ANATOMY
OF AN
EMERGENCY
Written by
Captain Ralph W. Omholt
INTRODUCTION
The paradox in modern airline operations is that the aviation
industry has failed to learn the lessons derived from the design,
operation and sinking of the Titanic, in 1912. We now approach 100
years of history, repeating the same formula for disaster,
brilliantly illustrated by a terrific Hollywood movie. Yet, today,
we still see design shortcuts and managerial mistakes being made in
the light as the cost cutting and attempted profit reaping of the
Titanic tragedy. Not surprisingly, the result is the same - tragic
and unnecessary deaths.
We also see the nearly identical failures in the onboard crew
teamwork, resulting in air disasters, instead. Today that teamwork
is a science, referred to as Crew Resource Management, or, CRM,
researched and developed by NASA. Without explanation, the FAA has
gone on record as refusing the National Transportation Safety
Board's (NTSB) pleas to implement the practices of CRM at the
cockpit level; the only place it has any relevance or effect. We
repeatedly witness CRM failings behind incidents and accidents, and
disasters.
The worst disaster in aviation history - the collision of two
B-747s - illustrated the potential for disasters caused by crew
teamwork (CRM) failings; yet the FAA all but refuses to address the
CRM issue in a dynamic manner. Most recently, the combined 99
fatalities in American flight 1420 and Alaska flight 261 punctuated
the desperate need for CRM; yet the FAA still refuses to budge.
Conversely, successful examples of safety, effected by CRM, are
methodically overlooked, almost 'buried.' The UA-232 accident
(Sioux City crash) is the only known exception of any prominence.
Paradoxically, the FAA illustrates the UA-232 accident as an
example of CRM, while refusing to actually implement CRM in the
cockpits. Thus, the FAA creates the illusion that they dynamically
endorse CRM. Few positions could be further from the truth.
Given the mechanical factors, we are thus confronted with the
terrible proposition that we must prepare for more disasters.
Prevention by any means is the only solution. Awareness of the true
reality is required, as then, only a difference can be made. With
short-term profits being an economic fetish, information and
awareness, with the threat of accountability - on a ledger-sheet or
in a courtroom - seem to be the only tools.
The staggering reality is that those paying the 'pittance' fares to
ride a bus across town or across country are entitled to a
radically higher standard of safety than the airline passenger -
anywhere. The bus driver's civil and legal rights as a wage earner
are far superior to those of an airline captain.
Yet, we may be certain, for the moment, that more incidents,
accidents and disasters will continue to happen. Hence, the core of
the following material is intended to give an appropriate in-dept
insight into that time, "when things go wrong." The following
presentation is intended to cover the mechanical, psychological and
emotional aspects of an emergency, so as to render a reasonably
complete presentation of the complexity of airline
emergencies.
AIRLINE EMERGENCIES
Everyone who has a responsibility for airline safety needs a clear
understanding of previous emergencies as well as reasonably
expected human response under stress. That knowledge is needed to
effectively direct the desired response of individuals, control
small groups or possibly to manage a crowd.
Human response in emergencies is highly varied and unfortunately
unpredictable. Aircraft accidents are rare and very little research
has been conducted in the aviation emergency and disaster
environment. It is simply impossible to predict what any
individual, or group is likely to do in a given set of
circumstances. Suffice it to say, that emergencies and accidents
rarely have reliable similarities.
Airline emergencies have a maddening characteristic; they are
extremely mobile. An entire scenario can be played out in flight,
with an imminent disaster avoided in flight, allowing an aircraft
to continuing on to its original destination. An actual accident
can occur en route, involving anything from a mid-air collision to
a bomb explosion. The actual accident can occur on land or in the
ocean. Statistically, most accidents happen within a few miles of
an airport, however, there is obviously no guarantee. The
worst-case scenario is an accident far from civilization, where
survivors must wait for rescue - if it ever reaches them in
time.
An amazing irony confronts the airline industry in that the
pertinence of the popular movie, "Titanic" is technically accurate
to an extreme as a depiction of a program for disaster, from the
contributing background factors, through the depictions of human
responses, ranging from the background to the aftermath. Yet, few
in the aviation industry seem to have learned from that, or any
disaster.
The issues to be explored in this material include -
* The background factors in emergencies.
* The role of passengers in emergencies.
* The four active phases of an emergency.
* The emotional and psychological impact.
* The variability and unpredictability of human response.
* The impact of stress on decision-making.
* The critical requirement for information and effective
communication.
* The importance of leadership in emergencies.
* The dynamics of aircraft evacuations.
EMERGENCY - Defined
For many of us an emergency can be simply defined as:
"An event, or set of events, which disrupts our normal day-to-day
routine." We are all familiar with minor 'road rage' and the tears
and words of anger over the classic tube of toothpaste, squeezed in
the middle.
An emergency, as we normally regard the term in a life threatening
sense, can erupt suddenly, or evolve over a considerable period of
time. An emergency can obviously result in physical damage and
injury to people; possibly leading to the loss of life.
The types of emergencies and their causes vary to an extreme. No
two emergencies are exactly the same. Some emergencies, such as
acts-of-war, are deliberate and man-made. Other emergencies result
from natural causes. For our purposes, we will concentrate on the
airline community with its human error; and systems or mechanical
failure.
The importance of the emergency issue addresses the fact that the
aviation community, particularly the airline industry is quickly
growing. Thus, more people are exposed to flight emergencies.
Despite a good safety record, accidents and major disasters still
happen. Beyond the mechanical factors, it is necessary to
acknowledge the importance of behavioral issues. A large portion of
human behavior knowledge comes from studies in
emergency situation 'crowd management.'
Ironically, maritime studies and safety rules are far ahead of the
aviation community. The maritime environment often provides
additional rules and procedures for dealing with people's special
needs and keeping order, reducing and avoiding panic.
In addition, such maritime codes call for personnel with the
responsibility for the safety of passengers in an emergency
situation, to follow approved training in crisis management and
human behavior which includes, but is not limited to:
* Situational assessment and the provision of an effective
response.
* Leadership during abnormal situations and emergencies.
* Identification of indicators and symptoms of excessive personal
stress, and adverse stress response.
* Identification of the impact of stress on response and its effect
on passenger and crew performance.
* Awareness of passenger and crew response/reactions in
emergencies.
* Recognition of specific responses of passengers and
crew.
* Recognizing the possibility, probability and character of
panic.
* Recognizing and understanding the importance of timely, clear and
concise information, instructions and reports, and the exchange of
information and dynamic feedback.
* Effective communication of instructions requiring crew and
passenger action.
In a sentence, the aviation community is far behind. The amazing
tragedy is that the gap in safety is profit driven, just as in the
Titanic affair. Interestingly, the maritime community learned the
obvious lessons; appropriately applying them.
LEADERSHIP
An emergency can quickly become complex, given the various layers
of leadership involved. An emergency can be as simple as a captain
calling for a checklist, resolving the threat. It can be a
dispatcher's decision to divert an aircraft due to weather, a
mechanical problem or a bomb threat. Leadership can be the
resolution of the final solution or the needed authority. While the
captain is mechanically and legally the final authority, history
proves that a captain's decisions can be swayed by political
threat; another Titanic.
Effective leadership requires the ability to be flexible, the
willingness to adapt one's belief system or style, to accommodate
a unique or rapidly changing situation, and/or set of
circumstances.
The gifted leader might be able to achieve the desired effect
automatically, while others need training and the time to think
before deciding on a course of action. Such courses of action are
usually described as autocratic, democratic, or composite.
In environments such as aviation, teamwork (democratic or
composite) is required. Normally, the captain is the team leader.
Such a role often requires an autocratic or authoritarian style.
Despite normal roles and responsibilities, the role of a good
leader in emergencies is to effect a safe outcome, via teamwork.
The autocratic style or role is often visualized as an extreme
style. Often it is feared out of tradition or prejudice, without
good cause. In recent years, the science of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) has been effected, with great success. Conversely,
most of the accidents which we have recently witnessed, contained
a major failing of that safety teamwork.
Where the individual asserts his/her style will depend on the
immediate requirement, the task at hand, the immediate environment
and the people involved. The inter-relationships will equally
include their perceptions, understanding of the situation,
preferences, prejudices and, of course, the time available.
POWER
Power is the primary resource, which enables a leader to influence
individuals and groups. It is that power which is utilized to
direct the efforts of others toward the achievement of the desired
objective. Power comes in a variety of forms.
PERSUASION
Persuasive or coercive power effects compliance, rather than
creating commitment, by eliminating perceived options and otherwise
motivating people. In an emergency, that form of power creates
action through fear of an adverse outcome such as accountability,
pain, injury or death.
For example, "We must listen to the pilots and flight attendants if
we want to survive. Calm down and just LISTEN!"
ASSUMPTION
Assumed power is based on the immediate leader's actual or
perceived connection with influential or important people.
For example, "The captain has asked me to advise everybody that
..."
EXPERTISE
The effect of expertise is related to a leader's special knowledge
and/or skills. It can be used very effectively to influence those
who are aware that they do not have the same magnitude of knowledge
and/or skills themselves. In most cases, people quickly display
respect for expertise, which gains and facilitates
compliance.
For example, "Attention everybody, I am a policeman. We have a case
of sky-rage, but the individual has been subdued and secured,
everything is going to be okay. Please go back to your
seats."
UNIQUE INFORMATION
Information available to the immediate leader can be a source of
power, if that leader has information that others need or
want.
For example, "Attention please, we have to clear the aisles and the
immediate seat area. My information is that we will probably have
to evacuate the aircraft very quickly after landing."
POSITION
Position obviously wields the authority or rank, which the
particular leader holds. Such position, and its implied power, is
typically legitimized by some form status, backed by either
tradition or a disciplinary code. The power of a unique position
creates a situation where the leader is perceived as having the
legitimate right to command; with the followers having a certain
obligation to obey. Such power can be delegated.
For example, "Ladies and Gentlemen, this is your Captain speaking.
Please give me your attention for a few moments. I'd like to bring
you up to date on the situation. However, I would first ask you to
remain calm, listen carefully and follow the instructions of the
flight attendants..."
PERSONALITY
The element of personal power is a function of the perceived
leader's inherent qualities such as image, charm, integrity and
apparent courage; as well as such traits as decisiveness and
bearing. The power comes from the individual's being liked and
possibly admired. For the perceived leader, those elements will
determine the level of commitment and compliance.
For example, imagine a Hollywood 'macho' hero on board saying,
"Come on folks, we have a job to do. I have a good feeling about
this. Just remember that we're going to have to work together to
get through this thing."
REWARD
The power of reward is based on the leader's ability to give his
followers some tangible outcome. This can be another form of
coercive power, related to gaining a tangible positive outcome, as
opposed to simply avoiding a negative outcome.
For example, "Just listen carefully, follow the instructions and
we'll get through this thing okay. The drinks will be on
me."
HUMOR
There is also power in tasteful and appropriate humor. Imagine the
situation above with the final message being, "The captain's buying
the drinks, but he doesn't know it yet." Those extra words can add
a small, but important, element of positive energy.
ACTION
The final decisions on appropriate action are not often easy as no
one can reliably predict an outcome and the needed action,
particularly in the final seconds. Often no action will be the
appropriate decision. If a safe landing is accomplished out of an
emergency with no remaining threat, the decision can be as simple
as a PA announcing, "Stay seated, stay seated!"
In an emergency, there are no hard rules as to what action is
appropriate when dealing effectively with an individual, group or
crowd. While there is always the risk of hindsight judgments, in
the midst of an emergency, there are no rigid right or wrong
answers, only the 'best judgment,' based on the best analysis of
the situation in the given time frame.
BACKGROUND
In the FAA history, there is a safety poster, which displays a tall
captain looking down at a young boy. The caption reads, "Son, good
pilots don't have exciting stories." While the realists typically
mock the caption, it expresses an admirable and desirable
idealism.
The background of an emergency is typically complex. However, there
are two elements, which particularly affect flight crews, education
and training. While the combination of these two terms might seem
redundant, bear in mind that pertinent flight crew knowledge can
independently operate in the background of the formality of the
training, which focuses on habits. Education serves to prevent an
emergency, training serves the extrication from the emergency, once
danger appears.
'Background' can involve the extremes of formal education such as
an electrical engineering degree in the background of flight
training. Thus, that engineer-pilot is better equipped to deal with
a potential electrical problem. The aircraft manual might cite the
limitation of re-setting a circuit breaker only twice. The
specialized knowledge of the engineer-pilot might recognize that
the 'popped' circuit breaker is a low power 'control' circuit
breaker, which protects current going to a relay which, in turn,
controls a 50 amp circuit.
Background can be as simple as the recollection of a 'rumor,' or a
distant account. Imagine a co-pilot saying, "Captain, if memory
serves me correctly, wasn't that the same circuit breaker that
supposedly started that DC-9 fire that killed 30 people?" Another
example, "Remember "X," he got time off / fired for not ..."
Crew training implies that once an event occurs, the flight crews
quickly identify and accept an abnormal situation as a signal that
something is wrong; needing the crews' action. From that point, the
crews solve the problem, via trained habits, or move on to warn
others or sound an actual alarm.
Passengers also get involved in many flight emergencies, however
their situation is significantly different. As with flight crews,
attitude makes the difference. In the accepted role of the
courteous and compliant passenger, they may tend to deny a problem
exists, or look for convincing reinforcement that something is
actually wrong. To protect their
self-image, passengers may resist communication or action, fearing
embarrassment or refuse to admit to themselves that a problem
potentially or actually exists. Fear may evoke denial, numbing the
passenger to inaction, even when a potential or actual emergency
exists.
There might be extraneous reasons for passenger inaction. For
example, if one passenger is obviously to be classed as a
'minority,' gets drunk and is approaching 'disorderly,' an
observant passenger might keep silent, rather than risk the
accusation of prejudice. Such a situation could ultimately lead to
a very dangerous sky-rage event.
It is common for 'deadheading' or 'commuting' airline employees to
be seated among the passengers, with observation skills or
supplemental expertise to offer. Surprisingly, that may not make a
difference. In one accidental belly-landing, three 'deadheading'
crew members later said that they were sure that the landing gear
wasn't down - yet said nothing.
In many accounts, individuals confess strong suspicions well in
advance of the onset of the threat itself. A copilot might later
confess, "I heard the circuit breaker pop. I didn't approve of the
captain resetting it without looking to see what it was or allowing
a 'cooling' time, but I didn't want to get him mad at me."
In another scenario, "I knew the company was trying to save on
fuel. I knew the weather forecast was bad, I knew the potential for
the airport going to a single runway with a shift in the wind; I
didn't ask for more fuel because I didn't want to create a 'hassle'
with the dispatcher or the chief pilot."
Human psychology plays a major role in emergencies; particularly in
the background. Even where appropriate action is taken to prevent
an emergency, the decisions often involve a requirement for
multiple threats before anything is said or done. The background
becomes particularly fertile for an emergency in cases where the
indicators are seemingly vague and/or ambiguous. A 'local culture'
may induce psychological denial in response to the fear of
potential embarrassment or retribution. This could be as simple as
a copilot wanting the captain's respect or as complex as a
pre-existing personality clash. The denial can potentially be a
"team effort." Imagine the captain saying, "If we keep demanding
more fuel, we're asking to get accused of some kind of union
action." In such a case, the copilot might easily go along with the
decision.
In the background, there are far too many profit-driven forces,
which create and drive an emergency. The obvious deadly combination
is on the order of maintenance or weather problems combined with a
crew-rest problem.
Let's examine some prominent examples from history -
Swiss Air 111
Swiss Air flight 111 is a complex fatal tragedy, which barely
deserves the term, "accident." It never should have been an
emergency, let alone a tragedy. The minute details of the event
itself are not well known, but sufficient information is available
to illustrate a disaster, which should never have happened for many
reasons.
1. The complexity of the aircraft design itself left the
probability that the minimum required crew of two pilots could
become so involved with an imminent disaster that the attendance to
flight control would become minimal to non-existent.
2. The personal knowledge of the pilots as to the aircraft systems
was deficient by virtue of the addition of a passenger
entertainment system which was directly powered from one of the
aircraft main power sources, as opposed to a more remote power
source which could be easily isolated or protected from a
catastrophic failure. Following the disaster, the suspect systems
were immediately deactivated or removed in the surviving fleet of
aircraft.
3. The failure of the company-training program to consider such a
possibility and give supplemental training to the pilots, which
conceivably could have averted the disaster. If current indications
are correct, appropriate knowledge could have led to the early
deactivation of the correct electrical power source, allowing a
safe landing.
4. The ignorance of the Swiss Air pilots as to the background money
politics created by the U.S. White House. Those politics set the
stage for the failure of safety authority. The particular document
is Executive Order 12866. The Order contains a tongue-in-cheek
provision that it is not intended to usurp any existing laws. While
the existing safety laws were and are in full force and effect,
their observance is selectively not observed; favoring corporate
profits over safety.
***************************
Alaska Flight 261
In a similar disaster, the pilots of Alaska Flight 261 were
probably ignorant of the FAA regulations and the effective elements
of Crew Resource Management (CRM). While a serious mechanical
failure created an emergency under the FAA regulations,
independently of pilot judgment, the corporate culture(identified
by the media) compelled the pilots to over-fly several good
airports, until the mechanical situation deteriorated; ultimately
aircraft control was impossible. Basic rule 3 of CRM is, "Land as
soon as possible."
On the heels of that accident, the company had two more
incidents, which included very similar serious CRM failings. After
the third incident, the pilot group apparently became
self-educated, as the life-threatening incidents abruptly stopped.
The Flight 261 disaster produced no significant changes made by
either the FAA or the company.
In these incidents, one valuable and historically validated lesson
had not been brought to the active attention of the pilots, "Land
as soon as possible!"
***************************
ValuJet Flight 592
A serious researcher of the VJ-592 crash will walk away bewildered.
The presented 'facts' don't make sufficient sense for a responsible
researcher to come to a well-defined conclusion. Too many reliable
facts were left out of the official report; many of the presented
'facts' were impossible.
However, the pilots, we can be sure, did their best under the
circumstances. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight (armed with the
history of subsequent similar events), the same lesson is apparent
- CRM rule 3, "Land as soon as possible." While the ValuJet pilots
were attempting to do just that, the reliable data indicates one
tragic fact, they dutifully asked permission and for directions.
The associated time factor probably made the life-death
difference.
We may be certain that the VJ-592 pilots didn't and couldn't have
known the magnitude of the threat they faced. It is well known that
the situation quickly deteriorated with the infamous "Murphy's Law"
catching the crew in many ways. The pilots had to have been totally
bewildered after the first few seconds of the emergency.
In all likelihood, the pilots did not have a historical
appreciation for the potential for rapid deterioration of
situations involving electrical problems; or any form of fire
threat aboard an aircraft. Their ignorance left them abandoned to
fate.
***************************
THE OBVIOUS QUESTION
Interestingly, in the extended background of events such as these,
there was another element lurking which still has not been
adequately addressed. That element being the obvious question, "If
we know that when pilots quickly land, they save lives and
aircraft, why is it that so many pilots still elect to continue to
the extreme of a serious incident or a tragic disaster?"
In a sentence, the answer undoubtedly lies in an accountant's
biased spreadsheet. While it is important to maintain corporate
viability, air disasters do not justify the short-term profits,
which seem to repeatedly enhance the careers of airline executives
and bureaucrats. A spreadsheet simply cannot readily depict safety
as an investment; it's shown only as an expense.
If it can be said in a single sentence, pilots, in general, are
afraid of losing their image due to punishment, rumor and innuendo;
hence they often take unnecessary risks.
Many years ago, the U.S. Air Force produced a training film called,
"The Failing Aviator." The film title was designed to get the
pilots' attention; it did. The film presented an almost humorous
account of pilot sociology. Those who saw it never forgot it. The
film portrayed the pilot fixation on their image, displacing safety
in the process. It is long past time for a similar film to be
presented, entitled, "The Psychology of Safety."
Amazingly, the cost of most common sense safety items can be
readily recouped. If the reality were well known, the traveling
public would have little trouble with the idea of their pre-paying
the costs in their ticket price. The lingering question remains,
"Even if the passengers pre-paid the expense, would the money be
used for the needed changes, or diverted into the profit coffers?"
The Pan Am Flight 103 history leaves that as a valid
question.
It must also be asked, "With the money in hand, will the changes be
made in time?"
Given the high probability of more airline disaster, we must be
aware of the 'real time' human factors involved in an
emergency.
GENERAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Like ocean-going passenger ships and local ferries, airliners also
carry a large number of people - they are also, to a certain
degree, 'crowds.' Thus, we must examine the details of crowd
behavior and why crowds are not just interesting, but sometimes
dangerous in their own right. It is necessary to examine the
details of the human behavior models and the general ideas and the
assumptions held about crowds.
Crowds earn their interest because of the potential tragedy for
something dangerous or deadly happening. Most importantly, because
of the potential number of victims.
In emergencies, crowds are significant because they can be either
'well behaved;' or, they can play a direct causal role, as well as
an incidental role in incidents, emergencies, accidents and
disasters.
The greatest concern with regard to crowds is the element of panic
leading to the crushing of those slow to respond. There is also the
fear that the mass of passengers can fail to properly react or
communicate important instructions to others, so as to effect the
desired action.
Conversely, a non-reactive sub-crowd can play an instigating role.
During an aircraft evacuation, if a significant percentage of
passengers decide to take their personal belongings with them, they
may present an obstruction to the remainder of the evacuees,
inducing a panic reaction. In reality, that is a rather common
occurrence.
The direct 'crowd' role in an emergency requires knowledge,
methods, systems and procedures to ensure that a crowd is unlikely
to cause a disaster. The incidental role played by crowds during an
emergency is a much more complex problem to deal with and
manage.
Obviously, not all groups or crowds are the same. Any crowd is
typically made up of individuals who have come together for a wide
range of different reasons. Their attitudes, roles, actions, and
reactions to any events will differ with a broad number of factors,
including age, status, sex, experience and expectations.
Each setting containing a large number of people is likely to have
certain aspects of crowd behavior in common with other settings.
However, different factors will result in behaviors unique to each
setting. The same people might behave at least slightly differently
when they are on a narrow-body aircraft than on a wide-body
aircraft. Their reaction in the gate area will be different than
when they are seated on the aircraft.
Crowds are complex; each one is somehow different in one way or
another. Despite the identifiable differences, researchers have
identified a number of factors, which influence crowd behavior.
Some of the factors include their upbringing, their every-day
'roles,' how they perceive themselves in relationship to other
people and certainly, their expectations in a given situation.
People in general have certain 'rules' associated with their
personal roles - how they behave, relative to others, and what they
expect, possibly demand, in return.
The key is in controlling the element of fear.
Researchers have also illuminated a number of myths held about
crowds and crowd behavior.
CROWD MYTHS
The concern regarding 'mob mentality' is found in the commonly held
that individuals in crowds undergo a psychological change - they
mysteriously transform, coming to obey some instinctive 'unified
mass mentality law'. In doing so they become somewhat irrational,
childlike and primitive.
Most people have their own concept of the term, 'mob mentality.'
Myth, holds that crowds become a crazy, random and unmanageable
body. The fear is that crowds they are highly suggestible or
anti-social; not wanting to be managed. While there is certain
phenomena associated with crowd behavior, the myth of inherent mob
mentality is simply not valid.
While the concern over 'mob mentality' is founded in fact, valid
facts and history defy any 'laws' regarding the predictability of
crowds, especially in emergencies. However, there remains the fear
that if a crowd were indeed to become crazy and revert to a
'unified mass mentality law,' then under certain circumstances this
would lead, almost inevitably, to lethal panic behavior.
Admittedly, that sometimes happens, even on aircraft.
Managing a crowd isn't to be feared as being virtually impossible.
Fortunately for flight crews, research reveals that people retain
much of their individuality and that they typically abide by their
every-day roles; and the constructive rules by which they normally
live.
Crowds, even in emergencies, have their underlying individual
pre-existing roles and their own associated rules which guide their
behavior. Superimposed on these are those unique 'rules of the
passenger'. That is to say that passengers generally behave exactly
as 'expected.'
The mixture of personal roles and rules continues to basically
guide and direct individual behavior in emergencies, just as in
normal circumstances. Thus, that behavior is worth considering in
more detail.
ROLES AND RULES FOR PASSENGERS
Passenger behavior is a function of a set of pre-determined
'normal' roles, whether wife, husband, mother or soldier. These
roles embody the primary rules, which guide the role, itself. The
combination determines the primary behavior, what the person is, or
is not, expected to do; how they will probably behave. Indirectly,
they define how other people are expected to behave in return. For
example, a large male passenger will get a more rapid response when
he says; "excuse me," than will a frail and elderly lady.
As another example, a married woman in the role of the onboard
'wife' might expect the accompanying husband to make any requests
and decisions on her behalf. Should they be separated, when an
emergency occurs she might stop in place, waiting for his
reappearance, according to the pre-existing rules of their
marriage. If he doesn't appear and if her survival needs are not
recognized, she might not receive the desired guidance, thus she
might remain in place, possibly as an obstruction to someone trying
to make an exit.
We can therefore see that 'normal' rules and associated roles get
superimposed on behaviors related to the normal range of behaviors
of the 'passenger' role, even in a 'crowd.'
Passenger behavior will also be a function of their perceived role
as 'passenger.' This will be, in part, be a matter of the
impression of the crew and the airline. A discount carrier with
dirty airplanes and an unfriendly crew will not evoke the same
response as a larger 'quality' carrier. The passenger attitudes and
opinions, as a group or as individuals, will significantly dictate
their primary actions and interactions. Ultimately the 'confidence'
factor will dictate the response to crew instructions; whether
normal or in an emergency.
Managing passengers who are confident in the airline and its crew
is radically different from passengers with serious doubts. A low
passenger confidence factor is likely to produce a low emergency
response factor. If the flight crewmembers strike passengers as
unhappy, ill informed and impotent under 'normal' circumstances,
the emergency scenario will likely be difficult - at best.
As a variant, the interaction of pilots and flight attendants might
make the difference, if the flight attendants are seen to be backed
up by the pilots. That proposition assumes an overriding faith in
the pilots.
The interactive roles and rules will reasonably guide behavior in
an emergency, just as in normal every-day life. In their own
manner, people will attempt to assess the reality, and then make
decisions as to what to do. People will do this in the light of a
number of things, including how they view the airline and it's
staff.
Within a complex situation there are many who have the unexpected
potential to influence the behavior of other people. In another
disaster scene, the legend of the Titanic's "Unsinkable Molly
Brown" is an example of passenger perception. An aggressive but
sensible passenger took effective charge; out-performing a ship's
crewman.
It is far more productive to think of crowds in ordered terms, as
opposed to allowing one's expected probability to shift to the
extreme notion (fear) that a group of passengers would
automatically react in the fashion of an open-air crowd,
transforming into an uncontrollable mob, liable to blind panic.
Instead, attention should be focused on the important issues
related to the more probable movement of people once an emergency
is underway - inspired and directed by the trained crisis
leadership of the crew. Regardless of its source, such leadership
is critical to safety.
Similarly, it must be asked, "What are the normal operational roles
of the crew, and what is their influence on passenger behavior as
an emergency develops?"
ROLES AND RULES FOR CREWMEMBERS
The crewmembers also have their own roles and related rules on the
aircraft, which guide their behavior. The 'human' behavioral rules
are also directed by corporate mandates in the form of policies,
procedures and cockpit checklists. The crews' response is well
practiced under normal operating circumstances and an unfortunately
limited number of emergency drills.
Actual emergency situations are different. While these events are
rare, the associated special roles and rules, which govern crew
behavior under these circumstances, are typically not well
practiced as an integrated crew. The obvious threat in that fact
still lingers, for lack of meaningful change by the
industry.
The more obvious question asks, "How easy it is to switch from the
'normal' mode to the 'emergency' mode?"
Evidence from available histories suggests that it is far more
difficult than we care to think about. Basically, during an
aircraft emergency, some people will continue to act in terms of
the role they occupy under normal circumstances, as opposed to
immediately reverting to an 'emergency' mentality and role, with an
appropriate and effective response, even trained crewmembers.
With the announcement of an emergency, a flight attendant may
briefly continue an unimportant but routine duty. A pilot may find
a diversion in an otherwise routine cockpit duty or fail to
recognize the demand for an instant and/or desperate response. Any
delay, however brief, can potentially be costly.
The tendency to stay in the safety illusion of the 'normal' role
can be so powerful that in extreme cases people will continue to
ignore obvious warnings that there may be a potentially disastrous
situation rapidly developing. Likewise, communication might be
hindered or prevented by the related psychological denial
mechanism.
Currently, the typical social/professional compartmentalization of
the pilots and flight attendants doesn't lend itself to integrated
teamwork. One of the more entertaining airline stories told is that
of the pilots being interrupted after takeoff by a passenger
banging on the cockpit door, wanting a cup of coffee, as the flight
attendants had been left behind. Surprisingly, that has happened
more than once.
Often, an examination of ditching training reveals that the pilots
have no appreciable idea as to how to inflate and set up a life
raft or manage the survival resources. Thus, pilots are often left
to delegate authority to the flight attendants - in the best
circumstances.
There is the distinct probability of the pilots being seriously
injured, trapped or killed in the cockpit in an accident. Thus the
flight attendants may be 'on their own.' Interestingly, the flight
attendants are typically trained to be autonomous, toward that end,
and will experience difficulty responding to pilot instructions
after the initial accident. In perverse airline humor, it is
commonly remarked that, "Pilots are the first to arrive at the
scene of an accident."
Often, flying incidents and accidents involve fire. The human
response to fire is typically on the borderline of panic. Thus,
crewmembers are faced with ensuring passenger safety; putting their
own safety in second place. Ideally the opportunity will allow all
to escape.
The traumatic nature of an accident can quickly sway anyone's
decision-making and response; crews are no different. Particularly
in the cockpit, head injuries are likely, with unpredictable and
confusing results.
One of the fears of pilots is that the flight attendant autonomy -
due to the status, authority, economic and gender differences -
will result in the pilots being abandoned in an evacuation. History
proves that fear to be valid.
Flight attendants have a clearly defined 'normal' role. It's
possible that they might call the cockpit for assistance, rather
than closely investigate a smoke source as a potential fire; such
an investigation being outside their perceived 'normal' role. In
the meantime, the fire could be actual and growing rapidly. If it
is their habit to personally visit the cockpit, the flight
attendants may walk to the cockpit to make the request for
assistance, costing precious time.
In the normal passenger cabin protocol, a flight attendant may
insist on only reporting safety concerns to the 'lead' flight
attendant, not following through to make sure the message actually
gets to the cockpit, even though a clear threat was perceived.
Worse, when the flight attendant is satisfied that nothing is being
done; he/she might not follow up with an independent interphone
call to insist that a needed response is given.
In many cases, a failure to follow up may be a function of the
flight attendant sociology. A domineering senior flight attendant
may insist on total control of the passenger cabin. With sufficient
fear being generated, that local protocol may be observed to the
endangerment of all on board.
The timing of an event can have a significant effect on the
outcome. If flight attendants are focused on a demanding task, in
order to get them to deviate from their 'normal' role, they might
require detailed, passionate and/or persistent input from a
passenger to be persuaded that something is actually wrong.
In many cases, people will readily switch into their emergency
roles. However, the power of their normal roles can still exert an
influence. For example, a flight attendant may attend to the needs
of 'her' passenger section, ignoring the plight of others in a
different section, out of habit.
The effect of the pilots' routine roles also contains the inertia
to extend into their response in emergencies - even if this is
potentially damaging. For example deferring to a flight attendant's
assigned role, as opposed to intervening by personally directing a
passenger to safety. This is especially true if they do not have
the benefit of proper and adequate integrated crew
training.
A major difference between passengers and the flight crew is that,
passengers need to be informed as to their roles in an emergency,
whereas the crew must be very clear as to theirs; in normal and
emergency situations. Flight crews are assigned the safety
obligations and expectations, reinforced by accountability.
Ideally the crew professional training and responsibility contains
a well-defined and effective breakdown of duties. Only then can the
crew be certain as to which role and associated set of rules to
adopt when coping with the realities of passenger management during
an emergency.
PASSENGER MANAGEMENT
No two groups of passengers are exactly the same, even if they
appear to have come together for similar purposes. Charter flights
are not particularly different from public flights. In spite of
certain expected variables, a number of common problems have been
identified, with respect to passengers.
COMMUNICATION
With large numbers of passengers, some forms of communication
become retarded, becoming increasingly difficult as the numbers
increase. Simply stated, there are more people to effectively
communicate with, in the same time span.
Large groups of people diffuse communication, potentially with the
result that those receiving important information may not be in a
position to act on it. For example, in a panic evacuation,
instructions given to those who are being crushed at the front of
the line may not be able to comply with the necessary instructions
from the passengers/crew at the back who are causing the problem,
in their rush to exit.
MOVEMENT
Larger numbers of people magnify the degree of inertia. More time
is required to get large numbers of people to begin the required
preparations and move toward safety.
Similarly, large numbers demand more time to stop moving and / or
to change direction. This is the same syndrome as the classic 'rush
hour' highway traffic, moving in the fashion of an
accordion.
DISTRACTION
Despite the obvious assumption that emergency warnings will focus
passenger attention to a maximum, there may be serious distractions
such as indications that the situation is about to evolve from a
warning environment to the onset of the actual emergency. Simply
stated, fear will block the reception of vitally important
information.
There can also be 'in-house' distractions such as hysteria or an
angry over-reaction. One of the biggest distractions will be the
leap to personal cell phones to call loved ones, the company or the
media. That particular tendency is likely to be not only
uncontrollable, but possibly dangerous, as cell phone signals are
known to generate signals of sufficient power to interfere with
navigation and warning systems. (Another 'plausible denial'
matter.)
RESPONSIBILITY
A large number of people are susceptible to confusion and
uncertainty as to who has the responsibility for decision-making.
The associated confusion and uncertainty regarding responsibility
will retard movement still further.
Once an emergency is in progress, details become vague, while
interactions become more complicated. Often, passengers and crew
may have to respond in ways which are unique, or beyond any
behavior standard they have previously imagined or experienced.
Their desired behavior, particularly their willingness to follow
crew instructions, may depend to a large extent on how confident
they are that the crew can actually cope with the
situation.
It is elementary that in order for the flight crew to cope with an
emergency, the everyday operation needs to be efficient and
effective. A crew, which does not inherently function well in
normal operations, will probably function even worse in an
emergency. It is reasonable that passengers will entertain that
same suspicion.
In situations containing role ambiguity, new and effective teamwork
will not likely appear. If communication lines are normally poor
they will probably continue to be poor. If the required normal
roles and responsibilities are not well defined, they can be
expected to continue in a similar form, in an emergency. Under such
circumstances, any patterns of confusion experienced by passengers
and crew can only be reasonably expected to intensify.
The complexity of role interaction, with the guidance provided by
procedures for passenger control should take the major issues into
account.
The instructions, help and advice given to groups should consider
the mix of passengers. The selection of 'able-bodied-assistants'
should be made to enhance the safe outcome. The competent
management of passengers will have a dramatic impact on people's
behavior and the final outcome of an emergency.
The roles and responsibilities of the pilots and cabin crew need to
be well defined in advance, understood and accepted. Whenever
possible, the individual's responsibility in an emergency should be
reasonably consistent and compatible with the roles they normally
carry out.
The visibility and importance of authority figures should never be
underestimated. The passengers receiving instructions from the crew
need, and are entitled to, confidence in the crewmembers.
The early stage of an emergency is crucial. Without constant
guidance and updating or reinforcement, people will get mentally
and emotionally 'lost' in the interim time, questioning whether
something unusual or actually threatening is happening. The
'inertia' effect of large numbers of people, and the inherent
difficulty in communicating with them, the quality and thoroughness
of early information is vital to the outcome. The passengers need
all reasonable assurances as to their safety.
All communications should contain sufficient, detailed and
obviously useful information to enable people to make a personal
commitment as to what to do, at the appropriate time. That might be
as simple as patiently waiting for the stairways and buses on the
ramp. Most importantly, if an evacuation is necessary, they need to
know the magnitude of urgency, how rapidly and by which route they
need to exit, along with a contingency plan if things don't go as
expected.
In unique circumstances, it may also become prudent to illustrate
the cockpit as a viable or primary exit route.
THE HUMAN ROLE IN EMERGENCIES
WARNING PHASE
Borrowing from an old philosophy of the Strategic Air Command,
to achieve the ultimate goal of aviation safety, it is prudent to
rely on the idea that accidents are always caused by human beings.
While exceptions exist, they are rare. By always thinking in terms
of accidents being caused, they can best be anticipated and
prevented.
Awareness is the primary element in the warning phase. The
awareness, born of professional knowledge, that a pre-existing
condition poses a threat, is the most crucial element, as disaster
is most easily prevented at the beginning of the operation.
Beyond awareness of the status quo, recognition of the significance
of any actual or probable changes (such as the weather), requires
awareness to assess the significance of such information.
Some emergencies develop quickly, totally overwhelming those
involved, giving the victims little chance to save themselves, cry
for help or issue warnings to others. Other emergencies, however,
develop over longer periods of time, with those responsible for the
safety of others having more than adequate opportunity to issue a
warning.
Warnings are inherently intended reduce the possibility of threat
and/or harm to others. Long-term warnings serve to prevent disaster
from striking unexpectedly, allowing potential victims to take any
necessary or possible actions to prevent or minimize any
consequences. In the aviation environment, the concern is expressed
in terms of "...persons or property." Even with adequate time,
alerting those who are potentially at risk can be
difficult.
Such difficulty can be simply an inability to communicate with the
affected people. The most daunting situations involve warnings,
which meet the barrier of ignorance, or the conscious unwillingness
to communicate warnings, or even to communicate information, which
can act as a resource for the formulation of warnings.
Emergencies are normally either historical or evolutionary.
Earthquakes are typical of the historical type. We can be certain
that they will occur, we can't predict their exact location, time
or magnitude. Historical emergencies are commonly referred to as
"acts of God."
Evolutionary emergencies typically have the hand of mankind
involved. The "Great San Francisco Fire" is an example. The fire
began as a major earthquake. However, earthquakes were bad for
business, so history only seems to focus on the resulting fire.
Hence sufficient business was subsequently drawn to San Francisco
in the earthquake aftermath to rebuild the city. Today, the local
residents are still faced with the uncertainty of the historically
reliable event of catastrophic earthquakes. Yet, the
victims-in-waiting are on location as volunteers. History has
yielded sufficient lessons to create planned emergency responses,
reinforced by actual drills.
In aviation, emergencies are quite similar to actual accidents;
their origins typically exist prior to the crew approaching the
aircraft itself.
If a well-qualified crew can be certain that they have a good
aircraft, good weather and sufficient fuel; the program for a safe
flight is set. That's the intended scenario; the threat enters when
any of those (or other pertinent factors) are changed. Again, the
awareness of the status quo, threat probability and accountability
make the difference.
Normally the human factor is the weak link. Aircraft are normally
well designed; crews are required to be well qualified, sufficient
fuel is mandated by regulation. Airports are required to meet
certification requirements.
Then something changes, with human beings abruptly making local
life-death decisions. The tragedy is that most such occurrences are
profit driven.
The human element is also the difference whether or not the
disaster chain of events gets broken to totally diffuse a threat.
God bless the pilot who maintains, "I'm like Woody Allen, death
doesn't bother ME; I just don't want to be there when it
happens."
Dynamic (as opposed to 'potential') emergencies are normally
evolutionary, with four phases:
* Warning
* Onset
* Reaction
* Aftermath
WARNINGS
Recognition is the key element of an emergency. Recognition can be
the historic identification of a similar circumstance, a change in
the status quo with a reflexive question or the brief illumination
of an annunciator warning light. Following the most subtle warning,
the response makes the difference. It can be an innocuous question,
"Did you see an annunciator light flash?" The other pilot may have
seen it also. If not, awareness is heightened. A change in the
sound of airflow can warn of the inadvertent and imminent
penetration of a line of thunderstorms, which was not forecast or
detected in time.
Human psychology again plays a key role in the warning phase. Even
when individuals accept the fact that something is amiss, they can
be mysteriously reluctant to address the matter, themselves. The
reasonings range from raw denial to fear of embarrassment or even
harassment.
Often, a personal history may play a key role in the warning phase
to either aggressively address the situation, or to allow it to
evolve. Imagine the thought process, "The last time I told a
copilot I thought he looked too tired to fly, I was accused of
implying that he was actually drunk. I'm not going to risk that
again. I've seen tired copilots before. We'll make it, just
fine."
Irrational fear of repercussions can be a deterrent in the warning
phase. Following a disaster, statements are commonly heard to the
effect of, "I just didn't want to be the first one to say
something." On a more local level is a similar fear concerning
being the first couple on the dance floor. However irrational, such
reactions are sufficiently historic to make them reasonably
predictable. Fear-based reactions can be expected of pilots, flight
attendants, ground staff and passengers.
Imagine a captain's frustration when a flight attendant says, "The
other two girls also think the passenger is getting too drunk.
Would you mind saying something to him?" Group denial manufactured
a safety threat - now the captain is 'put on the spot.'
Valid fear serves as a healthy warning. This form of fear could
range from mistrust in the weather forecast, known fatigue,
aircraft condition, etc.
Denial can play a deadly role with respect to the time requirement
of the situation. Many a flight deck crew has been dismayed that a
flight attendant would walk to the cockpit to personally report a
serious condition, with the interphone readily available.
Another element is the crew confidence factor. Flight attendants
often confess a serious problem uniquely being dealt with by flight
attendants, because they didn't trust the cockpit to 'get
involved.'
In sardonic humor, the story is told of a flight attendant who told
a surprised captain after the first landing of a three-day trip,
"Boy, this is obviously going to be a long trip. We used all three
fire bottles on that trash-can fire." The FAA inspector on the jump
seat beat the captain by asking, "Did you think to mention it to
the captain while it was still going on?" Three flight attendants
were reported to have been appropriately fired. Unfortunately, the
issue is not reported to have been investigated in terms of WHY
they didn't they call the cockpit. Hence, the confidence factor
still ranks highly among disaster precursors.
In another instance, the aircraft was accidentally taken off course,
past the destination city by ATC. While the passenger map display
clearly indicated that the aircraft had passed the intended destination
and was obviously off its intended course, the flight attendants said
nothing. Only the pilots were unaware of their actual situation.
EMERGENCY ONSET
Once an emergency is in progress, three elements play a role. The
first is the magnitude of threat, with an associated probability of
disaster. The second is the compounding of events to potentially
guarantee disaster. The third element is composed of the resources
to extricate those involved from the emergency.
RESPONSE
When a situation is clearly an the emergency, the people involved
may react in denial, reluctant to accept or communicate the fact
that a threat actually exists. Someone responsible might detect the
threat, but keep silent to protect their job. The initial response
can dangerously slow. The underlying reasons for such a reaction
are usually discovered to be complex, many and also varied. The
response to threat is most often deeply ingrained in either the
individual or the culture, whether it is trade, corporate sociology
or even gender based. Such factors typically exist in the core of
the individuals everyday life, but certainly before the flight
begins. For example, a mechanic might dismiss a captain's concern
over a mechanical issue, discounting the complaint in the light of,
"another crybaby pilot."
There are also those, for example, who automatically accept risk as
an expected element. These individuals are often the potential
crisis-recovery leaders. This group of individuals often accepts
the element of risk on the assumption that everyone else appears to
accept it. The risk then takes on the aura of being 'acceptable.'
Obviously, that can be unhealthy, to an extreme.
Often such individuals are mentally and emotionally well prepared
for any crisis. Typically, these people have a family history which
leaves them so well prepared to accept and deal with crisis, that
they give little thought to danger, without evaluating the risk
potential in each flight situation. These individuals also carry
the liability of being too willing to accept instigating factors,
which later lead to a problem, such as an intoxicated passenger,
for example. Risk tolerance is typical of those with a military
background.
Another group of individuals, however, may be pre-disposed to deny
that either risk or an actual threat exists. Such denial is often
a very powerful sub-conscious psychological mechanism, which can be
extremely difficult to overcome. The attitudes expressed by such
individuals can have a negative 'contagious' effect, adversely
swaying the concerns of those whom might otherwise be predisposed
to threat alertness.
The magnitude of such denial can also express itself in a
counter-productive 'salesmanship,' during a crisis. The strength of
the associated statements can be inherently dangerous. A smoke
alarm might induce a flight attendant to assert, "Don't worry about
it, it's probably somebody smoking 'pot' in the lav. I've seen this
before." As a consequence, a critical response with an accompanying
call to the cockpit is delayed.
The combination of acceptance and denial can create serious
problems for the pilots and the entire crew. Passengers again play
a key role. For example, during a normal flight, some passengers
might study the safety cards, listen to the safety briefing 'rules'
and in general, pay attention to any printed notices.
Conversely another group of passengers methodically might not.
(Studies suggest that approximately 50% don't study the safety
cards to any degree.) Neither of the groups may be particularly
motivated in their personality 'style.' One group may have simply
accepted the risks involved with something of a passing interest in
them, while the second group desperately doesn't care to be advised
or reminded of the risks.
Should it come to an actual emergency, the risk-accepting group may
be quicker to identify problems, taking any warnings seriously,
while also being well prepared to appropriately act. Conversely,
the second group may have prepared themselves to deny any risk and
be subsequently slower to react, endangering themselves and
others.
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Whether one cares to discuss crew or passengers, the underlying
factors influencing their behavior MUST be considered. In general,
the first reaction to a warning is statistically often not the
desired reaction, rather a defensive avoidance of the possibility
of threat. The individual typically generates a disbelief which
interferes with the requirement for action. When that happens,
appropriate decisions often get transferred to others.
Add the psychological denial of danger to the fear of
embarrassment. If the individual is at risk of being seen to
over-react, the combination can easily result in the conversion of
a problem into an emergency; brewing a disaster. Such is the
particular risk if any warnings are in any way unclear, ambiguous
or perceived to be so. Regardless of the influencing factors, a
mistaken belief in the magnitude of the situation can be very
deadly.
When a warning is perceived in its true sense, the outcome of a
situation will depend on a list of factors. Will the situation be
perceived as to its magnitude? Is the warning clear as to its exact
nature? Will appropriate action be taken? These questions depend on
several factors -
CREDIBILITY
Any obvious signs of authenticity, authority, as well as any known
experience and/or expertise, will lend credibility to a warning.
Crewmembers and passengers are likely to believe someone who is
normally expected to have the best information on the situation.
Ground staff is to be included in this concept.
COMMUNICATION AND CONTENT
The actual delivery, the means and tone by which the message is
delivered, to whom and by whom are important factors. Any authority
gives a message the element of credibility; ambiguity must be
avoided, so as to preclude confusion and / or denial. In one
disaster, the junior flight attendant delivered the message that
they had smoke in the lavatory to the copilot. The message should
have been delivered to the captain, describing "billowing" smoke.
AGE DIFFERENCE
Young people are often more likely to quickly respond to warnings
than their older counterparts. Older people often take past
experiences as an 'immortality license,' being more confident in
all situations and less willing to react quickly. That statement
should not be taken in the fashion of discounting age and
experience. A young, freshly trained pilot might be willing to
quickly shut down an engine - 'per the book.' The older pilot might
delay such a situation, saying, "It's not on fire and it's packing
it's own weight." Hence, age related experience can pays a
significant dividend.
LOCAL SOCIOLOGY
'Isolated' individuals or even those working with peers or work
groups containing an acceptance-approval social 'mechanism' may be
slower to react to warnings and be less likely to illuminate
danger. For example, a single female working with two male flight
attendants.
FAMILY / FRIENDS
Overall, families and groups of friends tend to heed warnings and
take situations more seriously. Out of habit, they tend to be more
trusting, stay together; looking out for each other's interest,
while being more willing to rely on each other for appropriate
advice.
PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS
People tend to observe others, interpreting others' response as an
indicator as to the exact nature and seriousness of the current
reality. One can imagine the effect of an obviously frightened
captain,
LOCATION AND FAMILIARITY
In familiar locations and situations, people tend to better
interpret warnings. In unfamiliar locations or in unusual
circumstances, it may be more difficult to get individuals to
accept the seriousness of the warning and get them prepared to act;
'denial' re-enters.
TIMING OF THE WARNING
At night it is more difficult to heighten awareness and to effect
a physical response. As a consequence, greater voice volume,
stronger wording and emphasis might be required in such
circumstances.
INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE / CONVICTION
Whether crew or passengers, the 'adaptive' response - people
immediately heeding warnings - is increased with either personal
knowledge or a known history of a recent or similar emergency;
certainly personal experience will contribute to such a
situation.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
People, in general, usually seek more information to support their
individual perception; whether with the intent of either
recognition or denial. Valid and supporting information typically
effects sensible responses during the warning stage of an
emergency.
DECISION MAKING FACTORS
Reaction to events is normally based on the individual's faith in
the presented information. There is the inherent risk that an
individual could irrationally decide that since emergencies are
rare, there isn't one. A correct diagnosis requires a combination
of indicators to aid the decision-making process.
WARNING STYLE
The direct warning conveyance, such as a cockpit warning light or
the odor of acrid smoke in the cabin will produce a decided
conclusion. A radio warning, such as a known in-flight threat
received from the ground staff will likely be taken very
seriously.
RESPONSE OF OTHERS
People will look to the response of other people for a personal
cue. If a crewmember is not taking the information seriously, the
passengers not likely do so. Conversely, a frightened reaction with
supporting information may induce over-reaction.
SPECIFIC MESSAGE AND STYLE
If a clear and serious message is delivered with conviction, but
with a calming style; others will appropriately respond. If a
captain advises the crew, "Dispatch just sent us a weather update.
We have terrific headwinds ahead, so we'll do a short divert and
get more fuel," the crew is likely to respond in a calm manner.
CONSENSUS
Passenger reaction is also a major consideration. People will
process whatever information is given by the crew. Passengers tend
to do this in small groups, especially family, peer groups or
individuals of identifiable equal social status. With the message
above, a family group may set the overall mood with a loud response
such as, "Well, at least we'll still make happy-hour!"
PRESENCE OR APPEARANCE OF CREW
The unexpected presence of a pilot or a clear authority figure will
modify passengers' views of the current situation. For example, a
flight attendant's request for assistance of a deadheading captain
or a uniformed serviceman will lend credibility to the situation's
seriousness.
UNEXPECTED CHANGES
Even if the changes are not directly related to the emergency, any
unexpected changes, such as a significant course change or a
significant change in engine power will have a direct influence on
the cabin crew and passengers.
PHYSICAL INDICATORS / EVIDENCE
Crew or passengers will be alert for noise, radical aircraft
motion, smoke and heat. Surprisingly, smoke alone is often taken as
an ambiguous warning, especially if it is light colored or low in
odor. Crew and passengers may fail to respond if presented with
only one indicator.
CREW INSTRUCTIONS
The physical presence of crewmembers issuing guidance and
directions prompts most people to take warnings seriously. This
includes crewmembers themselves. If the instructions appear to
originate from an established safety procedure or drill, they will
likely receive due attention.
RESISTANCE TO REALITY
Despite multiple indicators, there are those who can persist in
their denial for extended periods of time, refusing to believe that
a situation is, in fact, serious.
Researchers have used historic disaster models to derive a
rudimentary mathematical probability of group response. Researchers
have attempted to get an idea as to what percentage of involved
people might readily accept the idea or fact that something is
wrong, as opposed to how many might deny it. While it is impossible
to make accurate predictions, the result was a least one
'acceptance model' which attempts to predict peoples' reactions to
the first signs of crisis.
According to one such behavioral model:
* 10% of the group might immediately accept the reality of danger,
while mentally and emotionally preparing to take action.
* 30% might be doubtful; possibly curious, and investigate the
situation further.
* 60% might deny, ignore or even neglect highly obvious warning
signals!
Thus, the clear mandate is for early and effective warnings and
leadership.
MAXIMIZING WARNINGS
Logic aside, it is a serious mistake to assume that warnings are
clear. In the case of PA deliveries, it should not be assumed that
everyone has heard and understood previous announcements and are
certain how to react. Warnings and instructions should be given by
the appropriate crewmember as soon as the emergency information
becomes specific. Whether the instructions are intended for crew or
passengers, the instructions should be followed. Later, these will
need reinforcement.
The pertinent instructions should be made by those perceived as
being in authority, trustworthy, and in a manner which inspires
confidence. They should also be specific in their content,
containing pertinent information known to be, or likely to be,
accurate and reliable.
The instructions should also:
* Clearly define what is to be expected and when events will
occur.
* Neither under-estimate nor over-estimate the threat.
* Give the appropriate courses of action, citing their
appropriateness and intended outcome.
* Be made on as personal a level as possible.
* Be in terminology and in the language understandable to the
recipients.
* Be repeated as frequently as possible with short periods in
between, so as to reinforce the required response.
* Never refer to similar or familiar events.
* Not include unnecessary, distracting or other unrelated
information, delivered in any lapses between updates.
* Most importantly, effect acceptance of the situation and create
appropriate crew and passenger commitment to action.
In the background of communication is an industry social norm
that the cockpit is typically not advised of a failed or extremely
low PA volume made by the pilots. Often, flight attendants simply
place no value in the routine cockpit "welcome aboard" PA. As a
consequence of the apathy toward the cockpit, the value of the
cockpit PA capability in an emergency is overlooked. Thus, crew
awareness must be maintained as to the PA effectiveness, with the
mandate that an appropriate advisory is made to the cockpit.
Conversely, the pilots should solicit information as to the
adequacy of the cockpit PA.
The safety PAs from the cockpit should be 'dedicated,' so that
there are no interruptions by unnecessary distractions, such as
normal ATC communication.
If the warning phase becomes prolonged, without updated
information, guidance and instruction, the crew or passengers may
develop a high level of uncertainty and possibly a dangerous level
of anxiety. At one extreme, there will be those who patiently wait,
while mentally and emotionally preparing themselves. That group
also presents the possibility of badly delayed action or inaction
in the end. At the other extreme, uncertainty, tension and fear may
increase to a dangerous level, causing individual anxiety or
panic.
Safety demands early, accurate and clear information, with regard
to crew and passengers. Quality information dictates the success of
each phase of an emergency, if the information is provided in an
effective manner.
Despite the known data pertaining to effective management of
personnel, it is an unfortunate fact of life that emergency
procedures prescribed by some cultures and organizations (such as
corporations) prefer to delay warnings, thus creating an
independant problem. The concern is obviously PR and panic
avoidance; however, it must be acknowledged that surprise warnings
are famous for producing the unwanted panic.
EMERGENCY ONSET
RESPONSE
The onset phase of an emergency implies that the warning signs,
alerts and alarms have been seen, heard and accepted; it is clearly
understood that the threat is real. The term 'onset' can mean
either the realization that an emergency situation really exists or
the actual immediate time frame when the disaster strikes. In
addition to the peaked urgency and requirement for immediate action
by the passengers and crew, the onset can also bring immediate
injury or death. For example an uncontained engine failure can hurl
fan blades into the passenger cabin, causing serious injuries and
damage; while marking the beginning of an extended emergency, as a
consequence.
The onset period may not have any significant warning and last only
seconds. Perhaps it is the ideal 'planned emergency,' lasting from
warning to onset as much as an hour or more.
During the onset phase, people must recognize and accept the nature
and magnitude of the threat, acting appropriately if a potential
disaster is to be averted. If there is a prolonged waiting period,
the time interval can be a very difficult task for people to deal
with.
As an example, a crash or relatively simple emergency landing
evolving into an external fire might result in a delayed
evacuation. A wind condition might blow smoke on one side of the
aircraft, creating the illusion that the fire is on the same side,
when in fact the smoky side is the only viable escape route. Until
the actual threat is ascertained, waiting might be the only
acceptable option.
However short or long the onset period lasts, the most valuable
time is often lost in this phase. Even when people have accepted
the urgency of an emergency in progress, there is a certain risk
that they might resist an appropriate course of action. The
wind/smoke scenario is such an example. Being directed to evacuate
into the smoke may create a panicked response, leading to the wrong
reaction (delay), ultimately leading to a disaster.
The onset phase, along with the warning phase, requires the
passengers and crew to accurately detect changes, collect any
relevant information, interpret that information and evaluate it,
so as to make decisions. Individual perceptions may result in the
same information and warnings yielding convoluted understandings of
the situation. Hence the individual's responses may differ once
they have actually accepted the warnings.
The human response will be strongly influenced by the subjective
interpretation of the situation. The response during an imminent
disaster will be dictated by the actual ability or perception of
the passengers' and crew's ability to cope with the immediate
demands placed upon them, and upon those close to them. With time
available, support and assistance of ground staff is likewise a
factor.
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE
The onset period, however brief, is the juncture of the physical
and psychological aspects of the emergency. Here, the magnitude and
urgency of the reality is discovered. In extremes, imminent threat
or an actual catastrophic event will cause individuals to
experience a broad range of emotions and subsequent reactions.
The Emotions include:
* The effect of shock and a sense of total helplessness. This could
be the dominating effect - regardless of whether or not there has
been any significant period of anticipation and any
preparedness.
* A reaction of numbness, a sense of unreality - accompanied by
fear - with the result that the individual or group is easily
influenced, even to take highly inappropriate action.
* Confusion from a lack of meaningful understanding as to the cause
of the emotional and physical upheaval in their immediate
environment. In turn, this can interfere with their attempts to
identify, interpret and understand what is actually happening.
* Sense of 'injustice.'
* A 'flattening' of emotions, in an attempt to protect themselves
against any more emotional stimulation (overload), further
decreasing their willingness or ability to appropriately
respond.
* A sense of lethargy as the passengers or crew come to believe or
feel that there is little, if anything, they can do to improve
their situation.
* An illusion of 'isolation / abandonment,' causing individuals to
behave as if they are the only ones affected by the events. How
they perceive the situation and how they react can inevitably cause
the individual to become very focused on themselves, to the
exclusion of the welfare of others. Such individuals can become a
threat to others. A common image is the panicked person in the
water, using another individual as a piece of driftwood,
potentially drowning them, in order to ensure their own
survival.
* An overpowering awareness of their frailty, against the sudden
and dramatic impact of massive physical forces which may remove
their sense of personal control, thus dominating their sensory
perception - often with panic resulting.
To indulge in greater detail, the emotional experiences and
reactions have been studied in-depth. Various studies have divided
reactions into five basic categories:
INCREASED EXCITEMENT
An increased excitement and the associated focus lead to extremes
of thoughts. Feelings and fears of dying may become
intense.
The element of survival may become an intense focus with the
affected individuals concentrating on their personal and family
protection.
An intense concern for those for whom the individual has, or
assumes, a primary responsibility may often surpass the
individual's self-concern, particularly if the bonds are intense or
a self-imposed responsibility exists. For example, a passenger
electing to assume responsibility for an unaccompanied child or an
elderly person.
In most cases, people often manage to gain control of their fears,
so that they seem to assist the survival of others - a welcome fact
to be put to good use by those tasked with managing them.
FEAR - Defined
Fear should be expected to be the dominant, rational and an
appropriate response to any emergency situation.
Whether rational or unrealistic, fear produces a racing heart, dry
mouth and a narrowing of attention. These are automatic reactions
and a necessary part of the stress response in preparation for the
classic 'fight or flight' decision / action.
Often, the individual experiences irrational fears, consciously and
subconsciously. These become superimposed on realistic fears. These
fears produces the expectation of loss, injury, suffering and
death.
The human mind will emotionally cycle during a crisis. It is very
difficult to estimate the frequency of the emotional cycles
containing fear. Survival produces predictable emotional
self-protection reactions. A typical reaction is that people
experience the irrational element of shame, consequently denying
the natural emotions. Physical or mental activities, of any kind,
help to combat irrational fears.
With proper leadership, the element of fear can be significantly
controlled by the accurate portrayal of the reality.
SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS
A person may be confronted by their own ineffectiveness,
experiencing a sense of vulnerability or possibly frailty. This is
especially true if the emergency contains obvious powerful forces,
producing that fear. Often that reaction comes from a previous
life-threatening experience.
Fear naturally leads to a sense of helplessness. Without an
apparent and viable solution, the fear can feed upon itself in a
vicious cycle producing a high level of anxiety, potentially to a
debilitating degree.
The feelings of helplessness evoke a subconscious control
mechanism, triggering the irrational element of shame.
Subconsciously the potential victim attempts to understand or gain
control of the situation. It's likely that the elements of
frustration and anger/rage will be directed toward other passengers
and the crew - but the underlying feeling of helplessness can be
expected to dominate.
The sense of helplessness will be compounded if the suspicion of
physical entrapment is probable as an eventual reality. Often,
survival is irrationally assumed to be unlikely. Consequently,
reassurance from the crew is essential to the degree that it is a
vital factor in combating the fear syndrome. The needed message is,
"You are not helpless, your assistance will be needed. We will be
out of this situation soon." The passenger - even the crew - needs
the sense of empowerment.
SENSE OF ABANDONMENT
In emergencies, all 'normal' or 'reasonable' certainties may seem
to vanish. The key element will be the existing feelings of trust,
based on any previously held trust of the company, aircraft and the
crew.
Anyone who senses themselves as being isolated - rationally or
irrationally - will likely experience the feeling of alienation and
loneliness. Often this is fed by previous experiences and
historical feelings of abandonment in those events. There may be a
subconscious argument to the effect of, "It's happening again!"
Familiar assumptions can be expected to produce familiar
emotions.
The sense of abandonment can be a powerful and dangerous element in
an emergency. The result being that the sense of abandonment
compounds any other feelings of helplessness.
Children separated from their parents, particularly the
unaccompanied minor, are likely to be strongly affected by the
missing familiar protective influence. They can be expected to fear
abandonment. If possible, they need to be reunited with a family
member at the earliest possible opportunity. In the case of the
unaccompanied minor, a surrogate parent will be needed, whether a
flight attendant or a passenger.
SHAME
In human psychology, the element of 'shame' plays an intriguing
role. A self-imposed subconscious arguments assert such positions
as, "I should have done X. I didn't; so therefore, I'm being
punished."
To be brief, the irrational subconscious argument is essentially
two-fold:
1. "I know I deserve this; therefore I can accept it." - illusion
of acceptance
2. "I'm responsible for this, so if I do better, this will change."
- illusion of control
The important factor being that acceptance of a threatening
situation won't provide any positive outcome. Those who decide to
"...go down fighting to the bitter end.." are obviously the
individuals needed in an emergency.
DESPERATION FOR RELIEF
The desperation will likely be intense, normally growing with the
duration of the emergency. Survival instinct will focus on the
desired relief / rescue / safety in the manner of a preoccupation.
The associated thoughts and yearnings will often revolve around
feelings of guilt, possibly remorse. Many people focus their
thoughts on lost opportunities, ranging from adventures to saying
"goodbye" or "I love you" to their family.
A highly typical human response is a reappraisal of personal values
and realigned intentions for their future. Most are familiar with
this focus, whether from personal experience or the theme of a
Hollywood movie.
The desperation factor also carries the risk of passengers deciding
to 'self-medicate' with alcohol or, possibly, drugs.
If an emergency is prolonged, the majority of the passengers and
crew will maintain their focus on an escape from the danger or
being rescued. In the human experience, some may become overwhelmed
by the anxiety and give up, wishing for death, as an escape. Thus,
it is vitally important that effective reassurance be given that
the action being taken is appropriate, complete and that it will be
successful.
Depending on the complexity and severity of the event, the material
above is focused on the passenger experience. However, of vital
importance is the expected experience of the crew?
CREW EXPERIENCE
The crew experiences will be different. In the acceptance of their
job, the crew will have assessed the risks to a high degree and
will have been specifically trained to deal with them. In a
sentence, the crew will have a certain degree of expectation of
emergencies actually occuring; being better prepared, mentally
and emotionally, for an emergency.
Actual reports from crewmembers vary, but often have common
statements or 'themes.' What is clear is that crewmembers also
experience a traumatic mental and emotional struggle. The following
statements are relatively common and serve as a good descriptor of
the trauma in an emergency:
"'I just couldn't think; my mind seemed to go blank."
"Someone had to remind me what to do next."
"'I had difficulty catching my breath. There were moments that I
had to tell myself to breathe."
"I couldn't remember where I was. I kept forgetting what I was
supposed to do next."
"'I felt as though we were suspended in time."
"I just kept thinking about my family."
Such examples indicate not only the rising stress levels, but also
their impairing effect on the ability of the crew to properly
function. The required effectiveness of the crew can equally be in
danger of being undermined by stress.
ANXIETY, STRESS & RESPONSE
Breaks in any normal routines and expectations, particularly those
directly conflicting or unusual circumstances, produce some degree
of stress; imagine even a minor degree of
road-rage. In an emergency, the magnitude of stress that crew
members experience, and whether it will have either positive or
negative effects, will partly be a function of the conviction each
individual maintains as to how serious they perceive the emergency
being, or is probable to become.
A key element is the crewmember's conviction as to their personal
ability to meet the demands of the emergency. Equally important is
the crewmember's conviction as to the crews' collective ability to
deal with the emergency. There is the risk that if the individual
crewmember becomes convinced that the demands are too great, and /
or the crews ability to cope is inadequate, the stress levels can
reach an overwhelming magnitude, even if only temporarily. A
continuing electrical fire is an example of this.
Stress remains a complex issue, poorly understood and highly
debated among researchers. However, the history of actual reactions
to stressful situations leave a trail of indicators which can be
considered fairly basic and common, to a reasonably predictable
degree.
Normal operational workload leaves pilots keenly 'in tune' with the
aircraft operation. To a large degree, that leaves the pilots both
physically, emotionally and mentally predisposed to cope with an
emergency. During their normal duties, the pilots are very close to
the desired 'optimum performance level.' In the normal operational
environment, an emergency isn't likely to require a radical shift
of thought process, allowing a certain 'ease' in deciding when and
where to focus their attention.
Within the individual situation, each crewmember's effectiveness
will be subject to the same responses as the passengers, including excitation,
anxiety, fear, bewilderment, feelings of helplessness, and depression. The more
negative aspects of anxiety / stress response are the inability to accept support
and the resistance to the open expression of fear. These factors can be further
aggravated by such factors as pain, body position, distraction and noise. Pilots
will be subject to their unique factors such as actual or perceived status,
accountability, confidence, time pressure and fatigue effects.
The effect of anxiety and stress can be expected to interfere in an abnormal / emergency
situation by reducing the crews' capacity to understand and recall information. Thus,
the crew can be generally anticipated to experience problems in processing information,
affecting their capacity to correctly understand and, thus, to effectively comply with
appropriate instructions, and, consequently, to comply with safety measures such as
checklists and standard operating procedures. Further, anxiety and stress will probably
reduce the crews’ intuitive abilities to deal with unanticipated conditions and situations.
However, it is also important to recognize the history of desperation having also
effected brilliant solutions under stress.
Given the potential debilitating effect of anxiety and stress on flight crewmembers,
it is obvious that stress and anxiety should be anticipated and alleviated as far as
is humanly possible. Accident history leaves a lethal legacy in the form of a mandate
for dynamic prevention, as opposed to operational rationalization.
OPTIONS AND DECISIONS
An emergency increases the demands placed on the pilots.
Accordingly, the neurological system can accommodate such
situations by producing the required hormones for the production of
physical and mental energy. Thus, the pilots, in particular are
better prepared for the classic 'fight-or-flight' response.
However, the neurological response is not exclusively the 'magic
pill.' The subsequent excitation levels can potentially exceed
desired limits with negative impact on the management of the
emergency.
There is a certain amount of risk that the demands of an emergency
can result in
over-excitation. The individual's ability to function effectively
can subsequently decline, perhaps only temporarily. Thus, it is
also important to be aware of the limits of the human response. It
is important to anticipate a normal/typical response under stress,
recognizing when one's own stress response (as well as that of
others) is having an adverse impact. Throughout an emergency,
effective performance is essential. Gaining or maintaining that
performance level is a key element of coping with the situation, in
general.
Anxiety presents itself in a complex manner, requiring anticipation, recognition
and management on the personal, physiological and behavioral level. Anxiety is not
to be treated as a uniquely negative experience, as anxiety is also the key to the
timely anticipation of threat.
The personal anxiety level is the peak of the term, ‘subjective.’ Thus, honest and
clear self-assessment is required to defeat the obvious effects. Education and
self-awareness are required to achieve the desired outcome. The individual has to
be alert to such subjective symptoms as apprehension and fear, ‘dry-mouth,’ muscle
tension, trembling and dizziness.
Of particular note is the difference between the ‘typical’ anxiety level of the
individual, versus that experienced in the immediate abnormal / emergency situation.
This includes a history-based assessment. Such an assessment is required to
establish the real-time attitude, hopefully such as, “I’ve been through worse,
we’re going to be okay.”
In that same sense, the individual needs to be cognizant of effective ‘gut feelings’
expressing themselves as anxiety. Such experience leads to such mental or verbal
statements as, “I’ve got a bad feeling about this.” In consequence of such healthy
responses to anxiety, additional factors may be discovered, leading to a safe outcome.
There is a broad range of differences between individuals responding to anxiety.
There are those who ‘shine’ in emergencies, while there will be those who are normally
‘cool’ but who are incapacitated by the anxiety and fear in an actual emergency.
It is important to be alert for the obvious adverse indicators of
stress, both in the individual and in others.
In an emergency, the effects of stress can be put into four general
areas:
PHYSIOLOGICAL
These are normally short-term effects, which include: dry-mouth,
sweating, increased heart rate, difficulty or irregularity of
breathing. The psychological effects are also seen in the
associated cognitive processes, including concentration difficulty,
confusion and/or forgetfulness, the inability to prioritize or make
timely decisions, difficulty in transitioning between
tasks.
The physiological effects of anxiety and stress are typically viewed in the confines
of the parameters of heart rate, respiration rate, blood pressure and skin condition
(color / sweating).
EMOTIONAL
These include fear, anxiety and a sense of being helpless,
aggression, apathy, tension and irritability.
These effects should be considered 'normal.' For short periods of
time, they need not cause concern. Conversely, they serve as an
indicator that the 'healthy' "fight-or-flight response has been
activated; the individual is in the process of preparing themselves
for the impending extraordinary action.
However, it is important that crew members recognize the reality,
if their own, and others', reactions to the situation are effecting
danger or interfering with their basic ability to cope with the
situation or manage it.
In the absence of extremes, the individuals can then take a few
simple, but effective, steps to get back on an even keel.
A basic understanding of the progression of the impairment process,
however temporary is essential.
1. Acceptance that an emergency exists.
2. Nervous system activity is triggered.
3. Breathing accelerates, becoming more shallow.
4. Muscles tense with the excitation level increase.
5. Information gathering, comprehension and decision making is
impaired.
6. General performance begins to decline.
The obvious requirement is to counter any such effects, restoring
as much balance as possible, so as to return heart rate and blood
pressure to near-optimum levels. As the excitation level drops to
a magnitude near the normal level, energy is conserved, with coping
skills becoming enhanced.
On a personal level, an easy method to restore balance is to
consciously and deliberately slow down the rate of breathing,
taking normal to deep breaths. This requires the conscious tensing
of the related muscles, holding the tension for a few seconds, and
then releasing the tension. The controlled holding of the breath
and slowly and consciously relaxing the muscles leads to a
resumption of normal breathing - as well as other important
functions.
If these adverse symptoms are observed in others, encouraging them
to use the technique, as appropriate, can be effective. The tone of
voice will be important, "Hey chief, do me a favor & just hold your
breath for a second - now let it out. Do that again a couple of
more times." "Feel better now?" The impact that someone else is
aware of the individual's plight and cares enough to provide any
element of relief, while protecting the individual's dignity can be
a terrific boost.
BEHAVIORAL
The more typical and obvious indicators include: trembling,
restlessness or impulsive behavior, excitability or nervous
laughing, performance of 'rituals,' such as tightening and
straightening a tie, perhaps combing one's hair, extended time
taken to accomplish routine or simple tasks.
The behavioral effects of anxiety and stress are expressed in the form of sweating,
cold hands, tremor, rapid speech, voice pitch increase, as well as functional effects
in the form of forgetfulness, fumbling, oversight and avoidance.
It is obvious that imminent threat in an emergency can be
frightening for all, especially if the accident is expected to be
violent or fire is anticipated. The faith in the crew's training,
knowledge and experience provides some sense of protection,
enabling them to cope with the stress of an emergency, allowing
them to keep their emotions under some degree of control.
COMMUNICATION IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The proper management of crew anxiety and stress is a vital part
of effective Cockpit Resource Management. In particular, the function
of communication changes during high anxiety and stress situations.
The expected set of events during an abnormal, or an emergency,
anticipates the very worst of problems to present themselves one
at a time. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Further,
training curriculums typically prohibit ‘compound emergencies.’
Thus, the flightline reality often catches the flight crew short
on resources, while demanding the highest standard of strategy and
communication skills.
A pilot typically expects reasonable changes such as bad weather, low
fuel, go-around, diversion to the alternate or rather simple technical
problems. Even with these events as being deemed, ‘reasonable,’ there
is still a difference in reaction between experienced pilots and less
experienced crews, within these ‘reasonable’ changes. Obviously, this
divergence increases in the event of abnormal or emergency conditions.
Effective communication between the pilots and the cabin crew in an abnormal
situation or a bone fide emergency requires fast paced and dynamic
communication skills. Unfortunately, these skills most often come with
experience, as the industry does not place an emphasis on ‘human factors’
during the course of an emergency. Again, unfortunately, communication
during an actual emergency has a higher probability of breaking down, as
opposed to being enhanced. An actual emergency scenario will typically
contain samplings of breakdowns and enhancements, as well as intuition.
Emergency communication skills can and should be taught, but they rarely
are. Crew humanity is not factored, thus, most actual emergencies depend
on the best skills the individual crewmember can muster in the actual
scenario. It should be noted that listening skills are equally as important
as verbal skills. Emergency communication skills are ideally taught, but
are more often an improvisation or unique abilities of an individual.
The frequency of abnormal situations and emergencies demand that the desired
communication skills be developed through a curriculum of drills involving
classroom delivery on theory and research, practice, and instructor analysis
and guidance. Most importantly, attitudes toward emergencies should be developed,
embodying philosophies as, “The only ‘dumb’ question is the one which is not asked.”
Anxiety and stress affect performance and communication in their effect on
attention-span and the ability to acquire, recall and process information. Performance
and communication are hampered by the production of irrelevant thoughts, reducing the
‘working’ memory. Anxiety and stress can also increase the required amount of effort
required to maintain the ‘normal’ performance levels associated with typical low-stress
conditions.
Anxiety and stress have a particularly negative effect on crew communication. The
associated effects are necessary to anticipate, recognize and manage within the
individual and the crew. In concert with such management is required the attitude
of, “It’s not ‘wrong;’ it’s being ‘human.’”
Although CRM training, including communication skills, is supposed to involve both
pilots and flight attendants, history teaches that the pragmatic effect has been
negated by the non-application and reinforcement in the actual flight line experience.
The dynamics of emergency scenario communication are affected by a long list of
‘human factors,’ such as individual personality and personality conflict,
experience, seniority, gender, age and ethnicity.
From a captain’s position, there are several particular communication mandates:
* Anticipation, recognition and empathy with the crews' fear and anxiety.
* A demonstrated respect for the crewmembers’ competence and identity.
* Avoidance of any discounting statements or behaviors.
* An overt indication of empathy and caring for the crewmember’s
personal experience, including their immediate situation and associated problems.
* Honest and realistic assessment and assurances expressed to the crew, as opposed to
false reassurances or stark reality presentations, whether actual or exaggerated.
* Verbal and non-verbal responses which enhance crew synergy.
PASSENGER RESPONSE
In the case of the passengers, the difficulties become
amplified. With precious little preparation, they must be expected
to accept the threat in terms of their own mortality and make
radical attitude and behavior changes in a small span of time.
Risk evaluation is extremely difficult for some people under any
circumstances. The typical violence of aircraft accidents becomes
the epitome of chaos and confusion, compounded by the fire threat.
It is vitally important that the crew takes charge quickly,
preparing and effecting a constructive attitude and reaction at the
first signal or (forceful) request.
Research only tells us that the complexity of human behavior defies
a reliable mathematical model, permitting reasonable
predictability.
Yet, statistics do offer a small degree of predictability -
Depending on the intensity/chaos of the situation, it is possible
to identify three probable statistical groups:
60% may do very little, they may even engage in inappropriate
behaviors, while awaiting trusted guidance.
25% may act rationally, perhaps attending to the threat or
preparing their next move; they may provide warning, comfort or
guidance to others.
15% may become immobile or even totally paralyzed at the actual or
perceived seriousness of the situation.
INITIATIVE OF OTHERS
Those who strictly await the initiative of others sense their own
limitations, trusting in the notion that others will have the
necessary solution. It is a serious mistake to make assumptions as
to why people become relatively immobilized. Passengers, in
particular, will be affected by a broad range of experiences. The
immobility can range from a strange sense of dignity or discipline
to irrational fear if the next step is taken.
One group of passengers might need only clear directions to take
action. Another might need some sort of 'proof' that the next step
is necessary AND prudent. The second group might need forceful
guidance or physical assistance.
Studies suggest that if passengers trust the quality of information
they receive they are much more likely to react favorably.
Conversely, if they encounter difficulty in obtaining the needed
information, they may quickly become angered, aggressive and
difficult to manage.
Despite standard procedures, the crew can expect the requirement to
make necessary situational judgments to deal with passengers on an
interpersonal level, so as to achieve the desired effect.
There will be those passengers who simply want to be told what to;
they will then immediately comply.
SHOCK EFFECT
In general, time distortion is common among passengers involved in
an emergency, it is common to find little or no agreement of the
crisis duration following an emergency. Similarly, passengers have
difficulty remembering details in general. They may not be able to
cite their own address or phone number. These passengers (and crew)
are the ones in the greatest need of firm guidance and
assistance.
The same behavior will be seen in those who have been drinking.
Alcohol may cause some to become inhibited and sleepy, while others
become excited with their control over emotions diminished. Whether
they require waking, calming or direct orders is something which
can only be judged at the time.
In an aircraft accident, normally fire is the immediate threat.
However, history teaches an important lesson, panic is far less a
major concern, as opposed to inaction or inappropriate actions.
CATATONIA
Catatonia is more than instantaneous disbelief or 'freezing in
place.' It can be a
'shutting-down' process; a form of mental, emotional or even
physical escape. Some passengers may appear to be stunned, being
unable to communicate or express any feelings or emotions, in spite
of obvious signs of sweating, trembling or even nausea. Depending
on the nature and phase of the emergency, some may experience
tunnel vision, impaired hearing and impaired reasoning. Even with
the realization of imminent threat of injury or death, they may be
immobilized or react slowly; almost automatically. For these
passengers, their sense of time is often radically disrupted, in a
'Limbo' effect. There is also the possibility of the individual
fainting into unconsciousness, however briefly.
RATIONAL RESPONSE
The estimated 25% who can be reasonably expected to act rationally
are sometimes referred to as being, 'cool heads'. These individuals
appear calm; they collect their thoughts quickly. Their situational
awareness is intact; their judgment and reasoning are sound. These
individuals assess the situation correctly, make a plan and act
appropriately.
Within reason, this group can be divided into three statistical
ranges:
5% can be expected to act of their own initiative in the emergency.
They will be the ones who will make an attempt to fight a fire if
one is present, or prevent cabin flooding in a ditching
scenario.
10% can be expected to instruct or assist others.
10% can be expected to attempt to aggressively look after
themselves and may, for example, move towards any exit or safe
area. Their actions may serve as an appropriate inspiration for
others to follow.
The three groups compose the desired supplemental leaders who will
rationally attempt to ward off any threat and inspire others to
action. If they can be identified, they represent a valuable
resource for the crew to take advantage of. Often, they will
volunteer unique qualifications or simply their willingness to
assist.
During the onset phase of an emergency, the initial actions of the
'cool heads' also display a tendency toward traditional gender
roles. In general, the women can be expected to be more overtly
concerned with their own and other peoples' safety. They will
attempt to advise or assist others, and certainly quickly evacuate
their family and themselves.
The male 'cool heads' tend to be more in tune with the "action
requirement' of the situation, being more likely to attempt to
fight a fire or open an emergency exit. In general, they will try
to minimize risk and maximize desired action. If their assistance
is needed, they will very likely try to evacuate others before
themselves. Males are more willing to be separated from family, in
their personal risk assessment.
Examining the structural fire scenario in particular, research
indicates that the public seems more willing to fight a fire - if
able - than might typically be expected. In an aircraft accident,
fighting the fire is nearly impossible for passengers. However, the
same population can be expected to take a leadership role in
protecting passengers by ushering them to safety.
The potentially explosive nature of jet fuel is typically
sufficiently famous that these same 'leaders' can be reasonably
expected to act quickly and create the required distance from the
potential or actual fire.
In an aircraft accident, the pilots being trapped in the cockpit
can pose a unique problem. While flight attendants are taught to
ensure the cockpits evacuation, the typical flight attendant may
not have the physical strength to accomplish the task in the small
confines of the typical cockpit. Hence, the same group of leaders
can be utilized as a 'muscle' resource to extricate the pilots - if
possible.
It should never be assumed that a severely damaged cockpit
represents deceased pilots. Accordingly, unconscious or seriously
injured pilots should not be mistaken for deceased.
While passengers, in the capacity of a resource, play a key role,
this trait is not addressed with the intent of creating the
impression that an expected behavior of any group in an emergency
is that which conveniently fits the ideal 'heroic' model.
Certainly, it is a serious mistake to depend upon the emergence of
this type of individual in emergencies.
It is to be easily argued that the most logical behavior in an
emergency is that of rapid escape, especially when faced with
overwhelming threat. Setting aside reflexive judgments on the
issue, the choice of escape is appropriate as a reasoned choice, if
there is the element of self-control and a degree of rationality to
the action. Escape should also be viewed in terms of it's being
social and that it still recognizes the needs of others; certainly
that it is not any form of panic.
Escape behaviors become inappropriate when they are ineffective;
possibly counter-productive or threatening to others. Being the
first through an escape hatch with a pool of fuel awaiting ignition
is hardly to be admired. Beyond self-peril, the resulting open
hatch obviously endangers the remaining passengers if a fire should
erupts.
IRRATIONAL RESPONSES
The estimated 15% of the passengers who may demonstrate a high
degree of inappropriate response during an emergency can be
expected to behave in a variety of ways. The responses can range
from panicked escape attempts to paralyzed anxiety or even local
panic behavior. Again, escape is not necessarily an inappropriate
response. It is necessary to acknowledge the possibility that it
might successfully inspire others to actual safety, however risky.
When the physical and panicked escape is actually fulfilled, or is
physically prevented, passengers might resort to some basic or
primitive behavior such as crawling or crouching under or hiding
behind something. These individuals might cling onto other people,
either for either the illusion of protection or consolation.
A second irrational response is the opposite of escape - paralyzing
anxiety. Here, the element of catatonia plays a role, with a sense
of disbelief as the first reaction. The response might be
accompanied by thoughts such as, "This can't be happening to me,
this can't be real; there's some mistake, nothing bad really
happened."
Such a response might exhibit uncontrolled weeping and overwhelming
immobility. Passengers may stay in their seat, or, perhaps freeze
in the aisle. They may need to be physically led or carried to
safety. Again, some may lose consciousness.
Panic (discussed in detail later), is the extreme the inappropriate
responses. With respect to emergencies, the term is defined as, "An
irrational, fear-based response, which is anti-social, with the
potential for reducing the escape possibilities of others." The
history of aviation emergencies and accidents rarely contains the
element of panic, but sufficient cases have been reported to
reinforce the concern.
Panic in the emergency scenario is irrational and self-serving with
little or no thought for others. Those who panic can make a
difficult situation still worse - for everyone involved.
Panic is not limited to passengers. An interesting news video clip
caught a captain bolting from his sliding side-window after landing
with his left landing gear caught in the retracted position;
minutes ahead of the first passenger egress. Needless to say, the
core of the emergency leadership not only departed, but also may
have undermined the effectiveness of others. In all likelihood, the
remainder of the crew reacted with a rational 'revenge.'
Of those who would panic, it has been found that they may act
without conscious thought for their own, or others', safety. They
might be unaware of their actual surroundings, an immediate threat
and any adverse impact that they might be having.
In another accident, a couple panicked, defying the instructions of
the flight attendants, opened an emergency exit and exited to a
flaming death below.
Unless clearly overwhelming conditions prevail, very few passengers
are likely to panic. In non-aviation studies only 1% to 5% of
people fall into the estimated 'likely-to-panic' category.
Obviously, fire is one event likely to trigger a panic response,
however, the element of fire is inconsistent in that
regard.
Should passengers actually panic; their actions are likely to be
completely unpredictable. They may require physical restraint with
other people needed to look after them. Physical force may be
required to keep them from becoming an additional threat to
themselves or others.
It must be emphasized that the underlying cause is a combination of
their own sense of insecurity, causing them to react to actual or
perceived inadequate information or confidence in the situation or
crew. With sufficient fear, they can lose their ability to think or
act rationally.
The implications to flight crews are obvious - useful and
meaningful information at all stages is of vital importance for the
passengers - and the crew.
During these phases, families and close friends can be expected to
want to be together. They will rely heavily on each other for
advice, especially if the warning sources are uncertain and the
impact, when it comes, is sudden. They should, whenever possible,
be brought and kept together, so as to preclude supplemental
problems.
With some passengers having reached their own personal estimation
of threat, there may be a decision to act and/or to warn others. As
a rough guide only, if left to their own devices approximately 25%
can be relied on to act rationally. Such reactions are more likely
if the individuals have had recent similar experiences, knowledge
of similar disasters, or are with their family or a group of close
friends. This group can be a valuable asset to the flight
crew.
The bulk of passengers may accept the fact that there is a problem,
but either take no action for some obscure reason, or be slow to do
so. If it is fear or uncertainty, which is underlying the
inactivity, they may be experiencing thoughts such as, "This isn't
going to work" "It's too late" "No one can help me" "There's no
point in even trying." Thus, it is apparent that effective command
must be taken early and maintained.
EVACUATION BEHAVIOR
In elementary terms, evacuation is obviously the action of getting
passengers focused on the appropriate instructions and to
physically move away from a threatening environment. It is academic
that they must first become aware, or at least suspect or assume,
that a threat exists, referring to the so-called 'warning' phase.
Next, they must accept it, in terms of the onset phase. Given that
people differ in their ability to accept information during the
first two phases they must quickly decide on a course of action and
follow through with it.
Aircraft evacuations are independently threatening with respect to
an accepted institutional ignorance on the subject. The NTSB has
identified a long list of life-threatening aspects to aircraft
evacuations, from aircraft design through evacuation procedures.
While the NTSB has brought their issues to the FAA and Congress,
little attention is being paid to the topic - by anyone. Typical
behavior in the evacuation phase illustrates why this phase is so
critical to survival.
Human nature dictates that anything, which is unfamiliar and
unexpected, can be inherently alarming; even without an actual
threat. To control or reduce anxiety, people often attempt to
convince themselves, consciously and subconsciously, that what they
are seeing and hearing is actually normal or at least not
particularly threatening, as opposed to being an indicator that
things are rapidly going wrong. The most powerful internal debate
seems to be subconscious.
Such personal arguments assert that an 'apparently harmless and
plausible explanation' is available and leaves them safe. Such
irrational beliefs can be often accepted for considerable time,
despite clear evidence to the contrary. Passengers are no different
than any population in that they also tend to see and hear what
they choose. They typically do not want to be forced to accept a
breach in their safety assumptions.
Aircraft accidents are typically of two categories, planned - with
preparations, and unplanned - extremely abrupt and with precious
little time to act or react.
Aircraft are unique in that the physical angle or 'attitude' of the
aircraft can send a correct or incorrect message to passengers and
crew alike.
Lets examine a scenario -
A wheel brake locks-up with the aircraft taxiing for takeoff,
causing sufficient heat to burst a tire. The sound of the tire
burst might be puzzlement, varying to mild concern. The fact might
easily be that the burst tire tore open the wing, breaking fuel
lines. With the fuel spilling in the vicinity of the hot brake, a
fire is impending.
If sufficient knowledge is available to the cockpit, there might be
an order to evacuate. With no threat perceived by the passengers,
they may sit fast, even though an undisputed evacuation order has
been given. The fact that the aircraft is still upright and
seemingly 'normal' can send an erroneous message to the
passengers.
Now, if the fire erupts, the response is radically different with
the added element of a time shortage. If the wind carries the smoke
over to the safe side of the aircraft with the obvious ambiguity in
the passengers' minds, they may hesitate to exit into the smoke.
Conversely, they may decide of their own accord to go out the
opposite side, admitting smoke and flame into the cabin
itself.
With clear communication, much danger can be avoided. However, the
message has to be clearly understood with the appropriate
instructions and with pertinent detail and no more.
Imagine two PAs -
"Ladies & gentlemen, we seem to have blown a tire. We'll be
evacuating on the right side of the aircraft only. Please leave
your belongings and move to the exits now."
Or;
"This is the captain. We've had a tire burst, rupturing a fuel line
with a high risk of a fire on the left side of the aircraft, flight
attendants, right side only, right side only, evacuate, evacuate,
right side only!"
The two messages are radically different. The second message
carries authority, a command tone, accurate information,
identification of the threat and clear directions (preceding the
evacuation order) and evacuate the order itself, with both the
directions and the action ordered.
In most cases, the second PA would compel a 100% rapid
compliance.
Move to another level. Before the PA can be given, the fire breaks
out with the passengers fully aware. Again, put the wind on the
side of the fire, blowing smoke into the desired evacuation path.
The passengers may have formed their own resolve, possibly
initiating an evacuation on the wrong side. Chaos can be the
result, complete with panic. The over-wing doors are opened on the
wrong side, admitting smoke, the overhead evacuation lights are
obscured.
While the flight attendants might be screaming instructions over
the PA, is there enough volume to communicate over the panicked
voices of the passengers? With overwhelming indicators, the
passengers may become highly autonomous as to the immediate
evacuation. They may or may not, 'get it right.'
Even the most experienced passenger may find the scenario far more
confusing than they could ever have imagined. Without adequate or
timely information, even crewmembers can get badly confused. In one
aircraft accident, the left engine failed with an associated
vibration and ambiguous engine indications. Both pilots came to the
wrong conclusion, shutting down the wrong engine. Amazingly, the
bad engine continued to run, until short final; then quit, with a
resulting fatal crash. Having failed to validate their assumptions,
a highly professional crew shut down the wrong engine, ultimately
causing an unnecessary accident; with fatalities.
Aircraft emergencies often evolve rapidly. The desired time element
may not be available. Waiting for clarification or instructions may
not be an option.
LANGUAGE BARRIERS
From the United States, it's not uncommon to have a significant
percentage of non-English speaking passengers on flights into such
places as Mexico. Although certain limitations must be recognized,
the boarding safety briefing must be orally presented - per the FAA
regulations - with the obvious intent that the briefing is
understood. By the regulations and the FAA procedural manuals, the
seat-back safety briefing cards supplement the primary briefing;
they do not substitute.
Such passengers can only overcome their limitation by guessing
correctly or to follow someone else. With luck, they may have
looked at the evacuation cards in the seat-back pockets, gaining an
elementary idea as to what is expected of them. Ironically, that
action may leave them better prepared than those who understand
English, but didn't bother listening to the briefing or studying
the cards.
Thoughts Expressed from Historic Emergencies
"The little things seemed to make a big difference."
"Most people were concerned about family and friends."
"We just wanted to know what was happening."
"We waited for whoever was in charge."
"Nobody told us anything."
"Everyone was pushing and shoving."
"We desperately wanted to know what to do."
In the event of a violent crash, the cockpit may not have the
ability to communicate due to aircraft damage, injury or their
demise. Such a scenario is not uncommon or unexpected. However, the
command structure will have broken down, leaving the evacuation
command to the flight attendants. In such a threat situation there
is still the obvious need for clear information and a command
structure, so that, as far as may be possible, no matter who is
removed, the next person in the chain of command can, and will,
step into the suspected or known breach, advising and instructing
the evacuation process. Clearly, flight attendants need guidance on
when to self-initiate an evacuation.
Even if the command structure has not broken down, getting the
passengers to move in the required time frame and in the needed
direction by those managing the situation can still be a serious
problem.
Without clear information and guidance many people may remain in
their seats until they are satisfied that they have a very clear
mandate to evacuate. Even with adequate information and
instructions, some may still be reluctant to move when required to
do so. The flight attendant nightmare is when the passengers decide
to take their personal belongings with them, contrary to the
instructions. Between the time requirement and the obvious physical
impediment, such barriers can - and have - killed.
This tendency for human response, during an emergency, to appear
random and chaotic has led to the identification of a number of
common and mistaken assumptions during the evacuation phase of an
emergency.
For example, those responsible for the safe evacuation of people in
an emergency may assume that passengers will start to move as soon
as they, 'hear the order.' Unfortunately, such is not always the
case. Psychological denial mechanisms can still be in place even
after passengers recover from the 'brace' or 'impact' position
(bent over with arms crossed, contacting the seat in front of
them). The aircraft coming to a stop with a relative quiet might
create a false, but welcome, sense of security.
Without overwhelming indicators, some people might still be
reluctant to start evacuation procedures immediately. There might
be those who abruptly elect to wait for 'further' clarity and
'kinder' instructions, or they may decide that it is just better to
wait and see what happens next.
Any background panic or hysteria (screaming) could trigger a
thought process to the effect of, "Well, I'm not joining in THAT."
As a consequence, a different deadly delay could be effected.
Seconds can be very precious in any emergency.
Even when any warnings and threat have been accepted as genuine,
some people still cannot think and act for themselves.
An estimated 10-15% of the passengers may experience the 'disaster
syndrome.' They will appear as being stunned, dazed and bewildered.
Realistically, this response can be expected to be short lived,
ultimately yielding to either hyperactivity or to the desired
appropriate evacuation response. In psychological terms, the
'disaster syndrome' reaction is an 'adaptive' function which nature
seems to offer as a protection for the individual from being
mentally and emotionally overwhelmed by the impact of the immediate
trauma.
Passengers in this group may become immobile, sitting or standing
around in a passive or apathetic manner. They may seem oblivious to
both the danger and the presence or the needs of others. Whether by
aid of the crew or by the assistance of other passengers, they may
need mild-to-forceful assistance to get away from the threat. In
extreme cases they may need to be carried out. Some passengers may
struggle irrationally, unable to remember how or be able to
unfasten their seat belt.
An estimated 60% can be expected to understand the situation, but
without clear instructions and forceful orders, they might be
uncertain as to their plight and otherwise be given to changing
their minds, even if they do make a decision. Fortunately, these
are estimated to be more easily influenced, tending to follow the
lead of the strongest person in their immediate vicinity.
Unfortunately, these individuals also tend to follow such
individuals even if they have made a wrong decision. These too, may
become immobile, until forcefully instructed or until the threat
becomes too great. This group is normally much 'stronger' in all
manners and can render assistance if so instructed.
There is an incorrect assumption that the passenger motivation to
escape will dominate the passenger's autonomous decisions and
consequent actions. Again, passengers can be expected to initially
attempt to take stock of the situation, continuing their 'normal'
activity, as opposed to 'switching' into the 'escape' mentality.
Hence, they must be emphatically instructed to escape. There seems
to be a subconscious argument to the effect of, "control is
safety," in the early portion of any phase. Passengers will tend to
initially investigate, rather than immediately effect their
escape.
To repeat, 10% can be expected to attempt to save themselves,
acting or moving toward safety. Depending on the individual
situation, another 5% can reasonably be expected to act on their
own initiative and attack the problem - if possible.
10% of the passengers may repeat or originate warnings or instruct
others. This group contains the passengers who may emerge as
spontaneous leaders. These passengers will rationally attempt to
ward off any possible threat by putting others to work. These are
the individuals who can be expected to instruct others in the
fashion of, "Hey! Help him get his life vest on!"
There is also the risk that passengers will tune out or simply
forget recent information. The evacuation procedures can be
forgotten. These passengers will tend to revert to any familiar
responses, which have served them in the past, even though those
responses may now be non-pertinent and totally inappropriate.
Stress can also