
unable to help themselves. This is the typical description
associated with the term, 'disaster syndrome.'
The degree of mental and emotional withdrawal from the impact of
the emergency serves to protect the individual from either the
actual extent of the destruction and loss, or from the potential
impact. Eventually, it will pass, allowing the individual to return
to a more normal level of functioning.
Beyond personal trauma, passengers and crew can reasonably be
expected to react to the plight or fate of the passengers,
particularly the children, and the crewmembers. Personal injury or
the loss of a loved one, friend or colleague can effect an adverse
secondary reaction from simple sympathy to personal psychological
identification.
There can also be expected a time period between any emotional
withdrawal and the return to full awareness. This period may begin
with confusion and hyperactivity; possibly nearly hysterical
laughing. The reactions during this time may not be appropriate to
the situation. People may attend to personal grooming or engage in
a cleaning or dawdling 'ritual,' as opposed helping other
victims.
With a large number of passengers, there may be an awareness of
others and their needs, however, there could also be an unusual
degree of social fragmentation. Loose and unstable groups may form
without particular purpose, fracturing, and then re-forming.
Some people may actively seek others in worse condition, attempting
to either reassure themselves that they have-survived better than
expected or to relieve their own identification with the pain of
others by engaging in a 'rescue' activity. In extreme cases, which
lack leadership, any initiative to form stable groups with a
constructive mission may have to come from outside the immediate
group or the survivors as a whole. For example, if the accident
occurs at a remote location, radio instructions may be received,
commanding organization of serious injuries, women & children for
the first rescue effort.
Some adults may exhibit a childlike behavior or dependency,
becoming immediately dependent on anyone who displays any strength,
potential or actual kindness or comfort. Other people may exhibit
open guilt feelings for having survived the crash. They may express
the personal opinion that they didn't deserve to live, did not
perform as they should have, did not do enough or blame themselves
for being weak. In such cases, reality will have little effect
until they are forced to believe otherwise.
Any family bonds can be expected to override other social ties.
Passengers will initially look exclusively for loved ones, or
insisting on knowing that they are safe. People separated from
loved ones may experience a conflict between their family member
role and that of being an immediately needed rescuer / helper. This
conflict could render them ineffective, possibly creating a source
of conflict.
During the aftermath phase, people transition from confusion,
shock, denial or withdrawal through attainment of effective
response capability. This period may be brief, however, it can last
much longer, perhaps for days or weeks, depending on the
individual's trauma, stamina and the magnitude of the emergency.
During this period, there may be a random venting of feelings of
anger. Upon being rescued, such frustrations may possibly be
directed at rescuers. Historically, rescuers are commonly held
accountable by the media for their 'slow' response time, based on
passenger complaints.
In extreme cases, without appropriate support or the help, these
same people may find it difficult to recover to a normal state of
mind and may not function effectively for some indeterminate
period. Apathy and despair may continue, expressed in either overt
or veiled behavior. The effects of the trauma could eventually lead
to emotional and psychological breakdown to the extreme of suicide.
It is also certain that a significant percentage of passengers will
experience elation, possibly euphoria, in their survival.
The crewmembers attending to the passengers should be aware of the
potential for such extremes. The effect may be sudden or gradual.
Whatever the underlying cause, the expression may be an overt act
or passive, for example, a diabetic not citing an awareness of
his/her need for insulin.
The aftermath of an emergency may be as difficult for the
passengers to deal with as any of the other emergency phases.
However, there are healthy responses and reactions, thoughts and
feelings which help people return to the desired level of
appropriate functioning. Any positive responses should be openly
praised and encouraged with the hope or intention of establishing
such positive responses as a group norm. The important aspect of
such reactions is that there is the time and means available to
deal with the problem.
PASSENGER RESPONSE
The induced stress of the emergency may continue taking its toll
from elevated anxiety levels to what might be termed the 'adrenalin
effect.' This is particularly true in events which do not have a
well-defined termination point, leading to seemingly unending
uncertainty.
It's natural for passengers to take in the overall picture,
including the obvious destruction and any form of loss from
personal belongings to loved ones. In their own experience of
having faced death and injury, passengers will individually move on
to the next phase.
Depending on the individual's makeup, some passengers may
experience increased anxiety levels. Whether one cares to relate to
the anxiety behavior in terms of 'ordinary' anxiety, or attribute
behavior to adrenalin, the resulting energy will require release.
In the aftermath phase, the emotional release will begin with a
sense of increased safety or security, as the passengers realize
the recent history as being non-imaginary; some passengers may
continue to be stunned, appearing numb.
To address another probable reality, there may be a second rush to
use personal cell phones. There may also be an associated anxiety
or hysterical near-panic by those who don't have cell phones,
essentially attacking those who appear to be having results. Again,
this may be uncontrollable.
Unfortunately, it may be necessary for the crew to join in the fray
to use any cell phone capability in an attempt to facilitate rescue
and survival. Hence, the crew may have to secret themselves to keep
from being distracted or possibly mobbed, while using the cell
phones. It might be necessary also for at least the senior
surviving crewmember to commandeer a cell phone. However it is far
more likely that other crewmembers or the passengers will volunteer
a cell phone.
Eventually almost all the passengers will gravitate toward
regaining control of their senses, reacting by engaging in survival
activities, rescue activity and comforting others.
It will be important for any crew of leaders to take a
compassionate, yet firm, leadership role, which constructively
directs activities and supports morale, diminishes any anger and
activates the element of hope, if not gratification in the form of
returning to normalcy.
The leadership function will require situational control, which
will additionally require solicitation of a variety of information
with the ability to put the remaining situation into a perspective
easy for the passengers to understand. This information may require
more effort on the passengers' part. As soon as possible, the crew
should organize people to search for survivors, then survival
resources.
The most effective way to get and maintain such control is to rely
on the passengers will to survive. This may require blatantly
taking advantage of their emotions, whether their will to survive
is based on the desire to rejoin with loved ones, the seeking of
the opposite experience of pleasure or escape; possibly for the
element of revenge on those the individual perceives as responsible
for the emergency.
The passengers must be inspired to bring their focus on survival,
as a group, as well as individuals. It may become necessary to
accuse them of being selfish, inspiring able individuals to
actively assist others in the process of protecting themselves. As
best able, teamwork should be established where each is rendering
mutual assistance, comparing information and sharing pertinent
advice or any resources.
In this process, the mental and emotional focus is vitally
important. Asking passengers to rehearse their emergent
post-accident activities is a powerful, and typically welcome,
motivator. The underlying key is to bring constructive emotions
into play by getting the passengers to focus on people who are
important to them, particularly family members such as wives,
husbands, children and parents. The choice of verbiage will be
important; for example, "Just think how wonderful it's going to
feel when your kids throw their arms around your neck & give you
that big bear hug." Negative motivation may be necessary, "Do you
want to orphan your kids, or listen to me??"
There will also be those who are strongly religious or have
abruptly become so during the course of the emergency. Regardless
of personal beliefs, the spiritual energy can be a valuable
resource as well. When the situation becomes reasonably stabilized,
prayer can be a very constructive release, as well as being source
of inspiration and reassurance. Religious concepts can also be
employed in the form of an appeal in a seemingly hopeless
situation, even for those who would not consider themselves as
being religious.
An appeal such as, "C'mon folks, God didn't let us get this far,
just to quit on each other," can be the needed inspiration
necessary for survival in the aftermath.
With any degree of assured safety and stability in the aftermath,
physical and mental rest will be vitally important. Any measure of
rest allows passengers to regain energy, permitting the passengers
and crew to emerge some time later as being physically and mentally
refreshed, ready to focus their restored energy toward support and
survival. Obviously, it should be assured that the attainment of
any such rest is not accommodating a threatening condition such as
shock, depression or hypothermia.
Any children should be carefully attended to, as they are highly
vulnerable. Often, they will have stronger physical stamina in
their youth; however, their limited experience will strongly be
reflected in their response to an emergency or a full-blown
disaster, and the associated aftermath. Normally, children are
highly protected with an idealistic set of norms. Emergencies and
accidents take them a greater mental and emotional distance from
their expected safety norms. Accidents can be particularly brutal
for them, attacking any idealism, particularly their seemingly
automatic trust in adults. Any children should be shielded from as
much 'ugliness' of the accident as possible, despite their natural
curiosity. This is especially true with respect to the severely
injured or deceased.
When accompanied by parents, children can be expected to mirror the
actions of their parents. Fortunately, the parents will often be
rational and responsible in the protection of the children. For the
most part, unaccompanied children often show very little or no
fear. It would seem that they act so as to make their parents proud
of them later.
Obviously, as the age of the child increases, they will
increasingly emulate adult behavior. One of the key behaviors of
children, which must be watched, is their curiosity, even of threat
or the unknown. It should also be remembered that impulsive
children move rapidly.
In dealing with the aftermath of an emergency, particularly an
accident, the determining factor will be effective and strong
leadership, just as at any other point during the emergency.
Decisive leadership is required, however, it must also reasonably
contain the element of compassion to maintain the required morale,
diminish any frustration or anger, and to counteract or reverse any
sense of hopelessness.
In order to achieve that result, it will also be important to keep
a positive light on the situation, emphasizing any positive
aspects, avoiding any negativity.
Beyond passenger welfare and reaction, it is equally vital to
consider the plight of the crewmembers. They are ideally well
trained for emergencies and accidents, however, it must not be
forgotten that the pilots and flight attendants will be under
greater pressure, given their roles of responsibility; ultimately,
their accountability.
CREW RESPONSE
The pilots and flight attendants can also be expected to experience
a high level of tension and urgency when coping with the emergency
and the passengers; whether during the emergency or in the
aftermath. It should also be acknowledged that the crew is more
prone to serious injury or death, due to their location and
surroundings on the aircraft. Any crew injuries, particularly head
injuries can strongly affect their response. There may be unique or
extreme circumstances where a member of the crew is required to be
removed from authority due to injury or post-accident
trauma.
The individual crewmember's feelings can be controlled and
redirected through a focused effort to not become overwhelmed by
the events themselves and what could be new and unexpected
responsibilities, as well as the potential accountability.
In the process of gaining that control, the crewmembers will need
to gain a grasp the overall picture, resisting the temptation to
isolate small portions of the situation.
It will be important for the crew, as a whole, to develop a plan,
keeping it as simple but effective as possible. In that planning,
they will need to break down the requirements into manageable
tasks, setting clear and achievable results, while avoiding the
temptation to do too much, instead, acting as team members. Of
greatest importance will be the prioritization of tasks.
Each crewmember must accept their individual limitations, realizing
that one person cannot achieve all. The captain will probably have
the greatest difficulty with this aspect.
Survivor interviews indicate that those who have successfully
managed an emergency have had a natural tendency to both attend to
their own requirements and effectively attend to the requirements
of others. Obviously, prioritization is a key function in this
process.
In the aftermath, one of the crews' requirements will be to conduct
a roll call, so as to account for passengers and crew, establish
safety, a line of authority, and to ensure that passengers and crew
are clear as to who is in charge. It will be important to
illuminate the fact that at least the crewmembers are sufficiently
trained, and establish in the minds of the passengers that they can
have some degree of confidence in the crew.
As an additional function of the roll call, it will offer the means
to identifying those capable of effective action, assigning the
competent and able-bodied assistants to help and support those in
need, particularly those at the point of collapsing.
Obviously, it may be necessary to identify any crew or passenger
skills and knowledge. Qualified passengers may not necessarily
volunteer. After identifying the human resources, it will be
necessary to put those assets to work. The side benefit in
constructively enabling individuals is the benefit of their being
involved in some form of activity, which requires concentration,
facilitating their mental and emotional recovery.
It is important to improvise a means of identifying the surviving
individuals and recording any injuries; obvious and suspected. If
possible, it will also be vitally important to identify any
possible treatment and decide who will administer the needed care.
Time and resources permitting, it will also be necessary to
identify the missing or those known to be deceased. Wile the flight
attendants will be furnished a passenger manifest, that might get
lost in the course of the emergency; a hand-written list might be
necessary.
The roll call will also serve as a simple method to establish the
mental state of the individual. If a person can only remember their
name, they may be in more dire need of assistance than someone who
can remember more. Conversely, it is likely that an individual who
can remember more will recover more rapidly if assigned a task,
even if nothing more than talking to other passengers, identifying
their needs, or supporting or boosting their morale.
Personal contact will be important, if the situation permits.
Personal interest in any form will serve as a form of reassurance
to the individual. If they are recognized as an individual, with a
name and a personal role or with a family history, they will
respond to the interest as a form of caring, with the probable
response that they will stop thinking exclusively of themselves
simply as a 'victim,' transitioning to the role of a 'helper.'
Interpersonal contact will be received as a form of relief. Simply
talking to someone is often a timely and vital movement toward
trauma recovery. However, awareness should be maintained for any
sensitive issues. If any are discovered, it is unwise to explore
these too deeply. In the trauma of the emergency, survivors may be
simply be stunned by events, but they may also be hypersensitive,
as well. This is particularly true in a case where a survivor is
keenly aware of the actual or highly probable death of a loved one
in the accident.
Task assignment can be highly therapeutic as well as practical, as
an active role assignment may grant passengers, in particular,
their first chance to perform their first independent action since
the onset of the emergency. This can be as simple as giving their
name and that of their present family to a crewmember.
If actual rescue is delayed, roll calls should be repeated, so as
to monitor subsequent events, including subsequent incapacitations.
Repeated roll calls will reinforce the element of concern or care
until rescue is effected. This monitoring also assures the best
chance of identifying adverse physical or psychological problems.
In unique circumstances, there may be the possibility of people
'adventuring,' becoming lost or risking injury.
Despite actual immediate needs, volunteers should be accepted
whenever possible, remembering that rejection can be unnecessarily
damaging to the individual. Rejection can have an adverse impact,
which affects the general atmosphere. Even an injured or
immobilized passenger might have sufficient stamina, which can be
effective if in no other form than that than being a caring
listener. Maintaining a general 'can do' mentality is important.
Any periods of coincident or enforced inactivity make leave people
feeling unwanted or useless. Such brings the risk that they will
revert to focusing on their own plight, rationalizing that it is
worse than it actually is. This could also have the dangerous
effect of undermining their will to contribute or to survive the
emergency.
POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
This is an aspect of trauma and stress, which should NOT be
underestimated. It is a very real phenomenon, which is not merely
the 'stuff of personal injury attorneys.'
If an emergency is not serious or is quickly resolved, events and
lives should very quickly return to normal, without significant
effects. The crewmembers and passengers can resume their normal
activities or, if they have safely deplaned in a normal fashion,
the majority of passengers and crew will immediately get on with a
normal life. The event may seem extremely minor, if not an
interesting adventure.
Conversely, if the event was serious, matters will probably be
quite different and rather unpredictable. Most passengers and crew
will have a keen realization as to the full extent of what
physically happened to them. The realization will range from
personal injuries, the loss of loved ones and the loss of personal
possessions.
In a significant percentage of cases, some will be affected to the
extreme of frequent and vivid 'flashbacks' - recalling events with
sufficient clarity as to re-live them. It is also possible for some
to be affected to the extreme of psychiatric illness, including
random anxiety, depression and persistent nightmares, with a wide
range of associated disorders.
Anger and despair are not uncommon among survivors. The chief
difficulty of survivors is the knowledge or means to deal with the
resulting feelings. Venting anger is a common result and a healthy
and effective means of dealing with the feelings. Obviously, such
feelings must be directed so as to not inflict any harm, including
damage to the morale of others.
If the individual's only option is to direct anger at a large
organization, such as the airline or travel agency, the result can
be long-term frustration, lacking resolution. In consequence, the
hostile feelings may not have either a clear target or a probable
chance of relief or ultimate resolution. Hence, the survivor's
frustration may become very long term.
Whenever possible, humor should be illustrated as a form of
therapy, even if it is necessary to resort to sardonic
humor.
The post-trauma stress is far worse for the crew, as they will
probably not only be denied the opportunity to relieve their
feelings, but corporate politics could also dictate their being
silenced to an extreme, upon threat of termination, possibly legal
action by the FAA in the case of the pilots. Crewmembers may find
themselves the subject of seemingly unending investigative
interviews, including court subpoenas.
For the unfamiliar, the FAA maintains its own 'kangaroo court'
system, which has been successful in denying pilots and even air
carriers the ordinarily expected Constitutional 'due process.' The
FAA is famous for arbitrarily destroying pilots' lives for the
simple fact that they have the power to do so. While pilot error is
commonly cited, the case isn't always valid; a fact well known as
an unpredictable liability to pilots. Small air carriers have
experienced the same treatment, having their Operating Certificate
revoked for purely political reasons.
The knowledge, skills and decisions of the pilots and flight
attendants will determine how they handle an emergency, from the
warning phase through the aftermath. Their personal resources and
decisions will play a major role in how they and the survivors live
or suffer the rest of their lives.
The aftermath phase is essentially the termination of the immediate
crisis situation. Either an emergency has been properly handled or
an accident has been successfully averted. Ideally, the original
causative or contributing factors are no longer probable to cause
any injury, damage or death.
Ideally, the passengers are able to quickly return to normal
activities such as eating a meal, reading a magazine or watching a
movie. Some passengers may remain concerned, requiring additional
reassurance or support of the pilots and flight attendants before
accepting the problem as having been adequately dealt with; being
certain that it is improbable that it, or similar events, will
recur. In such events, information and reassurance are the
essential component to effect passenger comfort and faith.
Conversely, if passenger concern is discounted, such will lead to
a sense of abandonment, the pilots and flight attendants will then
have a radically different task in the aftermath phase, even for a
relatively simple event. Improper handling of the early phases of
an emergency will result in the pilots and flight attendants having
an extended role in the long-term welfare of the passengers.
In an extended emergency, the pilots and flight attendants often
experience a greater period of difficulty and trauma. The crew is
far better qualified to ascertain the probability of injury or
death. Worse, any confusion or ambiguity will first be known by
them. As a result, the toll of the emotional and psychological
impact will be increased.
During a life-threatening emergency, many go through the
stereotyped period of taking stock of their lives. Often this
action can amplify the perceived severity of the event. Among
passengers, some may become too shocked and stunned for any
coherent thought processes and appropriate response or action. Any
whom are separated from their family and friends on the aircraft
can encounter an almost unbearable concern and uncertainty as to
their safety. The stress of the situation results in the need for
emotional release. Even under stress, most will snap back to
relatively normal functioning, attending to their own welfare and
survival, as well as the welfare and survival of others.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the crucial difference is in
the constant information, support and leadership of pilots and
flight attendants. During any period of emotional and psychological
adjustment, from any degree of shock and any associated withdrawal,
to full awareness, the individual's ability to maintain or regain
effective control over events is critical. This is true, not only
with respect to accepting and coping with the more immediate and
short term difficulties, but also for the long-term welfare of all
those involved.
EVACUATION STUDIES
Ideally, an emergency will be resolved with a safe landing,
allowing the passengers to disembark through a jetway.
Unfortunately, many incidents and accidents result in a
full-fledged emergency evacuation. Few events are as crucial as an
evacuation, as seconds quickly become critical in a life-death
scenario.
Historically, only evacuations involving serious accidents have
been examined in various studies, as opposed to including
evacuations arising from incidents. Most studies also fail to
address successful evacuations. Therefore, these studies did not
identify what procedures and equipment were either effective or
ineffective in evacuations.
While research and studies have been conducted on aircraft
evacuations, most have provided insight into specific factors, such
as crewmember training and passenger behavior, which affected the
outcome of problematic evacuations.
As a consequence, little is known about the incident-related
evacuations, which can provide insight into how successful
evacuations can be performed and which can also identify safety
deficiencies before serious accidents do occur. Most studies are
retrospective in their analysis. The majority of the studies
account for individual accident related evacuations, as opposed to
identifying characteristics from a collective analysis of
representative evacuations.
Until recently, research on aircraft evacuations has not explored
some of the most basic issues as to how often commercial aircraft
are evacuated, how many people are injured and how these injuries
occur. Research also fails to identify the background causes in
evacuation-related fatalities.
The NTSB examined the following safety issues in their June, 2000
evacuation study:
* Certification issues related to airplane evacuation
* The effectiveness of evacuation equipment
* The adequacy of air carrier and rescue / fire fighting guidance
and procedures related to evacuations, and
* Communication issues related to evacuations. The study also
compiled some general statistics on evacuations, including the
number of evacuations and the types and number of passenger
injuries incurred during evacuations.
As a result of the June 2000 study, the NTSB issued their set of
safety recommendations and reiterated lingering safety
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration. That study,
however, only used a core of evacuations spanning two years.
To illustrate the seriousness of evacuations, as a whole, the
following accidents are used -
February 1, 1991, a B-737 landed and collided with a commuter
aircraft on the runway at Los Angeles International Airport. All
the passengers on the commuter plane died in the initial impact.
However, none of the passengers on the B-737 died as a result of
the impact. Following the impact, 19 passengers died from smoke
inhalation, while 1 died from burn injuries. Out of the 19
smoke-inhalation fatalities, 10 died while attempting to use the
right over-wing exit. The NTSB discovered two factors which caused
brief, but deadly delays - passengers' delay in opening the exit,
and a scuffle between two passengers. While the impact deaths were
a foregone conclusion, the smoke inhalation / burn deaths were
probably preventable.
June 1, 1999, MD-80 crash, in Little Rock, Arkansas, resulting in
11 fatalities, 45 serious and 65 minor injuries. Two of the
fatalities were the result of smoke inhalation in the rear of the
aircraft; while a second passenger died 16 days later of burn
injuries suffered while evacuating from an over-wing exit. The
injuries in that accident included smoke inhalation, burns, and
fractures. The final NTSB report is pending.
These accidents illuminate only a few of the safety issues related
to aircraft evacuations. In addition to accident investigations,
independent studies by the NTSB, the Transportation Safety Board of
Canada, the British CAA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
and other independent researchers examined specific factors, which
affect successful aircraft evacuations. Although these studies
provided insight into specific factors, such as crewmember training
and passenger behavior, which affect the outcome of evacuations,
they had several limitations.
In many studies, researchers did not examine successful
evacuations; therefore, they were not always able to discuss what
equipment and procedures worked well during evacuations.
Only evacuations following accidents were examined and not
evacuations arising from incidents. As a result, little has been
learned from incident-related evacuations, which can provide
insight into how successful evacuations can be performed and which
can also identify safety deficiencies before serious accidents
occur.
Each of the studies was a retrospective analysis of accident
evacuations. This approach limited the researchers to information
collected during the original investigation rather than collecting
consistent information on a set of evacuations.
As early as 1974, the NTSB began examining the aircraft evacuation
issues, making appropriate recommendations to the FAA to increase
passenger safety during evacuations.
A 1985 NTSB study examined air carrier over-water emergency
equipment and procedures. In that study, the NTSB focused on 16
survivable water contact accidents, which occurred between 1959 and
1984. In those incidents, most were found to be inadvertent,
occurring without warning. They involved substantial aircraft
damage, rapid cabin flooding and a high chance of injury. That
study led to improvements in life preserver design, packaging,
accessibility, and ease of donning. The study also produced crew
post-crash survival training; and water rescue plans for airports
near water.
In another 1985 study, the NTSB conducted a review of the
presentation methods used by carriers to present passengers with
safety information. That study was a systematic review of the
safety information content and the methods used to convey safety
information to the passengers.
The second study considered the merits and shortcomings of the
verbal briefings, demonstrations, the safety card content, and the
videotaped briefings. The study was based on an analysis of 21
accident investigations in which passenger safety information
briefings were considered to be a factor influencing passenger
survival. In response to the study and the NTSB recommendations,
the FAA also conducted research to establish the minimum level of
acceptable comprehension of the passenger safety cards. Strangely,
the matter of 'optimal' comprehension is more appropriate.
In 1992, the NTSB completed a special investigation report
concerning flight attendant training. That investigation
illuminated a serious lack of guidance to FAA inspectors in the
oversight of flight attendant training, particularly in regard to
flight attendant recurrent training. The investigation also
identified a lack of flight attendant knowledge of emergency
procedures and equipment. The study also identified the fact that
most air carriers did not employ standard locations for emergency
equipment. The concerning aspect was that the flight attendants
were not limited in the number of airplane type qualifications,
creating confusion.
That report remains relevant to the latest NTSB study, as many of
the same issues are still open, particularly the fact that many air
carriers still do not perform evacuation drills during recurrent
training, and the carriers still are not required by the FAA to
conduct such training.
In 1987, as a result of a fatal B-737 fire in Manchester, England,
the English Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) commissioned a series of
studies on cabin safety issues. The study examined passenger
behavior in aircraft emergencies, focusing on the influences of the
aircraft cabin configuration on the rate at which passengers could
evacuate.
Various aircraft cabin configurations were evaluated with respect
to competitive passenger behavior, simulating reasonable behavior
in life-threatening accident scenarios. Orderly conditions such as
aircraft certification testing were also studied. The results of
those studies indicated a minimum bulkhead passageway width of 30
inches. The studies also indicated a minimum distance between
over-wing exit row seats of 13 to 25 inches.
The distance between seats was measured from the rear of the seat
back of the forward row and the forward edge of the seat cushion
immediately behind.
NOTE:
Over-wing exits are typically designated as Type III exits, defined
as,'... rectangular openings of not less that 20 inches wide by 36
inches high with a step up from inside the airplane of not more
than 20 inches and a step down outside the plane of not more than
27 inches.'
The CAA studies also examined the effects of over-wing exit door
panel weight and the seating configuration, relative to passengers'
physical ability to operate the Type III over-wing exits. The
studies indicated the need for a 50% weight reduction in the
over-wing hatch weight, as well as minimum available seat space to
significantly reduce the exit operation time. While not politically
correct (in the USA), the benefit of a reduced hatch weight and an
increase in the seat space was demonstrated to be more significant
for females than males.
The FAA and the CAA jointly commissioned another part of those
studies, exploring the influence of the flight attendants on
passenger evacuation during an emergency in both competitive and
cooperative models. The results of that portion illustrated that
both the crewmember performance and the number of flight attendants
significantly influenced the evacuation rate and the passengers'
behavior. That portion of the studies also demonstrated that
evacuation times were faster through the forward exits than the
rear exits.
In their detailed investigations, the NTSB considered various
carrier documents and procedures:
1. The safety briefing cards
2. Aircraft cabin diagrams
3. Flight deck crew manuals, pertaining to emergency
evacuations
4. Flight deck crew training materials and syllabi (initial and
recurrent), pertaining to emergency evacuations
5. Flight attendant operating manual materials pertaining to
emergency evacuations
6. Flight attendant training materials and syllabi (initial and
recurrent), pertaining to emergency evacuations
7. Flight deck crew evacuation checklists
8. Flight attendant evacuation checklists
9. Flight deck crew and flight attendant statements from actual
evacuations.
EVENTS THAT LED TO THE EMERGENCY
In an NTSB survey of passengers who had been involved in an
evacuation, the reported competitive behaviors included pushing,
climbing over the seats and disputes among other passengers.
Overall, the survey indicated 12 percent of the passengers reported
that they climbed over seats, while 20 percent reported observing
someone climbing seats. However, the survey included over 40
incidents, with a wide range of severity in those incidents. In one
case, 80 percent indicated that they climbed over seats.
AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE-FIGHTING RESPONSE (ARFF)
In the U.S., Federal regulations determine the size of ARFF support
at each certificated airport. Incidents/accidents are relayed via
the air traffic control (ATC) tower "crash phone." The response
time for the typical event is approximately 2 minutes. Beyond basic
fire fighting, ARFF personnel assist passengers in evacuating the
airplane in cases by opening doors, helping passengers out of
exits, helping passengers at the bottom of evacuation slides,
directing passengers away from the aircraft, and treating injured
passengers and crewmembers.
FAA REQUIREMENTS FOR EVACUATION DEMONSTRATIONS
Evacuation demonstrations are required by the FAA to evaluate the
emergency evacuation capabilities of airplanes and operators. The
FAA requires these tests to be conducted by manufacturers of
airplanes, if the aircraft contains 44 or more passenger seats. The
FAA requires air carriers to conduct a modified evacuation
demonstration on each type of airplane in their fleet, which has 44
or more passenger seats, to satisfy their operating certificate
requirements.
MANUFACTURER'S TYPE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
The FAA may require aircraft manufacturers to perform full-scale
evacuation demonstrations for type certification for new airplanes,
and also for derivative models of currently certificated aircraft
for a unique cabin configuration, or when a significant number of
passenger seats have been added.
Under the requirements of FAR 25, a full-scale demonstration
simulates an emergency evacuation of a full complement of
passengers, deplaning through half the required number emergency
exits, under dark-of-night conditions. A trained crew will direct
the evacuation. The passenger complement is required to meet
certain age/gender specifications. The requirement is for all
passengers and crew to evacuate the aircraft and be on the ground
in 90 seconds or less.
The manufacturer's full-scale demonstration establishes that
certain operating requirements can be met by all operators of the
airplane type. For example, the number of seats on the aircraft
used for the demonstration, dictates the maximum number allowable
on any subsequent aircraft of the same type. The interior
configuration cannot be significantly different from the aircraft
used for the demonstration. Additionally, the number and position
of the flight attendants within the cabin, as well as the
associated training program cannot be unilaterally altered by the
individual operators. If a manufacturer or operator wants to change
any of these parameters, they must appeal to the FAA, and the FAA
may require the manufacturer to perform another full-scale or
partial evacuation demonstration to show that the same level of
safety is maintained.
To be brief, the FAA has incrementally liberalized the evacuation
standards to a dangerous degree by allowing the substitution of
data, as opposed to relying on actual full-scale demonstrations.
While injury to participants has been cited as the reason, an
increase in the risk factor has resulted through non-detection of
problems such as training deficiencies and equipment failures. Such
policy changes enhance profits, while increasing the risk to the
public. It is moot that such injuries are an indicator that major
safety issues need to be addressed, as opposed to minimizing or
eliminating the demonstrations. In a similar fashion, if the
injuries are significant, then it follows that such demonstrations
should be eliminated from the initial training of air
carriers.
The FAA also formed the ARAC (Aviation Rulemaking and Advisory
Committee), a group of industry and government representatives
convened by the FAA, allegedly to facilitate the FAA's rulemaking
process. The group is assigned to examine issues pertinent to a
particular area of concern and developing recommendations for
advisory material and/or revisions to current regulations. The
ARAC, while well intended, serves as more of a delay mechanism, or
an interim pacifier, than an effective safety body.
The NTSB illustrates that while full-scale demonstrations have been
criticized for the potential danger to the passenger-participants,
the only published research on injuries to such participants
indicates that most injuries incurred in the demonstrations are
minor, although serious injuries do occur.
The NTSB continues to remind the FAA that full-scale demonstrations
provide an empirical method for identifying strengths and
weaknesses in the evacuation capabilities of an airplane before it
goes into service. Such demonstrations also highlight the strengths
and weaknesses in the associated procedures. The NTSB also reminded
the FAA that past demonstrations have illuminated inadequate
evacuation slide designs and related procedures. The related
lessons subsequently remedied designs and procedures, in some cases
changing the minimum number and assigned positions of cabin
crew.
The FAA will sometimes allow a manufacturer to use data from
previous demonstrations, using averages of passenger flow rates
through exits, slide preparation times, and exit opening times to
calculate the number of passengers that should reasonably be
expected to evacuate the airplane within the 90-second time limit.
While pragmatic, the 'data' method denies the ability to identify
real-world problems, such as design reliability in typical line
operations.
The FAA requires the testing of previously untested apparatus, such
as a new evacuation slide design. The FAA testing may allow limited
tests of such equipment, as opposed to a full-scale
demonstration.
In a frightening proposal, researchers have proposed the
substitution of computer programs to simulate the dynamics of
emergency evacuations. Although the initial reaction by most to
such a proposal is typically positive, the history of data
corruption must also be considered. Given that 'live' testing data
has been appreciably skewed by the FAA to fit economic desires,
computer data must be viewed as being that much easier to
corrupt.
That is not to say that computer modeling is not valuable as a
method to research evacuations. Computer modeling attempts to
integrate the complex interactions of passengers and their
potential individual behavior with the physical characteristics of
the actual or proposed aircraft cabin. It is obviously valuable to
design computer algorithms to emulated predictable human
characteristics such as age, gender, mobility, and personality.
These factors can, to a degree, predict passenger movement within
the cabin, considering the physical design of the cabin such as
seat pitch (fore-aft distance between seats), aisle width, exit
size and availability, smoke, fire, and other personal
characteristics, which might influence passenger movements. The
computer-modeling proposal obviously argues in terms of time-money
economics, as well as safety.
To date, computer modeling is not proposed as an accident analysis
method.
Computer modeling is not currently recognized by the FAA as an
allowable method of demonstrating evacuations. However, it is
generally accepted by that computer modeling will probably have a
role in design and possibly evacuation certification in the
future.
The unfortunate fact of life is that each incident/accident is
different. Thus, the modeling can only effect a 'peak' standard,
identifying an ideal performance. Consequently, actual evacuations,
controlled or otherwise, remain as the only reliable method of
gathering data.
OPERATING CERTIFICATE REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR CARRIERS
The FAA requires an air carrier to provide evidence that its
crew-training program sufficiently prepares crewmembers to evacuate
passengers in an emergency. The FAA requires air carriers to
demonstrate the evacuation capabilities of their flight attendants
upon initial startup of the company, or when a new type of aircraft
is introduced into service.
Historically, the FAA required a full-scale demonstration. However,
over the years, the FAA regulations were modified to allow partial
evacuation demonstrations to be substituted as evidence of adequate
crewmember training for evacuations. The partial demonstrations
differ from a full-scale demonstration in that carefully selected
flight attendants are utilized. There are no representative
'passengers' on board the aircraft during the demonstration; only
procedures are examined. The FAA requires the procedural
demonstrations to be accomplished in 15 seconds or less. The
partial demonstration requires the flight attendants to get up from
their seats, assess the test conditions, open their assigned exits
if appropriate, and inflate the evacuation slides within the
allotted time.
The intent of the partial demonstration is to provide evidence that
the flight attendant training program effectively prepares the
flight attendants to respond to an emergency situation, that the
aircraft configuration is functional for an evacuation, and that
the equipment is reliable.
With respect to 'commuter' category aircraft, the NTSB is very
concerned about the evacuation standards. FAR Parts 25 and 121 only
address the requirements for aircraft having 44 or more passenger
seats. Currently, it is possible for passengers to unwittingly
board an aircraft, which has had no tests of the evacuation
capability of the aircraft or its crew.
Under FAR Part 121 the FAA does not require the air carrier to
perform a partial evacuation demonstration on aircraft with fewer
than 44 passenger seats to obtain an operating certificate.
Aircraft with fewer than 20 seats are not required to operate with
flight attendants, requiring the pilots to perform the dual role of
flying the aircraft; evacuating passengers when it becomes
necessary. Currently, there is no FAA requirement to perform an
actual or partial evacuation demonstration on these aircraft in the
evacuation training of the pilots. The pilots are only required to
demonstrate a passenger briefing. The NTSB has illustrated that as
of January 1, 1999, there were 846 airplanes in operation by
regional carriers in the USA, which did not require evacuation
certification testing. One can only imagine the numerical increase,
since that date.
The NTSB has taken the position that the standards for safety
should be based on the characteristics of the particular flight
operation, as opposed to the seating capacity of the aircraft,
citing that passengers on commuter airplanes should be afforded the
same regulatory safety protection granted to passengers flying on
Part 121 airplanes.
The NTSB appealed to the FAA to revise the Federal Aviation
Regulations to require all scheduled passenger service conducted in
aircraft with 20 or more passenger seats to be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of FAR Part 121. The NTSB also asked
the FAA to mandate that all scheduled passenger service conducted
in aircraft with 10 to 19 passenger seats be conducted in
accordance with Part 121, or its functional equivalent, wherever
possible.
The NTSB became highly concerned with the fact that the existing
regulations which exempt certain airplanes and operations because
of passenger seating capacity is not consistent with the goal of
providing "one level of safety" for all passenger-carrying
commercial operations.
The NTSB further concluded that all passenger-carrying commercial
airplanes and air carriers should be required to demonstrate
emergency evacuation capabilities through the manufacturer's
evacuation demonstration requirements prescribed in FAR Part 25,
regardless of the number of passenger seats on the airplane. The
NTSB also pushed the FAA to require all commercial operators to
meet the partial evacuation demonstration requirements prescribed
in FAR Part 121, regardless of the number of passenger seats on the
aircraft.
EXITS
The FAA regulations for emergency exits are also contained in FAR
25. Aircraft exits range from the largest, "Type A" ( floor-level
exit door with dimensions of at least 42 inches wide and 72 inches
high), to a "Type IV" (over-wing exit with dimensions of at least
19 inches wide and 26 inches high). "Type III" exits are the
typical over-wing exits, at least 20 inches wide and 36 inches
high.
TYPE III EXITS
The Federal regulations mandate that "the means of opening
emergency exits must be simple and obvious and may not require
exceptional effort." Crewmembers are required to operate each exit
type on their aircraft during initial training and every 2 years
thereafter. Obviously, passengers from the general population are
not likely to have an occasion to open an airplane emergency exit,
prior to an actual evacuation.
ACCESS TO EXITS
Aircraft design factors, such as exit location, aisle width,
bulkhead width, and seating density are factors which can influence
the passengers' access to exits. Consequently, these factors
dictate the success of an actual evacuation. Naturally, these
factors are governed by Federal regulations, intended to ensure
passenger safety. Actual emergency evacuations have prompted
several changes to some of the regulations. For example, a 1985
evacuation of a B-737 in Manchester, England, illustrated
passengers getting stuck at a narrow bulkhead and exit rows. This
event led to the obvious conclusion that both passageways needed
minimum dimensions.
In 1989, the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) conducted
evacuation trials to examine the effects of exit path width - the
distance between the forward-most point on an exit row seat and the
aft-most point on the seat directly in front of it - on the
evacuation rate through Type III over-wing exits. In those trials,
participants were required to evacuate through a Type III exit or
to open a Type III exit hatch using four different seating
conditions:
* a 6-inch unobstructed passageway
* a 10-inch unobstructed passageway
* a 20-inch passageway with 5 inches of the seat encroaching on the
exit, and
* a central seat placement with the outboard seat removed
The researchers reported that evacuation times were faster for the
seating conditions using the 20-inch passageway and the outboard
seat removed than were the evacuation times using the 6-inch
passageway.
However, the report indicated that the various exit widths did not
affect exit hatch removal time. These CAMI trials, combined with
the 1991 B-737 collision accident in Los Angeles, became the basis
for the FAA issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) which
required air carriers to increase the exit path width in exit rows
from 6 inches to 20 inches.
The Manchester fatalities were mysteriously ignored. Industry
comments questioning the need for such a substantial change led
CAMI to conduct another study in 1992 to examine alternatives to
the proposed requirement." In that CAMI study, participants were
required to exit through a Type III over-wing exit using four
different seating conditions: a 10-inch unobstructed passageway
with the seat in front of the exit row displaced forward by 15
10-inch unobstructed passageway with two seats abreast, instead of
three seats, a 20-inch passageway with 5 inches of the seat
encroaching on the exit, and three 6-inch passageways leading to
two exits in which the outboard seats closest to the two exits were
removed. The researchers reported that total egress time, hatch
opening time, and individual egress times were fastest for
evacuations to a single exit using the 20-inch passageway. However,
no interim statistics were reported to support the claims that a
20-inch passageway provided for the best performance.
Based on FAA studies and comments received, the FAA initially
increased the required exit path width to 20 inches. However, the
influence of the Air Transport Association and several air carriers
resulted in a reconsideration. In a strange move, the FAA Civil
Aero Medical Institute (CAMI) conducted still another series of
trials in 1995.
The researchers in the last study did not measure the exit hatch
removal times for the various conditions; and unrealistically
utilized a flight attendant just forward of the over-wing exit to
assist the evacuation trials. There were 30 trial reported in those
studies, indicating a possible skewing of data. To be brief, the
second set of trials did not reflect the performance reasonably
anticipated of a novice evacuee in an actual emergency evacuation.
However, based upon the second studies, the FAA granted air
carriers an exemption to the 20-inch width requirement. The FAA
also issued an NPRM proposing an amendment, allowing a reduction in
the exit path width to 13 inches.
Citing the details of the CAMI research, as a basis for the
proposed rule change, the NTSB illustrated the obvious flaws of the
study - such as unrealistically using a flight attendant at the
exit and no consideration given to exit hatch removal times -
questioning the validity of the 'research,' relative to an actual
emergency evacuation.
Accident severity will also determine how easily passengers can
reach an exit. Severe damage to the fuselage, for example, can
cause interior furnishings to be dislodged, creating obstacles for
passengers attempting to exit an aircraft.
The 1999 MD-80 accident in Little Rock, Arkansas illustrated these
concerns. In that crash, the impact caused seats to break free,
blocking the aisles. In the front of the passenger cabin,
passengers had to find their way around fallen overhead bins and
across the severely deformed floor - with the aircraft on fire.
Fortunately for the passengers, the impact created several gaps in
the fuselage, enabling a route for the passengers to escape.
In a similar situation, a B-727 crashed short of the runway,
striking a light structure and the runway threshold. In that
accident, a life raft ceiling panel door fell open, blocking the
main aisle to the forward entry exit (forward entry door). The
flight attendant re-directed the passengers to evacuate through the
right side floor level door, over-wing exits, and the left-aft
floor level exit.
In accidents studied by the NTSB, passengers and flight attendants
indicated that bulkheads, broken interiors, overhead bins and
seatbacks were the primary obstacles to the evacuation route. While
not described in the specific terms, the list might have easily
said, "everything." Passenger interference has already been
mentioned.
The studies conducted so far do not distinguish between degrees of
aircraft damage. Therefore, examination of the presented statistics
should be done with care.
EMERGENCY EXIT LIGHTING
The FAA regulations require aircraft to be equipped with emergency
lighting, independently powered. Emergency lighting systems
require illuminated emergency exit marking and locating signs,
general cabin illumination, lighting in the immediate emergency
exit areas, floor-level escape path marking, and exit exterior
emergency lighting. Perhaps the most important of these is the
floor lighting, given the threat of smoke obscuration of the
ceiling lighting and exit marking.
In general, the emergency lighting designs appear to be reliable in
actual incidents and accidents.
FLOOR-LEVEL EXITS
Floor level exits are often the primary exit routes. The ease of
opening floor level exit doors is a function of both maintenance
and accident severity. Depending on the aircraft design and the
typical utilization of exits, the door reliability can be a
significant variable in ideal conditions.
Violent accidents always carry the risk of doorway structural
deformation. In the Little Rock crash, a flight attendant reported
that both forward floor level exit doors were rendered inoperable
by impact forces. A second flight attendant reported that the floor
level exit door to the tail cone exit could not be readily opened
due to the deformation in the aircraft floor. That door was
eventually opened with the efforts of the flight attendant and two
male passenger volunteers. It should be remembered that a fire was
in progress in the mid-wing section; the fuselage damage provided
a welcome escape route.
One flight attendant, in the Little Rock accident was seriously
injured, leaving two flight attendants to evacuate the aircraft.
Those two flight attendants reported that the damage was severe
enough that the exit lighting was inadequate (not necessarily
inoperative), including the escape path lighting.
There are basically two designs in floor-path lighting. One design
has lights mounted in the floor itself, while another has lights
mounted on the aisle seats, illuminating the aisle way.
The incidence of failed slide-packs is high enough to be a serious
concern. In addition to their failure to inflate, the slide-packs
can act as an obstacle to either door opening, or the evacuation
process.
TYPE III OVER-WING EXITS
While trained crewmembers are normally expected to operate the
emergency equipment on an aircraft, including most floor level exit
doors; that is not always the case. In particular, the over-wing
exits are designed with the expectation that passengers will open
them. Although there are some situations where flight attendants
are assigned the responsibility for over-wing exit operation,
passengers are more likely to make the first attempt to open the
over-wing exit hatches, as the flight attendants are not physically
located closest to the over-wing exits.
Despite good design and markings, it is not uncommon for passengers
to experience problems in operating the exits. Often, confusion or
panic is behind such difficulty, as opposed to design and marking.
It is understandable that a passenger might assume that an
over-wing hatch is designed to open outward, as opposed to being
required to be first pulled into the aircraft interior.
Human factors can either send passengers scurrying for other exits
(which might not be available) or to unnecessarily wait for the
exit to be opened. Commonly, if one passenger cannot open an
over-wing exit, another passenger will solve whatever problem is at
hand. The basic problem is in the urgency of the particular
situation, wherein seconds can determine survivability.
Despite FAA regulations requiring passengers to be screened for
exit row seating, screening does not guarantee that the passengers
have read the safety-briefing card or clearly understand how to
open or dispose of a Type III over-wing exit hatch, even after
reading the card. NTSB studies have demonstrated that even
passengers seated in exit rows who are instructed that they may be
called upon to help in an emergency evacuation, admit to not
reading the briefing card. In one such study, 52 percent indicated
that they had not read the briefing card. The weight of over-wing
exit hatches has also posed a problem for some passengers.
One of the major problems with over-wing hatches is that it is not
intuitively obvious that after pulling the latch, the hatch is to
be rotated and either placed on adjacent exit row seats or thrown
out the opening. Further, the opening and maneuvering of this type
exit is also difficult to graphically on the safety cards.
Intoxicated passengers sitting at these exits is another
concern.
Boeing designed a new over-wing exit, based on human factors. The
new exit design offers a top-mounted hinge, allowing the exit to
open outward and upward. The design eliminates the problem of how
and where to dispose of the exit hatch, as it rotates upward, out
of the egress route.
Strangely, the NTSB reports that this new exit design was prompted
by the European aviation authority, in response to Boeing's stated
intent to increase the passenger count on the 737-600/700/800
series aircraft. The European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA)
announced that they would only agree to an increased passenger
count if there was a significant change to the cabin configuration.
Therefore, Boeing developed the new Type III hatch in order to meet
the JAA position, as opposed to the safety standard of the
U.S.
EXIT ROW PASSENGER TASKS
Despite the best of intentions, passengers seated in an exit row
may be called upon to assist in an evacuation; requiring their
readiness to act quickly upon a crew command or their personal
assessment of danger. It should be remembered that these passengers
might be required to decide if their exit is safe to use; then open
their exit quickly in an emergency. Unfortunately, unlike the
flight crew, these passengers receive no formal or significant
informal training on performing that task.
Although the FAA provides guidelines to the air carriers as to
which passengers to restrict from exit row seating; mistakes still
happen and some passengers re-seat themselves, with no regard to
the safety requirement. While the guidelines are reiterated on the
exit row briefing cards or on the general safety cards, there is no
guarantee as to conformity. There are common occurrences of
passengers with the inability to meet the safety standards being
seated at over-wing exits. The inabilities range from age (young
and elderly) to language inability and sobriety.
The FAA regulations require the air carrier to list the tasks that
an exit row passenger may be called upon to perform. The passenger
must be able to locate and operate the emergency exit, assess the
conditions outside an exit, follow the instructions of crewmembers,
open and dispose of the exit hatch, assess the condition of and
stabilize an escape slide (as required), and pass quickly through
the exit. If passengers report that they are unable or unwilling to
perform any of these tasks, they must be reseated in a non-exit row
prior to airplane movement. It should be noted that the passenger
is free to drink alcoholic beverages, while manning the
exit.
The NTSB studies indicate that in actual evacuations, the
passengers had difficulties deciding to actually open the exit.
Another problem posed was assessing the conditions outside of the
exit. There have been instances of passengers opening an exit with
fire clearly visible on the outside. In such cases, the fire was
not sufficient to deter others from using the exit. In addition to
the fire hazard, the smoke hazard is also a major factor.
The need for an individual briefing is best illustrated by the
NTSB, in the runway collision in Los Angeles California. That
report states:
"Passengers seated around row 10 stated that prior to departure,
the flight attendant assigned to the R-1 [forward right-hand door]
position interviewed a young passenger who was seated in 10D about
whether he could fulfill the duties of an able-bodied person in the event of an
emergency. The passenger advised the flight attendant that he was
17 years old. However, to be sure the youth understood his
responsibilities, the flight attendant conducted a special oral
briefing for the persons seated in and around row 10. Passengers
stated that the instructions provided by the R-1 flight attendant
aided in their evacuation. "
While it is not a requirement, carriers sometimes seat non-revenue
passengers (employees traveling on a company pass) at the over-wing
exits for good reason. Often, the seats do not recline, so
experienced travelers (including employees) may purposely avoid the
seats by any means possible.
Another issue, not officially addressed is the positioning the
megaphones within easy reach of flight attendants at their assigned
jump-seat positions is a matter not yet addressed by the industry.
Given the probability of a power failure in conjunction with an
accident, it is academic that flight attendants need quick access,
so as to instruct the over-wing passengers, at a minimum. The
location of the megaphones on most aircraft require a flight
attendant to fight a tide of desperate or frightened passengers
attempting to reach a floor-level door, at the front or rear of the
aircraft.
EVACUATION SLIDES
The FAA requires all exits higher than 6 feet off the ground to be
accompanied by an assist means for allowing passengers to reach the
ground quickly and safely during an emergency. This requirement is
typically met through the use of inflatable escape slides. In
general, these slides must be automatically deployed and inflated
in 6 seconds and usable in a 25-knot wind with the assistance of
only one person.
However, door-slide mechanical failures are far too common for a
variety of reasons. Despite the common failures the FAA / industry
is extremely slow to address the issue. In the summer of 2000, a
flight attendant was killed in a complex accident, after being
effectively thrown from a door whose slide failed. The particular
carrier had a history of such failures.
A major factor in slide failures is the 25-knot wind limitation. It
is conceivable for an aircraft to be dispatched land into a 40-knot
wind. An evacuation might be initiated in conditions which leave
all slides unusable. Worse, flight crews are typically not given
any instructions in such an event. Conceivably, an aircraft could
be reduced to half the over-wing exits as the only means of
evacuation.
Another issue in the slide failures is the trend for airlines to
reduce costs by eliminating detailed inspections of their aircraft.
Such inspections are typically beyond the skill of either pilots or
flight attendants.
Despite pleas by the NTSB, the FAA is typically slow or
non-responsive to urgent matters. In many cases, the FAA will only
go as far as publishing an Advisory Circular, which carries no
enforcement authority.
In their June, 2000 report, the NTSB cited a slide failure in 37
percent of their recent case studies of passenger evacuations
involving slide deployments. The NTSB also cited the failure of
the Service Difficulty Reporting system (FAR 121.703) to reveal
problems due either to non-reporting or lack of detailed
information.
EXIT HEIGHT FROM GROUND
Serious injuries in evacuations are commonly the result of falling
or jumping from exits or off the wings. Unfortunately, the
resistance of passengers unwilling to jump from a wing carries the
risk of the passengers returning to the airplane cabin; a
potentially lethal environment.
The absence of a crewmember being involved with over-wing
evacuation adds to the risk of passenger mistakes, once clear of
the aircraft cabin. Despite all attempts, there is a high risk that
passengers will not readily use the trailing edge flaps as an
escape route. There are a certain percentage of evacuations in
which the flaps are either not extended, or are inadvertently
retracted. In the case of the larger aircraft, the wing height can
be a risk due to height itself, or the unknown location of
passengers on the wing. Obviously, the presence of fire in such a
situation can be particularly hazardous.
EVACUATION GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES
As with passengers, a flight crew may conduct an emergency
evacuation as their first and only time. History repeatedly tells
us that the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful
evacuation can be measured in terms of seconds. Thus, clear and
precise procedures must be devised so as to be immediately
effective to assist the crew. Beyond training, the reinforcement of
emergency procedures and associated training is mandated.
Beyond the FAA regulations requiring each air carrier to have an
approved training programs for flight crews and flight attendants,
the FAA principal operations inspector (POI) assigned to the air
carrier is responsible for evaluating each air carrier's "initial
training plan and devices." After granting the initial approval,
the POI is directed to reevaluate the training program. Only if
crewmembers are adequately trained to perform their duties, is the
POI to issue a final approval of the program.
GUIDANCE TO FLIGHT CREWS ON WHEN TO EVACUATE
The decision to evacuate an aircraft is normally made by the pilots
or the flight attendants. In a case such as a bomb threat, others
can make the recommendation, remembering that the captain is the
final authority. In the NTSB study, the pilots initiated
approximately 95% of the evacuations. The predominate reason for
initiating the evacuations was the presence or risk of fire.
The NTSB also discovered an industry ambiguity on the evacuation
criteria in the case of both the pilots and the flight attendants.
Given that evacuations are rather common, it is surprising that
some specific and clear guidance isn't provided by either the FAA
or the individual airline.
In general, European carriers have ten events listed just for
flight attendant self-initiation of an evacuation:
1. Dense smoke in the cabin
2. Radical Attitude of the aircraft (after stopping or aborting)
3. Ditching
4. Self sustaining fire either inside or outside the aircraft
5. Sounds that indicate the catastrophic breaking up of the
aircraft.
6. Overwhelming odor of fuel or other clearly toxic fumes
7. Uncontrolled panic
8. Catastrophic damage to the cockpit
9. Bomb threat
10. Hijacking or terrorist threat
Thus, it can be seen that a list of clear indicators is possible to
formulate, weighing the captain's authority in all cases.
While pilots are provided some guidance from the flight operations
manuals, safety manuals and simulator training, the typical flight
manual or checklist generally states, "initiate evacuation if
required."
Some known checklist procedures vaguely direct pilots to initiate
or consider evacuation include generic descriptions such as,
"emergency landing," "fire (engine, APU, avionics, and cargo),"
"smoke (in passenger cabin areas and in air conditioning),"
"abnormal landing gear," and "ditching."
However, these indicators are neither clear nor specific enough to
be particularly useful. For example, an engine fire, which has
obviously been extinguished, is not an indicator for an evacuation,
as opposed to an uncontrollable engine fire. Likewise, air
conditioning smoke is typically a simple matter of shutting down
air conditioning packs.
Being brief, the NTSB concluded that pilots are simply not
receiving consistent guidance, particularly in flight operations
and safety manuals, as to when an evacuation is appropriate. The
NTSB appropriately requested the FAA to require specific guidance
in flight operations manuals, safety manuals and abnormal and
emergency procedures / checklists. To date, that has not been
accomplished.
In addition to actually initiating an evacuation, the action
requires careful coordination with respect to preparations, conduct
and post-event management, as well as effective communication
throughout all phases.
PLANNED EVACUATIONS
Air carrier flight attendant manuals normally deal with both
planned and unplanned evacuations. Planned evacuations are normally
treated in terms of having some adequate period of time which
allows the crew to review the evacuation procedures and to prepare
the passengers and crew for the impending landing and a reasonably
orderly evacuation. Planned evacuations permit the passengers to be
given such instruction as the brace instructions and focused
guidance on evacuation and exit use/operation.
Unplanned evacuations are generally defined as occurring suddenly,
with little or no warning and little or no time to prepare. Most
such manuals illustrate unplanned evacuations as occurring in
conjunction with emergencies, which occur during takeoff or
scheduled landings. Few manuals address unplanned evacuations
associated with the en route portion of flight, despite the
increasing occurrence of electrical fires, causing en route
diversions. Most manuals describe unplanned evacuations as being
far more common than planned evacuations.
In any evacuation, time can be a tremendous variable. In planned
evacuations, passengers should be told to expect an evacuation upon
landing and forcefully directed to examine their safety card.
Typically, the brace position is utilized only when there is a
valid concern of an impending impact in such instances as an unsafe
landing gear. With the time available, passengers should be briefed
on the appropriate brace positions and the location / operation of
exits. It may be advantageous to reseat able-bodied passengers near
the over-wing and floor level exits. A focused briefing should be
conducted to ensure an efficient evacuation. Any deadheading or
commuting flight attendants or pilots should be positioned next to
the over-wing exits to ensure quick opening and competence as to
the decision to open the exits. In addition, passengers should be
asked to remove any potentially hazardous objects prior to landing.
Any under-seat hand carry items should be verified to be secured.
If any unusual events are planned, an appropriate briefing should
be conducted, including the expectation of emergency vehicles,
regardless of the outcome. In all cases, updated or repeat
information is necessary to promote morale and to keep emotions
under control. The expression of caring promotes trust, diminishing
the panic risk.
Post-event reports tell a powerful story. In one event, passengers
wrote, "They kept us all well informed." Another stated, "The crew
acted professionally and efficiently." Another wrote, "I
appreciated that they kept us updated on what was happening."
Conversely, such positive comments toward crew communication with
passengers are not typical in events which allowed for good
communication, but in fact did not include preparation of the
passengers for a possible evacuation. In one case, passengers were
only informed that a maintenance problem had been identified and
that the flight would be returning to the departure airport. Upon
landing an evacuation was abruptly ordered. The passengers cited
the advisory that the airport fire trucks would meet the airplane
but that their presence was normal. While the passengers indicated
that the crew reassured them that there was nothing to worry about,
the crew gave no indication as to the magnitude of the problem. The
crew failed to cite the seriousness of the emergency landing, with
no evacuation instructions or brace instructions given.
Planned evacuations permit more than just PR and keeping passengers
calm. By keeping passengers informed and doing such things as
reviewing brace positions improves the chance that passengers will
be properly prepared for any scenario, which occurs during an
emergency landing. In simple terms, passengers do not respond well
to surprise events.
Planned evacuations allow flight attendants not only the time to
inform passengers of what to expect, but to build a professional
trust, which facilitates an evacuation. Being thorough and totally
honest avoids surprises, which might otherwise delay or hinder an
evacuation.
In cases, which allow inadequate time, the outcome depends on
the predisposition of all involved, including the passengers.
Ideally, evacuation / survival priorities are identified with
planned evacuations being conducted in concert with those
priorities. Unfortunately, there is no industry norm on the subject
of evacuations. One carrier might have planned evacuation
procedures unrealistically requiring upwards of 30 minutes. Another
carrier may have two or three categories of planned evacuations.
Many carriers simply do not specify a time requirement to conduct
a briefing in their manuals. There are also those who provide
little, if any, direction on how to conduct an abbreviated
briefing.
An important aspect of evacuations is to maximize any time
available to prepare the cabin for an evacuation. The preparation
involves the flight crew, just as much as the passengers. Many
incident / accident reports reflect the fact that adequate time was
available for an abbreviated briefing to the passengers but no
briefing was actually given. Such cases typically reflect something
of a panic / catatonia among the crew, sometimes an apathy. There
have been cases wherein it was discovered that the flight attendant
manuals had no procedures for rapid briefing of passengers. For
lack of a solution, the flight attendants elected to remain silent.
In other cases, the cockpit crew failed to adequately inform the
flight attendants, even though rapid briefing procedures were
available.
Depending on the individual carrier, Crew Resource Management (CRM)
procedures may penetrate the cockpit-cabin barrier sufficiently, so
as to adequately inform the flight attendants of the seriousness of
the event at hand, or their probable need to evacuate; thus
allowing a timely and adequate briefing.
Likewise, if a successful landing is achieved, an effort is needed
to prevent an unnecessary 'spring-loaded' evacuation. That can be
a simple PA, "Ladies & gentlemen, we're safe; stay seated." It is
obvious that the situation might not be clear to the pilots until
the last second. However, every attempt should be made to update
the passenger cabin to preclude any chaos or panic.
EXIT SELECTION
In an evacuation, the crews are tasked with the decision as to
which exits to use. Ideally, all exits would be used to evacuate
the aircraft as quickly as possible. However, this ideal is rarely
achieved as exits are commonly blocked by hazards such as damage,
debris, fire or smoke. In reality, it is unusual for evacuations to
employ every available exit, due to mechanical restrictions or
simple prejudice toward using only the floor-level exits.
Flight attendants are trained to assess which exits are usable.
Assuming cockpit survival, the pilots are expected to first secure
the aircraft through an "Evacuation" checklist. This checklist
essentially calls for shutting down the engines and activating the
emergency exit lights, as well as initiating the evacuation.
Thereafter, it is reasonably expected that the pilots will provide
any needed assistance to the flight attendants, including exit
opening and slide deployment, based on their knowledge of the
crisis. The evacuation procedures are not standardized, varying
broadly among the air carriers. Some air carriers direct the pilots
to direct which exits to use. Some air carriers direct the flight
attendants to determine which exits to use.
A major influence on the choice of exits to use is the concern for
passenger injury during an evacuation. Pilot judgment may dictate
an expeditious deplaning through the aircraft entry door, with
stairs in place, as opposed to a true evacuation. Common sense
dictates that an expeditious deplaning is to be used only with no
imminent threat to passengers exists. The reasons for conducting
such an evacuation vary from such events as a fuel spill to a
dubious bomb threat. Such evacuations may require using the normal
boarding jetway or the use of mobile airstairs.
Some air carriers provide written procedures for limited
evacuations, also limiting the exit utilization, based on passenger
safety. Air carriers may indicate in their procedures that certain
exits are preferable (typically those lowest to the ground) in
events such as landing gear failure. Such procedures might also
state that floor level exits are preferable to use, as opposed to
over-wing exits, honoring the probable hazardous angle of the wing.
The lack of standardized evacuation procedures carries another
potential hazard, in the form of crew concern for company costs. As
a result, evacuations are often limited to the use of a single
exit. While economically prudent, the matter needs to be addressed
in terms of the demand for maximum evacuation rate. The obvious
question to the captain automatically appears, "If an evacuation
was necessary, why didn't you use all exits? If it wasn't
necessary, why did you order an evacuation?"
UNKNOWN FACTORS
An example is important on this topic:
In one reported evacuation following a right main landing gear
failure, the pilots asked both a flight attendant and the tower if
any fire was present on or around the airplane. After receiving the
report of 'no fire,' the pilots ordered an evacuation using only
the front entry door. After approximately 15 passengers had
evacuated, the first officer exited the aircraft. He discovered a
fire around the left main gear; directing the flight attendants to
evacuate using all of the right exits.
Obviously, limiting the number of exits used during an evacuation
will have a dramatic effect on the evacuation time. While good
judgment is appropriate, there remains a major concern over the
matter. The subject quickly narrows to the choices of, 'retain,
deplane or evacuate.' To take the matter further, one quickly
arrives at the thought, "When in doubt, there is none."
Specifically, if any doubt/confusion exists; evacuate at maximum
speed.
Although limiting the number of exits does not directly imply the
risk of passenger injury because of the delay in exiting the
aircraft, several safety concerns are immediately raised. First,
the element of risk is presented by virtue of the fact that
carriers do not establish a safe procedure for determining when to
use a limited number of exits. Thus, the specter of 'dangerous
presumption' rapidly appears. In actual practice, flight
attendants are not likely to have been trained nor are they likely
to have received any significant guidance for evacuating an
aircraft, using limited exits.
Where flight crews have used limited exits for evacuations, the
company typically justifies the action - uniquely in hindsight -
contending that the procedure minimizes potential passenger harm
and panic. However, other than coincidence of history, there is no
significant data or evidence to justify such a decision. By
default, most parties take the political position, "no harm; no
foul." As a direct consequence, a major safety issue is evaded.
An issue also not addressed is the matter of evacuating as the
result of a baggage / cargo hold fire. While the bulk of these
incidents are false warnings, there have been a sufficient number
of valid fires to warrant serious consideration with respect to
establishing in-flight procedures and limited exit evacuation
procedures to deal with this issue.
For example, having the flight attendants monitor the floor
temperature with their hands. Histories of bleed air leaks have
established this as a viable procedure. Most importantly, is the
evacuation issue when a fire is probable. More particularly the
matter of whether or not to evacuate on one side of the aircraft
only, away from the cargo doors. Although the cargo doors do not
necessarily pose a greater exposure risk, it is assured that the
fire-rescue crews and equipment will be responding to those
doors.
Opposing the limited exit use during evacuations is the question of
legal liability. With rare exception, limited exit use is not in
accordance with the air carrier's existing (FAA approved)
evacuation procedures. At the minimum, all available floor level
exits, which can be safely used, should be utilized during an
evacuation.
SLIDE USE COMMANDS
During an evacuation, flight attendants are trained to shout
commands to the passengers to assist in the evacuation. When slides
are used, the typical commands are "Jump and slide," or, "Sit and
slide." Again, industry standardization is lacking. Honoring the
probable dynamics of such a moment, the command of "slide' should
be sufficient. Given the history of a limited number of evacuees
bouncing over the side of the slide, the command of "jump" is
questionable.
As with such emergencies as an engine failure, the aircraft type
certification procedures should include the appropriate command,
extracted from the manufacturers' studies and experience.
In particular, some carriers use the command, "Sit and slide." The
time taken to first sit to board the slide will obviously create a
significant cumulative delay. Such a procedure is not likely to
allow slide / aircraft manufacturers to attain the current required
slide rate of 70 people per lane per minute.
It must be remembered that speed is the primary issue in
evacuations. Consequently, many carriers utilize the command "jump
and slide." Despite a history of injuries, mostly minor, that
command might be appropriate. A conflict can be discovered in the
case of some carriers who use the command of "jump and slide,' with
their passenger briefing cards depicting the 'sit-and-slide'
procedure.
Based on their studies, the NTSB asked the FAA to review all air
carrier procedures and training programs to ensure that the
commands used for slide evacuations are consistent with the
commands used for slide evacuations during the aircraft
certification.
AIRCRAFT FAMILIARIZATION FOR RESCUE PERSONNEL
Typically, Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) units are not
given thorough hands-on aircraft familiarization and egress
training. These units typically do not receive systems or
cockpit-oriented training in such matters as shutting down engines
for all the airplane types operating at their airport.
Aircraft availability in all airplane types is often understandably
difficult and burdensome to achieve. Likewise, the knowledge of an
air carrier's procedures can be confusing. Again, the
standardization issue.
Thus, a reasonable expectation can be had in regard to the efforts
of ARFF personnel being hindered in their ability to quickly and
efficiently assist during evacuations.
In the background of this issue is that countries such as Mexico
and Canada do not measure up to the U.S standards. However, These
facts may signify the imminent downturn in U.S. standards.
COMMUNICATION
Once again, successful evacuations depend on good communication
between all parties, particularly among the aircraft crewmembers;
and between the crew and the passengers. Communication with
appropriate ground personnel is equally critical.
CREW-TO-CREW COMMUNICATION
Crew communication is a safety science. In a high percentage of
incidents and accidents, communication was the greatest break in
the safety chain. Standard terminology is also vitally important.
Many carriers utilize the command, "Easy Victor!" to indicate an
evacuation. The phrase, "Easy Victor," was originally intended as
a warning code to allow flight attendants to get to their
evacuation positions prior to passengers. However, its use has been
corrupted over time, commonly becoming a substitute for the
evacuation initiation. The potential for creating confusion is
obvious. While flight crew might be familiar with the expression,
the passengers will be confused to an appreciable degree. Although
a heated debate is possible on the subject, the command of
"evacuate" is far more clear and compelling. A strongly suggested
technique is to specify any restrictions PRIOR to commanding the
evacuation. ("Right side only, right side only; evacuate, evacuate,
evacuate!!!")
CRM plays a major role in evacuation scenarios. Often, safety
information is needed from the flight attendants, while status and
planning information is likewise needed from the cockpit. Standard
terminology and clear communication are essential. Having an 'open'
communication atmosphere is critical. A common report is a case
wherein the flight deck crew indicated to the flight attendants
that they would be making a 'precautionary landing,' failing to
mention that ARFF units would be responding. Subsequently, the
passengers were also not informed of a possible emergency
situation, nor that ARFF units would be responding during the
landing. In many such cases, the passengers should have been
briefed on the details of the situation and to assume the brace
position.
It is quite common for passengers and flight attendants to later
complain about the quality of crew communication, due to either
neglect or mechanical failure. The onus is on the cockpit, as a
failure to communicate leaves the flight attendants in the position
to decide on whether or not to self-initiate an evacuation. In many
cases, the flight attendants are seriously under-informed, just due
to their isolation from the radio communication.
Again, the cabin megaphones are more appropriately placed within
easy reach of the flight attendants at their assigned jumpseat
locations. In cases where interphone communication is cut off, the
anticipated response is for the aft flight attendant(s) following
the lead of the forward flight attendants. That scenario is
critical with the risk of the forward flight attendants being
seriously injured in a crash.
Post-event studies reveal the need for dynamic CRM. The primary
focus of such comments is on combined training of pilots and flight
attendants on emergencies, particularly with respect to evacuation
procedures.
While combined CRM training with flight attendants is performed by
some carriers, current information indicates that the integrated
training needs to be expanded. Actual cases where quality joint CRM
training with flight attendants was conducted by a carrier, the
training was rated as 'invaluable.' The CRM training cited in such
comments described simulated evacuation exercises with flight
attendants or trainees. The indications are that full drills need
to be conducted, similar to marine environment. The need is
particularly emphasized in the case of aircraft with two-person
cockpit crews.
Although the FAA expanded the issue of CRM training for flight
attendants in Advisory Circular, AC 120-51C, stating that flight
attendants should conduct CRM training with cockpit crews, covering
shared issues such as evacuations and ditching, the FAA stopped
short of actually requiring such training. Again, the Advisory
Circulars carry no enforcement capability.
It should be noted that the NTSB has repeatedly reminded the FAA
that joint exercises for flight deck crews and flight attendants on
evacuations, among other matters, would solve many of the
CRM-related communication problems that currently exist. Despite
the NTSB illustrations that such training is reported as beneficial
by crewmembers who have participated in both the combined training
and an actual evacuation, the FAA seems to remain mysteriously
disinterested.
Accident and incident reports illuminate the fact that serious
communication and coordination problems continue to exist between
flight deck crews and flight attendants during all emergencies,
including aircraft evacuations. However, despite the NTSB
illustrations of how joint exercises for flight crews and flight
attendants on evacuation have proven effective in resolving these
problems, the FAA resists any changes.
The FAA position, that Advisory Circulars are not to be regarded as
mandatory, leaves the standardization of evacuation procedures as
discretionary. Ironically, the content of the Advisory Circulars is
commonly used in enforcement proceedings against pilots.
CREW-TO-PASSENGER COMMUNICATION
Obviously, passenger performance during an evacuation is highly
dependent on how the crews prepare the passengers for an
evacuation. Two different primary methods of communication are
typically used by the air carriers to instruct passengers what to
do if an evacuation is necessary: the preflight verbal / video
briefing, and a printed safety briefing card.
PREFLIGHT SAFETY BRIEFING
The FAA regulations require a passenger safety briefing prior to
takeoff. This briefing is required to include information on
smoking, emergency exit location, seat belts, compliance with
safety signs, and the location and use of flotation means. If the
flight operates above 25,000 feet mean sea level, the briefing must
include information on the emergency use of oxygen.
The FAA Advisory Circular, AC 121-24B, is intended to guide air
carriers in the development of their safety briefings. The AC lists
the FAR material that must be covered, also offering suggestions
for material that should be covered. The AC addresses the
difficulty in motivating passengers to pay attention to the safety
information and suggests making the briefing as attractive and
interesting as possible to increase passenger attention. Further,
the AC suggests that flight attendants be animated, speak clearly
and slowly, and maintain eye contact with the passengers. The AC
also suggests the use of videotape, as it ensures a complete
briefing with good diction and allows for additional visual
information to be presented to the passengers.
In a study of passengers involved in actual evacuations, 13 percent
indicated they watched none of the briefing, and 48 percent
reported that they watched at least 75 percent of the
briefing.
Fifty-four percent reported that they had not watched the entire
briefing because they had seen it before. Some passengers indicated
that the briefing was common knowledge, and therefore there was no
need to watch the briefing.
Passengers who watched more than half the briefing were divided
evenly on the effectiveness of the briefing. Some passengers who
reported watching the entire briefing indicated that the briefing
was not helpful for their evacuation; the remaining number believed
it was helpful. The primary concern expressed by passengers was
that the briefing covered situations that did not apply to their
particular evacuation. Passengers reported that they would have
preferred information regarding exit routes or information such as
how to slide or how to get off of wings. Those that believed the
briefing was helpful indicated that they were more aware of the
exit locations because of the briefing.
The NTSB has issued several recommendations over 25 years on
improving passenger attention to preflight safety briefings. The
NTSB recommended that the FAA Issue an advisory circular that would
provide standardized guidance to the air transport industry on
effective methods and techniques for conveying safety information
to passengers.
The NTSB also recommended that the FAA require that recurrent
flight attendant training programs contain instructions on the use
of the public address (PA) system and techniques for maintaining
effective safety briefings and demonstrations which would improve
the motivation of passengers to pay attention to the oral briefings
and to the demonstrations.
Current information indicates that the problem of passenger
inattention to briefings continues to exist. The implied message is
that the Advisory Circulars are selectively complied with.
Unfortunately, despite the efforts and techniques applied over the
years to improve passenger attention to safety briefings, a large
percentage of passengers can be expected to predictably continue
ignoring the preflight safety briefings.
Again, 54 percent of the passengers indicated that they did not
watch the entire briefing because they had seen it on previous
flights. Another problem is that safety information for one
aircraft may differ from the safety information for the next
aircraft. Thus exit locations, floor path lighting, and oxygen
systems are important to be discussed in the oral briefing.
Passengers need to be aware of the existence of such differences
and the need to pay attention to the specific safety information.
With the exception of videotape presentations, there has been very
little change in how safety information is presented to passengers.
The NTSB has suggested the application of creative methods,
employing state-of-the-art technology, to improve passenger
attention to safety information. The NTSB has recommended that the
FAA mandate research and explore creative and effective methods to
convey the safety information to passengers. The information should
include a demonstration of all emergency evacuation procedures,
including how to open the emergency exits and exit the aircraft, as
well as how to use the slides.
Unfortunately, it appears that the economic demand for the shortest
possible taxi times creates a demand for abbreviated safety
briefings, inadequate for the actual safety needs.
SAFETY BRIEFING CARDS
The FAA currently requires the oral briefings to be supplemented
with printed safety briefing cards which pertain only to the
particular make and model of aircraft, consistent with the air
carrier's procedures (14 CFR 121.571(b)). The safety cards are
required to contain diagrams and methods of operation for all
emergency exits and any instructions for operating other emergency
equipment. Advisory Circular 121-24B provides guidelines for air
carriers in the development of their safety cards.
The NTSB studies on passenger use of the safety cards was
consistent with previous findings that passengers tend to NOT look
at the cards, 68 percent indicated that they did not read the
safety card. Of those, 89 percent indicated that they had read the
card on previous flights. Of particular concern to the NTSB was
that 44 percent reported that they neither examined the safety card
nor listened to the safety briefing.
Among the passengers who reported reading the card, 59 percent
indicated that the card was useful. The primary benefit of the card
was for identifying exit location. Other benefits cited by
passengers included instructions on how to use the slides, and the
location of emergency lights.
The safety briefing cards typically also contain information on
brace positions, such as brace positions for children, for a parent
holding an infant, and for a pregnant passenger. However, the
inclusion of bracing information is not mandatory for safety
cards.
All safety cards include instructions on operating emergency exits.
However, the degree of detail can often vary to a dangerous degree.
For example, such cards may include the instructions for an exit
operation, but not include a clear indication of the exit location.
The quality of the instructions for exit operation can vary widely.
An important aspect of the safety cards is the depiction of the
procedure for stowing the exit hatches. This issue varies as well;
some cards depict the exit hatch being stowed inside the aircraft,
while others indicate the hatch to be discarded outside the
aircraft. The actual exit instructions were also communicated in
various ways. Most cards illustrate how the passengers are to move
from the wing to the ground, sliding down the trailing edge flaps,
while others did not depict how passengers should get off the wing.
Slide use information is also varied, with cards not always
indicating an effective technique for getting onto the slide;
jumping or sitting.
The NTSB expressed serious concern with the minimum level of
acceptable comprehension and performance standards used to measure
whether persons who represent typical passengers understand the
safety information presented. Two 1997 studies demonstrated that
passenger comprehension of the safety cards to be unacceptably low.
Roughly two-thirds of tested subjects understood the meaning of
only half of the safety card pictures. Safety card information is
presented in oral briefings and demonstrations, on safety cards,
and in videotaped briefings. The NTSB expressed concern as to
whether typical passengers are actually able to perform the actions
described, such as using the supplemental oxygen systems, using
life preservers, and the operation of aircraft exits.
A small number of third-party firms commercially produce the
typical evacuation cards with a focus on visual comprehension.
However, not all such firms conduct comprehension testing, which is
not required by the FAA. The NTSB has become concerned with the
fact that many air carrier safety-briefing cards do not clearly or
effectively communicate safety information to passengers.
RETRIEVAL OF CARRY-ON LUGGAGE
Currently, U.S. air carriers use two primary methods to prevent
passengers from taking personal belongings during an evacuation.
The first method is a presentation on the safety-briefing card.
Typically, the cards display a pictogram to indicate, "Leave
baggage;" a suitcase in the center of a slashed circle. The second
method is the flight attendants' command, "leave everything - get
out" during the evacuation. Despite these attempted methods,
passengers often attempt to take their carry-on belongings.
Flight attendants commonly suggest including a statement in the
standard preflight safety briefing, advising leaving carry-on
luggage behind. However, the industry is yet unresponsive to such
suggestions.
Similarly, passengers who have been through the experience of an
evacuation, who concur likewise, indicated the necessity of a
preflight announcement regarding carry-on baggage in emergencies.
When asked how the safety briefing could be improved, one group of
passengers indicated that the preflight briefing should mention
leaving carry-on luggage behind.
The evacuation speed has been found to be highly dependent on the
actions of the flight attendants. Typically, flight attendants
receive both initial and recurrent training on methods to maintain
a constant flow of passengers through an emergency exit. However,
in actual practice, flight attendants also reported that their
attempts were often thwarted by passengers' insistence on
retrieving their carry-on luggage before evacuating.
In evacuation studies, passengers exiting with carry-on baggage
were the most frequently cited obstruction to evacuations.
Arguments between passengers and flight attendants regarding
luggage are relatively common during actual evacuations. As time
goes on, notebook computers and cell phones can be expected to
become sacred items to passengers, during an evacuation.
Flight attendants typically do not receive any appreciable training
with regard to passengers' retrieving carry-on luggage,
particularly as to the issue of what to do when passengers do not
follow the commands to leave everything behind. In actual
evacuations, flight attendants commonly report arguing with
passengers over the baggage. In the actual scenario, a dilemma is
posed to flight attendants finding it necessary to take bags from
passengers. The choice seems to be limited to throwing bags out the
exit to preclude clutter at the exit, or allowing the passengers to
take the bags. Using commands such as "leave everything - get out,"
is currently the only viable solution offered. Although tempting,
encouraging passengers to enforce the evacuation discipline may
cause more harm by creating a combative situation among the
passengers.
While it is understandable that passengers place a premium on such
small items as identification, credit cards, money, keys, wallets,
and medicines as necessities after an emergency evacuation, these
items can be the cause of a disaster when additional time is taken
to gather them during an evacuation. As a consequence, in a planned
evacuation, a PA should be given to relieve the anxiety over the
uncertainty of when or if passengers will get their possessions
returned if they leave the items behind.
Passengers attempting to take their luggage during evacuations will
obviously present undue risks and delays to a successful
evacuation. By retrieving luggage during an evacuation, passengers
radically increase the potential for serious injuries or loss of
life. While the problem is complex, techniques clearly need to be
developed to handle aggressive passengers who defy flight
attendants' instructions.
ARFF-TO-CREW COMMUNICATION
There is also a clear need to establish a designated radio
frequency at all airports, which allows direct communication
between the ARFF personnel and the aircraft. It is also necessary
to ensure that ATC personnel, ARFF personnel, and pilots are aware
of this asset.
There is additionally a distinct need for standardized hand
signals, allowing visual communication between the ARRF personnel
and the cockpit, as well as the flight attendants, to accommodate
situations in which radio communication is lost.
Radio communication is all too often vital for assisting aircraft
crews to conduct safe operations, particularly successful
evacuations. It is important for the ground personnel to be able o
advise the flight crews as to the need to keep passengers aboard,
or to evacuate the aircraft. Similarly, it is vital for the flight
crew to know if any exits should not be used.
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
Aircraft with more than 19 seats are required to have a PA system
and an interphone system. The aircraft interphone system permits
discrete communication among the crewmembers. Additionally, each
airliner, in particular, typically is required to have at least one
battery-powered megaphone.
While the FAA typically allows the aircraft to be operated with an
inoperative interphone system, the issue of in-flight fires, alone,
dictates that the interphone system needs to be a no-go item.
Similarly, the need for cockpit or cabin evacuation instructions
dictates the mandate for an operable PA system.
To illustrate these needs, consider the following examples:
Following a serious collision with ground equipment, the lead
flight attendant attempted to contact the cockpit using the
interphone, 11 seconds after the collision, to report that a fire
had started outside the airplane. For unknown reasons, the pilots
did not hear or recognize the significance of the flight attendant
call chimes. Instead, the captain used the PA system to command
passengers to remain seated. Using her own initiative, the flight
attendant decided to evacuate, having failed to contact the
cockpit. Eight seconds into the evacuation, the pilots were made
aware of the fire outside the aircraft.
In a case involving an inoperative interphone, an MD-80 experienced
a catastrophic uncontained engine failure. The aft flight attendant
attempted to call the cockpit to report debris, smoke, and injuries
in the aft cabin, and to inform the cockpit that she was initiating
an evacuation. The inoperative interphone system led to the flight
attendant evacuating the passengers, while the pilots, unaware of
the actual situation in the cabin, instructed passengers to remain
seated, over the PA.
Examining the various evacuations, the NTSB proposed that new
aircraft be equipped with an independently powered evacuation alarm
system, operable from each crewmember station, and establish the
related for the system use.
Despite the pragmatic approach, the FAA went into denial, claiming
that the current designs were reliable and sufficient, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The FAA passionately took the position that the interphone and
the PA systems are redundant to such an evacuation alarm,
especially if the PA and interphone systems are used in the
prescribed manner. The FAA also argued that if the training
procedures were not followed, neither the interphone/PA system nor
the proposed evacuation alarm would be effective. While the passion
of the FAA argument sounds convincing, reality again,
diverges.
In the case of the B-737, which overran the runway in Burbank,
California, (March 5, 2000) the cockpit failed to select the PA
button on their interphone panel, thus, their command for the
passengers to remain seated was broadcast to the ATC tower instead.
A later command to evacuate was, likewise, never heard over the PA.
It is moot that the proposed backup alarm would have prevented the
communication problems to a large extent. The aircraft stopped a
few feet short of a set of gasoline pumps at a service
station.
The FAA service difficulty reporting system currently allows
incomplete and inaccurate information about component failures. For
example, the various Service Difficulty Report (SDR) forms and
database do not address cycles and flight or calendar time since
the last inspection for failed components. The SDR reports do not
compel complete and accurate information on component failures. The
Federal Aviation Administration inspectors are not currently
required to review the component failure reports for accuracy and
completeness.
It should be appreciated that the FAA typically tolerates a
submission of only approximately 30% of the mandatory Service
Difficulty reports, without enforcement action against the
carriers. Given that it is a felony to withhold a mandatory report,
this is particularly worthy of question.
Of particular interest is the consistent pattern of the FAA
patronizing corporate profits, over the obvious issues of
safety.
In order to put the topic of aircraft evacuations into
perspective, the following observations from known data are
important to consider:
1. Evacuations are a relatively common occurrence.
2. From cases studied, an evacuation will result in an estimated 92
percent uninjured, 6 percent will sustain minor injuries, while 2
percent will sustain serious injuries.
3. Adequate research has not been conducted to determine the
appropriate exit row width on commercial aircraft. Thus, over-wing
exits may contain a hidden hazard, knowingly facilitated by the
FAA.
4. In general, passengers can be expected to access airplane exits
without difficulty. However, in a violent accident, such factors as
dislodged interior cabin furnishings remain as a risk to
passengers' access to exits.
5. Emergency lighting systems can be reasonably expected to
function as intended.
6. In the majority of accidents, the floor level exit doors can be
expected to be opened without difficulty.
7. Passengers can be expected to have problems opening the
over-wing exits and handling the hatch. The method for opening the
over-wing exits and disposing of the hatch cannot be expected to be
intuitive to passengers, nor is such a method easily depicted on
the emergency cards in the seat-back pockets.
8. Most passengers seated in the exit rows do not read the safety
information cards. Independently, these passengers cannot be
expected to easily understand the tasks they may need to perform in
an emergency evacuation. Currently, passengers seated in the
over-wing exit rows do not receive personal briefings from flight
attendants even though it is well known that personal briefings can
greatly assist passengers in their understanding of the tasks that
they may be called upon to perform.
9. Flight attendants are typically seated too far from the
over-wing exits to provide immediate assistance to passengers
attempting to evacuate through the exits.
10. In approximately 1/3 of evacuations with slide deployments
there are problems with at least one slide; that figure is
unacceptable.
11. The majority of serious evacuation-related injuries can be
expected to occur at airplane doors and over-wing exits without
slides.
12. Pilots and flight attendants are not receiving either adequate
or consistent guidance, particularly in flight operations and
safety manuals, on when to evacuate an aircraft.
13. Passengers receive significant benefit from precautionary
safety briefings, just prior to emergency occurrences. Thus,
reinforcement is critical, whenever possible.
14. The crew election to use a limited number of exits during
actual evacuations is typically not consistent with the respective
air carrier's evacuation procedures. All available floor level
exits that are not blocked by a known hazard should be used during
an evacuation.
15. The evacuation instruction to sit, before exiting down a slide,
is likely to delay the evacuation. The failure of the crew to issue
commands, directing passengers on how to get onto a slide will also
delay the evacuation. Further, the seat-back safety cards should
illustrate the correct method, consistent with actual
procedures.
16. Rescue crews need more hands-on training specific to the
airplane types that frequent their airports. Currently, aircraft
rescue and fire-fighting personnel may be hindered in their ability
to quickly and efficiently assist during evacuations.
17. Communication and coordination problems continue to exist
between pilots and flight attendants during airplane evacuations.
This is true, despite the fact that the NTSB continues to remind
airlines and the FAA that joint exercises for flight crews and
flight attendants on evacuation have proven effective in resolving
these problems.
18. Despite the best of efforts and communication techniques, a
high percentage of passengers will ignore the preflight safety
briefings. The NTSB has found that despite the FAA guidance,
including the FAA Advisory Circulars, too high a percentage of air
carrier safety briefing cards do not clearly communicate safety
information to the passengers.
19. The propensity of passengers to evacuate an airplane with their
carry-on baggage continues to pose a serious threat to a successful
aircraft evacuation.
20. The NTSB has illustrated that techniques are needed on how to
handle passengers who do not listen to flight attendants'
instructions need to be addressed.
21. Evacuations continue to be hampered by inefficient
communication in all regimes.
22. The NTSB is encouraging the installation of an independently
powered evacuation alarm on all newly manufactured
transport-category airplanes. However, given the variables possible
in an incident or accident, such an alarm should be viewed as a
backup communication means.
23. The occurrence of false cargo hold fire indications is a
serious concern for all obvious reasons. Given the possibility that
illegal cell phone use is a cause, more research is needed.
Further, consideration needs to be given to a video camera
monitoring system aboard aircraft. Given the current standard of
miniaturization, simplicity and low cost, the concept is highly
feasible
24. Air carrier selective failure to make mandatory reports to the
Federal Aviation Administration's service difficulty reporting
(SDR) system, and inadequate reports, severely hamper the
identification of the true extent of component problems or
failures.
While there are serious shortcomings in the arena of land
evacuations, the issue of ditching is equally as serious, as the
post-accident trauma and the evacuation process can be the
beginning of a greater peril. While ditchings are not as rare as
the typical person believes, it is an area which has been seriously
neglected, as well.
DEFICIENCIES IN DITCHING TRAINING
There also exists a serious deficiency in airline training programs
for ditchings, particularly in reference to the emergency
procedures and equipment for planned and unplanned ditchings, both
controlled and uncontrolled.
It may surprise many to learn that inadvertent ditchings / crashes
near airports during takeoff or landing - with minimal preparation
time - is the most common ditching scenario in transport category
aircraft accidents.
Aircraft crewmembers' response during ditchings is critical to
survival. With rare exception, crewmembers are not receiving
appropriate training in the subject of ditching accidents.
Beyond aircraft control, the preparation and control of passengers
is the single most important factor in survival during ditchings.
Comparing the typical training programs with reports from actual
ditching accidents reveals a desperate need for improved training
and methods to improve ditching survivability.
The typical training and written materials provided to flight
crewmembers is radically deficient. Most training programs presume
ideal conditions and events. From actual cases, it is evident that
`quick-response' procedures are needed, in addition to the current
'planned' ditching training and materials provided by most
carriers.
Typically, airline pilot and flight attendant training programs
reflect only aircraft manufacturers' suggested ditching procedures
as their official ditching training curriculum. That material is
typically extremely limited information on ditching-related
procedures and survival considerations. That level of ditching and
water-survival training information is totally inadequate.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) for transport-category
aircraft primarily treat ditching as a planned occurrence, under
ideal conditions. The typical (FAA approved) ditching training
treats the event as a planned emergency event in which the pilots
deliberately land in water, under ideal conditions, with the
aircraft under normal control. The typical training presumes that
time is available, before a ditching, for the flight crew and
passengers to don life preservers and preparing for the actual
ditching. Strangely, the training does not relate the ditching
scenario to any aircraft malfunction or failure. The standard
ditching training scenario unrealistically implies that an aircraft
will only ditch due to planned fuel starvation.
Actual occurrences paint a high percentage of ditchings as
"unplanned water contact," in which there was little or no time for
either crewmember or passenger preparation. Depending on the aspect
being considered, 'water-contact' events can be viewed in the
perspective of takeoff / landing overruns; or, planned and
unplanned ditchings. Statistically, uncontrolled, high-energy water
impacts near airports occur more often than traditional ditchings
during extended over-water flights by transport-category
aircraft.
Current regulations and training focus primarily on the traditional
concept of a planned ditching occurring in open water on extended
over-water flights. Again, statistically, the bulk of survivable
water-related accidents are no-notice events occurring near
airports.
A grave risk is found in the fact that airline training programs
rarely address the most probable reality, leaving flight
crewmembers at a serious disadvantage in dealing with any
inadvertent ditching. The typical ditching procedures are almost
inappropriate for inadvertent / surprise cases, given that such an
event would most likely be a case of an aircraft landing-short or
overrunning the runway during a takeoff or landing.
Depending on the individual airline certificate limitations, it is
possible for an aircraft to crash into a river, with the passengers
at a loss to locate a life vest or having the presence of mind to
grab a seat cushion as they exit in panic. A river also carries the
risk of passengers being carried away by the current, possibly to
their death.
Given the greater probability of a surprise ditching scenario, it
is prudent for the pilots and flight attendants to have an
automatic set of priorities to revert to, for example:
* FLOTATION
* EVACUATION
* CONGREGATION
* COMMUNICATION
* EXTRICATION
Currently, there is little likelihood of flight crewmembers being
able to react to the more probable surprise scenario of the
aircraft coming to rest in a nose-high attitude, sustaining severe
damage, experiencing rapid flooding, and in most cases, sinking
within a few minutes. In any event, the challenges faced by
crewmembers and passengers are formidable; the state of
preparedness of crewmembers and passengers for such events is
crucial to their survival.
The surprise scenario also adds the risk of crewmembers or
passengers feeling compelled to perform a dangerous but heroic
effort to achieve a higher level of survivability. In one crash
report, a flight attendant dove underwater to obtain more
life-vests for the survivors.
The element of surprise is likely to magnify human behavior, from
non-swimmers' panic to intoxicated passenger problems. A flooding
passenger cabin with damaged (shorted out) emergency lighting would
certainly add to the panic factor.
Statistics derived from a period from 1959 to 1979 show that 16
survivable air-carrier water accidents occurred worldwide. Those
events represented approximately ten percent of the total
survivable air-carrier accidents in that time frame.
A 1994 report on worldwide commuter operations cited 33
'water-impact accidents' occurring from 1982 through 1989. A1998
study illustrated that there were at least 179 U.S. airports
located within five miles (eight kilometers) of a significant body
of water, with the number of similarly located airports worldwide
being much higher. According to 1996 data, forty-four of the fifty
busiest airports in the U.S. are located within five miles of a
significant body of water.
It is only common sense that the likelihood of water accidents will
increase as the number of transport-category aircraft operations
increase. Common sense also demands an updating and increase in the
training for state-of-the-art emergency equipment and in ditching
and water-survival / rescue procedures.
The issues become more alarming in light of accident report
indications that passengers are generally uneducated about
emergency aircraft evacuation and accident survival. Survivor
reports indicate a general lack of knowledge about the obtaining
and use of flotation devices. Reports also illustrate that
passengers are generally unaware that they should leave their
carry-on luggage behind, and that the escape slides can serve as a
raft. Further, survivor reports also indicated minimal awareness of
what they should expect during a rescue of any type.
Dynamic communication among the crewmembers and passengers is
critical with respect to managing time in emergencies. Water
accidents bring unique requirements for communication. Survival is
highly dependent upon realistic factors being addressed in
water-related accidents, including water conditions, aircraft
damage, crewmember leadership skills, resource management and
passenger reaction.
In an actual water accident, of any sort, the aircraft, when
surviving intact, can be expected to remain afloat in calm seas for
several minutes, sinking tail first. There is the very real risk
that aircraft parts such as composite materials (extremely sharp
edges) flaps, slats, engine pylon components, probes or other
debris could detach. These items can pose great risk to personal
injury, with the added risk of damaging flotation devices.
The aircraft system fluids such as fuel, oil and hydraulic fluid
are likely to leak to some appreciable degree, exposing survivors
to thermal and chemical burns. The toxic effects of oral intake of
these fluids are an additional risk. These fluids are also likely
to create slippery surfaces on rafts or rescue equipment. All of
these pose serious hazards to the survivors and rescue crews. With
any significant damage to the aircraft fuel tanks or lines, the
odor of fuel is also likely to increase the chance of panic -
inside or outside the aircraft.
The final aircraft condition will depend largely on the pilot
ditching technique and the state of the water. The crew / passenger
ability to deplane into the rafts, will also depend on the state of
the water. In an actual ditching scenario, the hazard to passengers
and crewmembers will typically increase as time passes. Therefore,
proper crewmember training will obviously make the difference as to
whether or not the crewmembers can function effectively and
maintain control of the situation.
The example of the B-737 crashing into the Potomac, should bring
many issues to mind. The passengers were subjected to a river
current with floating ice, with passengers and rescuers being
subjected to the rapid onset of hypothermia.n Additionally,
rotorwash induces a high chill-factor.
In open water, the rescue operations will produce their own
hazards, such as the risk of rafts capsizing from helicopter rotor
wash and the possibility of static electrocution if the crewmembers
or passengers grasp the ungrounded steel rescue cable dangling from
the rescue helicopter hoist.
Various studies continue to identify serious deficiencies,
illuminating the need for operational and training program changes
to enhance safety in ditchings.
While aircraft manufacturers are required to develop ditching
procedures which are the basis for airline ditching and
water-survival training programs (FAR 25.1581), these efforts have
been ineffective in the sense of realism.
In typical training materials, "pre-ditching" communication focuses
on the radio distress call and the demonstration on how to don the
life vests. The training materials typically don't address any
pre-ditching communications among the aircraft crewmembers. The
typical training materials recommend a standard passenger briefing
with appropriate amendments to the normal pre-landing briefing. In
a sentence, the recommended communications are highly
inadequate.
Typical classroom training briefing exercises require a
demonstration on how to don the life vests and how to use the
flotation-seat cushions. The typical materials recommended that,
with sufficient time available, cabin crewmembers advise the
passengers to remove high-heeled shoes and assign able-bodied
passengers to aid other passengers who may need assistance.
Training materials also often suggested that cabin crewmembers
assign division lines to distribute passengers evenly among the
usable exits. Unplanned ditchings are rarely addressed.
Aircraft manufacturers typically provide the following
immediate-action recommendations for ditchings:
* Direct passengers away from unusable exits.
* Retrieve the Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) from aircraft
storage locations and carry them aboard a raft.
* Retrieve the survival kit, transporting it aboard a raft.
* Tie the ELT to a raft and deploy the ELT, if so equipped.
* Direct the first evacuees to move to center seating areas as they
enter the rafts
* Keep the raft weight distribution even
* Ensure that the aircraft is fully evacuated
* Release slides/rafts from the aircraft by releasing the girt bar
attachment and disconnecting or cutting the mooring line
* Guide any evacuees in the water to the raft-boarding stations;
bringing them aboard
* Toss a heaving line to any evacuees who may be floundering in
water
* Move the rafts away from any fuel-saturated waters, staying in
the vicinity of the aircraft until it sinks
* Attend to any serious injuries
* Check the condition of the rafts, repairing or bailing the rafts,
as necessary
* Connect two or more rafts using the mooring line; and
* Deploy the sea anchors
In most training materials, emphasis is given to the care of the
life raft. Typically, instruction is provided on raft repair,
proper inflation, with the added advice to keep the raft floor dry.
The typical flight attendant manuals note that the rafts are
equipped with locator lights, but it is typically not illustrated
that the lights are water-activated. Sea-anchor deployment is
normally addressed, but their function is not explained. The
installation of the raft canopy is normally addressed. Some
training materials state that if the raft should capsize with the
canopy deployed, the raft would be impossible to restore to its
upright condition. Typically, no instructions are offered for
coping with such a circumstance. Hence, the implication is that
this occurrence could create a non-survivable situation. It is
typically suggested only that the raft lifeline could be used to
secure survivors in the water until they can be assisted aboard the
raft.
Minimal attention is given to the obvious water-survival issues.
The typical training materials state that the passengers should
keep their life jackets on and stay low in the raft. These
materials typically cite the priority of first aid being
administered, with reassurance to the passengers as to the
probability of rescue.
The recommendations of aircraft manufacturers, as opposed to the
air carriers, are generally deficient, relative to the pragmatic
demands:
* Pre-ditching communication guidelines give no directions related
to crewmember communication / coordination, nor instructions for
unplanned ditchings.
* Basic information on evacuation is identified but not explained
in any detail. The manufacturer's materials typically don't address
adverse conditions such as disabled exits, fuselage breakup,
equipment malfunction, poor lighting, evacuation of
injured/disabled persons, passenger disorientation, cabin flooding,
poor communication and environmental stressors. The manufacturers
typically don't provide instructions for such activities as donning
life vests or how to distribute weight evenly in the life rafts.
The implied accountability appears to defer to the flotation
equipment manufacturers.
* No detailed information for utilization of the emergency
equipment is provided.
* The aircraft manufacturers' materials offer no information on the
subject of survival.
* No procedures for actual rescue, a description of rescue devices
and important tips for the use of rescue equipment are
provided.
AIRLINE TRAINING MATERIALS
In the United States, airlines are required to provide the flight
attendants with FAA-approved training, which includes
safety-related subjects and proficiency testing on various
emergency skills. This training is required during their 'initial
training.'
Flight attendants are typically instructed to use the mooring line
to tie rafts together, so as to prevent the rafts from becoming
separated or lost. Some training manuals direct the flight
attendants to tie the rafts 15 - 25 feet [5 - 8 meters] apart to
allow for wave action.
The typical training on ditching covers how to check and maintain
the proper inflation of the raft buoyancy tubes, repair raft leaks
and manually erect the protective canopy.
Flight attendants also are required by FAA to attend annual
recurrent training. During that training, they must demonstrate
their skills and competence in emergency procedures, ditching and
water survival. The flight attendant manuals typically contain
instructions concerning ditching evacuation, which includes the
need for careful evaluation of the emergency situation before
taking action.
In the typical training materials, the flight attendants are
instructed to select and brief able-bodied passengers to help with
such actions as retrieving the stowed life rafts and/or to relocate
the slide/rafts, as necessary. Such volunteers are also to be
directed to lead the exit process and to take command of the rafts
or slide/rafts until a crewmember becomes available. The typical
training manuals describe that after the initial preparatory steps
are accomplished, the flight attendants would assume command of the
evacuation process.
The flight attendants are typically directed to continue assessing
the external conditions as the exits are activated and to redirect
passengers to another exit if an exit or its attached slide/raft
becomes unusable. Typically, specific flight attendants are
designated to retrieve the ELT from the aircraft and to carry the
ELT to a life raft. Other flight attendants are directed to ensure
that the plane is entirely evacuated. The manuals are generally
found to state that once the aircraft has been fully evacuated, the
flight attendants should then release the slides/rafts from the
aircraft and assume their command of the rafts.
Many differences can be found in the methods addressing individual
passenger flotation. The use of flotation seat-cushions varies
greatly. Some airlines direct passengers to hold the cushions in
front of their bodies, others to rest their chins on the cushions,
while others direct passengers to wrap their arms around the
cushions with their hands grasping the outside loops. Other
carriers suggest that passengers lie forward on the cushions,
grasping and holding the loops beneath them, floating horizontally.
There are no known cases of carriers considering rough seas,
hypothermia, shock, unconsciousness or passengers falling asleep
while relying on the seat-cushions.
The typical flight attendant training programs provide dissimilar
procedures regarding the appropriate time to inflate life-vests.
Some carriers train the flight attendants to direct passengers to
inflate only one chamber of a two-chamber life-vest before leaving
the aircraft, while other carriers direct the inflation of both
chambers. Some carriers direct passengers to inflate their life
vest by pulling the CO2 cylinder tabs, while a few training
programs direct that life-vests be inflated only with the oral
inflation tubes.
In reality, the vests should be tightened in the aircraft, with a
prohibition against inflating the vests until water contact is
imminent. It is possible that a passenger could fall and roll over
an inflated vest in such a way as to fall off the side of a
slide.
Similarly, there are divergent procedures taught for the donning of
life vests. This is surprising, as carriers would be expected to
comply with the manufacturer's recommendations. Some carriers teach
their flight attendants to advise their passengers to tighten the
life vest as much as possible; another carrier advises passengers
to tighten the life vest only until they can put a clinched fist
between their body and the vest. One carrier is known to instruct
passengers not to tighten the vest at all. Experienced survivors
report that a vest needs to be worn with the straps tightened to
gain the optimum body position in the water.
Researchers have discovered that the special needs of infants,
children, elderly and handicapped passengers typically receive
minimal attention in the training materials they have
reviewed.
Child / infant life-vests are rarely offered by carriers.
Instead, many airlines train their flight attendants in a variety
of methods to secure children in adult life vests. A common method
is to have the parent strap the child in an inflated adult life
vest, holding the child in his/her lap. Although some airlines are
known to provide a combination child-restraint/flotation device,
most airlines rely on passengers to provide their own approved
child restraints. However, these will typically NOT float and will
not accommodate a child wearing an inflated vest. Obviously, a
takeoff/landing accident into the water would immediately pose a
serious risk to the life of a child.
Typically, minimal guidelines are provided for water survival in
airline training programs. However, more detailed information is
typically discovered in the survival manuals packed in the
life-raft survival kits.
Training programs can be expected to direct duties to be assigned
to passengers by the flight attendants, including distress
signaling, lookout duty for rescue vessels and aircraft, collecting
drinking water, rationing food and bailing water.
Very few training manuals cover the topic of first-aid,
specifically directed at the arena of ditching and water-survival.
The typical rationale being that general first-aid is sufficient.
There are no known flight attendant training manuals, which include
the topics of hazardous marine life, adverse sea conditions, severe
injuries, shock, seasickness, saltwater sores, sun blindness,
personal hygiene and survivor mental attitude.
There are no known training programs addressing the topic of rescue
procedures. The only known instruction is a generic comment
directing flight attendants to wait in the raft until guidance is
received from rescue personnel.
Given the obvious conclusions, there is a desperate need for air
carriers to improve their general training for ditchings,
particularly unplanned ditchings as a consequence of an aircraft
landing short or overrunning the end of the runway.
While the basic information on pre-ditching communication is
provided in the typical training manual is adequate for a
controlled ditching, assuming plenty of time to prepare, there is
a clear mandate for better Crew Resource Management [CRM]
techniques to provide dynamic and timely communication and
coordination among all crewmembers, especially during the earliest
stages of emergencies in general, as well as for potential or
actual ditching scenarios.
It is also typical of airlines to generally exclude the role of the
pilots in the actual process of any emergency evacuation, or in the
evacuation aftermath. Toward that end, study, procedural
development and training are additionally indicated.
Industry-standardized intra-aircraft communication signals are
needed to preclude confusion problems. It is an accepted fact that
different emergency signals are taught by the various airlines.
Therefore, employees who change companies, for any reason, such as
a merger or buyout, are often re-trained in new procedures. This
leaves the possibility of 'negative habit transfer,' with possible
stress-related confusion as to procedures and signals during an
emergency. The risk of confusion can be resolved if all airlines
adopt a universal emergency communication style, procedures and
signals.
Poor evacuation decisions are guaranteed to be the product of
unrealistic ditching presentations. It is necessary to accurately
address details of the more probable reality in the evacuation
phase of ditchings. The details regarding the probable aircraft
damage potential and the reasonably expected flotation time of
specific aircraft models is particularly important to address.
Although each required piece of aircraft emergency equipment is
typically described in the training manuals, differences in the
storage compartment contents, their locations, and specific
operating details and limitations of the emergency equipment may
impair effective action by the flight attendants who are qualified
on multiple aircraft. In the ditching scenario, such differences
may impede crewmembers in moving stowed rafts to usable exits or
slide/rafts from unusable exits to the desired doorways, even with
the help of able-bodied passengers.
Many airlines locate emergency equipment throughout the passenger
cabin. Those locations will make retrieval of needed equipment
difficult at best in any evacuation. As a minimum, the megaphones
need to be located within reach of the flight attendants, while
seated at their assigned jump seat.
The minimal exit lighting requirements enhance the risk of delays,
should anything go wrong during the deployment of slides and rafts.
While flashlights are located at the exits, their use can be costly
in terms of time.
All emergency equipment (notably survival manuals) must be made of
waterproof materials, whenever practical.
Maximizing visual presentations in the carrier's training materials
and manuals, or using dynamic video presentations, would also
enhance safety. Whenever possible, differences in the instructions
for emergency equipment utilization and survival kit contents
should be eliminated, or clearly explained.
The contents of survival kits need to be standardized, relative to
the geographic requirements. Likewise, survival training unique to
seasons and geographic regions needs to be conducted and
reinforced.
The standardization issue of personal flotation equipment needs to
be reconciled within the entire industry. Presently, life-vests
often differ in style and function from airplane to airplane, but
they can also possibly vary within the same aircraft. Thus, the
life-vest used for a preflight briefing may differ from the vests
that passengers would actually use.
Again, the various air carriers offer conflicting advice to
passengers on when and how to use the life vests. An
industry-standardized procedure is needed for the inflation of life
vests.
Instructions are also needed for the management of the elderly,
injured or handicapped individuals for general emergencies and
evacuations, as well as for ditching evacuations. The
'buddy-system' for assigning the preparation and evacuation
assistance of children, handicapped or elderly passengers is
potentially highly successful if effective procedures were also
adopted for establishing the flotation means for these
individuals.
Typically, the topic of survival is only discussed in the context
of the survival kit. Although the survival kit contents may differ,
the typical basic survival information needs to be expanded. It is
common for environmental survival issues, injuries and mental
attitudes of survivors/victims to be omitted. For example,
passengers might exit the aircraft directly into the water, as
opposed to boarding a life raft. Beyond the risk of hypothermia,
the water may be contaminated with fuel, oil or hydraulic fluid.
These fluids can impair vision, speech and hearing. If swallowed,
even in small amounts, they can produce nausea and vomiting. These
elements of trauma can compound the effect of shock or injuries,
including open wounds or burns.
During the course of a ditching, the assurance of survival is found
in effective life-raft management. The subjects such as weight
distribution and capsizing need to be expanded. In cases where more
than one raft is utilized, the management of 'flotilla' resources
needs to be discussed in terms of realism. Basic safety rules need
to be cemented in crewmembers' minds, such as the need for
passengers to wear their life vests at all times. Various duties
need to be assigned and shared.
It is also vitally important for the crew to secure all of the
survival equipment and miscellaneous resources in the raft to
prevent their loss in rough seas or if the raft capsizes. Ideally,
it would be obviously beneficial for aircraft crewmembers to have
the benefit of practice in righting a capsized raft during
training, especially in the open water, if possible. Conceivably,
other safety organizations might be able to provide supplemental
safety training, such as the Coast Guard.
Crewmembers would also be better served with an understanding of
basic raft survivability factors. For example, crewmembers can
readily utilize such concepts as the seaworthiness produced by
changes in freeboard (distance from the water's surface to the top
of the raft's buoyancy tube). The teaching of such concepts would
prepare crewmembers to maintain life-raft stability and flotation,
especially with damaged life rafts.
Information concerning what to expect during rescue efforts is
desperately needed. While most presume an open-water ditching with
an ultimate helicopter rescue, a merchant vessel or Coast Guard
Cutter are just as likely.
Crewmembers need operational information pertinent to the
various types of rescue, including ships, aircraft drops and
helicopters. Ideally, the crewmembers should have practice in the
use of rescue equipment. Presently, rescue procedures and the use
of rescue devices are not presented in the airline training
classes. Much of this information is critical to crewmembers. For
example, they need to know what to do if high winds or rotor wash
from a rescue helicopter capsize the raft and how to manage the
extraction of the survivors, if a rescue swimmer is not deployed
from the rescue aircraft or ship.
A reasonable understanding of methods to maintain the morale of
survivors is needed. For example, crewmembers need to outline the
probable chain of events during the rescue phase. When a helicopter
arrives, it may be operating by itself, able to accommodate only a
certain number of passengers. The passengers need to be aware that
the first survivors rescued need to be the injured, sick and
infirm. Thereafter, the women-and-children should follow; the
remaining survivors will have to wait for additional flights.
Again, the crewmembers should also be reasonably familiar with the
various types of rescue equipment and its application, so as to
prevent injuries during the rescue operation.
The lack of training, practice or at least familiarization on
rescue-related topics leaves the crewmembers at a loss for the
required knowledge, skill or proficiency to assist with a rescue
effort. Comprehensive water-survival training materials are
typically readily available from civil sources and the U.S.
military services (particularly the Coast Guard) and can be readily
assembled into an effective airline-training program.
Common sense dictates that approved flotation-seat cushions need to
be installed in all passenger-carrying aircraft to provide every
passenger and crewmember with an auxiliary means of flotation in
any type of ditching - not just for extended over-water
flights.
Of particular interest is the outcome of a 1994 simulated ditching
exercise, as well as comments from several accidents. These support
the obviously needed improvements in airline training.
In a 1994 simulation exercise, seven airlines, several
ditching-equipment manufacturers and 65 federal, state and local
government agencies participated in a combined airport-disaster
exercise for the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport,
Florida.
The exercise simulated the crash of a Lockheed L-1011 with 300
people on board. The crash scenario simulated a ditching in the
Intra-coastal Waterway, moments after takeoff. The exercise
simulated fifty fatalities and 250 `survivors,' floating in the
water or clinging to aircraft wreckage, waiting for rescue.
The water-emergency demonstration generated the following
observations from the participants. As you read these, bear in mind
the pre-existing level of mental/emotional preparedness of the
participating volunteers.
* 'Passengers' who could not hear the flight attendant's evacuation
commands described the feeling of panic.
* Problems occurred with conflicting instructions given on the use
of the life vests.
* Participants with baby carriers experienced numerous
problems.
* The participants who had to exit the aircraft directly into the
water were frightened and unsure of what to do after entering the
water. [Imagine the confusion that description indicates during an
actual ditching.]
* Participants had problems keeping the slide/rafts dry.
* No one assumed command, which resulted in problems with raft
management.
* No one was assigned to be the lookout.
* The survival kits presented several problems such as the kit
items were very hard to open, the survival manual was not
waterproof, the sponge was too small and difficult to use, and the
signal flare was hard to ignite. Once ignited, the raft was singed
while participants used the flare.
* As participants' hands lost agility from the cold, items such as
drinking water containers were almost impossible to open. [One can
imagine the effect of more realistic environments, such as the
North Atlantic.]
* Seasickness created problems.
* Personal hygiene was a major issue, especially for women.
* Participants stated that they felt cramped, tired and experienced
anxiety after only a short time in the slide/rafts with
strangers.
* There was no mooring line or ELT attached to the raft.
* Participants did not anticipate that the rescue helicopter rotor
wash would be so severe.
* Participants were unfamiliar with equipment used for
rescue.
* Participants did not realize that they could not be picked up
from inside the raft.
* Participants did not realize that a rescue swimmer was not always
dropped from the helicopter to aid with rescue."
From the exercise, in particular, flight attendants remarked that
better training should be developed concerning rescue procedures,
rescue-equipment usage and the boarding of slide/rafts in realistic
sea conditions.
The flight attendants suggested that a checklist of water-rescue
tasks (printed on waterproof paper) and thermal blankets should be
added to the survival kits. The flight attendant participants also
remarked that training materials should emphasize the wearing of
life vests at all times, during the rescue phase, in
particular.
The 'rescuers' in the exercise recommended procedures for making
the rafts more visible in darkness. The rescuers stated that their
night-vision equipment easily detected the flashlights provided in
survival kits. However, they recommended that the ditching/survival
training should require lookouts to frequently shine a flashlight
in the fashion of a beacon to enhance the visibility of the
survivors to rescuers.
In summary, the ditching and water survival studies consistently
suggested needed changes in the FAA approved cabin crewmember
training. Those recommendations come from studies ranging from the
1980s through 1998. The key findings in such studies is that
despite the rare occurrence of ditchings, aircraft crewmembers
should still be prepared to competently direct passengers in a
ditching and to immediately employ all available resources. Such
competence is not only critical for planned ditchings, but also
when the ditching is unexpected, and survival depends on timely and
competent decisions under adverse conditions.
CONCLUSION
It is first necessary to prevent incidents, emergencies and
accidents. The background factors are all too easy to control and
change. However, history continues to teach that those very factors
often go uncontrolled, leading to an 'event.'
We can only observe the lessons of past events, noting general
human tendencies for particular expected responses, understanding
the basic human response foundation. Thus, we are at least armed
with the benefit of some measure of understanding and what to
anticipate when people are faced with their own mortality and other
peoples' responses in an emergency scenario.
Hopefully, the lessons learned thus far in aviation emergencies
will enable people to operate with some pragmatic basis toward more
effective understanding and decision making while under stress.
Most importantly, it is hoped that the information provided will
enable all to assist and enable those who have put their faith in
the various safety systems and the flight professionals.