BEYOND HONG KONG

It may be reasonably speculated that the saga of Continental Micronesia Flight 985 actually began with a letter Captain Omholt wrote at the request of Continental's Chief Pilot Fred Abbott. In that letter, Captain Omholt illustrated to Captain Abbott various safety and regulatory issues he was aware of as being potentially the cause of an accident or possible FAA sanctions against Continental.

Captain Omholt's predictions were uncannily accurate. However, the response from Captain Abbott was a blistering discounting of Captain Omholt's concerns. Rationalization was in, Captain Omholt's concerns were labeled with such language as his concerns being 'inconsistent with those of his peers.'

Captain Omholt recognized the message, "Keep your mouth shut and just do your job." Captain Omholt did just that. However, two years later that letter exchange came back to haunt him.

People were destined to unnecessarily die in the morbid wake of Captain Omholt's predictions; American 1420 and Alaska 261 exemplified Captain Omholt's fears. Those people didn't have to die; particularly just for the sake of the almighty dollar.

Even today, more accidents and incidents persist. Despite obvious indicators, no one seems to care. Incidents and even accidents are regularly not reported or otherwise obscured. Continental's 1998 Guadalajara B-737 crash and the Alaska 506 incident are prime examples.

There are other accidents begging to happen. It's a paradox to refer to them as being "accidents."

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Following the Hong Kong emergency, involving Air Micronesia flight CS-985, Captain Omholt returned to Guam on the assumption that nothing major was to become of the Hong Kong affair - he was in for a huge surprise.

His first clue was that no one met the aircraft when he returned. Captain Omholt speculated that this was a sign that the event simply wasn't regarded as being important, he'd seen that before. Captain Omholt was a member of the union safety committee; he was surprised that another member of the union safety committee didn't meet the aircraft.

The following day, Captain Omholt prepared his mandatory "Irregularity Report." He was careful to ensure that it was the Air Micronesia form, as opposed to Continental Airlines, Inc. When he turned it in, the supervisor requested that the statement be modified so that attention wasn't called to the crew fatigue matter.

While Captain Omholt was opposed to the fatigue issue getting buried - again - Captain Omholt knew that it wasn't a minor request. The statement was changed to read, ".... to maximize safety, I requested Captain Menefee... ." The statement was honest, but not detailed. Captain Omholt knew something was wrong and that it would be in his best interests for survival to be the "team player." The request turned out to be part of a trap, rescuing Continental at Captain Omholt's expense.

Without being specific, the supervisor acknowledged that he knew of the many 'irregularities' which had taken place on the associated charter flight from Hong Kong to Hanoi, in the shadow of Flight 985.

Lost salary being a common concern, as a reflex, Captain Omholt pulled up his crew record on the computer to document his flying time. To his surprise, the record was complete and accurate. However it also showed that the company had illegally forced him to fly into his seventh consecutive day of duty. That wasn't particularly uncommon, but incriminating documentation was not normally available.

Approximately half an hour later, Captain Omholt decided to print an additional copy of his crew record - this time, it had been changed! The record had been falsified to show a reserve day as being a legal rest break, defeating the reality that he'd been flown into his seventh day of duty. With the accurate copy in hand, Captain Omholt wasn't worried as to his ability to document the facts.

Unknown to Captain Omholt, the record change was a falsification amounting to a felony under Title 18.

Captain Omholt's biggest surprise was that the record hadn't been falsified earlier. Now he had hard evidence of the record falsification. Knowing what he did about Continental's scheduling practices and the FAA indifference to the crew rest issue, Captain Omholt didn't think that much of the situation. He reasoned that if anything went wrong, he had the necessary leverage to assist any political problems he encountered. It wasn't to work out that way.

Trying to create a political posture, Captain Omholt advised scheduling that he was ready to fly, hoping a light-weight trip was the worst case. Captain Omholt was stressed, but knew that Continental had no time for tired pilots. Crew fatigue ranked with UFOs; whatever the reality, intelligent people knew better than to make a report. Captain Omholt didn't want the company to fear any adverse reaction on his part by raising the fatigue issue. He reasoned that volunteering to fly would send a welcome message to management. His batting average was rapidly worstening.

Originally, he was assigned a flight, then he was abruptly pulled off the schedule. His supervisor advised him that he'd done more than his share and would be taken off the schedule until his almost immediate (requested) transfer back to the mainland. Approximately three days later, The Air Micronesia chief pilot held a joint debriefing of the incident. Nothing significant appeared to be at issue. Captain Omholt was advised that the Continental safety people actually applauded his decision to utilize the deadheading captain, however unorthodox.

Captain Omholt spent his last week on Guam packing for the trip home, having been granted his transfer. However, he'd been advised that to appease the FAA, he had been assigned to "Error Management School," an extended portion of Crew Resource Management (CRM).

Captain Omholt was unable to sleep properly. His emotions strangely cycled from a strange sense of helplessness to rage. As a Viet Nam veteran, he recognized the symptoms. He tried to shrug them off as being baseless and irrational, yet they persisted. He was experiencing a bizarre sense of betrayal. History would later make the underlying cause of the reaction quite plain. Something within Captain Omholt sensed a reality which defied conscious articulation. A base fear was at work, causing its own bewilderment. It would take history to explain what he sensed.

When Captain Omholt returned to the mainland, following the Hong Kong incident, he was inexplicably denied his requested days-off, granted by the union contract. Instead, he was immediately scheduled for the extended Crew Resource Management class, referred to as "Error Management." He was also scheduled for a simulator checkride with no practice periods. Something was clearly wrong.

Captain Omholt left Guam, traveling via Los Angeles, to Newark, his new base. Upon arrival, he was scheduled for the class.

When Captain Omholt reported for the Newark "Error Management" class, he discovered that it had been cancelled, requiring him to commute from Newark back to his home in Seattle for a very few days off, then to Houston for the same class plus the simulator checkride. The associated jet-lag was adding to the stress factor.

By this time, Captain Omholt was keenly aware that the March flying, the Hong Kong incident and the commuting was taking a heavy toll.

Captain Omholt had protested that he was too stressed and tired to take the checkride; complaining to management and union alike - no result. Captain Omholt advised all persons involved that his fatigued and stressed condition left him unfit to take the checkride. His appeals were useless.

Unfortunately for Captain Omholt, one of his bags had failed to arrive from Guam; the bag held his company manuals, among other important papers. When he got to Houston, Captain Omholt had to borrow a manual to prepare for the checkride. To his horror, he discovered that a major portion had been changed. While similar in most respects, important details had been changed, leaving him poorly prepared for the checkride.

Per his predictions, he failed the simulator checkride - badly. Captain Omholt feared it was destined to be the legendary "trap checkride which check airmen swore never happened. People with an ounce of sense know that such things do happen. This was one such event. Politics aside, Captain Omholt wasn't physically and mentally prepared for the demand. Fearing repercussions from the company and the FAA, he made the mistake of trusting too much. In 20/20 hindsight, he should have gone to a doctor who would have probably quickly diagnosed the chronic stress, prescribing appropriate time off. From his training in the area of aviation safety, Captain Omholt was aware of that option, yet he was more afraid of its repercussions.

Following his failed checkride, he was then denied the re-training specified in the union contract; instead he was mysteriously sent home and later assigned to the Employee Assistance Program for a fitness-for-duty evaluation with no reasonable cause. The union refused to intervene. Lacking any support or information, the tension mounted. His appeals for company executive and union intervention failed.

In essence, the company was making the statement that they thought there was some kind of medical or mental problem involved with the Hong Kong incident. Against the obvious fatigue and stress involved with the Hong Kong incident, the travel and commuting, the company agenda was obviously politically driven. The union refused to intervene. The stress only got worse.

By placing Captain Omholt under the authority of the Employee Assistance Program, they automatically qualified him for protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Later, Captain Omholt discovered that the pertinent portion of the ADA law was worth far less than the paper it was printed on. This was going to become an issue of discrimination with no protection, despite the laws.

Captain Omholt reported to the first psychologist, having no idea what to expect. He anticipated an interview, possibly an IQ test, the infamous MMPI test was reasonable to expect.

Instead, he ran into a battery of "neuropsychological" tests he couldn't imagine. The result was a scathing denunciation of his 'cognitive ability.' The suggestion was that overnight, he lacked the ability to relate connected ideas, identify or distinguish objects and their relationship, relative motions, etc. It would seem that after thirty years of flying, a single flight had erased his capacity to safely fly an aircraft. PURE RUBBISH!

[later in a second round of testing, Dr. Robert Elliot (a second contract professional for CAL) supported Captain Omholt's position by stating that it was his belief that the sum of fatigue and stress effected the failed checkride. Ironically, Dr. Elliot had been one of the forces behind the grounding of stunt pilot, Bob Hoover. Captain Omholt was unaware of that history until nearly three years later.]

The psychological test results were inconsistent with Captain Omholt's known history as an amateur graphic artist. While his freehand ability wasn't that of an artist, Captain Omholt used an enhanced drafting and tracing technique to produce graphic images which are typically regarded as nothing less than impressive. Such did not speak to any actual cognitive failing worthy of discussion. Unfortunately, this was a political arena; reality had no pertinence.

Following the first examination, Captain Omholt was forced to consider the idea that the test results might be factual. Thus, he went back to his drawing board to produce more line-art imagery in the immediate time frame of the testing. The results were better than he'd done before; granted his motivation to excel was high. Still, he produced the images without any major effort.

The imagery demonstrated the fact that there was no significant deficiency or deviation in his actual cognitive ability. A prudent person would be quickly left to question the true scientific validity of such tests. Unknown to Captain Omholt, the grounded stunt pilot, Bob Hoover's, defense team had done just that. Money and politics could produce any result desired.

A recent book on the grounding of Bob Hoover leaves no doubt that the tests can yield highly selective results, driven by political winds. It was from that book that Captain Omholt appreciated Dr. Elliot's role.

In the same time frame of the first fitness-for-duty examinations, the FAA initiated the insane violation proceedings against Captain Omholt in connection with CS-985. Neither the fitness-for-duty examination or the violation proceedings had any reasonable cause; the actions did have obvious political motivation. By initiating the fitness-for-duty examination series, the terms of the union contract were selectively ignored by management and the union alike.

Captain Omholt was totally bewildered. In the Hong Kong incident, his decision was very carefully thought out - to the best of his ability, based upon his knowledge of the FAA regulations (FARs) and the company policies and procedures. His decision was not in any way irrational. Captain Omholt stayed in the seat and fought the Hong Kong situation for approximately an hour-and-a-half. Repeated crewmember statements clearly and accurately corroborated that fact.

Captain Omholt was shocked at the collective reaction of the company, FAA and the union. In the Hong Kong incident, he was convinced that the first officer had to be tired himself. With low fuel, a slippery runway, crosswind and reported windshear ahead, a maximum of safety was needed in no uncertain terms. Captain Omholt was dealing with the old Hong Kong airport, famous for its inherent danger.

Later, a fatal MD-11 accident at the new Hong Kong airport additionally attested to the validity of Captain Omholt's reasoning and the value of CRM. That accident didn't have an associated mechanical emergency.

Captain Omholt was well aware of the requirements of the company policies. In the Operations Manual, the directive language was clear -

Action By Pilot

The pilot will take any action that he considers necessary for safety, including use of his Emergency Authority. He will request any assistance that he desires from the Company or ATC and will, as far as possible, coordinate his course of action with the dispatcher.

[This was a mandate; not an option. His crew was unable to get as much as alternate airport weather info out of company Hong Kong operations. Expecting to establish contact with the company dispatcher was naive under the circumstances. Further, Captain Omholt and his crew were desperately short of time. Until the aircraft was on short final, the situation continued to go from bad to worse.]

INTRODUCTION

The flight crews, and specifically the Captains of Continental Airlines are charged with evaluating the unique circumstances affecting each flight and applying their experience and initiative to meet the corporate objectives. The procedures and information provided in this manual are tools to aid the crews in this decision making process. While some of the information reflects regulatory requirements, at no time are crews bound to any procedure which may compromise the primary and overriding objective of safety. A Captain is expected to use his/her emergency authority if necessary to ensure the safety of customers, crew and cargo. Safety is the single objective which cannot be compromised.

[The safety mandate and authority were quite clear.]

EMERGENCY AUTHORITY OF CAPTAIN AND DISPATCHER

Captain

In an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action, the Pilot-in-Command may take any action that he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such a case he may deviate from prescribed operations procedures and methods, weather minimums, and the provisions of FAR, to the extent required in the interest of safety.

The unsolicited and independent remarks of the first and second officers in their written statements tell an interesting truth:

FIRST OFFICER - WILLIAM LYKINS:

"In conclusion, regarding the case of Captain Omholt leaving the cockpit, I believe it was a wise and courageous effort on his part to ensure the safety of the aircraft by utilizing all his resources. He obviously realized at some point that he was fatigued so he called upon his resources, Captain Menefee, to assist him. I respect the decision that Captain Omholt made given these difficult circumstances."

SECOND OFFICER - CHRIS URQUIETA:

"I did not object to the captain's decision to involve the deadhead crew in the final phases of our flight. Specifically, I think the captain made an excellent decision (as any good captain would do) to utilize all the resources available to him to insure a positive outcome to the situation. His decision to utilize the other crew was a selfless CRM decision that provided excellent back up to the flying crew and enhanced the safety of the aircraft by providing extra eyes and support in a high stress situation. In my opinion, his decision was a product of our CRM training and an excellent CRM example."

These remarks were unsolicited and made prior to the initiation of the "fitness-for-duty" process. Captain Omholt knew the risks involved and was well prepared for the expected range of events.

SAFETY SYSTEMS ONLY WORK IF YOU USE THEM! CAPTAIN OMHOLT'S TEAM DID; IT WORKED.

The Hong Kong event was an excellent CRM example worthy of a classroom - not a hearing or courtroom. Captain Omholt reminded everyone involved:

Relinquishing command to a more qualified captain is an FAA approved procedure in the Continental Operations Manual.

In Continental Flight Operations Manual -

Note:

Any Captain who is aboard the flight and is current and qualified on the aircraft and is not restricted to "High Minimums" [cloud ceiling and visibility], may be designated Pilot-in-Command if the weather conditions are or anticipated to be below the [weather] minimums of the scheduled Captain. Such action will only, be taken upon agreement between Dispatch and the new Captain and the flight must be re-released noting the change of Captains. This may be done in flight. The new Captain will occupy the left seat.

[Why would this procedure not be utilized in an emergency? CAPTAIN OMHOLT'S CREW COULDN'T GET THE REQUIRED WEATHER OUT OF THE COMPANY HONG KONG OPS; IT WAS ACADEMIC THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONTACT THE DISPATCHER.]

Again, the Hong Kong event was a function of poor maintenance (The Guam pilots were told due to parts shortages due to the changeover from manual to computerized control), adverse weather, unacceptable communications and crew fatigue, not pilot competence, nor pilot error.

Further -

Seat-switching was a relatively common practice at Continental. It was essentially done under the authority of FAR 121.545. The FAR only requires that the pilot be qualified under Continental training standards.

Seat-switching was routinely done in the case of:

1. Training flights. Commonly, a qualified FAA inspector or qualified second officer is allowed to fly the aircraft from the left seat for currency.

2. Relief pilots. To extend flight time, an augmented flight crew is utilized. It is common for the relief pilot to be granted the left or right seat for the entire flight for currency and proficiency. Captain Omholt had personally been part of such crews. Regulations and policies aside, his decision was a practical one.

3. Commuters. A pilot going to work will often trade out an entire flight segment with another pilot who was going into days-off (illegal, but practical). According to his recent conversations with friends (shortly after the Hong Kong incident), Captain Omholt discovered that the practice was also so common domestically that the company proposed the procedure as an official policy, as it would obviously otherwise constitute falsification of flight records. According to Captain Omholt's information, the only requirement would be to notify Scheduling of the switch so that they could accurately track pilot location and flight time. While unorthodox, it was a practical procedure. In the time frame of Captain Omholt's Hong Kong incident, this was a common practice in Honolulu, particularly with Guam crews. However, obviously, to do so without scheduling's notification and approval resulted in falsification of FAA records.

4. A check-airman flying with an appropriately type-rated first officer.

5. An appropriately type-rated high time Captain stepping in for a low time Captain in low weather conditions.

Given the ciccumstances, neither Captain Omholt nor Captain Menefee would have dared to fly the Hong Kong approach. The first officer had to fly all the approaches, as the captain's instruments and radios were not reliable due to the original electrical problem and subsequent failures - further and clearly evidenced by the aircraft being returned to Guam under the authority of a maintenance ferry permit, the next day.

Passionately distorting the context of these events can't change the reality that Captain Omholt's crew was faced with. Again, his crew never endangered anyone. They all followed procedure and exercised the best of their judgement, effecting a safe conclusion.

Given the company, union and FAA reactions, Captain Omholt knew that his situation was desperate, although he didn't understand why.

Following the Hong Kong incident, Captain Omholt took it upon himself to research the peripheral issues. He talked to two NTSB investigators and an NTSB Administrative Law Judge in Washington, D.C. all of whom independently told him that if there had been an accident, crew fatigue would have been cited as a primary cause. The same individuals were kind enough to send him copies of the NASA crew fatigue studies. These reports validated his claim of fatigue in no uncertain terms.

Had he not made the decision he did, the "fitness-for-duty" action would have been appropriate. Had there been an accident without his decisions, there would have been a violation. Conceivably, Captain Omholt could have been arrested in Hong Kong if an accident had occurred.

Strangely, no one questioned why Continental management selectively refused to accept the seriousness of the Hong Kong incident relative to the need for the seat-switch decision as a prudent safety measure, consistent with company emergency procedures and Crew Resource Management (CRM) standards (1. Stabilize the aircraft. 2. Use all available resources. 3. Land as soon as possible.).

In the company's historic evasion of the crew fatigue issue, it was well known that two other Continental fatigue incidents resulted in totally incapacitated pilots - in flight. (No records are likely to be found.)

It should be noted also that CRM failures were the ultimate cause of past and recent accidents. The fatalities are tragic testimony to CRM failures. Despite the universal teaching of CRM, it is apparent by the continuing incidents and accidents, fatal and otherwise, that corporate cultures have an overriding effect. In Captain Omholt's Hong Kong incident, CRM made a life-death difference. The application of CRM saved lives. Unfortunately, success stories are rarely either recorded or given official attention.

In a recent event, the success of CRM on Continental's Flight 60 on the 25th of April, 2000 should also be noted. To be brief, the aircraft had one engine violently come apart, nearly taking out the other two engines and a hydraulic system, during takeoff. While normal procedure called for the shutting down of the first engine, good judgement and CRM prevailed, again effecting a saving of lives. The crew used all their resources, stayed close to the airport, stabilized the situation, landing as soon as possible. In that instance, the NTSB noted the success of the CRM role.

In the Hong Kong incident, if Captain Omholt's fitness-for-duty had been a valid question, Captain Omholt should have been grounded in Hong Kong. By coincidence of the associated charter flight, a spare crew was available for such a replacement. However, his crew had no objections to his judgement at any time, never protesting his judgement or ability, even on the return flight to Guam. Their written statements clearly reflect that fact.

Conversely, again, Captain Omholt was illegally scheduled the very next day to fly the charter aircraft loaded with passengers from Hong Kong to Saipan; and another from Saipan to Guam.

Captain Omholt's treatment just didn't make sense. Captain Omholt was too keenly aware of a batch of serious FAA violations which had taken place in conjunction with the charter flight to Hanoi. He also knew that the company was equally aware of the events.

Captain Omholt was aware that scheduling later falsified his crew record to make his return flight to Guam appear to be legal. However, he only recently learned that not only was the falsification an FAR violation, but a felony as well.

In the brief conversation with the union attorney (April 1997), Captain Omholt advised him of the falsification, advising him also that he possessed the associated documentation. In retrospect, Captain Omholt failed to understand why the attorney didn't react to that information. As an attorney, he must have immediately recognized the felony. Captain Omholt advised the attorney that he had left a copy of some of the documentation with the union president, illustrating the falsification. There was no union reaction.

Common sense dictates that if there had been the slightest doubt as to Captain Omholt's suitability to continue, the company should have at least required him to fly the broken aircraft back to Guam on the maintenance ferry permit, as opposed to flying two passenger flights. For all obvious reasons, there was no doubt as to his ability or judgement - until much later; and then for no rational or valid reason.

Conversely, Captain Omholt has always been mystified as to why the union didn't hold the company accountable for the actual and serious FAR breaches which took place in the immediate periphery of his Hong Kong incident. These occurred in connection with the charter flight and the ferry permit flight. These irregularities were discussed a meeting with union president, Len Nikolai and vice president, Bill Borrelli in late April of 1997.

In the interest of being a 'teamplayer,' Captain Omholt made it a point to keep the following information in a low-profile status:

Following the CS-985 landing in Hong Kong, the contract mechanics assessment of the generator problem was that Guam maintenance had failed to disconnect the No. 1 generator, per the company maintenance procedure. Consequently, the Hong Kong (contract) mechanics concluded that the No. 1 generator was back-feeding voltage into the electrical system, causing the ILS receiver failures.

Hong Kong contract maintenance switched the No. 1 Generator Control Unit with that of the identical unit on the Auxiliary Power Unit generator & reported that the generator problem was fixed. However, they had not tested the generator reliability with respect to the original air-ground logic problem.

Based on their assumptions, the Hong Kong mechanics signed off both the generator problem and the ILS problem, given their ability to receive the correct ILS identification signal, with a reasonable instrument needle indication. (During the initial approach phase into Hong Kong, Captain Omholt's crew also got normal indications.)

Captain Omholt's first officer indicated that based on his discussions with the Hong Kong contract mechanics, in the captain's absence, that the mechanics were not properly trained on the DC-10, as he felt that they clearly did not understand the DC-10 systems.

Knowing the first officer's experience on the DC-10 and trusting his first officer's judgement, being consistent with his own, Captain Omholt refused to accept the aircraft until Hong Kong maintenance tested the ILS with the appropriate sophisticated ground test equipment.

The Continental (contract) mechanics protested, as they said it would take up to 6 hours to get access to the test equipment - indicating their lack of ability, hence raising further concern as to their FAA certification validity as a contract maintenance company. Subsequently, they did test the ILS components, reporting a failed ILS receiver and the common control unit which operated both ILS receivers on Continental's "-10" series aircraft.

Consequently, for lack of parts (indicative of the basic problem by itself), the aircraft was grounded and returned to Guam on a maintenance ferry permit, coordinated with Houston Maintenance the following evening. The broken aircraft was flown back to Guam by the captain of the associated Hanoi charter and his crew.

Captain Omholt flew the aircraft originally assigned to the Hanoi charter on the passenger flight, with his original crew - back to Guam, via Saipan, the following evening, as flight CS-5986 - again, an "Air Mike" flight.

To repeat, the return flight to Guam was illegally assigned as it required Captain Omholt to fly into his 7th day of duty. Based on past experience, Captain Omholt took the flight on the assumption that scheduling would retroactively declare his last two reserve days as a rest period. Captain Omholt didn't expect to be able to document the falsification. The reality was that on the 22nd & 23rd of March, Captain Omholt was scheduled for & stood reserve days, on those dates, with no flight assignments. Legally, he did not have the mandatory one-in-seven day off. While flight time can be extended, the 'one-in-seven' requirement cannot; hence the falsification. FAA legal interpretations are clear on that distinction.

Following his return to Guam, on the 27th of March, scheduling retroactively did change the referenced time frame to a "break" status, thereby falsifying the record. Multiple FAA legal interpretations state that reserve status is not a legal rest period. Only recently did Captain Omholt discover that such a falsification is also a felony. These events are well documented.

Following the Hong Kong affair, no safety investigation committee talked to Captain Omholt or his crew, contrary to the investigating procedures listed in the company Operations Manual. Two days after the affair, Captain Omholt's second officer finally succeeded in getting through to the union on the 1-800 line - to one of the union secretaries. She said she'd relay the information. One has to quickly ask, "Why did no one from the union office contact them?"

With respect to the arbitrary FAA action, the Houston FAA office and the Southwest Region totally ignored FAR 121.627, which AUTOMATICALLY invoked the emergency authority provision [FAR 121.557] - PRIOR TO THE CREW REACHING HONG KONG AIRSPACE! With no procedurally legal authority, the FAA moved to violate Captain Omholt for getting out of his seat in flight and for careless & reckless operation!

The documentation is clear that following the flight attendant briefing, Captain Omholt immediately returned to the cockpit, participating as a crewmember in full concert with Captain Menefee.

The FAA procedures and policies specified that the particular FAA office (Southwest Region) couldn't legally originate, request or maintain jurisdiction in the matter, due to their pre-existing and then-current complicity.

In their complaint against Captain Omholt, the FAA Southwest Region cited the details, clearly amounting to an emergency condition, distorted the events, then took FAR 121.543 (FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS AT CONTROLS) severely out of context - treating a partial sentence as an independent regulation. FAA procedures and NTSB legal precedents prohibit that. Criminal law prohibits them from knowingly and willfully relying on false information. Captain Omholt repeatedly informed the FAA of the facts, complete with citation of the appropriate documentation.

In their allegations, the FAA began by describing the emergency underway, distorted the facts, then selectively ignored obvious details of the emergency, totally bypassing the beginning of the cited regulation, "Except as provided in paragraph (b) ....." Even in the absence of an emergency, paragraph (b), and the associated FAA legal interpretation, permits the action taken.

With a cockpit full of pilots, Captain Omholt needed to leave his seat to brief the flight attendants, at a minimum. That action was legal, independently of the emergency.

1. Captain Omholt's actions were totally within the confines of FAA regulations and the company policies and procedures - without exception.

2. This was evidenced by the attempted FAA violation clutching at straws by utilizing part of a sentence as an independent regulation. Their legal policies & procedures prohibit that strategy; as does criminal law.

3. A 1989 FAA Legal Interpretation clarifies the legality of Captain Omholt's action - independently of the emergency authority provisions of the FAA regulations.

4. The NASA studies (Dr. Mark Rosekind) substantiate Captain Omholt's claim of fatigue.

5. The last captain who relinquished aircraft control to a better qualified captain received a Presidential Citation. This was Captain Al Haynes, of the United 232 crash in Sioux City. Captain Omholt's decision was modeled after his action; his decision was not at all bizarre, unique nor unprecedented; it successfully guaranteed the safety of those on board and on the ground.

Captain Omholt appropriately maintains that if anyone's family had been on board, they would have personally thanked him for his decisions.

Relative to the FAA violation proceedings, Captain Omholt agreed with the union attorney that it was foolish to make the proverbial rush-to-judgement, strangely, no one tried to negotiate the total dropping of the violation in the meantime.

The Hong Kong affair was the result of a winter-long maintenance problem which occurred on the watch of the FAA, while the company was declaring one record-breaking profit after another.

Following the Hong Kong incident, the union president recommended that Captain Omholt elect to utilize the union General Counsel to handle the FAA action against him. Ignorant of the political reality, Captain Omholt agreed to do so.

Between a brief personal conversation with the union attorney in April, 1997 and the filing of the violation, Captain Omholt could not discover any support from the union, nor the attorney. Worse, in a phone conversation with the attorney, the union attorney would make the statement that Captain Omholt could not use his emergency authority as a defense.

Having already made the choice of the union attorney, Captain Omholt was shocked at the union attorney's response. Here his own attorney was telling him that emergency authority could not be used in an undeniable emergency. Something was clearly wrong. Hence, Captain Omholt complained to union president, Len Nikolai and the vice president, Bill Borrelli in a letter in October of 1997. Captain Omholt complained that the union attorney hadn't as much as interviewed anyone, while their memories were still fresh. Obviously, that was an elementary part of any information gathering process.

Captain Omholt complained of his treatment to the company president, Gordon Bethune and executive C.D. McClean. He cited the failure of the union attorney to respond to requests for help. Captain Omholt requested company legal assistance - no answer.

Beyond company policy, history and the union contract, Captain Omholt should have been given support per the American's with Disabilities Act - forget it!

Captain Omholt subsequently received a call on the second of December from the union attorney angrily discounting him for his complaint regarding his lack of support of Captain Omholt's situation with the company and the FAA violation.

The union's General Counsel started out in that phone conversation on December 2nd, in anger, claiming that Captain Omholt's brief casual conversation with him on the Hong Kong incident (earlier in April) constituted the interview which Captain Omholt protested the lack thereof. It is moot that a casual conversation does not constitute a formal interview.

Captain Omholt later pointed out to the union that any first year law student will tell you that an attorney's interview is a detailed written document; there is still none. To the best of Captain Omholt's knowledge, there was no interview with any of the crew members by the union attorney. Why? Where was the legal / union support? Elementary legal ethics demand a 'zealous defense' by an attorney.

When Captain Omholt later requested a copy of the assigned (contract) attorney's defense argument to the FAA, that attorney replied that there was none. He'd only had a few phone conversations with the FAA attorney, regarding Captain Omholt's defense. The creation of such documentation is elementary by any standard - why was it never accomplished by the attorney???

The union General Counsel also insisted that in the same brief casual conversation in late April, 1997, that his statement that he generally didn't recommend responding to the FAA Letter of Investigation (LOI) constituted an implied agreement on Captain Omholt's part to the same idea - it obviously didn't constitute approval, evidenced by Captain Omholt's previous questions and protests to his unilateral action and a phone call by Captain Omholt, which was made as the LOI response window was about to close.

When Captain Omholt didn't hear from the union attorney after faxing him a copy of the FAA's preliminary Letter of Investigation (LOI), in May, 1997, Captain Omholt called the union office twice, knowing the response window was about to close. The attorney was out of the office, but the secretary relayed to Captain Omholt, the attorney's sentiments that given the April date of the letter, it was too late to respond anyway. Consequently, Captain Omholt protested the matter to union president, Len Nikolai. The reply response window was based on the date of the signature of service; not the date of the letter. The union attorney didn't extend even the courtesy of a personal phone call to Captain Omholt. Further, he made no attempt to request an extension, which the FAA will normally grant, hoping to 'get lucky,' by obtaining incriminating information.

When the union attorney was informed of Captain Omholt's outrage, per his complaint to Len Nikolai, the attorney couldn't bring himself to apologize. Captain Omholt only received a letter with a cursory explanation from the attorney that he didn't recommend responding to the FAA Letter of Investigation.

As an attorney, it wasn't his prerogative to make such unilateral decisions. He obviously may advise against it; documenting his advice. For the most part, Captain Omholt agreed with him. However, in this case, Captain Omholt wanted to set the stage by putting it on record that the event was a bone fide emergency, embodying the appropriate use of his emergency authority.

Under the chronic stress of the whole Hong Kong situation, Captain Omholt failed to mail the NASA ASRS report in time (Which theoretically should have precluded a violation action.) Later, it would be clear that FAA tactics would have defeated it's intended purpose.

In Captain Omholt's last phone conversation with the union General Counsel on the 2nd of December 1997, the attorney persisted that the FAA's bypassing of the emergency authority provision [FAR 121.557] shouldn't be in question as Captain Omholt's flying competence was under review.

Captain Omholt's flying competence had nothing to do with the matter!

It quickly became apparent that the union attorney didn't have any significant depth of knowledge of the Hong Kong events - after eight months. He was apparently oblivious to the fact that Captain Omholt's crew had an actual and undeniable emergency under way. It can now be questioned whether or not he WANTED to know any facts.

The attorney was also obviously unaware (selectively or otherwise) that the electrical problem mandated that the first officer had to fly all approaches due to the mechanical failures. Captain Omholt's competence to fly the approach was never a factor.

In his written protest to union president Len Nikolai, vice president Bill Borelli and the IACP (union) Board of Directors, Captain Omholt questioned why the union attorney persisted in playing judge & jury instead of Captain Omholt's defense attorney. There was never an answer to those protests.

Later, the same union attorney quietly left the union's employ; unbeknownst to Captain Omholt. When it first became apparent that the union attorney didn't want to present a defense based on the emergency authority, Captain Omholt contacted the legal offices of ALPA National Headquarters for a solution. ALPA attorney, Jim Johnson, advised Captain Omholt that they couldn't represent him in any capacity, but agreed that the emergency authority was probably the best defense. Mr. Johnson cited the existence of many NTSB precedents to that effect. Captain Omholt obtained copies of those precedents; Johnson's position was quite accurate.

It is still worth questioning why the union, particularly the attorney couldn't find the interest or the time to discuss the event with Captain Omholt long enough to come to that same conclusion. As of the last contact, the union attorney's tone was evasive-to-hostile. Why?

Revisiting the company's institution of the fitness-for-duty examination, through the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), following the Hong Kong incident -

In the December 2nd, 1997 phone conversation with the union attorney, Captain Omholt informed the attorney that the FAA inspector, Nat Potter, had also somehow secured the confidential medical information of the EAP "fitness-for-duty" examination, and had relayed the information to the FAA Aeromedical section to effect a review / suspension of Captain Omholt's medical certificate. This would have occurred in approximately August of 1997. In the December phone conversation, the union attorney asked Captain Omholt to temporarily keep that information between the two of them. Captain Omholt agreed, clearly effecting attorney-client confidentiality.

In his next conversation with the directoress of the Employee Assistance Program, two weeks later, she informed Captain Omholt that she already knew from a union official, that Captain Omholt was upset over the issue. Until then, Captain Omholt had kept the issue to himelf. The information had to have come from the attorney.

It was nothing less than shocking for Captain Omholt to discover that he had been betrayed by the attorney. Perhaps Captain Omholt was being purely na�ve by then. Captain Omholt sent letters, questioning the union and its board of directors as to how that happened; there was no reply.

Captain Omholt advised the union leadership that as a result of the December 2nd phone conversation with the union attorney, he had subsequently received a letter from the attorney, officially stating his position on the case.

In that letter the attorney took the opportunity to belittle Captain Omholt by citing his concerns as to his own conduct, stating, "I will not reiterate, ad nauseum, my refutation of your contentions."

The immediate question was obvious -

What kind of attorney belittles his client - in writing?

Thousands of pilots joined Captain Omholt in paying his wages in the form of union dues! The pilots didn't pay for his ego.

The situation had reached the point of being totally bizarre.

By the terms of the union contract, Captain Omholt passed the first "fitness-for-duty" examination in July of 1997. However, a second examination was ordered in December of 1997, again with no reasonable cause. Captain Omholt protested its continuation, only to receive union lip-service in the spirit of "Be nice." "Don't ask; don't tell." "Don't worry; be happy."

Despite Captain Omholt's protests by phone to union officials, the union attorney attempted only one return call. When Captain Omholt called back, he was informed that the attorney wasn't available. Captain Omholt sent him back a fax pleading for his help; he heard nothing further from him on the matter - or any other.

One union official advised Captain Omholt that he had personally appealed to the EAP office directoress to accept the flight surgeon's written conclusion that Captain Omholt was NOT unfit for flight duty. He also illustrated that the FAA itself had just issued Captain Omholt's First Class Airman's Certificate. She was previously aware of the Medical Certificate issuance from a phone conversation with Captain Omholt.

The directoress responded by stating that Captain Omholt's Newark base supervisor insisted on a repeat examination, based on his (unauthorized) knowledge of part of the first examination which questioned Captain Omholt's cognitive ability. That supervisor, of all people, was well aware of Captain Omholt's abilities as an amateur graphic artist; he'd seen and admired some of his work.

Two obvious questions came to the forefront:

1. Contrary to the union contract and company policies, why were the contents of Captain Omholt's medical records being passed around management and the FAA?

2. Why wasn't an investigation or legal action initiated by either the company or the union?

While the union attorney stated the opinion that "reasonable cause" in the "fitness-for-duty" matter was a subjective definition, it was immediately worth questioning why the union's subjective definition didn't challenge the company's subjective definition in court - if necessary, visiting the obvious issues:

1. How was the "fitness-for-duty" examination warranted, as there was no bone-fide "reasonable cause." Captain Omholt stayed in his seat for nearly an hour and a half during the Hong Kong incident before requesting assistance from Captain Menefee. Again, Captain Omholt's schedule (105 hours flown in 25 days) and the emergency itself clearly attest to the reasonableness of his actions. With respect to the fatigue issue, there was no effective difference between whether a pilot becomes fatigued or ill.

Captain Omholt's actions were not the least bit unprecedented, evidenced by the United-232 accident. Again, it is appropriate to note that the crew on that flight was given a Presidential Citation.

2. There was no wrong-doing of any sort. This was further evidenced by the desperate nature of the FAA allegations.

3. All actions were consistent with the FARs and company policies, endorsed by the FAA.

4. The "fitness-for-duty" evaluations additionally violated the union contract by virtue of its exceeding FAA Part 67 (medical certification) standards.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement forbade the company from holding any pilot to a standard higher than the FAA Part 67 standards. They had been beyond that standard in Captain Omholt's case from the beginning. While the union was repeatedly informed of this, there was no assistance that Captain Omholt could determine. Everyone Captain Omholt talked to seemed content to facilitate the company's actions; why??

Why did the union make no effort to stop the company from sending Captain Omholt to an alcohol treatment center, when it was no secret that he didn't drink - at all. (Captain Omholt didn't drink, having witnessed his mother's alcohol related death over twenty-five years prior).

Despite his protests, no one made any reasonable effort to stop the company from sending Captain Omholt to the Baltimore alcohol/drug clinic "for evaluation." That act was pure harassment by itself. Why didn't the union intervene when Captain Omholt so loudly protested the event? There was no reasonable basis for it. Further, it constituted blatant harassment.

To examine that action:

In the final Medical evaluation, in the summer of 1997, the company selected flight surgeon stated that he did not find Captain Omholt unfit for flight duty, though he raised the possibility of alcoholism, admittedly (and mysteriously) based on non-fasting bloodwork. The bloodwork showed a high red-cell count (stress). The report also cited a high glucose level from Captain Omholt having eaten breakfast - this was identified in the same report from supporting hematology indicators. As a minimum, the bloodwork should have been repeated under fasting conditions.

The alcohol issue was quickly cleared in early July,1997 which should have ended the entire question. Further, the psychiatrist at the alcohol clinic tested Captain Omholt for gross cognitive ability and discovered no problem, which she stated in her report to the company. The psychiatrist's medical report should have been the final say on the matter.

Having ruled-out alcoholism and any pertinent cognitive disability, Captain Omholt should have been put back to work. Instead, in July 1997, the EAP directoress advised Captain Omholt that his medical certificate had been suspended. The statement was self-incriminating, as Captain Omholt had not been notified of any such action. The FAA is normally quite expedient in such matters.

Further, her statement was made in the same time frame that FAA inspector, Nat Potter, had secretly sent a telephone report to the FAA Aeromedical section distorting the details of Captain Omholt's confidential company medical records. The subsequent telephone memo not only cited information from the confidential records, but the company's plans for Captain Omholt, in regard to further examination. This was the same memo which was protested to the union attorney. How did the directoress know or even suspect the suspension at that particular date (July, 1997) In retrospect, it's na�ve to assume that she was in any way ignorant of the underhanded politics.

Approximately four months later, the Seattle FAA Aeromedical Office itself initiated an investigation of the matter and subsequently issued Captain Omholt's medical certificate on 10 Dec, 1997. Therefore, having met the Part 67 standards (medical & mental), this issue should have been totally and completely dropped and Captain Omholt should have been immediately put back to work.

The obvious question lingered. Why did the union NOT intervene with the original or continued evaluation process in December of 1997? There was absolutely no valid reason for any of it!

To date, beyond the initial investigation of the Hong Kong incident by the Guam Chief Pilot's Office, no flight supervisor has made any attempt to hear Captain Omholt's side of the incident. Captain Omholt's new supervisor in the Newark base blatantly refused to let Captain Omholt tell the story. He also refused Captain Omholt's request for time off to rest prior to his failed simulator checkride in April of 1997. Again, as a minimum, Captain Omholt was entitled to the time off by virtue of his transfer out of Guam - per the union contract.

Captain Omholt reported the refusal of time off to one union official who advised him to take the checkride anyway and sort it out later. Fearing the unknown, Captain Omholt decided that it might be politically expedient to comply.

Captain Omholt had previously requested time-off relative to his transfer from Guam to Newark; his requests were routed through Houston and Guam scheduling and the Guam Chief Pilot's Office; they were never answered, contrary to the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The cumulative stress and associated exhaustion of Captain Omholt's March flight schedule, the Hong Kong affair and the associated commuting had resulted in his miserably failing the assigned simulator checkride. Again, Captain Omholt was denied the consequent training specified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

For all his requests for assistance from union president Len Nikolai and vice president Bill Borrelli, since late June of 1997, Captain Omholt did achieve a response. While several individuals in the union office expressed deep sympathy for his plight, if Captain Omholt had any support beyond lip-service, he was unaware of it. Even a letter to the union Board of Directors went unanswered.

Given the documentation which clearly attests to Captain Omholt's lack of wrong-doing, why was there so little support? What support could the Continental pilots expect the union to provide for a pilot who makes a significant mistake?

Captain Omholt respectfully submitted to the union that the IACP was a union in all respects, not a tool to facilitate management's desires. Without question, morally or legally, it was the union's dedicated function to aggressively defend any pilot from actions such as these.

As a consequence of the impotent response by the union, Captain Omholt took his issues directly to Continental's upper management, starting in December 1997. One has to ask, "With a union on the property, why should any pilot be forced into shaming the devil into getting a demon off his back???"

As Captain Omholt illustrated then, the entire handling of his situation sent a clear message to the pilots as a whole that the union cannot be depended upon for reasonable support.

To date, Captain Omholt's bewilderment comes from many details hidden from view; not atypical of the FAA and the selected/protected companies.

To facilitate an effort in his own defense, in the fall of 1997, Captain Omholt appealed to the FAA's Washington National Headquarters, complaining that the Southwest Region was not doing its job properly.

By coincidence or by design, Captain Omholt had another surprise in waiting -

The FAA Southwest Region, which was processing his violation, had detailed one Tom Stuckey from the FAA Southwest Region to a temporary assignment to the FAA's Washington National Headquarters. Despite the criminal fraud being obviously perpetrated and an obvious conflict of interest, it was Tom Stuckey who conveniently received Captain Omholt's letter. Not surprisingly, he assigned the 'investigation' to his immediate subordinate in the Southwest Region. Yes, he had essentially directed the Region to investigate itself.

During that investigation of Captain Omholt's original complaint to Washington D.C., clear and undeniable wrong-doing , qualifying as criminal wire fraud, had been conducted by the FAA inspector which was criminally concealed by the Southwest Region. That would be revealed later.

During the FAA's processing of the violation, an "informal conference" was held in the spring of 1998 with the FAA. During that conference, one inspector cited his "rumor" that Captain Omholt only had approximately 75 total hours flying time in the DC-10, questioning Captain Omholt's claim of having flown 105 hours flown in the previous 25 days.

Captain Omholt was shocked at the question. The inspector was testifying to the fact that his 'rumor' should have led him directly to an investigation of Continental, as the flight time "rumored" would have made Captain Omholt illegal to fly into Hong Kong - considered a "special" airport for safety reasons. Hence, the inspector was admitting that he selectively evaded an investigation of Continental and was giving illegal preferential treatment to the company - in the presence of the FAA attorney.

Further, given the equipment failures cited in the violation proceedings and the informal conference, a search should have been made for sufficient factual information to lead the FAA to a set of missing Service Difficulty Reports, required by FAR 121.703, hence there was the issue of a felony for non-reporting.

There just didn't seem to be any limit as to the obvious cover-up -

IN THE PERIPHERY OF THE CS-985 INCIDENT:

A seat-switch was also effected in the case of the associated Hanoi charter flight. The deadheading captain (whom Captain Omholt put in his seat in the Hong Kong affair) was involved with that seat switch, the next day.

The deadheading captain was on board Captain Omholt's aircraft, being repositioned for the Hong Kong to Hanoi charter, departing the following day. Allegedly, another captain who was assigned to reposition the charter aircraft itself (a check-airman), told the deadheading captain's scheduled first officer that he could stay home and collect the flight pay, while he secretly flew in the capacity of first officer on the charter segment. (The charter flight was supposed to be the last Hanoi charter for Continental. The second captain [reportedly a former Viet Nam fighter pilot] wanted the honor(?) of serving on the last Hanoi charter.) This action would have resulted in multiple crew record falsifications - for starters.

To accomplish the Hanoi charter flight, the captain who repositioned the charter aircraft would have stayed awake in excess of 24 hours, violating company policy and the FARs (careless & reckless operation [FARs 91.13 & 121.537]. Allegedly, the captain scheduled for the Hanoi charter flight segment went along with the operation. During the en route portion of his flight inbound to Hong Kong, Captain Omholt was informed of the seat switch plan, as a matter of gossip.

To compound the affair, Air Micronesia scheduling discovered the problem and put another first officer on board the second charter aircraft. The substitute first officer claimed that he was not legal to accept the flight; scheduling insisted.

To make matters worse, the Air Micronesia Director of Scheduling was also on board the Hanoi charter aircraft. Although he was duly informed by the substitute first officer, he did nothing to investigate or stop the operation.

When the charter flight returned from Hanoi to Hong Kong, the substitute first officer complained bitterly to Captain Omholt that he was illegal for the flight and had so informed the Director of Scheduling - to no effect.

The charter aircraft captain, assigned to deliver the aircraft to Hong Kong, was subsequently stripped of his "check-airman" credentials for his role in the affair. This was glaring testimony in itself, as Continental had just recently put pressure on the FAA to certify two additional check airman, describing time as being of the essence.

FURTHER:

Following Captain Omholt's emergency landing in Hong Kong, Captain Omholt was pressured by several Continental departments to immediately make the return flight. Captain Omholt refused the aircraft and fought everyone involved for a correct analysis of the aircraft condition. Captain Omholt cited his fatigue as his primary reason for the flight shutdown.

Following Captain Omholt 's insistence on responsible action, the aircraft was returned to Guam the following day under the authority of a maintenance ferry permit by the charter flight crew, as the aircraft could not be repaired in Hong Kong. Captain Omholt's position was obviously quite correct.

During the arrangements for the maintenance ferry of the broken aircraft from Hong Kong back to Guam, Houston maintenance authorized transportation of the pilots who repositioned the charter aircraft, the flight attendants who worked the charter flight, the load planner, the director of Guam scheduling and two other "Air Mike" (Continental Air Micronesia) managers to ride back to Guam as passengers - even though the ferry permit clearly stated "essential flight crew only," per the FARs.

Air Mike scheduling had appropriately scheduled them to deadhead on Captain Omholt's aircraft back to Guam, Via Saipan. However, the crewmembers reasoned that the ferry flight would get them back to Guam sooner.

The Hong Kong (contract maintenance) mechanic discovered the situation and protested the operation to Captain Omholt, recognizing its illegality. Captain Omholt contacted the station manager, who agreed, but stated that he didn't have the authority to stop the flight.

The deadheading second officer from the Hanoi charter flight realized the illegal nature of the operation, returning on Captain Omholt's aircraft to avoid the illegal operation. His election was further testimony to Captain Omholt's capacity as a captain, as he was directly involved in the cockpit environment, during the emergency, the evening before. His trust in the judgement and ability of Captain Omholt was clear.

Later in Guam, Captain Omholt learned that following his departure from Hong Kong back to Guam, Houston Maintenance discovered their mistaken approval of the passengers and retracted their permission for the deadheading pilots and flight attendants to ride back on the broken aircraft. Houston maintenance finally relented, when they were informed that Captain Omholt's flight had already departed for Guam and that the company personnel could not otherwise get back to Guam for several days.

One can imagine the volume of actual FAR violations which were involved in the charter flight operation. Later, Captain Omholt's Guam supervisor stated that the company was aware of all the details involved with the charter flight and the ferry flight.

That was the same supervisor who also requested that Captain Omholt change his official statement so as not to attract undue attention to the crew fatigue issue.

Given all of the above, it is pertinent to ask how the union justifies sacrificing one captain who did nothing wrong, given the overshadowing violations just described. The union was holding nothing but trump cards to totally relieve any politics from being effected on Captain Omholt or anyone else. It was evident from the beginning that Captain Omholt was the proverbial 'team-player.'

Nine months after the Hong Kong incident, the pressure applied on Captain Omholt resulted in the abrupt onset of clinical depression. Following the diagnosis, Captain Omholt received a letter from the company Chief Pilot, Fred Abbott implying that he intended to terminate Captain Omholt. Captain Omholt's personal attorney intervened, only to effect an atmosphere of harassing interference in every aspect of Captain Omholt's situation. Captain Abbot's action was blatantly contrary to the American's with Disabilities Act (ADA); enforced by the EEOC.

While Continental executive, C.D. McLean, had previously directed Captain Abbott to resolve all previous issues, Captain Abbott failed to respond to Captain' Omholt's phone call regarding Mr. McLean's directive.

Captain Omholt is caught in a 'no-man's-land.' To date, the company won't respond to the doctor's repeated requests for the company to clarify and resolve any issues, thus, Captain Omholt remains stuck in his current situation. The union won't get involved, despite the doctor's requests for their assistance.

To date, there has been no attempt to facilitate Captain Omholt's recovery by relieving the implied threat of termination by Continental. Again, that threat was delivered after the company knew of the onset of depression, contrary to the Federal "American's With Disabilities Act' (ADA).

The executives of Continental have been repeatedly informed of all the facts, refusing to assist Captain Omholt's situation.

Does this betray the 'real' Gordon Bethune?

Captain Omholt filed a formal complaint per Federal Law against the company and the union, through the EEOC. It turns out that the law has no significant enforcement effect, except in very radical cases.

Since the first of 2000, Continental denied Captain Omholt's disability insurance claim based on an application time restriction which he was unaware of. The time restriction should have been known made, per state and federal law which requires full disclosure of the terms and conditions of the policy.

Further, the company itself effected the delay by knowingly delaying the application forms, failing to advise Captain Omholt of his removal from the payroll and initially sending him the wrong forms for the wrong insurance management agency.

Accordingly, Captain Omholt again requested the union's aggressive assistance to reverse that position - no response.

Further, the EAP directoress, employed her unique authority, authorizing the particular psychiatrist to diagnose and treat Captain Omholt as a patient. The company has resisted or not paid a high percentage of her claims. The union's assistance was requested in that matter also - to no effect, despite the psychiatrist's battery of requests to the company and her requests to the union.

Captain Omholt also wrote multiple letters requesting union intervention in his matter to resolve any and all issues with the company, pursuant to the psychiatrist's battery of requests to the company and her request to the union.

Captain Omholt requested the union to:

1. Stop the inquisition.

2. Clear any and all issues with management - with finality.

3. Effect his return to work as a pilot - permanently free of retaliation of any sort.

4. Effect either full back pay or the payment of the disability insurance.

5. As a minimum, that the union facilitate a comparably paid position which Captain Omholt could hold, pending his returning to the flight line (a common practice).

The Americans with Disabilities Act be damned - no response.

In general, Captain Omholt requested that the union assertively provide appropriate assistance per civil law and regulations, the union Constitution & Bylaws and the Collective Bargaining Agreement; certainly, per the intended union's primary function.

Still, no response.

Again, the doctor also made multiple requests for assistance for Captain Omholt; to the company and the union - all ignored.

As opposed to receiving assistance, radically distorted versions of the Hong Kong story which conflict with documented fact were circulated. At least one of these originated from the union staff, peddled to Captain Omholt's personal attorney. That version alleged that Captain Omholt's crew used the wrong abnormal procedure, despite the common knowledge that there was no procedure for the particular problem. The same union official described a bizarre account in which Captain Omholt was supposed to have personally failed in three attempts to land the aircraft. The deadheading crew was supposedly so frightened that they pulled Captain Omholt out of his seat, effecting a safe landing. His attorney was brushed off when she asked for support for the fabricated story. Not surprisingly, she was totally ignored upon her second request for that information.

Captain Omholt received so little assistance from the union staff that it should have been overwhelmingly embarassing. The associated union legal support consistently seemed to better serve the adverse political agenda of company management.

As with the incidents and accidents, Captain Omholt's fight goes on.

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