ProAir
The Untold Story

NOTE:

Other accounts on this Web site describe the FAA disregard for safety and the dignity of human life. Below is the story of the FAA's corrupt power over an entire airline.

In the aftermath of the Alaska Airlines flight 261 crash, ProAir also fell under the scrutiny of the same FAA team, the AFS-40, which inspected Alaska Airlines. Alaska was notified of approximately 500 findings. Pro Air was notified of less than ten; all minor, with no violations. ProAir had been cleared by the SWAT team from Washington, D.C.

Strangely, approximately a month-and-a-half later, in the middle of July 2000, the Seattle FAA office requested a 100% surveillance of all ProAir operations. There was no historical basis for that request. The same office was responsible for ProAir's safety status. Essentially, the local FAA office was asserting that it wasn't doing it's own job and that was ProAir's fault.

It is academic that a month-and-a-half isn't long enough for anything to have changed. That surveillance request initiated an unprecedented number of en route inspections, station records reviews, dispatch observations, maintenance checks, and aircraft records inspections. ProAir was operating a fleet of three airplanes, and only forty- two pilots. There was no justification for such extensive surveillance of their operations for such a lengthy time.

The 100% surveillance continued until ProAir's Shutdown, September 18, 2000. During that time, the Seattle FAA office refused to share the results of their extraordinary surveillance with ProAir, although the results were repeatedly requested.

In the meantime, the FAA assured ProAir that if any safety concerns were uncovered, they would be notified immediately. Beyond courtesy, that was also legally required. As of the middle of August, the FAA indicated that inspectors were not identifying any significant safety concerns.

Under public law, the FAA has a responsibility to conduct surveillance of any air carrier. However, ProAir made it an additional point to question the legitimacy of that surveillance in terms of cost versus safety benefits. In theory, that's important to the government, as well. ProAir also expressed their serious concerns about the extraordinary surveillance as negatively affecting ProAir's system-wide safety and the risk management of their operation.

As of the middle of July, Pro Air protested that the FAA was placing a tremendous stress and increased risk on their operations by its constant presence. The pool of 42 pilots had been subjected to over 150 enroute inspections by FAA inspectors over the previous six weeks.

Their dispatchers had endured forty days of constant surveillance, every maintenance function had been observed by the FAA, and the same station records have been reviewed dozens of times. Although the conduct of the inspectors was generally regarded by ProAir as being professionally conducted, ProAir protested those inspections as being inappropriate, causing undo stress on their flight crews and ground personnel.

At that juncture, the surveillance had reached the point where the FAA could no longer claim a safety justification. After six weeks, the FAA had not identified or relayed any safety concerns to ProAir.

ProAir justifiably protested the stress of the constant FAA inspections which were placed on personnel from a human factors standpoint. Even the FAA had to acknowledge the effects of stress as being cumulative. It was obvious that any system enduring that type of stress long enough, and for no apparent reason, would eventually collapse.

ProAir was understandably afraid that a pilot or ground employee would make an error, with the FAA being a significant factor in that error. ProAir appealed to the FAA's reasoning, that there should be a mutual interest in preventing a breakdown of system safety. ProAir protested that instead, the FAA was contributing to the potential for an eventual safety breakdown.

Another frequent problem came in the form of two or more FAA inspectors attempting to ride the same aircraft during the same leg of flight, further stressing ProAir's system safety. That became a common occurrence. Two or more inspectors conducting enroute inspections on the same airplane was contrary to both FAA and ProAir's FAA accepted policy.

ProAir complained that FAA inspectors were occupying their jumpseats who appeared to be untrained in air carrier operations. They complained that these individuals were a distracting element in the cockpit. ProAir suffered several events in which inspectors were the cause of safety incidents and inappropriate flight delays. In one recent case, a FAA inspector 'inadvertently' deployed the passenger cabin oxygen masks. The deploying switch was located in the overhead, under a guarded cover. ProAir protested that from a human factors point of view, it would be just as easy for an untrained FAA inspector to "inadvertently" activate the fuel cutoff switches in flight.

The ProAir Safety Department pleaded with the FAA to address the effect on their system safety aspects. ProAir went on to plead that the FAA address any possible solutions with ProAir to enhance safety during their surveillance, as opposed to permitting the surveillance to detract from safety as was occurring.

ProAir took the bold step of requesting a complied list of the number of enroute inspections, station inspections, records inspections (all), maintenance inspections, ramp inspections, dispatch inspections, and all other inspections, indicating the number of satisfactory and unsatisfactory inspections, and those that will result in enforcement action. They pleaded to know what, if anything, was wrong.

ProAir also requested a specific and detailed list of all safety and regulatory issues and concerns identified by the inspections during the 100% surveillance program, offering for the ProAir Safety Department to immediately begin to address any issues immediately.

The FAA's response came on 18 September, 2000, two months after the inspections began – an emergency revocation of their operating certificate. Eloquent language aside, there was no legitimate emergency or any other reason to initiate a certificate revocation.

While there had been some publicized nonsense claims made of ProAir's conduct under the regulations, the FAA investigated the claims immediately; reality quickly nullified those claims. No carrier is going to avoid the expected inadvertent violations, however, ProAir was no more or no less perfect than anyone else. The few minor infractions in their history did not suggest operating certificate action.

While any issue can be debated, it is only responsible to put things into responsible perspective -

1. ProAir, although young, had no significant adverse safety record.

2. The Washington D.C. "SWAT" team had just given ProAir a clean and commendable bill of health.

3. The Seattle FAA office was responsible for ProAir's regulatory compliance – there was no significant previous history.

4. If there had been a single significant safety infraction discovered during the 'killer' inspection, the FAA was compelled to act on it, not permit it to 'accumulate.'

5. If there had been a negative safety trend discovered, immediate action would have been mandatory. Ignoring such a trend would have made the FAA complicit.

6. Conversely, the local FAA office did have a well known serious 'problem child.'

7. If the FAA had been intent on legitimate enforcement, they would have at least notified their Washington D.C. office that they needed help in correcting the problem with that carrier.

8. Instead, known safety problems are permitted to continue at the other carrier, with no discoverable plans to attend to those problems.

9. All this happened under the nose of all the major government investigative bodies; all the way to the White House, itself.

10. Given the FAA's stated reasons for grounding ProAir; the FAA has no valid excuse for allowing their well publicized 'problem child' to continue operating. The other carrier is additionally under criminal investigation and indictment for their failings. This is particularly true with respect the the fact that the other carrier has yet to indicate their intention to cure known safety violations.

With a history of other carriers having a very serious number of incidents, accidents and fatalities, ponder the reality behind what you've just read. Think about the accidents and incidents which were made to conveniently 'disappear.' Take time to wonder why so much information was left out of published accident reports.

One has to wonder whether the almighty dollar has been officially declared superior to human life and dignity. Is that the true definition of "Politically Correct?" Ponder the probable future – It's yours!

- Below is the Chronology of the FAA History -

The following material is a more detailed description of the events involving (and preceding) the originating FAA inspection process, which began in January 2000 with a desk audit. This audit was conducted out of the Seattle FAA offices. The June 2000 evaluation was step two of the process.

Between the two processes, ProAir was given a thorough evaluation by a team from Washington D.C. That team gave ProAir a commendable bill of health.

August, 1998 - The Seattle FAA conducted a safety inspection of Pro Air. The inspection team made nine findings, with immediate corrective action made by ProAir. The FAA issued no civil penalties as a result of the inspection.
June 10, 1999 - The Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), Ross Demel, faxed a message to ProAir, stating that all "accepted" ProAir manuals would require FAA approval prior to use. This was a serious contradiction, as such manuals are not 'approval' items. Historically, the FAA has evaded official responsibility by categorizing manuals as 'acceptance' items. Demel was essentially 'inventing' new FAA policy. From that date until February 10, 2000, ProAir accommodated the FAA, sending all their "accepted" manuals to the FAA for 'approval,' despite the fact that such was contrary to the requirements of FAA regulations and their guidance handbook.
August, 1999 - The Seattle FAA conducted another safety inspection of Pro Air. The inspection team alleged nine violations. With detailed examination of the allegations, all enforcement cases were closed, with no further action required by Pro Air. The FAA issued no civil penalties as a result of the inspection.
December, 1999 - When the FAA review process and delays became a serious burden, a letter was written to the FAA, informing them that their delays were becoming a safety problem for ProAir. The FAA was requested to notify ProAir formally, in writing, of any concerns or unacceptable information in ProAir's publications. No notification was ever provided.
December, 1999- The ProAir Safety Director wrote a letter to the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) requestng a dialogue to resolve any significant observations or findings by the FAA, on a weekly basis. ProAir attempted to create a maximum awareness of any FAA concerns before they become a problem. This was expressed as a desire to make the requested process part of ProAir's own internal evaluation process. There was never a response to this specific request by the FAA.
ProAir was not certified under a special program called Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS); nor are the FAA principal inspectors ATOS trained. However, in January 2000, an FAA evaluation was conducted at the Seattle FAA office, utilizing the ATOS model. The ProAir FAA principal inspectors indicated that ProAir had 10 areas of significant concern. Despite Pro Air's requests for information regarding the concerns, no information was provided by the FAA.
February 16, 2000 - A letter was sent to the FAA requesting formal notification of specific manual objections, requesting a meeting. The FAA did not respond.
Given the FAA's failure to respond, ProAir resorted to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesting the FAA results of the January 2000 inspection. ProAir made an all-out effort to address any safety issues. ProAir also requested a copy of the process, the assessment tools (analysis methods), the data collection forms, and questionnaires. ProAir attempted to tailor their Internal Evaluation Program to mirror the FAA process. The FAA denied the request.
March 16, 2000 - The Seattle FAA office provided a letter identifying 10 vaguely worded areas of concern as a result of the January inspection. In response, ProAir requested specific information; none was provided. Thus no action was possible. Further, the FAA's failure to accommodate any actual safety concerns made the FAA inherently culpable.
April 2000 - From Washington D.C. came the AFS-40 "SWAT" team to conducts an inspection on ProAir. The results of the inspection were positive. However, the AFS- 40 team identified the antagonist and uncooperative relationship between the principals and ProAir. The AFS-40 team also identified the fact that ProAir was assigned unqualified and inexperienced principal inspectors.
June 13, 2000 - The Seattle FAA office conducted an onsite evaluation of ProAir. During the 'Inbrief,' Mr. Richards stated that the FAA had 38 known areas of concern. Contrary to policy, none of these areas of concern were previously addressed with ProAir, including the 10 areas cited from the January 2000 evaluation. 114 'findings' resulted from the current evaluation. Utilizing the tactic of 'time compression,' ProAir was given ten days to answer the findings. All findings were adequately addressed by ProAir. Most of the findings were distortions of logic and void of any reasonable concern.
At the 'Inbrief,' to the inspection, ProAir asked the FAA team to work with ProAir on a daily basis, so that any findings could be corrected immediately. While inspector, Larry Richards agreed to do so, the FAA failed to fulfill that promise.
June 16, 2000 - ProAir sent another letter to the Seattle FAA office, requesting the inspection process guidance. This second request was also ignored.
June 27, 2000 - ProAir hand delivered a letter to the FAA inspection team leader informing him of the difficulties ProAir was encountering with the FAA manual reviews, informing him that the FAA's own manual revisions were severely out of date, up to a year in some cases. It was impossible for the FAA to review and provide feedback, using outdated manuals. Any guidance given by the FAA would have been erroneous, as a consequence. Had ProAir responded to those changes, there was the high risk that ProAir would have been culpable, despite the FAA's actions. Under the FAA regulations, ProAir was required keep their manuals current, with updated FAA requirements.
June 28, 2000 - At the 'Outbriefing', Larry Richards, the FAA inspection team leader stated that ProAir had no significant safety findings of immediate concern.
All normal weekly meeting between FAA and ProAir had been suspended. The FAA ceased any significant dialogue with ProAir.
Following the June 2000 evaluation, ProAir was given 8 days to answer the 114 findings. The 8 days included a 4-day holiday for government employees. In light of the holiday, ProAir asked for a contact number and availability of inspectors over the holiday. The ProAir POI promised to get back to ProAir with a contact number, promising that someone would be available to answer any questions. The promised return call was not made by the POI. ProAir called several more times with no response, no contact name and number, and no return phone calls until after the holiday. Consequently, the ProAir personnel worked 10 days straight, up to 18 hours per day.
ProAir requested a two-day extension to get their report back to the FAA. Bill Baldwin refused to grant the two days, stating that ProAir's problems were a detriment to public safety and again suggested that ProAir shut down. This was in direct contrast to the Larry Richards statement that there were no urgent safety concerns! ProAir made the same request to the FAA Division Manager; the two-day extension was granted.
The day before the report to the FAA was due, the SEA FAA office sent a team of three inspectors to the ProAir office, who spent the day going through ProAir's records and disrupting the personnel who were completing the report. The inspectors personally took aircraft records out of the file drawers without permission - contrary to ProAir's policy. The extension request put the FAA on notice that time was short for completing the required report. The actions of the inspectors struck everyone as an inappropriate disruption and undue harassment. Their actions caused a serious hardship to ProAir, their operation, and their personnel. ProAir wrote the FAA a letter of complaint, with no answer.
July 14 & 20, 2000 - ProAir sent letters to the Seattle FSDO requesting a meeting to discuss the cited findings and ProAir's corrections. Despite repeated requests, the Seattle FAA office would not hold discussions with ProAir, nor would they provide any feedback about submissions, or provide guidance. The FAA principal inspectors informed ProAir that they are not available to conduct normal business and sign operations specifications. The FAA canceled a proposed July 18th meeting.
The Seattle FSDO called for 100% surveillance of ProAir's operations, commencing on approximately 15 July. This effort continued until the shutdown order, with no feedback from the Seattle FSDO. The lack of feedback suggests to ProAir that the inspectors were observing no significant issues. The inspections became disruptive and developed into a safety issue in themselves. Some issues with inspector mis- conduct occurred. One incident resulted in a formal complaint to the DEN FAA office on July 28, 2000.
July 22, 2000 - ProAir sent a letter to the Seattle FAA office and to Nicholas Lacey at the FAA National Headquarters, in Washington D.C. describing the lack of FAA response and input from the Seattle FAA office. In that letter, ProAir also discussed their concerns of erroneous findings.
August 2, 2000 - ProAir officials meet with Nick Lacey at FAA Headquarters in Washington D.C. They inform Lacey of the Seattle FAA office's lack of response to ProAir's requests, or to look at responses submitted by ProAir. The ProAir officials provide Lacey with copy of the FAA findings. Lacey gives the impression that he agrees to assist ProAir. All known inspection findings except for 2 are resolved before the meeting with Lacey; ProAir had met all correction deadlines.
August 4, 2000 - ProAir sends another letter to Nicholas Lacey, citing the unchanged problems with the FAA lack of communications and the erroneous findings.
August 11, 2000 - ProAir finally achieves a working meeting with the FAA to discuss their findings. The FAA personnel drag their heels, continually claiming that they cannot discuss findings. They can only listen.
August 23, 2000 - ProAir sends a fax to the FAA hotline regarding the lack of responsiveness to Pro Air's submissions and questions. In that fax, ProAir forwarded an E-mail previously sent to the FAA inspection team manager with the same concerns.
September 5, 2000 - ProAir sent a letter to the Seattle FAA office reiterating the lack of responsiveness to Pro Air's submissions and questions.
September 14, 2000 - ProAir sends two letter to the FAA regarding 196 and 144 manual transmittals not returned (indicating manuals severely out of date, some by 2 years.)
September 18, 2000 - The FAA revoked the ProAir certificate without warning. ProAir was only able to effect one working meeting with the FAA regarding their inspectors findings since the inspection. Since the January FAA evaluation, the FAA was reluctant to share safety information with ProAir.

Other significant incidents:
In December, 1999, ProAir took possession of a new B-737 from Europe. The aircraft had all the required legal paperwork. However, ProAir's FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector announced that he didn't like the paperwork and would not accept it. Pro Air called for an FAA team to conduct a "conformity inspection" by a neutral party, from another region; the request was granted. On the assigned day of the inspection, the conformity team failed to appear. A call revealed that the Seattle FAA office (supervisor Tim Miller) called the inspection team's contact and told him ProAir had cancelled the meeting! ProAir had not made such a call. Obviously, the Seattle FAA office did not want to risk a bad call being made, nor to be overruled. The aircraft consequently sat on the ground for 5 months, while ProAir paid the lease fee. ProAir additionally lost the potential revenue, and two very profitable and long- term charter contracts. ProAir lost millions of dollars because of that lie. This incident precipitated the start of ProAir's financial difficulties.
In mid- May, 2000, ProAir had an engine change done on an aircraft in Dallas. A FAA inspector inspected the airplane in Dallas and approved it. ProAir flew it for 10 days, when their FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector called and informed ProAir that he didn't like the other inspector's paperwork. He told ProAir to ground the airplane - the day before Memorial Weekend. ProAir lost the revenue for the whole weekend.
During one FAA inspection, ProAir had an airplane in Oklahoma for a maintenance "C" check. Several FAA inspection team members showed up to inspect the process, mysteriously requesting several more inspectors out of the Oklahoma City FAA office. So many inspectors showed up to watch the "C" check that the maintenance company refused to do the check. This was an expensive impact on ProAir's business, taking the time and attention of ProAir's maintenance personnel away from other duties to find a new vendor.
For approximately 6 months prior to the shutdown, many FAA 'operations specifications' issues had been on the FAA's table with no response. ProAir had been awaiting the FAA's response to numerous letters since February, 2000.

July 2000 - Harvey Tharps, an FAA inspector, called to say he observed the engine change on another airplane in Phoenix, stating that he saw no problems. Shortly thereafter, the Seattle FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector called, grounding that airplane. The maintenance vendor Quality Control Director was reported to have made a written complaint to the Phoenix FAA office about the Seattle FAA office decision.

The week of September 23rd seemed to be the "krystal nacht" for the FAA. They had their way - once again - with their abuse of the FAA emergency authority. First with the captain of AK-506, then ProAir's appeal of that authority abuse. If ProAir couldn't satisfy the NTSB as to the abuse, no one in their right mind would again waste a dime on such an appeal. The FAA clearly demonstrated that they had powers above all authority. Even the IRS has to conform to criminal law - not so the FAA. So much for the "Hoover Bill." The FAA has successfully laughed in the face of Congress - with obvious impunity.

In the media, the Director of ProAir's maintenance was described as 'falsifying' a document. In reality, he followed an FAA approved and industry norm "sign-off" procedure in the same fashion of a lead mechanic signing off a logbook, based on the word of the mechanics who actually performed the inspection. He is currently under investigation by the FAA.

A second case of alleged falsification involved a questioned electrical test of a plug on an aircraft. The ProAir Quality Control person discovered that the first test hadn't been conducted properly, used the correct technique & verified that the test passed. Per FAA approved procedures - again - he signed off the test. The FAA later distorted this as a falsification. Subsequent re-testing of the affected item verified that it was in fact airworthy. Exempting convoluted logic, there was no legitimate falsification and no compromise of safety.

In the ProAir case, it is fitting to also compare the FAA radically taking the regulation language out of context in the CS-985 case. This isn't an occurrence, it's an ongoing pattern.

Following the emergency revocation of ProAir's certificate and the loss in the appeal of ProAir's futile protest to the NTSB of the FAA emergency authority itself, the FAA kept digging, trying to come up with anything to support a case against ProAir. This was a case of the police going after evidence, ex post facto, based on the fact that the arrest needed some evidence which wasn't pre-existing. Despotic power aside, the FAA sanction guidance cites falsification as the only justification for the revocation of a carrier's certificate. Such is to be considered only reasonable - provided the case is valid.

Despite overwhelming Federal law, regulation and policy which prohibits such arbitrary abuse of power, the FAA presses on. ProAir finds itself in a unique position. Normally, the FAA oversight should preclude anything which is now cited in the FAA claims. In fact, that was accomplished, except for the FAA distortion of their own approved procedures. It is fitting to compare the treatment of the Alaska 506 pilots in the same light.

In the background of the ProAir case are multiple NTSB decisions citing events caused by FAA complicity as being exculpatory (worthy of being excused). Certainly, if there was a valid case in any of the FAA allegations, the FAA's negligent oversight would play a major role - not so in this event; WHY??? This case is well known in Washington D.C. with respect to the FAA's abuse of power; yet there is no significant response.

While the FAA attempted to keep up appearances by holding a limited number of meetings with ProAir, the meetings were an exercise in non-communication. The FAA refused to cite any clear position or to actively inform or facilitate correction of any cited problems - if legitimate. Clearly the meetings were intended to be an illusion of FAA function, as opposed to the effective stonewalling of function or communication. There could be no doubt that the meetings were intended to be void of any function, save for a delaying maneuver or the creation of a political or PR illusion for later use.

Interesting also, is the fact that the application of this non-communication style is not unique to ProAir; it is known as a somewhat 'standard' style in the FAA to achieve their obviously political ends. The style is known in Washington D.C., it isn't a local FAA invention.

Contrasting the treatment of ProAir against the recent FAA pro-active re-certification efforts of Sun Pacific betrays the FAA's responsiveness to politically accepted carriers; reasoning unknown. The average person is left to question the possibility of the ancient issue of greased palms.

In reality, ProAir isn't the first such search and destroy mission, Sun Pacific was another case; minus the emergency authority. Sun Pacific was also able to certify the FAA criminal corruption. The similar extreme's of Sun Pacific's case should at least remove the illusion that ProAir's situation was a function of Mary Rose Diefenderfer being the force majeur behind the FAA's action.

Given the notoriety of so many corruption cases of the FAA (and it's allied agencies), the resounding question remains - Why is there no legal or congressional intervention???

The extreme of corruption in the Democratic Administration keeps flashing into view. Examine the eight years of major corruption events with associated massive supression of any responsible investigation. Against such a history, perhaps the answer is more evident than the average person realizes. Perhaps aviation safety is 'small change,' against a larger background of overwhelming corrupt money-politics. Certainly, the key players are highly evident by their silence and equally prominent by the blackness of the shadow they attempt to hide within.

Against the large number of accounts of blatant FAA and selective oversight and political favoritism, a reasonable person is taken to a state of frustrated rage. Fear is the next appropriate reaction, as the corruption is clearly indicative of a well established and self-confident system.

The underlying threat in stories such as this is in a message being regularly transmitted in the format of government actions - the cultural expectations of the historic American free society are being methodically destroyed in all arenas. These politics are not unique to the aviation industry!

A divergence is needed to emphasize that last point. Two recent events underscore a conspicuous trend. The first is the crash of Alaska-261 on the watch of the FAA. The FAA Mary Rose Diefenderfer case telegraphed the probability for exactly such a crash. It happened well within the specific warnings of the FAA team led by Mary Rose. Further, the company maintenance practices were already under criminal investigation. Surprise cannot be claimed.

The second event was the killing of the passenger aboard the Southwest flight approaching Salt Lake City. Where is the FAA concern for safety or the Federal Government's concern for human rights? The highly selective corporate profit protection is all to obvious to an educated person.

While the preponderance of media accounts describe the killing as an act of self defense, further investigation strongly suggests that it was a mob killing of an obvious psychiatric case. Subsequent investigations indicate that the passengers involved went very far beyond self-defense.

The characteristics displayed by the passenger were not only a repeat of a long standing air-rage problem (little addressed by the FAA as such or within the scope of aircraft security), but were sufficiently indicative of a possible medical foundation, as to warrant scientific investigation as to a possible common cause / trigger.

Beyond the cause and effect of the passenger's outburst and actions, this case goes to the actual actions of the passengers, particularly with the possibility of an off-duty police officer being involved, either as a participant or a bystander. Of special interest should be the actions / inactions of the flight crew. Federal law not only protects the flight crew, it protects the passengers from unwarranted attack, certainly murder.

All accounts of the outburst do not address the actions of a rational person; it was very similar to the Alaska 259 case, landing at San Francisco. It is simply unlikely that the killed passenger could have been considered by anybody on board as rational, hence self-defense is highly questionable as either a fact or a potential effective detering "lesson" for others. If subsequent news accounts have any credibility, it was a senseless mob killing in every sense of the term.

This event also testifies to a not-so-obvious question, "What happened to the civil rights issue?" Return to the Rodney King beating or the civil rights killings in the '60s. Except for profit protection, those cases cannot be separated without an irrational extreme of rationalization. Assuming the account of the off-duty police officer is accurate; there is no valid excuse for treating this as a justifiable homicide.

An article in the Los Angeles Times by Eric Malnic (8 Oct. 2000) cited a nearly secret meeting of the top FAA officials in a Holiday Inn meeting room in the Washington D.C. area. The meeting was strange in itself with all the offices in the world in Washington D.C. available. In that meeting, the FAA heads discussed the miserable state of affairs in the agency. Yet they left the meeting to perpetrate more of the very same treatment which they acknowledged as being totally unacceptable. Malnic was able to get them to admit even their subsequent failures as being factual. Still, no change except for the worse.

While Malnic's article did an excellent job of focusing on the continuing reality of crew fatigue, hidden from Malnic was the crew fatigue factor in the Gander DC-8 crash, the Houston DC-9 belly-in and the CS-985 incident. The obscuration of these events testify to the clever ability of the FAA to hide major factors in incidents and accidents. There is still more to that story.

The immediate history (i.e., Alaska 506, Pro Air and Sun Pacific, CS-985, etc.) following that 'secret' meeting in Washington tells one message - someone outside the Federal Government is actually calling the shots.

Remember that this is an election year; political embarrassment is not allowed. Whether it is a single agency or the entire government, "subversion" is the only appropriate term. Challenge yourself for another explanation. Al Gore is all too well informed; it's his show as Vice President alone. Given the media attention to the airline industry, burden, ignorance and chaos are not a viable answers. Selective windfall profits offer the enduring answer; at the risk of passenger's lives.

Whether it is the Continental Micronesia flight 985, the Alaska 506 pilots or ProAir; where is the Federal law enforcement of the most basic of rights allegedly guaranteed under the Constitution.

None of these events are unknown to the White House, Congress, pertinent government agencies or the FBI. Where is the law??

The shocking part of the FAA's actions is that their repetitive nature is described as a major crime (felony) in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The pattern of the actions qualifies them for criminal prosecution under the racketeering laws. This is particularly true, given the resultant profits of certain preferred companies, obviously immune from comparable enforcement treatment.

As in the CS-985 case, the action against ProAir was protested to Washington D.C. - so what??? The FBI is previously aware of such, yet does nothing to suggest that they seriously care.

Given that all this is happening on the informed watch of Al Gore, one has to wonder HOW it happened and WHY it continues. Next, it is worth asking if Gore learned from the mistake of another; strategically embracing a previously outcast community, to achieve his ambitions.

In that perspective - is what we're seeing a message that the FAA is the role model for the new Gestapo? Executive Order 12866 is not limited to aviation. It's selective application is far too obvious. Following the model of the FAA's success, any Federal agency can use it.

Be certain that the last statement is neither a paranoid leap of credibility, nor a 'cheap shot,' in any sense of the word. There are far too many examples of this abuse of power - with immunity.

A glaring example is the GAO June, 2000 report to Congress on the FAA failure in the arena of airport security. That report is quite clear as to the selectively failed mission of the FAA and their style of corruption. Still, nothing changes, while the ultimate D.O.T. boss claims "American" integrity and morals in his bid for the Presidency.

It is only fitting to compare -

Alaska Airlines ProAir

1993- Alaska de-ices aircraft with vodka in Russia. No monetary fine. 1993- VP Flight Operations falsifies his training records to show training he didn’t receive. Investigation continues into 1994.
1994- FAA Security investigation shows that many Flight Managers had a pattern of falsifying training records. SEA FSDO took action against individuals, but protected Alaska. No criminal investigation. Supervisors in the FAA would not allow a violation against the company. 1994- FAA Security discovers Alaska keeping two sets of operations training records, one to show the FAA, and one that tells the real story. No company violation for falsifying records. No criminal investigation.
1995- Alaska Airlines discovered to be conducting instrument approaches illegally into Dutch Harbor (flying 1300’ lower than legal, found to be conducting flight training with unqualified instructors. No company violation. FAA supervisors protected the airline from being violated.
1996- Several cases discovered of illegal or no training being conducted as required, failing to write up mechanical discrepancies (many) in aircraft logbooks, illegal flight routings, generally non-compliant and hostile attitude toward the FAA. No company violations.
1997- Pilots caught flying with known mechanical deficiencies. Alaska documents pilot line checks as being completed when they were not given (falsification), Alaska caught disregarding simulator Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) required hours and specialized training for Reno airport, caught using unapproved checklists. FAA supervisors told the inspectors that they were not to conduct any more investigations, No company violations. No criminal investigation. 1997- Alaska knowingly flies with cracked "walking beam" and leaking MD-80 fuel tank. Fines imposed, but drastically reduced by FAA supervisors. 1997- Alaska becoimes very hostile to FAA. FAA supervisors telling inspectors they are too hard on the airline; they won’t allow violations. Supervisors discovered to be tipping airline officials off. Alaska caught destroying records they were told to keep by FAA. No violation filed. No criminal investigation. 1997- FAA received a letter from an Alaska ex-mechanic who had evidence that the airline was falsifying maintenance records. FAA never followed up in that time frame. Most inspectors involved in finding violations at Alaska are removed from Alaska oversight.	1997- ProAir receives operating certificate. FAA approved all procedures, manuals, etc.
1998- News breaks that FBI is investigating Alaska Airlines Oakland maintenance base for falsification of records. John Liotine and other mechanics come forward to give testimony. FAA did nothing. 1998-Discovery made that Alaska B-737 passenger and cargo "combis" do not have the required number of emergency exits for passengers. FAA discusses it, but does not allow inspectors to take action against Alaska.	1998-New Principal Maintenance Inspector assigned to ProAir 1998- FAA does white glove inspection on ProAir. Minimal findings. FAA 'mysteriously' requires ProAir to have all accepted manuals and revisions approved by them.
1999- More evidence comes out about Alaska Airlines falsifying records, including in the Seattle base. FAA is doing nothing. No criminal investigation.	1999- One or two new Principal Maintenance Inspectors assigned to ProAir. Mr. Pritchard becomes new Principal Maintenance Inspector at end of 1999- his assignment marks the start of trouble. 1999- FAA does 'special emphasis' inspection and opens 9 violations. Eventually all violations are closed with no action.
2000- Alaska 261 crash. Linked to Oakland base and falsified records. FAA sends in an AFS-40 "SWAT" team, which finds 500 maintenance findings, including inadequate CAAS program. FAA then sends a special inspection team to spend 10 days assisting Alaska get their programs and manuals written. Subsequently, the FAA inspection teams made at least 3 more visits to Alaska to assist them to get the manuals and programs written. September 2000, a special inspection team leader cites report to his supervisor that Alaska Airlines still hasn’t actually implemented their amended maintenance program, reliability program, or heavy maintenance program in place. Alaska Airlines continues to hold its certificate.	2000- FAA refuses to accept legal paperwork for new airplane, #361, and requires special certification. ProAir asks for disinterested inspection team to review situation, but SEA FAA office tells the assigned team that ProAir does not want the review. This was not true. This cost ProAir millions in expenses and lost charter contracts. January 2000- Special inspection team desk audit of ProAir. SEA FAA office refused to provide ProAir any feedback on what report said until Freedom Of Information Act used to get the information. Inspection team reports shows the FAA inspectors unqualified (general aviation backgrounds). April 2000- AFS-40 "SWAT" team from D.C. begins inspection for 10 day. 10 minor findings, which were corrected prior to the team leaving. June 2000- SEA FAA office orders another inspection, which includes 15 inspectors for 2 weeks. 114 write-ups. Report obviously inflated with duplicates and non-regulatory write-ups. ProAir responds to every finding and make all FAA requested changes. FAA refuses to give ProAir feedback. July 2000- FAA initiates 100% surveillance. No findings officially reported to ProAir. August 2000- 100% surveillance continues (8 weeks total), with no feedback from FAA. September 2000- Certificate revocation. New issues cited in Order, Order and FAA submissions cite that ProAir corrections to the finds were not acceptable, but they never provided feedback. Cite one case of falsification (not true).

Alaska Airlines has a history of serious non-compliance, falsification, and an uncooperative attitude.	ProAir maintains a very compliant attitude; expressing their willingness to work with the FAA. ProAir has no serious violation or non-compliance history.

Personnel of interest:

Alaska POI from 1993-1997- M.R. Diefenderfer

Removed by FAA for insisting on saftety at Alaska . ProAir Certification Team: Bill Whitaker

Dennis Harn

Charlene Pagan

1997- 2000 Alaska POI - Dennis Harn,

Promoted to POI for his excellent work in

certifying ProAir.

1999- 2000 Alaska PMI- Bill Whitaker, promoted to

PMI for his experience in certifying ProAir. 1999- ProAir VP Safety- M.R. Diefenderfer

Then Something Changed!

ProAir put up a valiant battle. The FAA, on November 7, 2000, abruptly agreed to withdraw the revocation of ProAir's operating certificate. The FAA Revocation Order will be treated as though it had never been issued. There will be no fines or civil penalties levied against the Company (evades a civil court room, as opposed to the kangaroo court environment) in connection with any of the allegations that were made in the Order. ProAir agreed to revise its operational procedures, meeting the new FAA "ATOS" standards for large airlines. The FAA also agreed to allocate the necessary resources to ensure that the changes can be approved on a schedule which is intended to allow ProAir to resume flying by January 19, 2001. Pro Air agreed to not sue the FAA or any of its employees for the revocation of ProAir's certificate. ProAir's operating certificate will be moved from Seattle to the Detroit FAA office. The employees rallied to the cause.

Toward the end of January, 2001,
the FAA re-issued ProAir's operating certificate.
If rumors are correct, the FAA installed
two rotten trap-doors before lowering that draw-bridge.

Nefarious control is still on the FAA's side,
with time and expense still working
against ProAir, we'll see.

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