A harsh fact of life is that 9-11, and its subsequent consequences, can't rationally be separated from political viewpoints and political commentary. As a larger scale of the Viet Nam War, money and power drove ALL of 9-11 and its subsequent history. Thus, 9-11 doesn't afford the Hollywood-CSI luxury of "…just analyze the evidence."

9-11 and subsequent history demonstrate a new sicience, "Virtual Un-Reality," wherein forensic benchmarks don't line up; but are passionately pandered as being otherwise 'logical' by a perverted mass media.

This presentation compiles various timelines, with the intent of this material being a collective of that which is readily documented, and that which is "…well known." The various timelines have their good & bad points. In the maze of all 9-11 matters, it is necessary to read between the proverbial lines; so as to arrive at a reasonable semblance of the truth, which is otherwise "officially" buried – with great prejudice.

While some readers may prefer to have the 9-11 flights individually broken out, the intent of this presentation is focused upon keeping the time-line continuous, as a somewhat unique forensic perspective.

It should be noted that the "official" version of 9-11 quickly surpassed the influence of Orson Wells" "War of the Worlds" broadcast. The "official" version of 9-11 contains a comparable amount of fiction. Whatever anyone wants to say, "…it sold!"

This timeline incorporates an airline captain's perspective, injecting pertinent "airline insider" information, rounding out the details of the day. When the "aviation professional" perspective is added, an entirely different version of 9-11 appears – as a far greater horror story.

For example, the "official line" is that the 9-11 aircraft had viable crewmembers and passengers, until their crash. Yet, the purported "phone call" accounts of events on board those aircraft don't suggest the 'standard" airline security procedures of the day.

The "psyops" of 9-11 heralds commoners as "heroes," ignoring the command structure of the air crews of four separate flights. In an extreme, that might happen on one flight; not four.

It's necessary to appreciate the element of "probability" in the scenes of 9-11. Four aircraft were hijacked – not by Arab wannabe pilots, who were avid students of aircraft manuals; rather by professional jet pilots.

The hijack issue instantly comes to the fact that no passenger reservation "locator code," passenger manifest or ticket can yet be produced to show that ANY of the named hijackers made it onboard the four aircraft. Certainly, there were at least four. While some measure of "error" can be reasonably anticipated, the total lack of such documentation is too extreme to be considered in the realm of "accident" or a matter of "error."

Passionate language 'suggesting" that the hijackers made the 9-11 flights can be readily found; that's inadequate for the accounting of 9-11 and the subsequent "war" campaigns. In consequence, the 'wars' became War Crimes; however unpopular it may be to say.

The strongest suggestion is that the four ACTUAL hijackers were among the passengers, with false IDs, including cockpit access credentials, such as a pilot's license, airline ID, or FAA identification.

Whether one or two hijackers – or more - on each aircraft, the issue of crew and passenger control are paramount to the designs of the hijacker, as the hijacker knows that there are effective counter-measure procedures in place. The easiest method for "crowd control" – given the suicide mission - is to kill the passengers & crew by depressurizing the aircraft. What is obviously intended is so nefarious, that the light load of passengers won't add any trouble to whatever remaining conscience the hijackers had.

The pandered Flight 93 tapes are supposed to have come from recorders propelled deeper into the ground than a high caliber bullet could reach – emerging with viable data. That's absurd; either the depth or the surviving data viability. Most amazing were the "forensic" photos of the flight recorders, not showing as much as a dent - for all the "G" load it would have taken to get the recorders as much as a foot underground.

There isn't a viable bit of evidence of a cockpit battle. Whatever happened in the cockpits was fast – and effective; very possibly guns having been smuggled on board.

Eight pilots had the training and opportunity to signal their distress or attempt to defeat their attackers by easily turning the aircraft over, using the control yoke, or stomping a rudder pedal. That didn't happen on any of the four aircraft involved. That leaves no suggestion of the purported amateur terrorists.

The scene could easily have been a "pilot" gaining access to the cockpit, via his credentials, killing both pilots & taking control of the cockpit. At most, it would take ten minutes to snuff the flight attendants and passengers. Unconsciousness would be within approximately 30 seconds, death within five minutes, as the hijacker survived, using the flight deck emergency oxygen.

There isn't a viable shred of evidence that an aircraft actually impacted at the 9-11 Pentagon; or at Shanksville, PA. Yet, those sites were obviously "prepped" for the day, just in case – in case of what? In case that only two aircraft were destroyed; notably crashed into the WTC towers. By elementary conjecture, the second two were backups, for the first two. That left two missing aircraft and around 100 missing bodies.

Obvious propaganda aside, the second two aircraft can't, otherwise, be traced to a "mission." If they had a mission apart from the WTC, there would have been no "prepping" of the Pentagon & Shanksville sites. Remember that statement - if the second two airctaft had a mission apart from the WTC, there would have been no "prepping" of the Pentagon & Shanksville sites.

The lack of large aircraft parts, the spread of the 'salted" aircraft debris and the nature of the debris make a factual impact, at those two sites, too improbable to consider. The 9-11 Pentagon and the Shanksville site lack any viable suggestion of burning jet fuel. The aircraft skin planted on the Pentagon lawn was the wrong color - from the wrong end of the purported aircraft. Pre-collapse photos don't show forward-moving damage, nor enough of a hole to swallow an aircraft; leaving the collapsed portion totally unaccountable. The forensic benchmarks leave no viable way for the purported aircraft parts to have gotten into the building. The list goes on.

It must be remembered that no one claimed the 9-11 hijackings and/or attacks; and there was no "gain" demanded. There were no political concessions demanded, no ransom, no prisoner releases – NOTHING! There was no legitimate follow-up "claimant" message to the "terror" attacks. Before the famous – and obviously phony – Osama bin Laden videotape could be produced, bin Laden emphatically denied involvement. No proof of his involvement has yet been produced – save being an involuntary patsy.

Whatever the 9-11 motive was, someone is keeping it to themselves. That's not the style of such "extremists." Years later, no Islamic group has viably claimed 9-11.

Bizarre claims of grandeur aside, Zacharias Moussaoui emerges as another "Manchurian Patsy."

There is no suggestion that the second pair of aircraft had another set of targets. Follow the money; they probably didn't – after the first two aircraft found their mark. The hijackings were terror, for sure; but whose?

The term "Reichstag Fire" comes to mind, in the shadow of the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution," of the Viet Nam War and Texas profiteering!

9-11 is a tale of cover-up; from the White House on down. To understand 9-11, it's necessary to follow the known timeline.


Prior to 7:59 AM       Supposedly, nine of the nineteen purported hijackers were selected for special screening before they boarded their aircraft. None of their names are known [Washington Post, 3/2/02 (B)], but one news article made it clear that purported hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, already on a terrorist watch list for international flights, were not selected for screening. [See - Cox News, 10/21/01]

At least seven of the hijacker "names" were almost immediately reported to be still alive, with no attempt to ascertain who the purported hijackers factually were. Nor was there an attempt to track down any "associates." No excuses were given.

By 9-11, airport security was a routine Federal joke; a "filler" for the local evening news. There was no serious airport security; and no appreciable FAA enforcement. By 9-11, the U.S. "private" airport security companies had been merged into three, and sold overseas. One must conclude that their days of profitability were clearly numbered – and known.

The Airlines were criminally responsible for airport security, famous for "outsourcing" the security screening to underpaid and under-motivated workers; famous for quitting.

Instead of being held accountable, the airlines were rewarded for 9-11. Despite the legal responsibility for airport security, the Airlines were not investigated or prosecuted for the purported failings of 9-11 – instead, they were REWARDED with cash grants, tax breaks and loans. Only the airlines were so rewarded. Tom Daschle INSTANTLY led the reward effort in the Senate, his former FAA administrator wife, Linda, lobbied the House; it worked! Imagine that matter as a priority on the day of 9-11.

The FAA was famous for minimal enforcement of the airport security; even after horrendous embarrassments and even security disasters. As convenient, they claimed that they didn't have enforcement powers – a lie. The FAA record of levying fines and revoking airline operating certificates attests to no shortage of enforcement powers.

The airport 'security" video images of the purported hijackers could be anyone – on any day. One's mind should be drawn to the phony "plumped-up" Osama bin Laden videotape of post-9-11 fame; add the phony 9-11 Pentagon fireball. The institutionalized use of phony images has a long record.

As you read the following, note the pattern of the FAA failing to notify NORAD of the hijackings, in a timely manner. The fighters – when finally launched – are kept busy with navigation tasks. Thus, they never had a chance to use their targeting imagery, to witness or record the reality.

7:59 – 8:02 AM       American Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 181 passengers , loaded with 23,980 gallons of fuel, departed from Boston's Logan Airport, 14 minutes after its scheduled departure. [See - Los Angeles Times 9/20/01; ABC News 7/18/02; CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; AP 8/19/02; Newsday 9/10/02; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

The original take-off was scheduled for 7:45. There were supposed to be 92 passengers and crew on board American Airlines Flight 11; but according to the official manifest, published on CNN.com, there were only 86. See - http://911Timeline.net/36or37missingand70percentempty.htm

8:01 AM       In Newark, United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with a capacity of 200 passengers, loaded with 11,489 gallons of fuel, pushed-back from the gate, with 44 people aboard bound for San Francisco, California. Flight 93 would be delayed by 41 minutes prior to taking off. Flight 93 reportedly had to wait in a line of approximately a dozen aircraft before it can take off. [See - USA Today 8/12/02] There were supposed to be 44 passengers and crew aboard, yet according to the official manifest, published on CNN.com, there are only 33. Strangely, no one wants to clear up the passenger manifest issues. The missing hijackers are that sacred.

8:13 AM       The last routine communication occurred between ATC and the pilots of American Flight 11. Air Traffic Controller Pete Zalewski was working the flight. The pilot responded correctly, when told to turn right, but fails to respond to a command to climb. Reportedly, Zalewski tried to reach the pilot, even using the emergency frequency, but he still got no response. [See - 8:13, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 8:13:31, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:14, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:13, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

By all indications, American Flight 11 was hijacked at this time. One Air Traffic Controller speculated that the aircraft was hijacked over Gardner, Massachusetts, less than 50 miles to the west of Boston. By then, he'd have been "handed-off" to the en route ATC "Center." [See - Nashua Telegraph, 9/13/01]

The Boston Globe noted: "It appears that the hijackers' entry was surprising enough that the pilots did not have a chance to broadcast a traditional distress call." It would only have taken a few seconds to press the right buttons. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

In reality, there are multiple signals that a pilot can use, between radio phraseology and the use of the transponder. None are reported. Whatever happened in the cockpit was very quick.

The final takeover control of the cockpit didn't appear to be in place until approximately 8:20; evidenced by the transponder being turned off. (see - 8:20 AM ).

Shortly after Air Traffic Controllers ask Flight 11 to climb to 35,000 feet, the transponder stopped transmitting its code. The transponder code identifies an aircraft on a controller's radar screen. The digital data display gives its identification, exact location and altitude. The pilots can also use the transponder to transmit a four-digit hijack code; or a generic "emergency" code.

Air traffic manager Glenn Michael later stated, "We considered it at that time to be a possible hijacking." [See - 8:13, "When given permission to climb to 35,000 feet," AP, 8/12/02, 8:13, shortly after trying contact on the emergency frequencies, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01, 8:15, "Just moments" after radio contact is lost, MSNBC, 9/15/01]

The initial versions after 9-11 suggest that the transponder was turned off around 8:13. But a year after 9-11, Pete Zalewski, the Air Traffic Controller handling the flight, claimed that the transponder was turned off at 8:20. [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

The "9/11 Commission" cites 8:21. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Colonel Robert Marr, the head of NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector, (NEADS) later claimed that the transponder was turned off some time after 8:30. [See - ABC News 9-11/02]

Of special importance is that the radar data was recorded, with no viable question available, as to such details. By Congressional testimony, the radar data was recorded and analyzed – with no public revelation as to details – WHY? The ATC audio recordings of the radio exchanges should have been enough to establish the timeline, alone. It's possible that the FBI seizure of the tapes precluded the documentation. Naturally, one has to ask why those tapes were 'sealed" or possibly destroyed. As 9-11 goes, that information was nothing less than sacred.

It's possible that the FAA was trying to "buy back" some delay time, as to why they didn't notify NORAD, sooner. Other than "teamwork," why would the FAA voluntarily want to take any blame? That tactic, otherwise, instantly invokes criminal investigation and career suicide. It can only be speculated that the FAA took much of the blame, as a means to minimize the NORAD finger-pointing.

8:13:31 AM       American Airlines Flight 11 last instruction from Boston Air Traffic Control: "American 11, turn 20 degrees right." American Airlines Flight 11 responded: "…20 right, American eleven." The ATC instruction was incomplete, as the controller should have indicated the purpose of the turn. Normally, a specific heading is assigned, in the form of "Turn 20 degrees right, heading, heading zero-eight-five, vectors around traffic." A few seconds later the Controller instructs: "American eleven, climb and maintain Flight Level three-five-zero [35,000 feet]." Controller: "American eleven, climb and maintain Flight Level three-five-zero." Controller: "American eleven, Boston…." There was no further response from American Airlines Flight 11.

8:14 AM       United Airlines Flight 175 a Boeing 767 with a capacity of 181 passengers and, reportedly, with 23,980 gallons of fuel, departed from Boston's Logan Airport, 16 minutes after the scheduled departure time. [See - CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; AP 8/19/02; Newsday 9/10/02] It was headed for Los Angeles, California. The take-off was originally scheduled for 7:58 AM. There are supposed to be 65 passengers on board; according to the official death manifest, published on CNN.com, there were only 56 aboard.

Assuming this version is correct, it is necessary to question why this flight would have nearly a full load of fuel on board; nearly twice that of American Flight eleven? In all likelihood, the figure is in error. The "error" seems suspicious, as "tankering" fuel is expensive, due to its weight.

8:14 to 8:20 AM       At some point after the hijacking begins, the pilot of Flight 11, John Ogonowski, is claimed to have activated a "push-to-talk" transmit button, enabling the Boston Air Traffic Controllers to hear what was being said in the cockpit. In all likelihood, it is – at best - a nervous hijacker; if at all. It is possible for a nervous or inexperienced pilot of airliners (versus fighter pilot) to grip the control yoke & accidentally key the mike. An overpowered pilot pressing the "push-to-talk" transmit button would be sure to have some tattle-tale voice message to go with it. Such a move would be very obvious to the hijacker; thus not likely. Activating a "push-to-talk" transmit button on any of the radio-selector consoles would activate a headset-microphone, or an oxygen mask microphone, allowing a chance of cockpit voices getting out. If nothing else, the pilot could tap out the standard SOS. The same pilot would also have the ability to intervene in the hijacking – even if it meant shutting the engines off, ala Egypt Air Flight 990.

There would be three types of microphones available; a hand-held mike, with its own "push-to-talk" transmit button, the headsets and the oxygen mask microphones, which could be selected, then activated by using a switch on the yoke, or any of the four interphone communication boxes.

A controller was claimed to have said, "The button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York." An article later noted that "his ability to do so also indicated that he was in the driver's seat much of the way" to the WTC. The transmissions are claimed to have continued until approximately 8:38 AM. [See - Christian Science Monitor 9/13/01; MSNBC 9/15/01]

8:15 AM       Two Boston Air Traffic Controllers, Pete Zalewski and Lino Martins, are reported to have discussed the fact that Flight 11 can't be contacted. Zalewski reportedly said to Martins, "He won't answer you. He's "nordo" [no radio] roger thanks." [See - See - Guardian 10/17/01; New York Times 10/16/01 (C); CNN 9/17/01; MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

That statement is puzzling; communication radios fail rather routinely – usually due to pilot-error. Speculating that a pilot "won't" answer is off-scale abnormal. Advising that an aircraft is "nordo," still anticipates a pilot determining that something is wrong & making every effort to re-establish communication. That would also include using a special transponder code, 7600, indicating any true aircraft communication distress.

ATC would normally be using a multitude of procedures to contact the pilot, including having the company "page" the pilots with an "Airinc" (Aeronautical Radio Inc.) message, or a 'sel-cal" (Selective Calling). They wouldn't just casually discuss the situation. In a controller's mind, the combination of no transponder and no communication represented a radical situation – whether a mechanical failure, hijacking, crash or a bomb.

If a transponder signal stopped, the controllers" radar console immediately alerted him/her to the situation. Loss of a transponder signal was cause to worry about a bomb or a impact – or a hijacking. Such a failure/error causes controllers a great deal of trouble, with an immediate advisory to the aircraft. One must imagine the situation in the Air Traffic Control Center.

The northeast corner of the United States contains some of the busiest airspace on Earth. Each controller has a 'sector" that he/she is responsible for. Commercial flights are always under what is termed "positive control," they must be in constant communication with the controllers, so as to maintain legal separation (distance) with other aircraft. If an airliner loses its transponder, it causes instant problems, just with the altitude information being lost.

The modern ATC radar isn't designed to readily display traditional radar 'skin paint;" passive radar echoes from the airframe. Instead, it took luck and a good eye to discriminate a "Primary Return."

This particular airspace is normally stretched to the breaking point with controller work overload. Any "glitches" add incredible stress and work. This flight became an instant hazard to air navigation.

The pilot's procedure for a "hard" lost communication emergency is rather simple - follow the last ATC clearance; stick to the original flight plan. The pilot would also 'squawk" the "lost-communications" transponder code; 7600.

The FAA controllers would be switching transmitters; possibly asking other controllers to attempt communication. Within reason, an errant aircraft following its last clearance allows the controllers to reasonably predict the flight path. ATC can reasonably keep other flights out of harms way. If a controller witnesses lost communication and transponder signal, a serious emergency is indicated.

Calls would have been made to other aircraft to attempt contact with the target aircraft, the company would be advised; requesting the company to try communication, from their end. Any sizeable airline company can also pull up a radar display of the aircraft, to see what was going on, for themselves. The privately owned "Airinc" company is called to attempt to contact the aircraft, as well. If the flight then deviated from its last clearance, the ATC system is thrown into an emergency condition. Alarms all over the national ATC system would be going off. Within minutes, the FAA should attempt to have a fighter launched, to investigate the aircraft, ala the Payne Stewart case. There is no record of such an attempt being made – on FOUR hijacked aircraft!

Mysteriously, the 9-11 scenario is prominently void of requests for nearby aircraft to attempt radio contact with the hijacked aircraft. Once an aircraft is presumed to be hijacked, that scenario changes; until that point, there should have been a host of "…contact" requests of nearby aircraft and "company" aircraft, using the "…company frequency."

Beyond the horror of the day, there was no accountability – why?

ATC would be recording the controller and pilot conversations; add the radar image data. These tapes would be designated for investigative preservation. The NORAD data was also recorded.

What happened to this data? What is the world NOT supposed to see or know? Where is the Satellite image data?

The FBI reportedly confiscated all of the tapes between the controllers and these four flights - WHY? 9-11 is long over; where is the data?

Within a few minutes, the air traffic control system would go into a near-panic mode – just with ONE aircraft being "lost."

8:17 AM       It was reported that American Airlines Flight 11 passenger Daniel Lewin, who belonged to the Israel Defense Force Sayeret Matkal, a top-secret counter-terrorist unit, was either stabbed or shot to death. It's far more likely that he would kill the hijackers.

A very preliminary FAA memo stated that Lewin was shot by Satam Al Suqami at 9:20. One must assume that the time citation is a typo; possibly 8:20 is intended. [ABC News, 7/18/02, UPI, 3/6/02, Washington Post, 3/2/02 (B)]

Nothing was later reported as to investigations on how the gun was brought on board. The report was labeled as an "error."

8:17 AM       From Chapter 1, page 32 of the 9-11 Commission report, flight attendant, Betty Ong, notified American Airlines that Flight 11 was hijacked. The report cited the manager on duty, Craig Marquis, as realizing that the situation was an emergency.

8:20 AM       The American Flight 11 transponder signal stopped. [See - CNN 9/17/01]

Flight 11 started to veer dramatically off course. [See - 8:20, {MSNBC 9-11/02} (B)]

8:20 AM       On Flight 11, flight attendant Amy (Madeline) Sweeney reportedly borrows a calling card [credit card?] from flight attendant Sara Low, using an Air-Phone to call Boston's Logan Airport. She supposedly spoke to Michael Woodward, an American Airlines flight service manager. He was reportedly a friend of Sweeney; and thus didn't have to verify that the call was not a hoax. The call was not recorded but Woodward reportedly took detailed notes. [See - 8:19, New York Observer, 2/11/04, "Over the next 25 minutes," ABC News, 7/18/02]

Ong reportedly calmly told Woodward, "Listen, and listen to me very carefully. I'm on Flight 11. The aircraft has been hijacked." [See - ABC News, 7/18/02]

She supposedly gives him the seat locations of three hijackers: 9D, 9G, and 10B. She was claimed to have reportedly stated that they are all of Middle Eastern descent, with one speaking English very well. [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Those seat assignments should turn up the names of the legitimate passengers; who are they? Again, the hijackers names don't appear on manifests. A flight attendant would NEVER fear authentication of her identity. Such reports are instant-action events.

Another version has her identifying four hijackers (but still none of the five said to be on the aircraft) and reported that not all of the seats she gave matched up with the seats assigned to the hijackers on their tickets. [See - ABC News, 7/18/02, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)]

She reportedly stated that she cannot contact the cockpit, and didn't believe that the pilots are flying the aircraft any longer. [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Flight attendants would never presume that the pilots are not in control. A legitimate report would cite why she thought the pilots aren't flying the aircraft. Such a report would include details as to the location & actions of the other hijackers. It would include the description of any weapons and demands. It would include a description of an attempt to identify the perpetrators – by name. To airline crews, the report doesn't make sense. In a legitimate hijacking, the perpetrators would have close control of the flight attendants. If a flight attendant factually called, she would explain how she was able to use the phone.

The Los Angeles Times cited: "But even as she was relating details about the hijackers, the men were storming the front of the aircraft and "had just gained access to the cockpit." " (Sweeney supposedly witnessed the storming of the cockpit at least seven minutes after radio contact from Flight 11 stopped and the hijacking apparently begins 8:13 AM.) [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)]

Why the time discrepancy?

Sweeny reportedly cited the hijackers having stabbed two first-class flight attendants, Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin. She supposedly added, "A hijacker cut the throat of a business-class passenger, and he appears to be dead." This is supposed to have been Daniel Lewin. She reportedly stated that the hijackers have brought a bomb into the cockpit. She's asked by Woodward, "How do you know it's a bomb?" She answers, "Because the hijackers showed me a bomb." She describes its yellow and red wires. Sweeney continues talking with Woodward until Flight 11 impacted. [See - Boston Globe 11/23/01; New York Observer 2/11/04]

The story lacks credibility, as the situation aboard the aircraft would be action-intensive. Flight attendants have strict guidelines, as to how to handle hijackings. Fear of death aside, American flight attendants would be too frightened of management, to deviate from established procedures. She should be teaming up with other flight attendants; and seeking help from "able-bodied-assistants." The flight attendants should be gathering weapons and briefing passengers. Calling friends, isn't on the hijacking procedures list. At a minimum, a flight attendant would be calling Dallas Operations; not Boston. If she made such a call, she would be providing structured forensic information, per a standardized protocol. She wouldn't be queried as to whether or not it was a bomb, versus being asked for details about the bomb – real or not.

8:20 AM       Flight 77 departed the Dulles International Airport, ten minutes later than the scheduled departure time. [See - CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; Guardian 10/17/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04; AP 8/19/02]

American Flight 77 was a Boeing 757 with a capacity of 200 passengers and reportedly 11,489 gallons of fuel. It departed Dulles International Airport, located 30 miles west of Washington D.C., bound for Los Angeles, California. The take-off was originally scheduled for 8:01. There were supposed to be 64 passengers and crew on board, according to the official death manifest list, published on CNN.com, there were only 56.

8:20 AM       In Boston, ATC was reported to have decided that Flight 11 has probably been hijacked. They don't appear to have notified other ATC centers for another five minutes, and reportedly didn't notify NORAD for approximately another 20 minutes. [See - "About 8:20," Newsday, 9/23/01, "about 8:20," New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

ABC News was quoted as saying, "There doesn't seem to have been alarm bells going off, traffic controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There's a gap there that would have to be investigated." [See - ABC News 9/14/01]

The delay was insane – what more can be said?

8:21 AM       Boston Air Traffic Controller Pete Zalewski, handling American Flight 11, noticed that the flight was off course, with both lost communication and its transponder off. Zalewski later claimed that he turned to his supervisor, saying: "Would you please come over here? I think something is seriously wrong with this aircraft. I don't know what. It's either mechanical, electrical, I think, but I'm not sure." When asked if he suspected a hijacking at this point, he reportedly replied, "Absolutely not. No way." Another Air Traffic Controller, Tom Roberts, reportedly has another nearby American Airlines flight attempt radio contact with Flight 11; still no response. The lost flight was now 'drastically off course" but NORAD was still supposedly not notified. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

This version is bizarre. A controller should call in the watch supervisor, who would then direct the action. A situation of lost communication and lost transponder leads instantly to a conclusion of a downed or hijacked aircraft. Just NORAD's radar would make the crucial difference, why were they not called? Lost electronics spells mechanical problems; the addition of "off-course" is a disaster in the making, whether with the individual aircraft, or a midair collision risk. Add the high probability of a hijacking.

From the 9-11 hearings, the FAA's "Hijack Coordinator" somehow went missing – on that particular day. The hearings produced no name; certainly no testimony from the FAA's "Hijack Coordinator." The subject was simply dropped.

8:21 AM       Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong was supposed to have called Vanessa Minter, an American Airlines reservations agent in North Carolina, using a seatback GTE Airfone from the back of the aircraft. [Why call a 'reservations" agent?] Ong supposedly spoke to Minter and an unidentified man for approximately two minutes. Then supervisor [type unknown] Nydia Gonzales was phone-conferenced into the call. Ong supposedly said, "The cockpit's not answering. Somebody's stabbed in business class and … I think there's mace … that we can't breathe. I don't know, I think we're getting hijacked." Approximately a minute later, she said, "…and the cockpit is not answering their phone. And there's somebody stabbed in business class. And there's … we can't breathe in business class. Somebody's got mace or something …. I'm sitting in the back. Somebody's coming back from business. If you can hold on for one second, they're coming back."

Mace or pepper spray burns the eyes – it doesn't just "choke." By this version, she was in business class, and in coach – at the same time. Which is it?

In the heat of a hijack incident, her duties as a flight attendant don't include calling anyone other than the cockpit, or company "operations."

Ong was supposedly in the back – in "coach." She supposedly continues: "I think the guys are up there [in the cockpit]. They might have gone there — jammed the way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside."

This simply isn't a description by a flight attendant. She might say that the cockpit isn't answering, not that they can't call. She would be reasonably clear where the hijackers are – or she would be busy trying to discover where they are. The standardized hijacking procedures would discourage flight attendants from going to the cockpit; why would she cite that "….We can't even get inside." That doesn't make sense – to airline crews.

According to another version: "She said two flight attendants had been stabbed, one was on oxygen." "A passenger had his throat slashed and looked dead and they had gotten into the cockpit." She supposedly identifies the seats of the hijackers; saying that the aircraft was descending.

The first four and a half minutes of the supposed call was later played to the 9-11 Commission. Ong supposedly continues speaking to Gonzales and Minter until the aircraft finally impacted (See - 8:23 AM ). [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04, 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

8:21 AM       American Airlines flight service manager Michael Woodward, was reported to be listening to Flight 11 attendant Amy Sweeney (See - 8:20 AM ). He supposedly called Nancy Wyatt, the supervisor of pursers at Logan Airport. [Why not company security?] Supposedly, holding both telephones, he repeated to Wyatt everything that Sweeney was saying. Wyatt supposedly simultaneously repeated his version to the Fort Worth, Texas company headquarters. [The call can't be transferred or "conferenced?]

The conversation between Wyatt and the managers at headquarters was supposedly recorded. All of the details from Sweeney's call reach American Airlines' top management almost instantly.

Strangely, according to victim's relatives later hearing the recording, two managers at headquarters immediately begin discussing a cover-up of the hijack details. They supposedly say: 'don't spread this around. Keep it close," "Keep it quiet," and "Let's keep this among ourselves. What else can we find out from our own sources about what's going on?"

Another former American Airlines employee who has also supposedly heard that recording recalls, "In Fort Worth, two managers in SOC [Systems Operations Control] were sitting beside each other and hearing it. They were both saying, 'do not pass this along. Let's keep it right here. Keep it among the five of us." "

The implication is that American Airlines was in on the hijacking! The managers should have been activating an emergency response team, immediately calling the FBI. These assertions are very serious criminal matters – if factual. Corporate privacy is always a major issue, but not at the risk of safety; particularly in the light of final accountability.

Reportedly, Gerard Arpey, the American Airlines' executive vice president for operations, soon got the details from Betty Ong's phone call (see 8:30 AM ). In theory, he apparently didn't hear about Sweeney's call until much later. The New York Observer quoted the victims' relatives who openly ask if lives could have been saved if this same information had been quickly shared with other aircraft. [See - New York Observer 6/17/04]

8:23 AM       Nydia Gonzalez, an American Airlines supervisor with expertise on security matters, was supposedly patched in to the call with flight attendant Betty Ong on Flight 11. [See - "approximately 23 minutes" prior to impact, Independent Commission, 1/27/04]

"…with expertise on security matters…" – What is the statement here? Why wasn't a security manager on the phone?

8:24:38 AM       It was reported that the captain of American Airlines Flight 11, John Ogonowski - or one of the hijackers – accidentally keys the transmitter, enabling the Boston air traffic controllers to hear one of the hijackers command the passengers: "We have some aircraft. Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport. Nobody move."

The idea presented is that one of the hijackers confused an aircraft radio selector button, with the public-address system. Air traffic control reportedly responded, "Who's trying to call me?" [That's not a controller's response. This would be a time for monitoring. If anything, "Calling Center, say again," would be typical of a controller. ]

Air Traffic Controller John Zalewski reportedly responded, "Who's trying to call me?" The hijacker continued, "Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the aircraft. Just stay quiet." [See - 8:24:38, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:24:38, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:24:38, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 8:24, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, after 8:24, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:28, New York Times, 9/12/01, before 8:28, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01]

After hearing this, Air Traffic Controller John Zalewski "knew right then that he was working a hijack" and called for his supervisor. The frequency of Flight 11 was played on speakers so everyone in Boston ATC can hear. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Village Voice 9/13/01] While dramatic, the radio call – if factual - could have been made from anywhere, by anyone. BUT, one would need to know the correct frequency – not difficult to obtain. Most importantly, why did it take such a call to "certify" a hijacking? His supervisor should have been called with the first indication of trouble.

8:24 AM       Boston ATC radar observes American Flight 11 making a 100-degree turn to the south (already far off-course). The Air Traffic Controllers claimed that even with the transponder turned off, they never actually lost radar contact with the flight (now a Primary Target), although they could no longer determine its altitude. [See - 8:24, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 8:28, Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01]

"Boston Center could still track it on primary radar …." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Boston Air Traffic Controller Mark Hodgkins later stated, "I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down." [See - ABC, 9/6/02]

However, there were also reports stating that Boston ATC didn't spot the aircraft course until just prior to or just after it impacted. (See - Washington Post, 9/12/01 and Newsday, 9/10/02). NEADS had highly sophisticated radar, but supposedly around 8:40 they could not find Flight 11. Supposedly, Boston ATC periodically updated NEADS as to Flight 11's position by telephone. Finally, NEADS reportedly found it a few minutes prior to it impacting into the WTC tower. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02; ABC News 9-11/02; Newhouse News 1/25/02]

The "notification" matter is quite the smoking gun. By all appearances, the factual notification of NORAD was around 8:24. The later notification time citation implication being that the FAA is attempting to 'share" part of the 9-11 "no-response" blame.

Theoretically, NEADS should have been better able to pick out the flight, than could the FAA.

8:25 AM       The Guardian reported that Boston ATC "notifies several air traffic control centers that a hijack is taking place." Boston first lost communication with American Airlines Flight 11 more than 11 minutes earlier. That's a long time to begin to start implementing procedures. Again, why didn't they also notify North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at least by this time? Supposedly they didn't notify NORAD for another 6 to 15 minutes, depending on the particular version (See - 8:37 AM ). [See - Guardian 10/17/01]

If ATC had followed procedure, notifying NORAD at 8:25; with NORAD ordering the 102nd Fighter Wing of the Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts to scramble; then two F-15's could have been airborne by around 8:32. Those F-15's would have had at least 14 minutes to catch American Airlines Flight 11, which impacted the north side of the North Tower (1-World Trade Center) at 8:46:26. The two F-15's, flying at top speed, could have at least buzzed the B-767; even if a shoot-down was impractical, or the order not received. Conceivably, that might have made a major difference.

Strangely, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controller monitoring Flight 77 supposedly claimed that they did not know about Flight 11 or of the Flight 175 hijacking, as of twenty minutes later (see 8:56 AM ). Similarly, the Air Traffic Controllers at La Guardian Airport [local control only], reportedly were never told about the hijacked aircraft; learning about them from watching the news (see 9:01 AM                  and 9:13 AM ).

The aircraft are supposedly known to be clearly headed into New York's airspace; why wasn't New York told, for purposes of midair collision avoidance, alone? The information – at a minimum – would allow a NOTAM       to be posted. The 'suicide" nature of the event isn't yet known or suspected. The information would alert various levels of security to be ready to handle a presumed hostage situation.

The suggestion is that the hijackings were deliberately "compartmentalized." This is no minor question.

No mention can be found of a "Hostage Rescue Team" (HRT) being assembled, for any of 9-11. WHY?

Prior to 8:26 AM )

Reportedly, flight attendant Amy Sweeney identified the seat locations of three hijackers (See - 8:20 AM ), to the American Airlines flight service manager Michael Woodward. He allegedly ordered a colleague at Boston's Logan Airport to look up the seat locations, on the reservations computer. According to that version, the names, addresses, phone numbers, and credit cards of these hijackers are quickly discovered. Abdulaziz Alomari was supposedly identified and located in seat 9G, Mohamed Atta was supposed to be in 9D, and Satam Al Suqami was in seat 10B. 9-11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey claimed that from this information, American Airlines officials monitoring the call would probably have known or assumed right away that the hijacking was connected to al-Qaeda. [See - ABC News 7/18/02; New York Observer 2/11/04]

Why would a lowly Flight Service Manager be called? Why would he not call corporate security? Why would he not get a law enforcement action going? Why would the al Qaeda assumption be so automatic?

To date, there are no known records of ticket purchases or passenger manifest to cite the purported hijackers as being on board the flights.

8:26 AM       American Airlines Flight 11 was now heading west-northwest, its location would have supposedly been somewhere between Albany and Lake George, New York; it's altitude was unknown. Then it supposedly makes a 100 degree turn to the south; heading directly toward New York City. It's assumed that the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 followed the Hudson River, until it impacted the North Tower of the WTC.

An interesting detail is that descending a jet into an airport is a technical undertaking, given just the airspeed of a "normal" flight. With the added speed of the 'strike," the problem becomes more complex. Jets don't easily descend; thus, a descent must be carefully planned – the trade-mark of a professional jet pilot. Amateur hijackers would have been circling the city, all day, trying to lose enough altitude to make the strikes. It took a bright mind and skill to descend to the 'strike" altitudes. In the case of the second aircraft, United Flight 175, the aircraft went south of the city, then turned back north. That could suggest some measure of sloppy descent planning – or an planned strike-path.

While technically possible, the "human factors" of a first experience in an airliner cockpit make it highly unlikely that amateur hijackers successfully re-programmed the cockpit computer from memory, or from written instructions. Nor, are they likely to have been able to readily use the autopilot controls to achieve the needed descent – not on a "first-try."

In theory, flight 11 was always at low altitude – but, can that be certain? Where is the DoD radar data?

8:26 AM       Betty Ong supposedly reported that the aircraft was "flying erratically." A minute later, Flight 11 was supposed to have turned south. Within this same time frame, Amy Sweeney was supposed to have reported that:

1. The aircraft had been hijacked

2. Two flight attendants were stabbed

3. A bomb was in the cockpit

Nothing is mentioned about Craig Marquis contacting the FAA or NORAD, once realizing the emergency. Why not the FBI?

Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM       Craig Marquis, listening to the Air-Phone information from Betty Ong (See - 8:21 AM ), was claimed to have called the American Airlines' system operations control center in Fort Worth. He supposedly stated, "She said two flight attendants had been stabbed, one was on oxygen. A passenger had his throat slashed and looked dead and they had gotten into the cockpit." He relays that four hijackers had come from first-class seats: 2A, 2B, 9A, and 9B. She supposedly stated that the wounded passenger was in seat 10B. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

Did the first class section extend as far back as row 9?

This version conflicts with the seats that Amy Sweeney gave for the hijackers, around the same time: 9D, 9G, and 10B (See - 8:20 AM ). This information was supposedly passed to Gerard Arpey, of American Airlines (see 8:30 AM ). By 9:59, the information was reportedly given to Richard Clarke, as well as other top officials (See - 9:59 AM ).

Lydia Gonzalez reportedly held the headset from Ong up to one ear, and the headset from Marquis to the other. [See - Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01, New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Gonzalez supposedly talked to Marquis continuously until Flight 11 impacted. The first four minutes of this call were later played before the 9-11 Commission. Marquis quickly said, "I'm assuming they've declared an emergency. Let me get ATC [air traffic control] on here. Stand by …. Okay, we're contacting the flight crew now and we're … we're also contacting ATC." In the four recorded minutes, Gonzalez relayed that Ong is saying the hijackers from seats 2A and 2B are in the cockpit with the pilots. There are no doctors on board. All of the first class passengers were supposedly moved into the coach section. The aircraft was reportedly flying very erratically. [See - Independent Commission 1/27/04]

The version doesn't make sense. Was Gonzales in any position of authority, to be making such calls? She should know that a hijacking is an automatic "emergency." Why couldn't she transfer or "conference" the call?

Toward the beginning of the four minute excerpt, from the call which reportedly started at 8:27 (See - 8:23 AM ), Marquis supposedly stated, "We contacted Air Traffic Control, they are going to handle this as a confirmed hijacking. So they're moving all the traffic out of this aircraft's way …. He turned his transponder off, so we don't have a definitive altitude for him. We're just going by … They seem to think that they have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending." Thus, Boston ATC was supposed to be aware that Flight 11 has been hijacked by this time. [See - 9-11 Commission 1/27/04]

8:28 AM       The Boston ATC center called the FAA's Command Center in Herdon, Virginia, telling them that it believes that Flight 11 was hijacked and that it was headed toward New York's airspace. At 8:32, the Command Center function reportedly passed to the Operations Center at the FAA headquarters in Washington. FAA Headquarters was said to have replied that they've just begun discussing the hijack situation with their main FAA New England office. The Command Center reportedly established a teleconference between the Boston, New York, and Cleveland centers [why Cleveland?] enabling Boston to help others understand what's happening. By 8:24 Boston was certain that Flight 11 has been hijacked, still, NORAD was not yet contacted. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

Why is New York Center not the active ATC contact, by this time?

8:30 AM       Gerard Arpey, American Airlines' executive vice president for operations, supposedly hears from manager Joe Burdepelly who stated that he had been trying to page him to tell him about a possible hijacking of Flight 11. Reportedly, Burdepelly told Arpey that he's been informed that another manager, Craig Marquis, was in contact with flight attendant Betty Ong on the hijacked flight (See - 8:21 AM ) and (Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ). Supposedly, Arpey learned that Ong claimed that two other flight attendants were stabbed, that two or three "passengers" are now in the cockpit. Arpey was reported to be the top executive of American Airlines during the early portion of the crisis, as the company president was at home - out of contact. [See - 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

At some point prior to Flight 11 impacting, Arpey also hears about the comment, "We have some aircraft" supposedly made by the hijackers. [See - USA Today 8/13/02]

Around 8:30 AM       Secretary of State Colin Powell left from Lima, Peru after hearing the news.

The question is quickly asked, "Why did he know, prior to the President?" That's no small question.

Many of the US leaders are scattered across the country; and overseas.

1. President Bush was now in Sarasota, Florida.

2. Vice President Cheney and the National Security Advisor are at their offices in the White House.

3. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was at the Pentagon, meeting with a delegation from Capitol Hill.

4. Secretary of State Powell was then in Lima, Peru.

5. The CIA Director Tenet was at breakfast with his old friend and mentor, former Senator David Boren (D), at the St. Regis Hotel, three blocks from the White House.

6. General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was flying to Europe.

7. Ashcroft was flying to Milwaukee. The FBI Director, Mueller, was in his office at FBI headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

8. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta was in his office at the Department of Transportation. [See - Senate Commerce Committee, 9/20/01]

9. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Joe Allbaugh was at a conference, in Montana. [See - ABC, 9/14/02 (B)]

10. George Bush Sr. was supposedly on a flight, en route from Washington to St. Paul, Minnesota. He reportedly had his aircraft diverted to Milwaukee when the air ban began. [See - Time, 9/24/01]

11. The Counterterrorism "leader," Richard Clarke, was at a conference in the Ronald Reagan Building; approximately three blocks from the White House.

8:30 AM       The FAA's Command Center in Herndon, Virginia began the daily senior staff meeting. National Operations Manager Ben Sliney interrupted the meeting, reporting a possible hijacking in progress. The Center had been told about the Flight 11 hijacking a few minutes earlier (see 8:28 AM ). Later, a supervisor interrupted the meeting to report a flight attendant on the hijacked aircraft may have been stabbed (See - Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ). The meeting broke up prior to the first WTC impact at 8:46. Apparently no one in the meeting contacted NORAD. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 12/17/01]

8:30 AM       Captain Charles Leidig, the Deputy for Command Center Operations at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) took over temporarily from Brigadier General Montague Winfield; he was effectively in charge of NMCC during the 9-11 crisis. Winfield requested the previous day that Leidig stand in for him on September 11, starting at this time. Leidig had just started his role as Deputy for Command Center Operations two months prior and had just qualified to stand in for Winfield the previous month. Leidig remained in charge from a few minutes prior to the 9-11 crisis beginning, until approximately 10:30, after the last hijacked aircraft impacted. He presided over an important crisis response teleconference, which had a very slow start (see 9:39 AM ). [See - Independent Commission 6/17/04 (B)]

8:32 AM       The Bush motorcade left the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort on Longboat Key, Florida for the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota.

8:33:59 AM       Another radio transmission, supposedly from American Airlines Flight 11, "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves."

8:34 AM       The Boston Air Traffic Controllers attempted to contact the military, via the FAA's Cape Cod facility. Two fighters sit on twenty-four hour alert at the Otis Air National Guard Base, on Cape Cod. Boston tried reaching this base so that the fighters can be scrambled after Flight 11. Apparently, the Controllers make the contact, prior to going through the usual NORAD channels. The 9-11 Commission left the details vague, as to what the outcome of that call was. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

However, the lead pilot at the Otis base, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (code-named 'duff"), later claimed that he was given an advance warning to get ready to scramble prior to the official notification (See - 8:46 AM ), thanks to a call from Boston ATC (See - 8:40 AM ). [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02]

Why would he be called, versus a command position?

8:34 AM      

Around this time, Boston ATC attempted to contact an Atlantic City, New Jersey air base, to send fighters after Flight 11. Why not NORAD or NEADS? For decades, this air base had two fighters on 24-hour alert status, but this changed in 1998, due to budget cutbacks. The Air Traffic Controllers didn't realize this, apparently trying in vain to reach anyone.

Why the desperation? Their SOP should have been more than sufficient to "… contact anyone."

At the time Flight 11 impacted the north tower of the WTC, two F-16s from this base were reportedly practicing bombing runs on an empty stretch of the Pine Barrens near Atlantic City. They were only eight minutes away from New York City, yet they were not alerted to the emerging crisis. Shortly after the second WTC impact - at 9:03 - the two F-16s were ordered to land, to be refitted with air-to-air missiles, then sent aloft – re-launched over an hour after the second impact.

They were supposedly launched to Washington, but didn't reach there until almost 11:00 (see 10:42 AM ). After 9-11, one newspaper questioned why NORAD "left what seems to be a yawning gap in the midsection of its air defenses on the East Coast — a gap with New York City at the center." [See - Bergen Record, 12/5/03, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

It's academic that had these two fighters been notified at 8:37 - or before - they could have reached New York City prior to Flight 11. Why were they not launched, just to verify the reality?

8:34 AM       Air Traffic Controllers hear one hijacker on Flight 11 say to the passengers: "Nobody move, please, we are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves." [See - 8:33, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 8:33:59, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:33:59, New York Times, 10/16/01, 8:34, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Reportedly, shortly after this, the ATC tapes were played back to hear the words spoken by the hijackers (See - 8:24 AM ). Everyone in the Boston ATC center heard the hijackers say "We have some aircraft." [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

8:35 AM       Flight attendant Amy Sweeney reportedly continued to describe what was happening on board Flight 11 to Michael Woodward at Logan Airport (See - 8:20 AM ). At some point prior to this, she reportedly stated that flight attendants were giving injured people oxygen. [Not First-Aid?] Reportedly, they've made an announcement over the PA system asking if there's a doctor or nurse on board. [The hijackers don't have control of the cabin?] Sweeney was supposedly calling from the rear of the coach section, explaining that the passengers in the "coach" section, separated by curtains from the violence in first class, were calm; believing that there was some type of medical emergency at the front of the aircraft. [The hijackers left the passengers and flight attendants un-guarded?] Supposedly, at that time, the aircraft suddenly lurches, tilting all the way to one side, then rights itself. [no "G" loads described, nor a pitch-down of the nose. Such a maneuver would be beyond the capability of the autopilot, with any of the supposed hijackers (amateur pilots) losing manual control of the pitch of the aircraft, at lease momentarily.] Then she supposedly reportedly stated that it began a rapid descent. [No descriptions of screaming passengers.] She supposedly tried to contact the cockpit again, but still got no response. [See - ABC News 7/18/02; New York Observer 2/11/04]

8:35 AM       Bush's motorcade left for Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. [See - 8:30, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 8:30, BBC, 9/1/02, 8:35, Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01, 8:39, Washington Times, 10/7/02]

8:36 AM       On board Flight 11, flight attendant Betty Ong supposedly also reported that the aircraft tilted all the way to one side then becoming horizontal again. Flight attendant Amy Sweeney then supposedly reported on her phone that the aircraft has begun a rapid descent. [See - ABC News 7/18/02]

These would be critical moments. Why are the flight attendants not involved with 'standard" hijacking procedures?

8:36 AM       A NORAD spokesman, Major Mike Snyder, reportedly said, that the FAA had notified NORAD of a hijacked aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11, approximately 10 minutes prior to the aircraft impacting into the North Tower of the World Trade Center.


Following 8:37 AM       NORAD gave the command to scramble fighters after Flight 11, after being "officially" notified (See - 8:37 AM ). Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, at NEADS, told Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, "I have FAA on the phone, the shout line, Boston Center. They reportedly said "…they have a hijacked aircraft." Marr then called Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD's command Center in Florida, saying, "Boss, I need to scramble [fighters at] Otis [Air National Guard Base]." Arnold recalled, "I said go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get the authorities later." Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

After seeing that the proper authorization had been given, NEADS called Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD's headquarters. Jellinek was sitting near Canadian Air Force Major General, Rick Findley, the director of combat operations there. Findley's staff was "already on high alert" because of a joint US-Canada exercise known as Vigilant Guardian (See - 6:30 AM ), and another joint exercise known as Operation Northern Vigilance (See - 9:00 AM ). Jellinek got the thumbs up authorization from Findley to send fighters after Flight 11. Findley later stated, "At that point all we thought was we've got an aircraft hijacked and we were going to provide an escort as requested. We certainly didn't know it was going to play out as it did." Findley remained in charge of NORAD headquarters while his staff fed information to the NORAD commander-in-chief, Ralph Eberhart, stationed in Florida. [See - CBC 11/27/01; Toronto Star 12/9/01; Ottawa Citizen 9-11/02; Aviation Week and Space Technology 6/3/02]

Two Canadians had charge of NORAD. Nowhere is there a suggestion of an American officer jumping in, to assume "American" control. One must ask what it would take for the "Americans" to act.

8:37 AM       The Air Traffic Controllers asked the United Airlines Flight 175 pilots to look for the lost American Airlines aircraft 10 miles to the south of them. The United pilots responded that they can see it. They were told to keep away from it. [See - Guardian 10/17/01; Boston Globe 11/23/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04] . This incident was not included in The New York Times transcript. Why?


Just prior to this, Flight 11 passed from Boston's airspace into New York's airspace. John Hartling, the New York Air Traffic Controller put in charge of the hijacked flight, later recounted being told that Flight 11 was hijacked: "I didn't believe him. Because I didn't think that that stuff would happen anymore, especially in this country." [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

The statement is almost ludicrous. The acceptance of the statement should have been automatic. A controller would be 100% in the 'reaction" mode.

8:37 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, Boston ATC contacted NEADS (NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector) at this time. This was apparently the first successful "formal" notification of the military about the crisis that morning. Tech. Sgt. Jeremy Powell, a member of the Air National Guard at NEADS, initially took the call from the Boston Center. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Boston ATC reportedly said, "Hi. Boston Center TMU, we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out." Powell replied, "Is this real-world or exercise?" Boston answers, "No, this is not an exercise, not a test." [See - 8:37:52, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, BBC, 9/1/02]

Powell supposedly gave the phone to Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, the regional Mission Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise (See - 6:30 AM ). Deskins later stated that initially she and "everybody" else at NEADS thought the call was part of Vigilant Guardian. After the phone call she had to clarify to everyone that it was not a drill. [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also stated that when he heard of the hijacking, "The first thing that went through my mind was, "..is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?" [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Deskins recalled, "I picked up the line and I identified myself to the Boston Center controller, and he said, we have a hijacked aircraft and I need to get you some sort of fighters out here to help us out." However, the timing of this vital notification is in some dispute. Deskins herself claimed that the call occurred at 8:31. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Another report later stated, "Shortly after 8:30 AM      , behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking [reached] various stations of NORAD." [See - ABC News, 9/14/02]

FAA Administrator Jane Garvey testified in 2003 that the FAA notified NORAD at 8:34. [See - New York Times, 12/30/03]

NORAD, on the other hand, originally claimed they were first notified at 8:40; this was widely reported by the news media prior to the 9-11 Commission's report. [See - 8:40, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:40, AP, 8/19/02, 8:40, BBC, 9/1/02, 8:40, Newsday, 9/10/02]

If 8:37 is the accurate time, that would mean that the Air Traffic Controllers didn't notify NORAD until 24 minutes after radio contact with Flight 11 was lost (See - 8:13 AM ); or around 17 minutes after the transponder signal was lost - and the flight going far off course (See - Between 8:13- 8:21 AM ) and (8:20 AM ), that would also be 13 minutes after voices of the hijackers in the cockpit remove any possible doubt that the aircraft had been hijacked (See - 8:24 AM ).

Nothing makes sense in the reports; add the non-accountability, later.

8:38 AM       American Flight 11 pilot John Ogonowski's reported periodic activation of the "push-to-talk" button, which began around 8:14, stopped around this time. The suggestion being that this was when the hijacker(s) replace him as pilot. [See - Christian Science Monitor 9/13/01; MSNBC 9/15/01]

8:38 AM       The Boston air traffic center notified NORAD that American Airlines Flight 11 was hijacked.

8:40 AM       Major Daniel Nash (code-named "Nasty") and Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy (code-named 'duff") were the two F-15 pilots from the 102nd Fighter Wing of the Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts who later scrambled after Flight 11; then after Flight 175. Reportedly they got several informal calls warning them to get ready. Nash stated that a colleague at the Otis Air National Guard Base told him that a flight out of Boston had been hijacked, and to be on alert. [See - Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] They put on their flight gear and get ready.

8:40 AM       The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) notified NORAD that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked. Even NORAD officially admitted that the FAA told them about the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 at 8:40.

NORAD Press Release:


AP Article On NORAD PR:


A NEADS senior technician, Jeremy Powell, informed of the hijacking at 8:37 (See - 8:37 AM ), stated that he telephoned Otis Air Base and told it to upgrade its 'readiness posture." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Robert Marr, head of NEADS, also stated that after being told of the hijacking at 8:37, he said, "I'll call 1st Air Force [at Otis] and let them know we've got a potential incident." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Boston ATC reportedly tried calling the Otis base directly at 8:34, though the result of that call remains unclear (see 8:34 AM ). Duffy recalled being warned: "I was just standing up by the ops desk and I was told I had a phone call. I asked who it was and they said the [Boston] Tower calling and something about a hijacking. It was Flight American 11, a 767, out of Boston going to California. At the time we ran in and got suited up." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, BBC, 9/1/02, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

Duffy said, "Halfway to the jets, we got "battle stations" … " which means to get ready for action. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

The actual scramble order supposedly didn't come until they were already waiting in the fighters: "We went out, we hopped in the jets and we were ready to go — standby for a scramble order if we were going to get one." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Duffy continued, "I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines flight. About 4-5 minutes later, we got the scramble order and took off." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

However, the official notification to scramble these fighters supposedly didn't come until 8:46. The six minute delay between the unofficial and official notification has not been explained (See - 8:46 AM ).

8:40 A.M. In NORAD's logs, this was the first occasion where the FAA reported a possible hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11. Supposedly, the initial report was a possible hijacking; un-confirmed.

The F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, approximately 153 miles away were placed immediately on battle stations by the Northeast Air Defense Sector Commander.

8:41:32 AM       The pilots of Flight 175 tell ATC about Flight 11, "We figured we'd wait to go to your center. We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed the mike and said: "Everyone stay in your seats." It cut out." [See - 8:41, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:41, Newsday, 9/10/02, 8:41:32, New York Times, 10/16/01]

An alternate version: "We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure from B-O-S [Boston's airport code]. Sounds like someone keyed the mike and said, "Everyone, stay in your seats." " [See - Boston Globe 11/23/01]

That was the last transmission from Flight 175. [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

In theory, ATC would have also heard the call, with the Flight 175 flight crew confirming the report, not delivering an initial report on it.

8:41 AM       Flight 175 flew from Boston ATC airspace into New York ATC airspace. Dave Bottoglia was in charge of monitoring the flight. Bottoglia had just been told by the pilot of Flight 175 that he'd heard the threatening communications from Flight 11 (see 8:41 AM ). Seconds later, a controller sitting next to Bottoglia got up and pointed to a radar blip. He said, "You see this target here? This was American 11. Boston center thinks it's a hijack." Bottoglia keeps watching the blip until it disappeared over New York City, failing to notice Flight 175 for several minutes (see 8:46 AM ). [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

8:42 AM       United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with a maximum capacity of 200 passengers and 11,489 gallons of fuel, departed from Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey bound for San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Its take-off was scheduled for 8:01. There were supposed to be 44 victims on board; according to the official death manifest list, published on CNN.com, there were only 33. It left 41 minutes late because of heavy runway traffic. [See - MSNBC, 9/3/02] [Newsweek 9/22/01; AP 8/19/02; CNN 9/17/01; Guardian 10/17/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:42 AM       An air traffic controller said of United Airlines Flight 175, "..looks like he's heading southbound but there's no transponder no nothing and no one's talking to him."

8:43 AM       NORAD was notified that Flight 175 had been hijacked. [See - 8:43, NORAD, 9/18/01, 8:43, CNN, 9/17/01, 8:43, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 8:43, AP, 8/19/02, 8:43, Newsday, 9/10/02]

In theory, NORAD didn't need to be notified, because by this time NEADS technicians have their headsets linked to the FAA in Boston to hear about Flight 11, so NORAD theoretically learned instantly about Flight 175. [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

The significance of this is that the controllers working Flight 77 and Flight 93 would have been aware of both Flight 175 and Flight 11's hijacking from this time.

8:43 AM       The FAA notified NORAD that United Airlines Flight 175 had been hijacked. NORAD officially admitted that the FAA told them about the hijacking of United Airlines Flight 175 at 8:43.

8:44 AM       The pilot of US Airlines Flight 583 told an unidentified Air Traffic Controller, regarding Flight 175, "I just picked up an ELT [emergency locator transmitter] on 121.5 it was brief but it went off." The controller responded, "O.K. they said it's confirmed believe it or not as a thing, we're not sure yet.… " One minute later, another pilot said, "We picked up that ELT, too, but it's very faint." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01 (B)]

In reality, an ELT signal would not be associated with an airborne airliner.

8:44 AM       Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, talking about terrorism at the Pentagon said, "Let me tell you, I've been around the block a few times. There will be another event." He repeated it for emphasis, "…there will be another event."

This statement is significant, given that many details of the day attest to a lot of details being "officially" known in advance.

Prior to 8:45 AM       At the American Airline's headquarters in Fort Worth, their crisis command center was activated. A page was sent to American's top executives and operations personnel: "Confirmed hijacking Flight 11." The top managers gathered at the command center; watching the "computer feed" radar blip of Flight 11 until it disappeared over New York City. [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

8:45 AM       Just prior to the impact of Flight 11, flight attendant Amy Sweeney was supposedly asked on the phone if she could recognize where she is. She said, "I see the water. I see the buildings. I see buildings," then after a pause, a quiet "Oh, my God!" Seconds later the line went dead. Meanwhile, flight attendant Betty Ong supposedly ended her call repeating the phrase "Pray for us" over and over. Apparently there was quiet, as opposed to screaming in the background. [See - ABC News 7/18/02]

8:46 AM       President Bush was traveling through Sarasota, Florida in a motorcade when the first WTC impact occurred (see(8:35 AM ) and (Between 8:46-8:55 AM ). According to the 9-11 Commission, at that time, "no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that [Flight 11] had been hijacked. Immediately afterward, duty officers at the White House and Pentagon began notifying senior officials what had happened." However, supposedly no one notified President Bush about the impact until his motorcade reached the school, even though there was a highly secure phone in his vehicle, with others in the motorcade being notified. Not even the Jane Garvey, the head of the FAA, nor her deputy had been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learn about the impact from the television. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

By this time Colin Powell has been long notified in South America. The communications scheme is all wrong.

8:46 AM       The Naudet brothers, the French documentary filmmakers, were filming a documentary on New York City firefighters approximately ten blocks from the WTC. One of them heard a roar, looked up, then capturing a distant image of the first WTC impact. They continued shooting footage of the 9-11 carnage for hours. Their footage was first shown that evening on CNN. [See - New York Times, 1/12/02, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 9/19/01]

Thus, Bush's later two claims that he'd seen the first attack live on TV was impossible (See - 9:01 AM ).

Following 8:46 AM       Shortly after the WTC was struck, the FAA opened a telephone line with the Secret Service, keeping them informed of all events. [See - NBC 9/16/01]

Why not NORAD?

8:46 AM       Flight 175 stopped transmitting its transponder signal. It was 50 miles north of New York City, heading toward Baltimore. [See - 8:46:18, Guardian, 10/17/01, "about the same time" as the Flight 11 impact," [See - Newsday, 9/10/02, 8:47, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

However, the transponder was supposedly turned off for only approximately 30 seconds, then changed to a code that was not designated for any aircraft on that day. [See - Newsday, 9/10/02]

This "allow[ed] controllers to track the intruder easily, though they couldn't identify it." [See - Washington Post 9/17/01]

8:46 AM       Two F-15 fighters were ordered to scramble from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts to find Flight 11, approximately 190 miles from the known location of the aircraft; and 188 miles from New York City. [See - 8:39, Channel 4 News, 9/13/01, 8:44, CNN, 9/17/01, 8:44, Washington Post, 9/15/01, 8:44, Los Angeles Times, 9/17/01, 8:46, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Supposedly, NORAD made the decision to scramble after only one phone call. The decision was made to act first and get clearances later. Yet there is a nine minute gap between when the 9-11 Commission stated that NORAD was notified about the hijacking, and when the fighters were ordered scrambled (See - 8:37 AM ). Supposedly, the pilots received several unofficial warnings prior to the official one (See - 8:40 AM ), possibly warned as early as twelve minutes prior(see 8:34 AM ). One of the pilots recalled sitting in the cockpit, ready and waiting for the scramble order to come. [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

Supposedly another six minutes pass before they took off (see 8:52 AM ).

NORAD, by their own version, held on to the information of the two hijackings for at least 6 minutes prior to ordering Otis to scramble. Such bureaucratic "fog" and "friction" are difficult to believe, in this particular environment. NORAD may have held on to the information of American Airlines Flight 11 for possibly 8 minutes, or even 10 minutes (see 8:36 AM #25 statement by NORAD's spokesman, Major Mike Snyder), maybe up to 26 minutes (see 8:20 AM #14 American Airlines Flight 11 transponder signal stopped transmitting its IFF beacon signal). It's necessary to remember that the last transmission of American Airlines Flight 11 to the Boston air traffic control occurred at 8:13:31. NORAD had possibly over 32 minutes before they notified Otis to scramble their two F-15's.

Assuming that's the case, how could NORAD hang on to the 8:40 information of the American Airlines Flight 11 hijacking, versus immediately scrambling Otis? Or; the 8:43 information of the United Airlines Flight 175 hijacking; not immediately scrambling Otis? How could they hang on to the most vital information of both of these hijackings for three and six full minutes prior to notifying Otis to scramble? In such cases, three minutes is a lot of time.

See the NORAD Press Release:


See the AP Article on NORAD PR:


See the two New York Times articles:

Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet But Found No Way to Stop It


Chronology of Plane Impactes: Orders, at the Time of Impact


8:46:26 AM       The first jet, American Airlines Flight 11, impacted the north side of the North Tower (1-World Trade Center) between the 94th and 98th floors. American Airlines Flight 11 was supposedly flying at a speed of 490 miles per hour (MPH).

That speed at sea level is in the realm of "highly-questionable."

When American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower, "it set up vibrations which were transmitted through the building, through its foundation, and into the ground," said Lerner-Lam. The vibrations, as indicated by seismographs at Lamont-Doherty and other locations, were described as the equivalent of a magnitude 0.9 earthquake; too small to be felt.

People in the floors below the 94th of Building 1-WTC started to evacuate. Officials in the South Tower (2 WTC) told people shortly afterward by megaphone and office announcements that they were safe and to stay in their offices. Some people didn't hear the announcement, others ignored the advisory, and evacuated anyway.

8:46 AM       NORAD claimed this time as receiving the last of very little radar data for the "primary targets," which was not actively noticed on 9-11. It was reportedly reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron and other agencies; professionals at reviewing radar tapes.

This is an interesting issue, by itself. Why couldn't NORAD see these primary targets? Why wasn't the data immediately made public? Particularly that portion of 9-11 had no aspect of "national secrecy," except to obscure failures, which the public needed to know about. The Pentagon and Pennsylvania sites will demonstrate "no aircraft;" where did those two aircraft go. There's the secret!

While the NORAD system is centered on primary targets, the FAA system is largely dependent on transponders. The ability of the FAA to detect Primary Targets is largely a function of the quality of the radar equipment itself; different areas have different quality radar antennas. Additionally, the software which interprets and displays the primary targets is another variable. The allocation of hardware and software is a function of cost-based priorities. The farmland of Missouri or Pennsylvania won't have the same ATC priority as a major city.

There is a certain amount of FAA-NORAD radar data interfacing. However, that is a matter of professional forensic analysis, in the case of 9-11.

8:46 AM       The Otis F-15s were scrambled; airborne in six minutes - well within the time allowed for them to get airborne.

8:46 AM       The United Airlines Flight 175 transponder stopped transmitting.

Following 8:46 AM       Bush would say in a speech later that evening: "Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans." [See - White House, 9-11/01]

Bush just departed the hotel for the school. According to reports and images on television, it was the lower-level officials who activated the Conplan — the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.

8:46:26 AM       Flight 11 impacted the WTC North Tower. See - CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01 (B); CNN 9/17/01; NORAD 9/18/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; AP 8/19/02; USA Today 9/3/02; USA Today 8/13/02; Newsday 9/10/02; Guardian 10/17/01; MSNBC 9/22/01; New York Times 9-11/02; USA Today 12/20/01]

Reportedly, the aircraft still had approximately 10,000 gallons of fuel on board; and was traveling 470 mph. [See - New York Times 9-11/02; USA Today 12/20/01]

That speed, at sea level, is in the realm of "highly-questionable."

8:46 AM       The New York Air Traffic Controller Dave Bottoglia was in charge of monitoring both Flights 11 and 175. He had just watched Flight 11's radar blip disappear over New York City, not realizing that the aircraft had just impacted. "Within seconds" of losing Flight 11's blip, he realized that Flight 175 was also missing. He had another controller take over all his other aircraft so he could focus on finding Flight 175. He reportedly tried contacting the aircraft several times unsuccessfully. Curt Applegate, who was sitting at the radar screen next to Bottoglia, reportedly saw a blip which might be the missing Flight 11. It's actually the missing Flight 175. As Bottoglia noticed it, the transponder signal came back on, with a different code than before (See - 8:46 AM ). MSNBC reported, "There was no longer any question in Bottoglia's mind that he's looking at a second hijacked airliner." He watched it turn to the east and start descending. He kept an eye on it; watching it head toward at Delta Flight 2315. He recalled saying to the Delta flight, "Traffic, 2:00, 10 miles. I think he's been hijacked. I don't know his intentions. Take any evasive action necessary." Flight 2315 reportedly took evasive action, missing Flight 175 by less than 200 feet. [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

The version of Flight eleven is questionable, as the radar "ground clutter" of the buildings of New York City should have obscured the flight, from the ATC "Center" radar.

Still no claim that NORAD was yet notified about the hijacking. According to one NORAD timeline, NORAD was notified by Boston ATC three minutes earlier (see 8:43 AM ). The 9-11 Commission seemed to completely ignore this version from Bottoglia, instead citing his noticing the transponder change at 8:51, not as it was happening, as he claimed (see 8:51-8:53 AM ).

8:46 AM       Flight attendant Amy Sweeney was reportedly still on the phone with Michael Woodward, describing the conditions on Flight 11 (See - 8:20 AM ) and (8:35 AM ). The aircraft was reportedly nearing New York City; with the coach section passengers quiet, apparently unaware a hijacking was in progress. Woodward reportedly asks Sweeney to look out the window to see if she can tell what was going on. She reportedly replied, "I see the water. I see the building. I see buildings." She reportedly told him the aircraft was flying very low. She supposedly then took a slow, deep breath and slowly said, "Oh my God!" Woodward reportedly heard a loud click; then silence. [See - Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, ABC News, 7/18/02]

In reality, the passengers would have been asking a lot of questions. The flight attendants would have been keenly aware of the low altitude (just by virtue of the cabin pressurization changes, alone) and would have "prepared" the cabin for a landing. The flight attendants would also be busy attending to the hijacker(s) and keeping the passengers calm – requiring a lot of open communication. An ignorant passenger going to the lavatory could inadvertently trigger an on-board disaster. The flight attendants would be trying to find any "able-bodied passengers" to assist with either the hijacking or eventual evacuation. In such a call, they would be describing their actions and frustrations. If they suspected the pilots to be dead, they would be frantically be seeking out any pilots – of any kind – among the passengers.

Supposedly, there are at least four hijackers on the flight; they would be managing the passengers, themselves. There are no such descriptions. Given the quantity of hijackers cited, it's ludicrous to think that there wouldn't be major interactions between the flight attendants and the hijackers.

A factual report by a flight attendant would be more on the order of:

"This is ___, on Flight ____; we've been hijacked. I'm on my cell phone, this has to be quick. Get a pen, let me know when you're ready to copy." "There are four middle-easterners from coach, armed with ____, they claim to have a bomb. It's in a fanny-pack, with just a switch on the outside; I can't see anything inside. One hijacker is in the cockpit. They got the crash axe. I don't know names or seat numbers, everybody moved around, when they got on board. They are speaking to each other in Arabic, I think; I can't make out names. No demands are being made, they just want everybody quiet; I don't know where we're going – looks like into Kennedy. They won't let anyone near them. They are holding ____ hostage, threatening to kill her first, then the passengers. No word from the cockpit; nothing. I don't know what's happening in the 'pit. Gotta go."

Reportedly, flight attendant Betty Ong, on another phone, didn't deliver such dramatic descriptions, repeatedly saying "Pray for us. Pray for us," before her phone call ended. (See - 8:21 AM ) and (8:23 AM ).

However dramatic, she should have been trying to coordinate a number of anti-hijacking details. Even if she was just a junior flight attendant, the others would be tasking her for assistance.

8:46 - 8:50 AM       Rick Tepper, an Air Traffic Controller at the Newark, New Jersey tower, reportedly looked across the Hudson River at New York City in time to see the explosion of Flight 11. Another Air Traffic Controller tried to find out what caused it. He recalled that in the next few minutes, "We contacted La Guardia, Kennedy Tower, and Teterboro Tower to find out if they lost an aircraft. And they all stated that they didn't know what it was. I got on the phone to the en route air traffic control's facility out in New York on Long Island, and I asked them if they'd lost any aircraft, and they said, "No, but Boston Center lost an aircraft. They lost an American 767."

The coordination between ATC centers should have "handed off" the flight, regardless. The New York Center and all possible New York ATC agencies should have been on notice, just for an anticipated hostage scenario. In all of the 9-11 reports, there is no description of a hostage scene preparation. WHY?

8:46 AM       At the time of the first WTC impact, three F-16s assigned to Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, were reported to be flying an air-to-ground training mission in North Carolina, 207 miles away. Eventually they were recalled to Andrews and landed there at some point after Flight 77 impacted into the Pentagon. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

8:47 AM       NORAD was informed of American Airlines Flight 11 striking the World Trade Center.

8:47 AM       NYC Fire Battalion Chief Joe Pfeiffer from the 7th Battalion put out an emergency call stating that American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the north side of the North Tower (1 World Trade Center) was no accident.

8:48 AM       Canadian Air Force Major General Rick Findley was reportedly in charge of the exercise "battle stations" at NORAD's Colorado headquarters. [NORAD is a joint-operations effort, shared between the USA and Canada.] According to Findley, "As the phones were beginning to ring, someone said "Sir, you might want to look at that." I looked up and there was the CNN image of the World Trade Center. There was a hole in the side of one of the buildings." Someone reportedly told him it was a small aircraft. "I said the hole's too big for a small aircraft …. I asked if it was the hijacked aircraft. I was scratching my head, wondering if it was another aircraft altogether."

8:48 AM       A manager at a New York ATC center manager spoke in a teleconference between flight centers. The person reportedly said, "Okay. This is New York Center. We're watching the aircraft [Flight 11]. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they've told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there were people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft, and that's all the information they have right now." The manager was apparently unaware that Flight 11 had already impacted. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Following 8:48 AM       The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers saw the first WTC impact [coverage] on television. Myers was the acting Chairman of the US military during the 9-11 crisis, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Henry Shelton was flying to Europe. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Reportedly he saw the TV coverage in an outer office of Senator Max Cleland (D), but said, "They thought it was a small aircraft or something like that," so he went ahead with the meeting with Cleland. He stated that "nobody informed us" about the second WTC impact. Thus, he remained oblivious that there was an emergency. He was leaving the meeting with Cleland, as the Pentagon explosion took place at 9:38. Then he spoke to General Ralph Eberhart. [See - AFPS, 10/23/01]

However, in his version on September 13, 2001, he stated, "after the second tower was struck, I spoke to the commander of NORAD, General Eberhart. And at that point, I think the decision was at that point to start launching aircraft." [See - Myers Confirmation Testimony, 9/13/01]

NORAD claimed the first fighters were scrambled even before the first WTC strike. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

In the 2004 testimony before the 9-11 Commission, Myers' version changed again. He stated that he got a call from Eberhart; then 'shortly thereafter that the Pentagon was struck as we were on our way back to the Pentagon." [See - 9-11 Commission, 6/17/04 (B)]

Myers' claim of being out of the loop contradicted his previous version, and also that of the Richard Clarke version of what Myers did that day. Clarke placed Myers as taking part in a video conference from approximately 9:10 until after 10:00 (see - (Between 9:45-9:55 AM ), and (After 10:06 AM ). If Myers was not involved in that conference, his whereabouts and actions remain unknown until his travel to the Pentagon; showing up at the NMCC around 10:30 (See - Before 10:30 AM ) and (10:30 AM ).

8:48 AM       The first news reports appeared on TV and radio, that an aircraft may have impacted into the WTC. [See - New York Times, 9/15/01 [C], CNN, 9-11/01, Toronto Star, 1/7/03]

CNN was the first major TV network to show footage of the impact scene. CNN broke into a commercial, with anchor Carol Lin saying, "This just in. You are looking at … obviously a very disturbing live shot there — that is the World Trade Center, and we have unconfirmed reports this morning that an aircraft had impacted into one of the towers of the World Trade Center." CNN then switched to Sean Murtagh, the network's vice president of finance, who said, "I just witnessed an airplane that appeared to be cruising at a slightly lower than normal altitude over New York City. And it appears to have impacted into — I don't know which tower it is — but it strike directly in the middle of one of the World Trade Center towers. It was a jet, maybe a two-engine jet, maybe a 737 … a large passenger commercial jet … It was teetering back and forth, wing-tip to wing-tip, and it looks like it had impacted into-probably, twenty stories from the top of the World Trade Center — maybe the eightieth to eighty-fifth floor. There is smoke billowing out of the World Trade Center." [See - A Pretext for War, by James Bamford, 6/04, pp. 16-17]

8:49 AM       United Airlines Flight 175 deviated from its assigned flight path.

8:49 AM       Businessman Peter Hanson reportedly called his father from Flight 175, saying, "Oh, my God! They just stabbed the airline hostess. I think the airline is being hijacked." He was supposedly cut off twice. Still he reportedly managed to state that men armed with knives were stabbing flight attendants, apparently in an attempt to force crew to unlock the doors to the cockpit. He reportedly called again and reportedly said good-bye just before the aircraft impacted. [See - around 8:49, Telegraph, 9/16/01 (B), Toronto Sun, 9/16/01, BBC, 9/13/01]

The 9-11 Commission later concluded, "Reports from Flight 175 included one passenger predicting the hijackers intended to fly an aircraft into a building." [See - CNN 3/10/04]

8:49 AM       According to the Wall Street Journal, the managers at the United Airlines' headquarters in Chicago were unaware of any unfolding emergency until they watched the CNN story at 8:48. "Within minutes," United headquarters got a call from the FAA saying that the aircraft which had impacted into the WTC was an American Airlines passenger aircraft. At approximately the same time and prior to a call about the flight at approximately 8:50 (See - 8:50 AM ), a manager reportedly said to Jim Goodwin, United's chairman and chief executive, "Boss, we've lost contact with one of our aircraft [Flight 175]." [See - Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01]

Why would the FAA advise United of the "gossip" of American Airlines, when it knew that United also had a flight in trouble?

8:50 AM       Flight 175, had passed New York City, flying south, then made a U-turn; heading back north toward the city. [See - CNN 9/17/01]

8:50 AM       As soon as the Boston Air Traffic Controllers heard the news that an aircraft might have strike the WTC, they were sure it was Flight 11. They were tracking it continually since it first began behaving erratically. It took 'several minutes" for Boston to report to NORAD that they thought that Flight 11 was the aircraft. [See - New York Times 9/13/01 (F); Newhouse News 1/25/02]

8:50 AM       Rich 'doc" Miles, the manager of United's Chicago system operations center, reportedly received a call from a mechanic at the airline maintenance center in San Francisco, which took in-flight calls from flight attendants about broken items. The mechanic reportedly stated that a female flight attendant from Flight 175 just called and said, "Oh my God. The crew has been killed, a flight attendant has been stabbed. We've been hijacked." Then the line went dead. A dispatcher monitoring the flight then was reported to have sent messages to the aircraft's cockpit computer; with no response. [See - "a little more" than 8:47, Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01, "around 8:50," Boston Globe, 11/23/01, "around 8:50," 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

That information was quickly relayed to the United headquarters. [See - 9-11 Commission, 1/27/04]

8:50 AM       The last radio contact with Flight 77 was made when a pilot asked for clearance for a higher altitude. Six minutes later, the aircraft failed to respond to a routine ATC instruction. Presumably it was hijacked during that time frame. The aircraft was being handled by the Indianapolis ATC center. [See - Guardian 10/17/01; Boston Globe 11/23/01; New York Times 10/16/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:50 AM       CIA Director Tenet was told of the first WTC impact while he was eating breakfast with his mentor, former Senator David Boren. Boren reportedly stated that Tenet was told that the WTC had been attacked by an aircraft: "I was struck by the fact that [the messenger] used the word attacked." Tenet then reportedly handed the cell phone back to an aide and said to Boren, "You know, this has bin Laden's fingerprints all over it." [See - ABC, 9/14/02]

While there were 'suggestions" of bin Laden's forces planning such a mission, there was nothing viable that suggested that he was anywhere close to actually doing such.

Another version had Tenet saying into the phone, "They steered the aircraft directly into the building?" Then he reportedly stated to Boren, "That looks like Bin Laden." In a reference to recently arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, he mused out loud, "I wonder if this has something to do with the guy who trained for a pilot's license." [See - Stern, 8/13/03]

If these versions are accurate, it certainly negates the claim of surprise.

8:50:51 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 last radio communication occurred, approximately 285 miles west of the Pentagon.

8:51 AM       Bush arrived at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida for a photo op with a band of 16 second graders. He went there to promote his administration's new bill on education.

8:52 AM       Mike McCormick, head of the New York ATC center, saw the first WTC attack images on CNN. He assumed that Flight 175, which he had on his radar screen, was also headed to the WTC. He reportedly said, "Probably one of the most difficult moments of my life was the 11 minutes from the point I watched that aircraft, when we first lost communications until the point that aircraft strike the World Trade Center. For those 11 minutes, I knew, we knew, what was going to happen, and that was difficult." [See - CNN, 8/12/02]

Strangely, according to the 9-11 Commission, this ATC center didn't notify NORAD of Flight 175 until after it impacted (See - 9:03 AM ).

8:52 AM and after) There are differing versions as to how long the F-15s which were scrambled from Otis took to reach New York City. According to pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, they were in a hurry. Duffy later recalled, "We've been over the flight a thousand times in our minds and I don't know what we could have done to get there any quicker." However, though Duffy reportedly stated that he'd been warned that Flight 11 had been hijacked and appeared to be headed toward New York City, he reportedly seemed not to realize it was something other than a routine exercise: "It's just peacetime. We're not thinking anything real bad was going to happen out there." [See - BBC, 9/1/02, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

But in another version, Duffy claimed that a fellow officer told him prior to takeoff, "This looks like the real thing." Duffy recalled, "It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

"Full-blower" implies that the fighters were flying at or near their full speed. An F-15 can fly over 1875 mph. [See - Air Force News, 7/30/97]

While "full blower" (afterburner) requires a huge amount of fuel to maintain those high speeds, a NORAD commander noted that those fighters were stocked with extra fuel. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Duffy later said, "As we're climbing out, we go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us." He reportedly stated that their target destination was over Kennedy airport in New York City. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

He said, "When we [took] off we [started] climbing a 280-heading, basically towards New York City. I [was] supersonic …. We [were] to proceed to Manhattan directly and set up a combat air patrol." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

There were different versions offered, as to just how quickly they traveled. According to Major Gen. Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, "The pilots [flew] "like a scalded ape," topping 500 mph but [were] unable to catch up to the airliner." [See - Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01]

ABC News later said, "The fighters are hurtling toward New York at mach 1.2, nearly 900 miles per hour." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

NORAD's commander, Major General Larry Arnold, reportedly stated that they headed straight for New York City at approximately 1100 to 1200 mph. [See - MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C), Slate, 1/16/02]

"An F-15 departing from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes, according to an Otis spokeswoman." [See - Cape Cod Times, 9/16/01]

Given an average speed of 1,125 mph, the fighters would have reached the city in 10 minutes — around 9:02. Thus, if Arnold's speed citation was correct, those fighters would have reached Flight 175 just before it impacted. Still, according to a NORAD timeline published just after 9-11, the aircraft took approximately 19 minutes to reach New York City (approximately at 9:11), as they would have been traveling below supersonic speeds at less than 600 mph. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

The 9-11 Commission later concluded that the fighters were never directed to New York City at all, despite the versions of the pilots and others, instead heading out over the ocean (See - 9:08-9:13 AM ). They reportedly didn't reach New York City until 9:25. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:52 AM       The two F-15s took off from Otis Air National Guard Base, 153 miles east-northeast of the WTC, six minutes after being scrambled to go after Flight 11 - which had already impacted. That was 39 minutes after the Air Traffic Controllers lost contact with Flight 11 (See - 8:13 AM ); 26 minutes after the Air Traffic Controllers were certain that Flight 11 was hijacked (See - 8:24 AM ). [See - NORAD 9/18/01; CNN 9/17/01; Washington Post 9/15/01; ABC News 9-11/02; Washington Post 9/12/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:53 AM       ATC reportedly stated to other aircraft about United Airlines Flight 175, "We may have a hijack. We have some problems over here right now."

8:51-8:53 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the Air Traffic Controller handling Flight 175 (presumably Dave Bottoglia [MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]) just noticed that the flight's transponder code had changed. However, indications point to this occurring around 8:46 (See - 8:46 AM ). The controller asked the aircraft to 'squawk" its proper transponder code - with no response. From 8:52, he made repeated attempts to contact the aircraft, with no response. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] ] He reportedly contacted another controller at 8:53, saying, "We may have a hijack. We have some problems over here right now." [See - Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:53:23, New York Times, 10/16/01, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This version conflicts with earlier versions that NORAD was actually notified at 8:43, that Flight 175 had been hijacked (see 8:43 AM ). It also conflicts with Bottoglia's own version on finding Flight 175 at 8:46; realizing that it was hijacked (see 8:46 AM ).

Between 8:46 - 8:55 AM       When Flight 11 impacted the WTC at 8:46, Bush's motorcade was just crossing the John Ringling Causeway, en route to Booker Elementary, from the Colony Beach & Tennis Resort, located on Longboat Key. [See - Washington Times, 10/8/02]

Sarasota Magazine claimed that President Bush was on Highway 301, just north of Main Street when he was advised that an aircraft had impacted in New York City. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

Around that same time, Eric Draper, a news photographer, was riding with Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. He reportedly heard Fleischer say on a cell phone, "Oh, my God, I don't believe it. An airplane just strike the World Trade Center." Fleischer was reportedly told that he would be needed on arrival to discuss reports of the impact. [See - Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/01, Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02]

Fleischer was reportedly told this "just minutes" after the first news reports. [See - MSNBC, 10/29/02]

Congressman Dan Miller also reportedly stated that he was also told about the impact, just prior to meeting Bush at Booker at 8:55. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

Some of the reporters who were waiting for Bush to arrive also learned of the impact just minutes after it happens. [See - CBS, 9-11/02 (B)]

8:53 AM       In the radar reconstruction, NORAD was just picking up the primary radar returns of the F-15s, launched out of Otis.

8:54 AM       Flight 77 from Washington-Dulles reportedly began to go off course over southern Ohio. It reportedly turned to the southwest. [See - Washington Post 9/12/01; Newsday 9/23/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

8:55 AM       The head New York Air Traffic Controller notified a local manager that she believed that Flight 175 had been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers, but was told the managers were discussing the hijacking of Flight 11 and refused to be disturbed. Strangely, even though the controller who was managing Flight 175 reportedly said "we may have a hijack" at 8:53, NORAD was still not notified. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This version was according to the 9-11 Commission. However, this version conflicts with the previous versions that NORAD was notified of the Flight 175 hijacking at 8:43 (see 8:43 AM ). The head of the ATC center, Mike McCormick, had already decided at 8:52 that Flight 175 had been hijacked and was also on a suicide run to New York City (See - 8:52 AM ).

8:55 AM       Bush's motorcade arrived at the Booker Elementary school. [See - 8:46, ABC News, 9-11/02, 8:55, Washington Times, 10/7/02, 8:55, Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01, "just before 9:00," Telegraph, 12/16/01, 'shortly before 9:00," Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/10/02, "just before 9:00," New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), 9:00, Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02]

Prior to 8:55 AM       Captain Deborah Loewer, the director of the White House Situation Room, was traveling with the Bush motorcade to the Saratoga elementary school. She received a message from her deputy in the White House Situation Room on the first WTC impact. As soon as the motorcade reached the school, she ran from her car to Bush's car, passing the message to Bush. [See - Catholic Telegraph, 12/7/01, AP, 11/26/01] However, apparently Bush already knew (See - Between 8:46-8:55 AM ).

8:55 AM       A PA was broadcast inside the WTC South Tower, saying that the building was secure and that people can return to their offices. [See - New York Times, 9-11/02]

These announcements continue until a few minutes before the building was struck. No one knows exactly what was exactly stated (although many later recalled the phrase "the building is secure" ); or who gave the authority for that message. [See - USA Today, 9/3/02]

Additionally, security agents inside the building reportedly repeated similar messages. One survivor recounted hearing, "Our building is secure. You can go back to your floor. If you're a little winded, you can get a drink of water or coffee in the cafeteria." [See - New York Times, 9/13/01 (G)]

Despite the messages, approximately two-thirds of the tower's occupants evacuated during the 17 minutes between the attacks. [See - USA Today 12/20/01]

8:55 AM       Barbara Olson, a passenger on American Airlines Flight 77, "allegedly called" her husband, the Solicitor General, Ted Olson at the Justice Department. She reportedly said, ''they have box cutters and knives. They rounded up the passengers at the back of the aircraft.'' She reportedly asked him, "What should I tell the pilot to do?" She was reportedly cut off. Ted reportedly called the Justice Department command center to alert them to the hijacking. Barbara reportedly called back, saying that the aircraft was turning around. She appeared to have been the only person on American Airlines Flight 77 to call someone on the ground. Why was she the only person who "allegedly called" from American Airlines Flight 77?"


911 Planes Exceeded Their Software Limits / Cell Phone Calls Could Not Have Been Made


Ghost Riders In The Sky An Alternative 9-11 Scenario

by A. K. Dewdney



Operation Pearl

by A. K. Dewdney


8:56 AM       Flight 77's transponder was turned off. [See - 8:56, Guardian, 10/17/01, 8:56, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 'six minutes before" Flight 175 strike WTC, Newsday, 9/23/01]

According to the 9-11 Commission, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controller in charge of the flight had seen it go off course and head southwest before the signal disappeared. He looked for a primary radar signal along the projected flight path, as well as in the airspace where it first had started to turn. He reportedly couldn't find the aircraft. He reportedly tried contacting American Airlines, but got no answer. The controller reportedly had not been informed of the other hijacked aircraft. He reportedly assumed Flight 77 had experienced electrical or mechanical failure. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The New York Times recounted the controller's attempts, " "American 77, Indy," "American 77, Indy, radio check. How do you read?" By 8:56 AM, it was evident that Flight 77 was lost." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

This version adds to the bizarre. Another flight with three indications of a hijacking – with totally inappropriate response. In this case it borders on ludicrous that any controller in the country would not have heard of the WTC strikes. Few Americans didn't know of the WTC strikes, within minutes.

Flight 77 was off course with its radio and transponder inoperative. Once again, NORAD was supposedly not notified, even though an attempt was made to notify American Airlines headquarters (See - Before 9:00 AM ); the Pentagon's NMCC was apparently notified, as well (See - After 8:50 AM ). Other centers were notified of the Flight 11 hijacking over twenty minutes earlier (see 8:25 AM ).

Beyond the assigned controller, a supervisor should have been notified. That supervisor should have been aware of the hijack potential; prepared to follow protocol. The same protocol violation in different centers is off-scale for the element of probability.

Following 8:56 AM       The New York Times reported, 'during the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 [was] under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in [the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (see )] [were] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do." [See - New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

8:57 AM       The FAA formally notified the military that American Airlines Flight 11 had impacted into the WTC. Until that notification, the two F-15's from Otis did not know that the aircraft had impacted - however at 8:47 AM, NORAD had been notified. Why could it take over 10 minutes to inform the F-15's of this, with United Airlines Flight 175 now headed directly for New York City?

CNN coverage was just beginning to appear of the burning tower shortly after the impact. NORAD would appeal for an understanding, pleading "fog" and "friction" of war. NORAD, by implication, needs to have someone watching the newswires, as well as the radar scopes.

8:58 AM       Brian Sweeney, on United Flight 175 reportedly called his wife but can only leave a message. "We've been hijacked, and it doesn't look too good." Next, he called his mother; to tell her what was happening onboard. [See - Hyannis News, 9/13/01, Washington Post, 9/21/01]

She recalled him saying, "They might come back here. I might have to go. We were going to try to do something about this." She also recalled him identifying the hijackers as Middle Eastern. The 9-11 Commission later concluded that the Flight 175 passengers planned to storm the cockpit but didn't have time before the aircraft impacted. [See - CNN 3/10/04; New York Daily News 3/9/04]

Following 9:00 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, shortly after 9:00, the Indianapolis ATC Center started notifying other government agencies that American 77 was missing, possibly having impacted. At 9:08, Indianapolis reportedly contacted the Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, advising them to look out for a downed aircraft. They also reportedly contacted the West Virginia State Police, asking whether or not they have any reports of a downed aircraft. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

With three indications of a hijacking, against the immediate WTC history, the ATC version is absurd, nigh unto criminal; factual, or otherwise.

9:00 AM       Richard Clarke was reportedly at a conference three blocks from the White House when he was alerted to the crisis, by phone. He ran to his car, ordering, "Activate the CSG on secure video. I'll be there in less than five." The CSG was the Counterterrorism Security Group, comprised of the leaders of the government's counterterrorism and security agencies. Clarke hurriedly drove to the White House.

Between 8:55 and 9:00 AM       Just after the WTC impact, the pagers of the politicians' aides were sounding en masse, with the news of the first WTC impact. Bush was just entering Booker Elementary School, in Florida. According to reports, Karl Rove rushed up, took Bush aside, and told him about the calamity. Rove reportedly stated that the cause of the impact was unclear. Bush reportedly replied, "What a horrible accident!" Bush also suggested the pilot may have had a heart attack. [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02]

Dan Bartlett, the White House Communications Director, also stated that he was present when Bush was told: "[Bush] being a former pilot, had kind of the same reaction, going, was it bad weather? And I said no, apparently not." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

One version explicitly stated that Rove told Bush that the WTC had been struck by a large commercial airliner. [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Bush later remembered Rove saying that it appeared to be an accident involving a small, twin-engine aircraft. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

In yet a later recollection, Bush recalled that it was chief of staff Andrew Card who first told him, saying, " "Here's what you're going to be doing; you're going to meet so-and-so, such-and-such." And Andy Card said, "By the way, an aircraft flew into the World Trade Center." " [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02]

Prior to 9:00 AM       The fire department commanders at the WTC Tower No. 1 advised the Port Authority police and the building personnel to evacuate Tower No. 2. There is no evidence that the advice was effectively communicated to those personnel in Tower No. 2. When Tower No. 2 did make the announcement to evacuate - 9:02 (one minute before it was impacted), the message was ambiguous advice, stating that everyone may wish to start an orderly evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 5/19/04]

8:59 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 supposedly completed a180 degree turn over southern Ohio / northeastern Kentucky; starting directly back to Washington D.C. , 330 miles away.

9:00 AM       United Airlines systems operations issued a system-wide warning to its pilots, citing a potential "cockpit intrusion." United Airlines Flight 93, flying over Pennsylvania replied "Confirmed."

9:00 AM       The last radar contact on United Airlines Flight 175 was observed at an altitude of 18,000 feet, descending, at a ground speed of 480 knots.

9:00 AM       The FAA began contacting all airliners, warning them of the hijackings.

9:00 AM       The Pentagon moved its alert status up one notch from "normal" to Alpha. It stayed on Alpha until after the American Airlines Flight 77 purportedly struck the Pentagon.

9:00 AM       (B) The National Reconnaissance Office had planned a simulation of an aircraft accidentally impacting into its headquarters, located four miles from the Washington -Dulles airport. The NRO was described as "operating many of the nation's spy satellites; drawing its personnel from the military and the CIA." The simulation was run by John Fulton "and his team at the CIA." An agency spokesman claimed, "It was just an incredible coincidence that this happened to involve an aircraft impacting into our facility. As soon as the real world events began, we canceled the exercise." [See - AP 8/21/02; UPI 8/22/02]

9:00 AM       National Security Advisor Rice later claimed that she was in her White House office when she heard about the first WTC impact, just prior to 9:00. She recalled, "I thought to myself, what an odd accident." She reportedly spoke to Bush at 9:00 on the telephone; telling him that a twin-engine aircraft had struck the WTC tower. She reportedly said, "That's all we know right now, Mr. President." Despite her position as National Security Advisor, she seems to have been oblivious that NORAD knew that there were at least two hijackings in progress for over 15 minutes. She continued her national security staff meeting (See - After 9:03 AM ). [See - Newsweek 12/31/01]

9:00 AM       The NORAD headquarters in Colorado, was at "full "battle staff" levels for a major annual exercise, which was designed to test every facet of the organization. The exercise was named "Operation Northern Vigilance." The exercise had begun two days earlier, deploying fighters to Alaska and Northern Canada to monitor a factual Russian air force exercise in the Russian arctic. Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek was one hour into his shift, overseeing the Colorado command center, when he learned that the FAA believed there was a hijacking in progress, asking NORAD for support. "Northern Vigilance" was called off. As the Toronto Star reports, "Any simulated information, known as an "inject," was purged from the [radar] screens." [See - NORAD, 9/9/01, ]

The "inject" was digitally simulated radar 'display" data, added to the "normal" displays. This data would ordinarily be used to simulate targets for the participating fighters to intercept.

Thus, many minutes into the factual 9-11 attack, there could have been false radar blips causing confusion. However, that data would have been programmed, allowing for later isolation of the factual data. (Not seen to the present day.) According to Jellinek, the cancellation of Northern Vigilance came just a minute or two prior to the second WTC impact at 9:03. The Russians, having also observed the second WTC impact on television, quickly communicated that they were canceling their Russian arctic exercises. [See - National Post 10/19/02]

It is interesting to note the role of public television, amidst the crisis of the day.

Most overlook another bizarre circumstance; a Canadian, Major General Eric Findley, was supposedly in charge of NORAD that day. He reportedly had his staff immediately order as many U.S. fighters into the air as possible. [See - Ottawa Citizen, 9-11/02] Two Canadians had charge of NORAD. Nowhere is there a suggestion of an American officer jumping in, to assume "American" control. Why would a Canadian be left at the helm of American defenses?

Between 8:55 - 9:00 AM       Just after Bush arrived at the Booker Elementary School, having been briefly told of the WTC impact, he was reportedly taken into a holding room; updated on the situation via telephone by National Security Advisor Rice. [See - Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/01, Time, 9/12/01]

Rice later claimed, "He said, what a terrible, it sounds like a terrible accident. Keep me informed." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

The school principal, Gwen Tose-Rigell, was summoned into a room to talk with the President: "He said a commercial aircraft has struck the World Trade Center, and we're going to go ahead and go on, we're going on to do the reading thing anyway." [See - AP, 8/19/02 (D)]

That briefing also gave him every avenue needed to leave, then or later. At a minimum – given the "93 bombing history - he should have delayed the event, to speak with other agencies. With a second aircraft listed as "hijacked," the sense of the crisis couldn't have been unknown at his level.

Prior to 9:00 AM       The American Airlines headquarters in Forth Worth, Texas, learned [from the FAA] that Flight 77 was not responding to radio calls, was not emitting a transponder code, and that ATC that had lost its location (See - 8:56 AM ). [See - Independent Commission, 1/27/04]

Those three indications, against the previous hijackings, told only one story. American Airlines knew of the crisis, but not Bush.

According to the Wall Street Journal version, the FAA call roughly stated that Flight 77 had "turned off its transponder and turned around. Controllers [have] lost radio communications with the aircraft. Without hearing from anyone on the aircraft, American [didn't] know its location." Airline executive Gerard Arpey reportedly gave an order to stop further American Airlines take-offs in the Northeast. Within minutes, American Airlines reportedly got the word that United also had an aircraft missing; also out of contact (presumably this was Flight 175). When the reports started coming in after 9:03, concerning the second WTC impact, one manager recalled mistakenly shouting, "How did 77 get to New York and we didn't know it?" [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

8:56-9:05 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission informational presentation, "Radar reconstructions performed after 9-11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked [Flight 77] from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56." Reportedly, for eight minutes and thirteen seconds, the primary radar data was not available to the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controllers. "The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying." [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The radar data is the true smoking gun in all of 9-11. Two aircraft are unaccounted for. Whether the FAA or DoD radar data, where are the facts? For all the purported mistakes, where are the investigations, reprimands and terminations; and/or forced retirements?

Following 9:00 AM       Ed Ballinger, the flight dispatcher for United Airlines, reportedly sent the same warning to all United flights: "Beware of cockpit intrusion." Flight 93 reportedly replied, "Hi Ed. Confirmed." By all indications, the pilots were not told why, what happened at the WTC, or that another aircraft was missing. [See - "Just after 9:00," New York Observer, 6/17/04]

In the airline industry, the cockpits are incredibly 'sterile" of outside information. However, something such as a ball-game score is readily available, upon request. Each airline has it's "company frequency" for casual operational information. There are a handful of "chat" frequencies, which the airliners "illegally" use on occasion. How could the WTC events have escaped the attention of the airways? While there would be a certain level of professionalism, preventing audio congestion, a few cryptic messages would leak through. Additionally, the modern airliners have an "ACARS" messaging system to relay important information. That information would be destined to leak at an incredible rate. If nothing else, an illegal radio "jab," to the effect of "You guys might want to tune in a news station."

An Air Traffic Controller at the Cleveland tower later recalled, "I saw controllers step up to the plate and start warning flight crews. This was totally by the seat of their pants. It's not because they're directed to by anybody. It's just, OK, everybody's on alert right now." [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

Reportedly, Ballinger later said, "One of the things that upset me was that [the FAA and United Airlines headquarters] knew, 45 minutes before [Flight 93 impacted], that American Airlines had a problem. I put the story together myself [from news versions]. Perhaps if I had the information sooner, I might have gotten the message to [Flight] 93 to bar the door." [See - New York Observer, 6/17/04]

Apparently a more formal warning reached Flight 93 later (See - 9:24 AM ).

9:00 AM       Vice President Cheney later stated that he was in his White House office watching the television images of the first WTC impact. According to his recollection, he was puzzled. "I was sitting there thinking about it. It was a clear day, there was no weather problem — how in hell could an aircraft strike the World Trade Center?" His staff members elsewhere in the White House were seemingly unaware of the emerging crisis. For example, his chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, saw the television images briefly, but turned off the television so as not to be distracted from a conversation on another topic. [See - Newsweek 12/31/01]

9:00 AM       Renee May, flight attendant on Flight 77, reportedly called her mother in Las Vegas, using a cell phone. She supposedly told her mother that the flight had been hijacked, and that everyone had been asked to move to the back of the aircraft. She supposedly asked her mother to call American Airlines and let them know that Flight 77 had been hijacked. The mother then reportedly called the airline. [See - Independent Commission 1/27/04]

A flight attendant, in fear of her life – and that of the passengers - calls her mother? A flight attendant is trained to deal in terms of passenger safety, first and always. Asking her mother to relay is absurd! Who would she expect her mother call, at American?

9:00 AM       The Pentagon moved its alert status up; from normal to "Alpha." It stayed on Alpha until after Flight 77 supposedly impacted; then the level was raised to "Charlie," later in the day. [See - USA Today 9/16/01]

9:01 AM       New York ATC reportedly contacted New York terminal approach control, asking for help in locating Flight 175. Different Air Traffic Controllers operate different altitudes. According to the propaganda of the day, the terminal approach controllers are better equipped to deal with low flying aircraft. Those low altitude Air Traffic Controllers reportedly remained uninformed as to what happened to Flight 11 until this time: "We had 90 to 120 seconds; it wasn't any 18 minutes," reportedly stated one controller, referring to the actual elapsed time between the two WTC impacted. Another such controller reportedly said of both aircraft: "They dove into the airspace. By the time anybody saw anything, it was over." [See - New York Times 9/13/01 (F); Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

The radar controllers deal with distance and assigned altitude. The "local" radar (30 mile responsibility – less than 10,000 feet) isn't particularly any more adapted to deal with primary radar than the "enroute" high-altitude radar. However, the "Approach Control" team would be more accustomed to scanning its local airspace, with an enlarged 'scale" advantage. In theory, the local controllers might have 5 - 6 minutes to observe the inbound aircraft. Even if they can spot the aircraft, they can do nothing about it.

Here's the catch. The missing element in this scene is that the inbound aircraft would constitute an incredible midair collision hazard. The reported exchange fails to mention the primary safety concern, for the controllers. It doesn't make sense.

9:01 AM       Bush later made the following statement. "And I was sitting outside the classroom waiting to go in, and I saw an aircraft strike the tower -- the TV was obviously on, and I used to fly myself, and I said, 'There's one terrible pilot.' And I said, 'It must have been a horrible accident.' But I was whisked off from there -- I didn't have much time to think about it." Bush could not have possibly seen the first aircraft (American Airlines Flight 11) strike the WTC, as the only video showing that event was not broadcast until that evening. Yet, Bush twice claimed to have seen the event, in real-time.

Between 9:01-9:03 AM       Flight 175 would have been an unmarked blip on the radar screens of the New York Air Traffic Controllers. One controller reportedly stood up in horror, crying. "No, he's not going to land. He's going in!" "Oh, my God! He's headed for the city," another controller reportedly shouts. "Oh, my God! He's headed for Manhattan!" [See - Washington Post, 9/21/01]

Air Traffic Controllers are not spectators; they are action oriented. The "ripple-effect" of one event can produce a subsequent disaster, very quickly. That's especially true in New York's airspace. Thus, controllers are predisposed to analyzing situations and resolving them – not discussing the gory details, in real-time.

The managers at American Airlines' headquarters in Forth Worth, Texas reportedly also watched their [repeated] radar display, showing Flight 175 heading to New York City. [See - USA Today, 8/12/02]

According to the 9-11 Commission, no one had yet notified NORAD about the flight (See - 9:03 AM ).

9:01 AM       An unidentified woman in the La Guardia control tower reportedly spoke to a Port Authority police officer, asking the officer what had happened at the WTC; the officer replied that he'd learned from the news that an aircraft impacted into it. [See - New York Times, 12/30/03]

Around that same time, one Air Traffic Controller in the tower reportedly stated to another, "But you don't know anything." The other supposedly responded, "We don't know. We're looking at it on Channel 5 right now." [See - Bergen Record, 1/4/04]

"Nothing on the [later released transcripts] shows that the La Guardia controllers knew that the aircraft flying into their airspace had been seized by terrorists, or that military aircraft were screaming in pursuit over the Hudson River." The Port Authority officials appeared to be equally oblivious (see also 9:13 AM ). [See - New York Times 12/30/03]

9:01 AM       A manager from the New York ATC Center reportedly told the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia,"We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us …. We're, we're involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here …." The 9-11 Commission called this the first notification to the FAA leadership of the second hijacking. [See - "Between 9:01 and 9:02," Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

If this is true, then it must be concluded that the United Airlines headquarters hasn't contacted the FAA, despite knowing that Flight 175 had been hijacked since approximately 8:50 (See - 8:49 AM ) and (8:50 AM ).

He repeated the story on other occasions. [See - White House, 1/5/02, CBS, 9-11/02]

However, it was noted that Bush didn't have access to a television until at least 15 minutes later. [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02]

As a Boston Herald article later cited, "Think about that. Bush's remark implied he saw the first aircraft strike the tower. But we all know that video of the first aircraft crash did not surface until the next day. Could Bush have meant he saw the second aircraft crash — which many Americans witnessed? No, because he said that he was in the classroom when Card whispered in his ear that a second aircraft crashed." That article illustrated that Bush told that story more than once; asking, "How could the commander-in-chief have seen the aircraft fly into the first building — as it happened?" [See - Boston Herald, 10/22/02]

A Bush spokesman later referred to Bush's comments as, "…just a mistaken recollection." [See - Wall Street Journal 3/22/04]

9:02:54 AM       Flight 175 struck the south tower, 2 World Trade Center. [See - CNN 9/17/01; NORAD 9/18/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01 (B); Guardian 10/17/01; CNN 9/12/01; AP 8/19/02; Newsday 9/10/02; USA Today 9/3/02; USA Today 8/13/02; MSNBC 9/22/01; Washington Post 1/27/02; New York Times 9-11/02; USA Today 12/20/01]

Millions watched the impact; live on television. The aircraft damage extended from the 78th through 84th floors of the 110-story building. An estimated 100 people were killed or injured in the initial impact; 600 people in the tower would eventually die. The death toll was in the north tower was far lower, as approximately two-thirds of the tower's occupants evacuate within approximately 17 minutes after the first tower was impacted (see also (8:55 AM ). [See - USA Today 12/20/01]

The F-15 fighter jets out of the Otis Air National Guard Base were still approximately 70 miles, or 8 - 14 minutes away when the first tower was struck. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

According to NORAD, United 175, the second aircraft – reported to NOT have turned off its transponder prior to impact - impacted into the WTC North Tower.

9:02:54 AM       United Airlines Flight 175 had reversed its course and impacted into the south side of the South Tower of the WTC. It strike between the 78th and 84th floors, reportedly at a speed of over 500 MPH [almost impossible at sea level]. Parts from the aircraft - including an engine - exit the building to the north, later found on the street, up to six blocks distant.

NORAD cited their F-15's from Otis as still being 71 miles away. The estimated average flight speed would have only been 24% of their potential top speed.

Otis was 153 miles from the WTC. With the F-15's having a top speed of approximately 1875 MPH. Deducting 71 miles from that 153 miles equals roughly 82 miles covered in the 11 minutes from their 8:52 take-off to 9:03. That equates to an average speed of 390 knots, or 447 MPH. The obvious question asking how those two F-15's possibly be going less than one quarter of their top speed; trying to intercept such a threat?

It must be acknowledged that intercepting the aircraft doesn't imply the ability to immediately shoot it down. The fighters would have been reasonable bound by 'standard" intercept procedures, which would largely involve an attempt to communicate with the flight. Given the special circumstances, there would probably have been some local improvisation going on, had any of the aircraft have been successfully intercepted.

In any event, there has never been a known "official" accountability, as to the speed flown, versus the obvious lies, told to the public.

Flight 77 was now left, maneuvering with its transponder off. The saga of Flight 93 was yet unknown. Flight 77 had just – reportedly - made a course reversal over southern Ohio / northeastern Kentucky; heading back to Washington D.C. The question immediately arises as to why the Otis F-15's – approximately 71 miles from NYC were not immediately vectored to intercept the obvious target.

The F-15's would have approximately 30 minutes to reach Washington D.C. American Airlines Flight 77 supposedly strike the Pentagon at 9:38 AM - "officially. The two F-15's could have covered the approximately 300 miles to Washington D.C. in approximately 10 minutes; reaching D.C. around 24 minutes before American Airlines Flight 77 reportedly struck.

The F-15's should have been vectored to intercept Flight 77, well ahead of its reaching D.C.; if the "official" version is to be at all believed. The only known "rogue" airliner was supposedly heading directly for the nations capitol – with "official" impunity.

The two F-15's from Otis could have "loitered" over New York City until as late as approximately 9:25, with enough time remaining to protect Washington D.C. – if the purported tale of Flight 77 was factual.

Most importantly, why wasn't Andrew AFB a scene of scrambling aircraft. The scheduled "war-games" of the day imply a very high state of readiness – not a vacation day.

NORAD Press Release:


AP Article On NORAD PR:


Two New York Times articles apologetically describing this:

Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet But Found No Way to Stop It


Chronology of Plane Impacts: Orders, at the Time of Impact


Following 9:03 AM       Reportedly, "… within minutes of the second impact," the Boston's ATC Operations Manager instructed all of the air traffic controllers in his center to inform all aircraft in the New England region that they should survey the events unfolding in New York; and to advise aircraft to heighten their cockpit security. Boston reportedly asks the FAA Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert to all aircraft - nationwide. However, the 9-11 Commission concluded, "We have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructed any Centers to issue a cockpit security alert." [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:03 AM       The 9-11 Commission later concluded that New York ATC told NEADS that Flight 175 had been hijacked at this time. The Commission called this "the first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft." [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Col. Robert Marr, the head of NEADS, claimed that he only learned of a flight other than Flight 11 being hijacked by watching the coverage of Flight 175 impacting into the WTC on television. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

However, after 9-11, NORAD originally concluded that they were notified about Flight 175 at 8:43 (see 8:43 AM ). As Flight 175 impacted into the WTC, Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek, who was overseeing the command center in NORAD's Colorado headquarters, was reportedly on the telephone with NEADS. He saw the live event on television; asking NEADS, "Was that the hijacked aircraft you were dealing with?" The reply was "yes." [See - Toronto Star, 12/9/01]

This position contradicts the 9-11 Commission's conclusion that NEADS had not yet been told about Flight 175. Assuming that the 9-11 Commission's version is correct, then it necessary to remember that Flight 175 lost radio contact at 8:42, changed its transponder code at 8:46 (See - 8:46 AM ), an Air Traffic Controller called it as being possibly hijacked at 8:46 and/or 8:53 (see 8:46 AM                  and 8:51-8:53 AM ), with an ATC manager calling it hijacked at 8:55 (see(8:55 AM ). The 9-11 Commission did not bother to explain why the New York ATC would wait at least 10 - possibly as many as 17 - minutes prior to warning NORAD that Flight 175 was possibly hijacked. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Given that Flight 11 was already a "known" event, there is no excuse available.

It would also mean that United Airlines headquarters failed to notify NORAD, despite knowing the aircraft had been hijacked for approximately 12 minutes (See - 8:49 AM ) and (8:50 AM ).

9:03-9:06 AM       Bush entered the classroom of Sandra Kay Daniels' second-grade class for a photo-op, promotomg Bush's education policies. [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02]

Bush later claimed that while he was sitting there, he was thinking of what he would later say about the WTC impact. "I was concentrating on the program at this point, thinking about what I was going to say. Obviously, I felt it was an accident. I was concerned about it, but there were no alarm bells." [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02]

Chief of Staff Andrew Card comes in to advise Bush of the second WTC impact (See - 9:06 AM ). [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02]

9:03 AM       Flight 175 strike the WTC south tower. F-15 pilot, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, recalled, "We're 60 miles out, and I could see the smoke from the towers." They call to NORAD for an update; Duffy relates, "At that point, they said the second aircraft just strike the World Trade Center. That was news to me. I thought we were still chasing American [Airlines Flight] 11." [See - ABC, 9/14/02]

Duffy asked for clarification of their mission, but his request was met with "considerable confusion." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Bob Varcadapane, a Newark, New Jersey Air Traffic Controller [Presumed to be in the airport tower] saw the Flight 175 impact, claimed, "I remember the two F-15s. They were there moments after the impact. And I was just — said to myself, "If only they could have gotten there a couple minutes earlier." They just missed it." [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

Still, the 9-11 Commission later concluded that the pilots never got near New York City at that time. According to the Commission, from 8:46 until 8:52, the NORAD personnel were unable to locate Flight 11. It was reported that shortly after 8:50; just before the fighters departed, NORAD was given the word that an aircraft had strike the WTC. That left the fighters lacking a clear target, thus the fighters proceeded toward military controlled airspace over the ocean, off-shore of Long Island (See - 9:08 -9:13 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

Following 9:03 AM       Soon after the second WTC impact, calls from fighter units start pouring into NORAD and the various sector operations centers, asking what could be done to help. At Syracuse, New York, an [Air National Guard] commander [told the NEADS commander Robert] Marr, "Give me 10 min. and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 min. and I'll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams]." Marr replied, "I want it all." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Supposedly, Marr said, "Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

Canadian Major General Eric Findley, then based in Colorado was reported to be "in charge of NORAD" that day. He supposedly had his staff immediately order as many fighters into the air as possible. [See - Ottawa Citizen, 9-11/02]

[A Canadian in charge of NORAD?]

Yet another version claimed those calls didn't occur until approximately an hour later: "By 10:01 AM, the command center began calling several bases across the country for help." [See - Toledo Blade, 12/9/01]

Later, the 9-11 Commission concluded that the command for other bases to prepare fighters to scramble wasn't actually given until 9:49 (see 9:49 AM ). By all appearances, the first fighters from other bases to take off were launched from Syracuse at 10:44. That would have been over an hour and a half, following Syracuse's initial offer to help, shortly after a general ban on all flights, including military ones, was lifted (See - 9:26 AM ) and (10:31 AM ).

[This version conflicts with the C-130 launch at Andrews. With a ban on flights, the aircraft would not have been allowed to file a flight plan, taxi or take off.]

These were the first reported additional fighters to be scrambled; assisting the three at Langley, two at Otis, and two more from Toledo, Ohio fighters ordered scrambled at 10:01 that launch fifteen minutes later (see 10:01 AM ). [See - Toledo Blade 12/9/01]

Following 9:03 AM       The Assistant Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, had just left a meeting with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (See - Before 8:46 AM ). Wolfowitz later recalled, "We were having a meeting in my office. Someone said an aircraft had strike the World Trade Center. Then we turned on the television and we started seeing the shots of the second aircraft striketing, and this was the way I remember it. It's a little fuzzy …. There didn't seem to be much to do about it immediately and we went on with whatever the meeting was." [See - Defense Department, 5/9/03]

Rumsfeld recalls, "I was in my office with a CIA briefer and I was told that a second aircraft had strike the other tower." [See - Independent Commission, 3/23/04]

Assistant Defense Secretary Torie Clarke recalls, "A couple of us had gone into the secretary's office, Secretary Rumsfeld's office, to alert him to that, tell him that the crisis management process was starting up. He wanted to make a few phone calls. So a few of us headed across the hallway to an area called the National Military Command Center [around 200 feet away]. He stayed in his office." [See - Defense Department 9/15/01 (B)]

9:03 AM       Reportedly, the Air Traffic Controllers in Newark, New Jersey were on the phone with the New York Air Traffic Controllers, having been asked to visually locate Flight 175. They saw it descend the last five thousand feet; impacting into the WTC. Rick Tepper (who also reportedly saw the explosion of the first impact) recalls: "He was in a hard right bank, diving very steeply and very fast. And he — as he was coming up the Hudson River, he — he made another hard left turn and — just heading for downtown Manhattan …. You could see that he was trying to line himself up on the tower. Just before he strike the tower, he almost leveled it out and just — just strike the building." Newark immediately called the Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Washington, advising that they would not land any more aircraft in Newark, so as to keep aircraft away from New York City. That would have been the first step in shutting down the national airspace. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

9:03 AM       The Boston air traffic control center halted traffic from its airports to all New York area airspace.

9:05 AM       Andrew Card walked up to Bush, who was listening to the Goat Story at Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida. Card reportedly whispered in his ear "A second aircraft had strike the World Trade Center. America is under attack." Bush (commander-and-chief?) kept listening to the Goat Story for at least 7 minutes; perhaps as much as 18 minutes. One quickly asks why he didn't excuse himself right away; immediately leaving or addressing the national emergency. The version lacks viable explanation.

The next question goes to why the secret service hadn't found out about United Airlines Flight 175 impacting the WTC (then becoming aware that it was a "terrorist" act), immediately grabbing Bush; taking him to an undisclosed location. Logically the secret service should never have left Bush in place (Emma E. Booker Elementary School), where everyone knew he was.

9:05 AM       The West Virginian ATC noticed a new eastbound aircraft entering their radar region, with no radio contact and no transponder identification. They were not sure it was American Airlines Flight 77. Supposedly they wait another 19 minutes prior to notifying NORAD about it.

9:05 A.M. According to NORAD, the FAA reported a possible hijack of United 175 - three minutes after its impact into the South Tower. This is an indicator of how long it was taking for the information to flow through the system.

9:06 AM       The order to halt air traffic was expanded, so as to include the entire northeast from Washington D.C. to Cleveland. The FAA's air traffic control center outside Washington D.C. notified all of the air traffic facilities nationwide of the suspected hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11.

9:06 AM       The FAA formally notified the military that United Airlines Flight 175 had been hijacked.

9:08 AM       The FAA ordered all airborne aircraft to leave the New York area airspace; ordering all of the New York-bound aircraft, nationwide, to remain on the ground.

9:03 - 9:08 AM       Sequentially, the ATC managers ban all aircraft from flying near the cities used by the hijackers. Takeoffs and landings in New York City were stopped within a minute of the Flight 175 impact. Both Boston and Newark quickly followed suit in the next few minutes. Approximately 9:08, the nationwide departures heading to or through the New York and Boston airspace were canceled. [See - AP, 8/12/02, Newsday, 9/10/02, AP, 8/19/02, USA Today, 8/13/02]

The order to block all aircraft from departing New York's La Guardia airport, was given at 9:07. [See - New York Times, 12/30/03]

Mike McCormick, the head of the Long Island, New York air traffic control center, makes the grounding decision without consulting any superiors. [See - ABC News 8/12/02]

Additionally "a few minutes" after the Flight 175 impact into the WTC (9:03), all of the takeoffs from Washington D.C. were halted. [See - USA Today 8/12/02; USA Today 8/13/02]

The 9-11 Commission later determined that the communication between the military and the FAA was extremely poor.

Following 9:03 AM       Reportedly, a few minutes after 9:03 AM, a pilot at Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, heard of the two aircraft impacting into the WTC. He supposedly called a friend in the Secret Service to ask what was going on. Supposedly, the Secret Service called back, asking whether Andrews can scramble any fighters. It was reported that one commander had already anticipated the need, starting the preparation of weapons for the fighters. However, the weapons were located on the other side of the base, requiring time. The fighters didn't take off at approximately 10:42 AM. In the meantime, there were also three unarmed F-16 fighters on a training mission, 207 miles away, in North Carolina. These were not immediately recalled; not reaching Washington until 10:45 (See - 10:38 AM ). [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold stated, "We [didn't] have any aircraft on alert at Andrews." [See - MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C)]

This flies in the face of the pre 9-11 mission of the District of Columbian Air National Guard based at Andrews "to provide combat units in the highest possible state of readiness." Very shortly after 9-11 the mission statement on the associated website was changed, to a "vision" to "provide peacetime command and control and administrative mission oversight to support customers, DCANG [District of Columbian Air National Guard] units, and NGB in achieving the highest levels of readiness." [See - DCANG Home Page]

Of particular note is the "weasel language," to the effect, "…we TRY; we don't promise."

9:03 AM       A manager at the Boston ATC Center reportedly reported to the FAA's New England regional headquarters the "we have some aircraft" comment made by a Flight 11 hijacker earlier in the morning (See - 8:24 AM ). The Boston controller said, "I'm gonna reconfirm with, with downstairs, but the, as far as the tape … seemed to think the guy said that "we have aircraft." Now, I don't know if it was because it was the accent, or if there's more than one [hijacked aircraft], but I'm gonna, I'm gonna reconfirm that for you, and I'll get back to you real quick. Okay?" Asked, "They have what?," this person clarifies, "Planes, as in plural …. It sounds like, we're talking to New York, that there's another one aimed at the World Trade Center …. A second one just strike the Trade Center." The person at New England headquarters replies, "Okay. Yeah, we gotta get — we gotta alert the military real quick on this." At 9:05, Boston confirmed that a hijacker reportedly stated that "we have aircraft" (forgetting the 'some"). [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

By implication, Boston replayed the recording of the hijacker, from around half an hour earlier (see 8:33 AM ). Others, such as American Airline's Gerard Arpey, apparently learned about this comment, prior to the Flight 11 impact at 8:46 (see 8:30 AM ).

Following 9:03 AM       National Security Advisor Rice had just started her usual national security staff meeting at 9:00. Shortly after 9:03, an aide hands her a note saying a second aircraft had strike the WTC. Rice later claimed that she thinks, "This is a terrorist attack," and then left the meeting, quickly walking to the White House Situation Room. [See - Newsweek, 12/31/01]

However, according to Richard Clarke, Rice left the meeting for Vice President Cheney's office. Clarke meets her there a few minutes later and only then did she go down to the basement bunker.

9:08-9:13 AM       The two F-15s sent to New York City to find Flight 11 were ordered to hover in a 150-mile chunk of air space off the coast of Long Island. There were contradictory versions over whether they reach New York City prior to being directed over the ocean (See - 9:08 -9:13 AM ). Pilot Major Daniel Nash states, "Neither the civilian controller or the military controller knew what they wanted us to do." [See - Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

At 9:09, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander learns of the second WTC impact, and decides to send the fighters to New York City. The 9-11 Commission stated that the fighters remain in a holding pattern over the ocean until 9:13 while the FAA clears the airspace. The fighters then establish a Combat Air Patrol over the city at 9:25. It's unclear what the fighters do between 9:13 and 9:25, as the distance between the two locations is unknown but presumably not large. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

These fighters remain over New York City for the next four hours. [See - Cape Cod Times 8/21/02]

NORAD-9:09, Langley F-16s were directed to battle stations just based on the general situation, and the breaking news and the general developing feeling about what's going on. And approximately that same time, kind of way out in the west was when American 77, which in the meantime had turned off its transponder and turned left back toward Washington, appears back in radar coverage. And my understanding was the FAA controllers now are beginning to pick up primary skin paints on that airplane and they don't know exactly whether that was 77 and they were asking a lot of people whether it is, including a C130 that's westbound toward Ohio.

9:03 AM       According to Sarasota County Sheriff Bill Balkwill, just after Bush enters a Booker Elementary classroom, a Marine responsible for carrying Bush's phone walks up to Balkwill, who was standing in a nearby side room. While listening to someone talk to him in his earpiece, the Marine asks, "Can you get me to a television? We're not sure what's going on, but we need to see a television." Three Secret Service agents, a SWAT member, the Marine and Balkwill turn on the television in a nearby front office just as Flight 175 impacted into the WTC. "We're out of here," the Marine told Balkwill. "Can you get everyone ready?" [See - Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/10/02]

Following 9:03 AM       Brigadier General Montague Winfield. Brigadier General Montague Winfield, commander of the NMCC, the Pentagon's emergency response center, later said, "When the second aircraft flew into the second tower, it was at that point that we realized that the seemingly unrelated hijackings that the FAA was dealing with were in fact a part of a coordinated terrorist attack on the United States." [See - ABC, 9/14/02]

However, despite the tenor of this and other media reports (for instance, [CNN, 9/4/02, ABC, 9/15/02]), Winfield wasn't actually at the NMCC during the 9-11 crisis (see 8:30 AM ).

In the personal written statement of Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig, Jr., which was entered into the hearings before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Leidig stated that on 10 September, he was asked by Brigadier General Montague Winfield to stand in for a portion of his duty as the Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center (NMCC). That watch required the supervision and operation of all of the necessary communications, in the capacity of watch commander.

In Leidig's testimony: "On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U.S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. [September 11] I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001."

Drawing from that testimony, Winfield's request for Leidig to assume his watch, was timed at the very beginning of the 9-11 attacks. American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked just minutes before Winfield handed over his watch.

Captain Leidig's statement to the Commission was only 1.25 typewritten pages, in large font; double-spaced.

The timing of the watch changeover is too suspect to attribute to coincidence – as is the lack of accountability. It is instantly questionable, as to what prompted Winfield's request for Leidig to assume his watch, why Winfield chose 8:30 AM for the relief time. Certainly it is to be questioned as to why the Commission never addressed the obvious issues, and whether or not Winfield had any access to some form of intelligence, which suggested the events of 9-11. The lingering intelligence description remains of a: 'spectacular attack, designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." [ See - CIA Intelligence Report for White House, July 5, 2001—60+ days prior to 9-11, Newsweek, 5-1-2003 / The Hill, 5-1-2003]

Following 9:03 AM       Controllers at the New York traffic center were briefed by their supervisors to watch for aircraft whose speed indicated that they were jets, but which either were not responding to commands or have disabled their transponders. "Controllers in Washington [got] a similar briefing, which [helped] them pick out hijacked aircraft more quickly." [See - New York Times 9/13/01 (F)]

9:05 AM       and after) According to the 9-11 Commission, Flight 77's radar blip reappeared on Indianapolis ATC's primary radar scopes after being missing for eight minutes (See - 8:56-9:05 AM ). It was east of its last known position. It remained in the air space managed by Indianapolis until 9:10, and then passed into Washington air space (See - 9:10 AM ). Two managers and one Air Traffic Controller continue to look west and southwest for the flight, but don't look east. Managers don't instruct other Indianapolis controllers to join the search for the flight. Neither they nor FAA headquarters issues an "all points bulletin" to surrounding centers to search for Flight 77. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Newsday claimed that rumors circulate the aircraft might have exploded in midair. [See - Newsday, 9/23/01]

But the idea they wouldn't look east was contradicted by an version that American Airlines headquarters was told Flight 77 had turned around (See - Before 9:00 AM ).

9:05 AM       Richard Clarke was driving up to a gate outside the White House so he can get inside and respond to the crisis when an aide called and told him, "The other tower was just strike." He responded, "Well, now we know who we're dealing with. I want the highest-level person in Washington from each agency on-screen now, especially the FAA." He had already ordered this aide to set up a secure video conference approximately five minutes earlier. A few minutes later, he found Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice in Cheney's White House office. Cheney told Clarke, "It's an al-Qaeda attack and they like simultaneous attacks. This may not be over." Rice asks Clarke for recommendations, and he said, "We're putting together a secure teleconference to manage the crisis." He also recommended evacuating the White House (in fact, evacuation did not begin for another forty minutes (See - 9:45 AM ). Rice noted the Secret Service wanted them to go the bomb shelter below the White House, and as Clarke left the other two, he saw them gathering papers and preparing to evacuate. [See - Australian 3/27/04]

9:05 AM       West Virginian ATC noticed a new eastbound aircraft entering its radar with no radio contact and no transponder identification. They were not sure it was Flight 77. Supposedly they waited another 19 minutes before notifying NORAD about it. [See - Newsday 9/23/01]

9:06-9:16 AM       Bush, having just been told of the second WTC impact (See - 9:06 AM ), did not leave the Sarasota, Florida, classroom he entered around 9:03. Rather, he stays and listens as 16 Booker Elementary School second-graders took turns reading a story called , from the book "Reading Mastery 2, Storybook 1." It's a simple story about a girl's pet goat. [See - AFP, 9/7/02, Editor and Publisher, 7/2/04]

They were just about to begin reading when Bush was warned of the attack. One version stated that the classroom was then silent for approximately 30 seconds, maybe more. Bush then picks up the book and reads with the children "for eight or nine minutes." [See - Tampa Tribune, 9/1/02]

In unison, the children read out loud, "The — Pet — Goat. A — girl — got — a — pet — goat. But — the — goat — did — some — things — that — made — the — girl's — dad — mad." And so on. Bush mostly listens, but did ask the children a few questions to encourage them. [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02]

At one point he said, "Really good readers, whew! … These must be sixth-graders!" [See - Time, 9/12/01]

In the back of the room, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer catches Bush's eye and held up a pad of paper for him to read, with 'dON'T SAY ANYTHING YET" written on it in big block letters. [See - Washington Times 10/7/02]

CNN reported in 1999, "Only the president has the authority to order a civilian aircraft shot down." [See - CNN, 10/26/99]

The pilot of one of the aircraft flying to catch Flight 175 noted that it wouldn't have mattered if he caught up with it, because only Bush could order a shootdown, and Bush was at a public event at the time. [See - Cape Cod Times 8/21/02]

In actual fact, by 9-11 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also had the authority to order a shootdown, but he also claimed to be out of contact. [See - New York Observer, 6/17/04]

Much of this video footage was shown in Michael Moore's 2004 movie, Fahrenheit 911. [See - New York Times 6/18/04 (C)]

9:06 AM       Andrew Card told Bush the second WTC tower had been struck. See a video of Bush's reaction here:

Bush was in a Booker Elementary School second-grader classroom. His chief of staff, Andrew Card, enters the room and whispers into his ear, "A second aircraft strike the other tower, and America's under attack." [See - New York Times, 9/16/01 (B)]

[9:05, New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), 9:05, Telegraph, 12/16/01, 9:05, Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02, 9:07, Washington Times, 10/8/02, ABC News reporter Ann Compton, who was in the room, stated that she was struck "So much so that I [write] it down in my reporter's notebook, by my watch, 9:07 AM." ABC News, 9-11/02]

Intelligence expert James Bamford describes Bush's reaction: "Immediately [after Card spoke to Bush] an expression of befuddlement passe[s] across the President's face. Then, having just been told that the country was under attack, the Commander in Chief appear[s] uninterested in further details. He never ask[s] if there had been any additional threats, where the attacks were coming from, how to best protect the country from further attacks…. Instead, in the middle of a modern-day Pearl Harbor, he simply turn[s] back to the matter at hand: the day's photo op." [See - Body of Secrets, James Bamford, 4/02 edition, p. 633]

Bush continues listening to the goat story. Then, in an event noticeable in its absence, as one newspaper put it, "For some reason, Secret Service agents [do] not bustle him away." [See - Globe and Mail, 9/12/01]

Bush later said of the experience, "I am very aware of the cameras. I'm trying to absorb that knowledge. I have nobody to talk to. I'm sitting in the midst of a classroom with little kids, listening to a children's story and I realize I'm the Commander in Chief and the country had just come under attack."[Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Bush continues to listen to the goat story for approximately ten more minutes (See - 9:06-9:16 AM ). The reason given was that, "Without all the facts at hand, George Bush ha[s]

no intention of upsetting the schoolchildren who had come to read for him." [See - MSNBC, 10/29/02]

9:06 AM       All air traffic facilities nationwide were notified that the Flight 11 impact into the WTC was probably a hijacking. [See - House Committee 9/21/01; Newsday 9/23/01]

9:09 AM       Supposedly, NORAD orders F-16s at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, on battle stations alert. Around this time, the FAA command center reported 11 aircraft either not in communication with FAA facilities, or flying unexpected routes. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

The 9-11 Commission also later concluded that the battle stations alert happens at this time. They claim the alert was not to protect Washington, but because there's concern that the fighters over New York City would run low on fuel and need to be replaced. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

But one pilot version said the battle stations alert didn't happen until 9:21, and another pilot version said 9:24 (see 9:21 AM and 9:24 AM).

9:09 AM       Indianapolis fight control reported the loss of contact with Flight 77 to the FAA regional center. They describe it as a possible impact. This center waited 16 minutes before passing the information to FAA headquarters (see 9:25 AM ). [See - Washington Post, 11/3/01, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

However, American Airlines headquarters had been notified of the same information before 9:00 (See - Before 9:00 AM ).

9:10 AM       Vice President Cheney (pointing finger) with Rice and others in the underground bunker Cheney was carried into. This facility was called the Presidential Emergency Operations Center.

According to Richard Clarke and others, Vice President Cheney goes from his White House office to the PEOC, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker in the East Wing of the White House at approximately this time. National Security Advisor Rice, after initiating a video conference with Richard Clarke in the West Wing, goes to the PEOC to be with Cheney. There was no video link between response centers in the East and West Wings, but a secure telephone line was used instead. [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 3-4, "Just after 9:00," ABC, 9/14/02 (B), around 9:06 when Bush was being told of the second WTC strike, New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), same time Bush was being told, Telegraph, 12/16/01]

One eyewitness version, David Bohrer, a White House photographer, said it took place just after 9:00. [See - ABC, 9/14/02 (B)] This is supported by Norman Mineta's accounts.

However, there was a second version claiming that Cheney didn't leave until sometime after 9:30. In this version, Secret Service agents burst into Vice President Cheney's White House office. They carry him under his arms — nearly lifting him off the ground — and propel him down the steps into the White House basement and through a long tunnel toward an underground bunker. [See - shortly after Bush's speech at 9:30, CBS, 9-11/02, 9:32, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 9:33, BBC, 9/1/02, 9:35, Newsweek, 12/31/01, after 9:33, New York Times, 10/16/01, after 9:30, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), "just before 9:36," 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

At approximately the same time, National Security Advisor Rice was told to go to the bunker as well. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

In addition to the eyewitness versions of Clarke and Bohrer, ABC News claimed that Cheney was in the bunker when he was told Flight 77 was 50 miles away from Washington at 9:27, suggesting that the claims of Cheney entering the bunker after 9:27 were most likely incorrect.

9:10 AM       Roughly at this time, Richard Clarke supposedly reached the Secure Video Conferencing Center next to the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. From there, he directed the response to the 9-11 attacks and stays in contact with other top officials through video links. On video were Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, CIA Director Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (filling in for the traveling Attorney General Ashcroft), Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (filling in for the traveling Secretary of State Powell), and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (filling in for the traveling Chairman Henry Shelton). National Security Advisor Rice was with Clarke, but she lets Clarke run the crisis response, deferring to his longer experience on terrorism matters. Clarke was also told by an aide, "We're on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call." [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 2-4, Australian, 3/27/04]

The 9-11 Commission acknowledges the existence of this conference, but only gives it one sentence in a staff report about the day of 9-11: "The White House Situation Room initiated a video teleconference, chaired by Richard Clarke. While important, it had no immediate effect on the emergency defense efforts." [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Yet, as the Washington Post puts it, "everyone seems to agree" Clarke was the chief crisis manager on 9-11. [See - Washington Post, 3/28/04 (B)]

Even his later opponent, National Security Advisor Rice, called him 9-11's "crisis management guy." [See - UPI, 4/10/04]

The conference is where the government's emergency defense efforts were concentrated (see for instance (Between 9:15-9:25 AM ), 9:28 AM (9:30 AM ), and (Between 9:38-9:45 AM ).

9:10 AM       Washington ATC reportedly noticed a new eastbound aircraft entering its radar with no radio contact and no transponder identification. They didn't realize it was Flight 77. They were aware of the hijackings and impacted of Flights 11 and 175, Yet apparently they fail to notify anyone about the unidentified aircraft. [See - "About 9:05" , Newsday, 9/23/01, 9:10, Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Another report stated that they never notice it, and it was only noticed when it enters radar coverage of Washington's Dulles International Airport at 9:24 (See - 9:24 AM ). [See - Washington Post 11/3/01]

9:10 AM       Roughly at this time, Vice President Cheney went from his White House office to the PEOC, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker in the East Wing of the White House. National Security Advisor Rice, after initiating a video conference with Richard Clarke in the West Wing, goes to the PEOC to be with Cheney. There is no video link between response centers in the East and West Wings, but a secure telephone line was used instead.

9:10 AM       According to released transcripts, a caller from the Port Authority police desk told a La Guardian Airport control tower employee, that "they are considering [the crash into the WTC] a criminal act." the control tower employee replies, "We believe that, and we are holding all aircraft on the ground."[AP, 12/29/03]

La Guardia is one of two major New York City airports; the Port Authority patrols both the WTC and the city's airports.

Between approximately 9:15 - 9:25 AM       Richard Clarke begins a crisis response video conference by asking FAA Administrator Jane Garvey what she knows. Garvey replies, "The two aircraft that went in [to the WTC] were American flight 11, a 767, and United 175, also a 767. Hijacked." She stated that she had put a hold on all takeoffs and landings in New York and Washington, then states, "We have reports of eleven aircraft off course or out of communications." Clarke and Garvey discuss the feasibility of canceling all takeoffs nationally, and grounding all aircraft in the air. Garvey stated that it is possible, but would take time.

9:08 AM       The FAA ordered all aircraft to leave the New York area airspace and ordered all New York-bound aircraft nationwide to stay on the ground.

9:10 AM to 9:20 AM       United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked.

9:11 AM       Two F-15 Eagles from Otis Air National Guard station in Falmouth; Massachusetts reached NYC. It took the F-15's, which have a top speed of 1,875+ MPH, 19 minutes to cover the 153 miles from Otis to the WTC. Their average flight speed from Otis to the WTC was only 483 MPH or just 26% of their top speed.

9:12 AM       The FAA formally notified the military that United Airlines Flight 175 had impacted into the WTC.

9:13 AM       An Air Traffic Controller at La Guardian Airport in New York City was called by a Port Authority police officer. The officer asks, "They are inquiring whether or not you can call Kennedy's tower, because they can't get through, and inquire whether or not they had any contact with these aircraft." The Air Traffic Controller responded, "At this time, we do not think that anyone in the F.A.A. had any contact with them." [New York Times, 12/30/03]

9:15 AM       American Airlines prohibits new takeoffs in the U.S.; United Airlines follows suit, around five minutes later. [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

9:16 AM to 9:20 AM       The FAA notified NORAD that United Airlines Flight 93 had been hijacked. (Reported at 9:20 AM; the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) No fighters were scrambled in any specific response, then or later. There is a suggestion that the fighters which were sent after American Airlines Flight 77 later proceeded toward United Airlines Flight 93. However, NORAD's timeline inexplicably fails to state when the FAA actually told them about the hijack, the only flight which they fail to provide this data for.

By then, two airliners have crashed and fighters had been scrambled already; the Air Force had 55 minutes to intercept Flight 93.

There were media reports that: "investigators had determined from the cockpit voice recorder from United Airlines Flight 93 … that one of the four hijackers had been invited into the cockpit area before the flight took off from Newark, New Jersey." Supposedly, the cockpit voice recordings indicated that the pilots believed their guest was another pilot "…and was thereby extended the typical airline courtesy of allowing any pilot from any airline to join a flight by sitting in the jump-seat, the folded over extra seat located inside the cockpit." [See - Fox News, 9/24/01, Herald Sun, 9/25/01]

The version was never confirmed. Given the disparities, surrounding the Flight 93 recorders, the version is unlikely to be verified.

Between approximately 9:16 - 9:29 AM       Bush was in a holding room, before giving his initial 9-11 speech. The communications director, Dan Bartlett, pointed to the TV - the clock read 9:25.

Bush worked with his staff to prepare the speech for 9:29. He intermittently watched the television coverage. [See - Albuquerque Tribune, 9/10/02]

He also spoke on the telephone to advisors, first National Security Advisor Rice, then Cheney, then the New York Governor George Pataki. [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02]

Bush often turned to look at a TV screen. He declared, "We're at war." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

9:16 AM       Bush left the Sarasota school classroom, where he'd been since approximately 9:03. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

A reporter asked, "Mr. President, are you aware of the reports of the aircraft crash in New York? Is there any… " The question was interrupted by an aide who had come into the room, saying, "All right. Thank you. If everyone could please step outside." Bush then said, "We'll talk about it later." [See - CBS, 9-11/02 (B)]

Bush then told the school principal, Gwen Tose-Rigell, who was in the room, about the attacks; and why he needed to leave. [See - Washington Times, 10/7/02] He then went into an empty classroom next door, to meet with his staff. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

9:17 AM       The FAA shuts down all of the New York City area airports. [See - CNN, 9/12/01, New York Times, 9/12/01]

9:18 AM       The FAA Command Center finally issued a nationwide alert to the Air Traffic Controllers to watch for aircraft disappearing from the radar or making unauthorized course changes. [See - Washington Post 11/3/01]

9:20 AM       The FAA set up a hijacking teleconference with several government agencies, including the Defense Department. This happened almost an hour after the FAA's Boston ATC Center notified the other ATC centers about the first hijacking (see 8:25 AM ). Amazingly even after this delay, the FAA and Defense Department participants in the teleconference later claimed that the conference played no role in coordinating the response to the hijackings. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:20 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission report, the Indianapolis ATC Center learned by this time that there were other hijacked aircraft (presumably Flights 11 and 175). Those crashes were known to millions of people since the mass media began broadcasting the related images from New York at 8:48 (see 8:48 AM ). Yet, somehow, the Indianapolis Center was still supposedly unaware of the events, until this time. Supposedly, the Indianapolis Air Traffic Controllers had now begun to doubt their assumption that Flight 77 had gone down; considering that it might also be hijacked. After a discussion between the Indianapolis manager and the FAA Command Center, the Command Center notified other FAA facilities that Flight 77 was lost. By 9:21 AM, the Command Center, some of the FAA field facilities, and American Airlines joined the search for Flight 77. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:20 AM       FBI WFO was notified that American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked

United Airlines prohibited new takeoffs in the United States.

9:20 AM       Mineta testified that he arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) underneath the East Wing of the White House, with Vice President Cheney and other staff present; with Cheney clearly in command. Mineta claimed to have heard the infamous 'shoot-down" conversation between Cheney and an unnamed "young man." [May 23, 2003 before the 9/11 Commission] This testimony seriously conflicts with the Commission report. However, the suggestion is that Mineta is testifying truthfully.

9:21 AM       The New York City Port Authority ordered all of the bridges and tunnels in the New York City area to be closed. [See - MSNBC 9/22/01; CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; AP 8/19/02]

9:21 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission Report, the FAA Command Center advised the Dulles Airport terminal control facility in Washington D.C. to look for primary targets. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

9:21 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NORAD's NEADS was contacted by Boston ATC. A controller stated, "I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards — heading towards Washington …. That was another — it was evidently another aircraft that strike the tower. That's the latest report we have …. I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south." The NEADS official asked, "He — American 11 is a hijack? … And he's heading into Washington?" The Boston controller supposedly answered "yes" both times; adding, "This could be a third aircraft." Somehow Boston was supposedly told by the FAA headquarters that Flight 11 was still airborne. The Commission wasn't able to find where this mistaken information came from. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:21 AM       Major Dean Eckmann, an F-16 fight pilot at Langley, Virginia, recalled, "The scramble horn goes off and we get the yellow light, which is our battle stations. So at that point I go running out to the aircraft — to my assigned alert aircraft — get suited up and I get into the cockpit ready to start." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

A few minutes prior to the battle stations order, Eckmann was told that the WTC had been struck by an aircraft. He assumed that it was some kind of accident. [See - AP, 8/19/02 (C)]

However, another pilot, codenamed Honey (Craig Borgstrom), claimed that the battle stations command happened at 9:24 (See - 9:24 AM ) while the 9-11 Commission claimed it happened at 9:09 (see 9:09 AM ).

9:21 AM       The United dispatchers were instructed to advise their flights to secure their cockpit doors.

9:23 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NEADS had just been told that Flight 11 was still in the air; heading toward Washington. The NEADS Battle Commander stated, "Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him." The NEADS Mission Crew Commander issued the order, "Okay … scramble Langley. Head them toward the Washington area." The Langley base received the scramble order at 9:24 (See - 9:24 AM ). NEADS kept their fighters from the Otis base over New York City. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:23 AM       Bush talked privately with Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the head of the FBI, Robert Mueller and Governor George Pataki of New York. The obvious question goes to why Bush waited from 9:05 (when Card told him of the United Airlines Flight 175 striking the WTC) until 9:23 to finally call. He still had not given the authority to shoot down any hostile airliners.

9:23 AM       A sonic boom occurred, picked up by an earthquake monitor in southern Pennsylvania, 60 miles away from Shanksville. This was assumed to most likely have been caused by a fighter breaking the sound barrier.


9:24 AM       Shortly after 9-11, NORAD reported that the FAA notified them that Flight 77 "may" have been hijacked and that it appeared to be headed toward Washington. [See - 9:24, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9:24, AP, 8/19/02, 9:25, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:25, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:25, Guardian, 10/17/01]

Supposedly, the Air Traffic Controllers at the Dulles International Airport discovered a high speed aircraft, heading toward Washington. Supposedly, they sounded an alarm within moments that the aircraft appears to be headed toward the White House. [See - Washington Post, 11/3/01]

The FAA – in 2003 - supported this version, claiming that they had informally notified NORAD earlier. "NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 AM, but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges prior to the formal notification." [See - FAA, 5/22/03]

Strangely, in 2004 the 9-11 Commission claimed that both NORAD and the FAA were both wrong, and that NORAD was never notified by the FAA, instead, they supposedly learned about Flight 77 at 9:34, by accident. (see 9:34 AM ).

9:24 AM       At 9:24, a United dispatcher sent an electronic message to Flight 93: "Beware of cockpit intrusion. Two aircraft in New York strike Trade Center buildings." Flight 93 acknowledged the message two minutes later. This was the last vocal contact from the cockpit of Flight 93. [See - Independent Commission, 1/27/04]

This warning was apparently in addition to an informal one which reached Flight 93 earlier (See - After 9:00 AM ).

9:24 AM       The BBC later reported that at 9:24, Robert Marr, the head of NEADS, gave the scramble order for the F-16 fighters based at Langley, Virginia: "North East sectors back on. We ought to be getting the weapons crews back in. Get the scramble order rolling. Scramble." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

The 9-11 Commission and NORAD concured that the scramble order was given at 9:24. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, NORAD, 9/18/01]

However, many media reports have placed the order as having been given later (for example: 9:27, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:25, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:35, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:35, Washington Post, 9/15/01). The pilot codenamed Honey gave a slightly different version; claiming that a battle stations alert sounded, with two other pilots being given the order to climb into their F-16s and await further instructions. Honey, who was the supervising pilot, talked to the other two pilots. Then, according to this version, "five or ten minutes later," a person from NORAD called Honey. He was supposedly then told that all three of them were ordered to scramble. Honey then went to his living quarters, grabbed his flight gear and took off. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 64-65]

Honey appears to be the codename for Captain Craig Borgstrom, because in another version it is Borgstrom who was given an alert and then talks to the two other pilots. [See - AP, 8/19/02 (C)]

Another pilot version described the battle stations warning as being given three minutes earlier (see 9:21 AM ), while the 9-11 Commission claimed that it happened fifteen minutes earlier (see 9:09 AM ). Pilot Major Dean Eckmann recalled, "They go "active air scramble, vector zero one zero one, max speed'. And then I push us over to the tower frequency and get our departure clearance and they launch us out right away …. We can carry M9-Heat Seekers, Side Winders for the M7-Sparrow, plus we have an internal 20mm Vulcan Cannon, and we were pretty much armed with all that. We had a pretty quick response time. I believe it was four to five minutes we were airborne from that point." " The BBC reports, "Even while last minute pre-launch checks are being made, the controllers learn that a third aircraft — American Airlines flight 77 out of Washington — may have been hijacked." Just before the fighters departed, the BBC said, "The pilots get a signal over the aircraft's transponder — a code that indicated an emergency wartime situation." [See - BBC 9/1/02]

9:24 AM       According to NORAD, the FAA reported a possible hijacking of Flight 77. That would be some time after they had been tracking it as a primary target. The Langley F-16s were now departing Langley. [See - 9:24, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9:24, AP, 8/19/02, 9:25, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:25, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:25, Guardian, 10/17/01]

CNN noted that "after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had warned the air defense command that a hijacked airliner appeared to be headed toward Washington, there was no effort to evacuate the White House, Capitol, State Department or the Pentagon."[CNN, 9/16/01]

A Pentagon spokesman stated, "The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way." [See - Newsday, 9/23/01]

Most senators and congress-people were still in the Capitol building, which was not evacuated until 9:48 (see 9:48 AM ). Only Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice and possibly a few others, were evacuated to safety a few minutes after 9:03 (See - 9:10 AM ). Since at least the time of the Flight 11 impact, "military officials in a command center [the National Military Command Center] on the east side of the [Pentagon] [are] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do." [See - New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

9:24 AM       The FAA notified NORAD that American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked. The FAA lost contact with American Airlines Flight 77 when the transponder code stopped at 8:55 AM. That means that it took 29 minutes for the FAA to tell NORAD that the American Airlines Flight 77 had been hijacked.

9:24 AM       NORAD ordered the 1st Fighter Wing from Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia to scramble two, possibly three F-16 fighters. Langley AFB is 130 miles south of Washington D.C..

The obvious question goes to why Langley AFB wasn't scrambled as early as 8:20; or at the very least at 9:02. Why would NORAD possibly have waited 21 minutes from the time United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the WTC at 9:02:54, before scrambling the Langley aircraft - at 9:24? That delay should have cost many careers.

9:25 AM       Reported "Mineta" account of the shoot-down order "There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out, "the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" [May 23, 2003 Mineta testimony before the 9/11 Commission]

The suggestion is that the shoot-down order was previously given. This timing is consistent with the Pentagon "event," versus anything to do with Flight 93. However, the timing of the shoot-down order is skewed, in the final Commission report. The implication is that the shoot-down order was deliberately withheld from the pilots, along with the methodical denial of a successful intercept. There was method to that madness.

The highly probable case of two aircraft (Flights 77 & 93) "gone missing," suggests that the fighters were deliberately held at bay, so as to preclude the fighter's discovery of the factual disposition of the second pair of aircraft. The fighters" onboard target acquisition electronics would have allowed them to spot and track the aircraft. The argument being that the second two aircraft were back-ups for the first pair. The obvious lack of factual "crash" evidence at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania leave the obvious conclusion that the sites were "prepped," just in case the second two aircraft were not needed to take out the WTC.

In its final report, the 9-11 Commission gave the time of arrival of the Vice President Cheney at the PEOC as 9:58, almost a 38 minute difference from Mineta's public testimony.

9:25 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the FAA Command Center advised the FAA headquarters that American Flight 77 was lost in the Indianapolis ATC airspace, and that Indianapolis had no primary radar track, but was looking for the aircraft. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The Command Center had supposedly learned of this information 16 minutes earlier (9:09 AM ). The American Airlines headquarters had been notified before 9:00 (see – (Before 9:00 AM ).

9:25 AM       Barbara Olson, a passenger on Flight 77, supposedly called her husband, Theodore (Ted) Olson, who was the Solicitor General at the Justice Department. Ted was in his office, watching the WTC news on television when his wife supposedly called. A few days later, Ted said, "She told me that she had been herded to the back of the aircraft. She mentioned that they had used knives and box cutters to hijack the aircraft. She mentioned that the pilot had announced that the aircraft had been hijacked." [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

He supposedly told her that the two aircraft had strike the WTC. [See - Telegraph, 3/5/02]

She felt that nobody was taking charge. [See - CNN, 9/12/01]

He stated that he didn't know if she was near the pilots, but at one point she reportedly asked, "What shall I tell the pilot? What can I tell the pilot to do?" [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

Then she supposedly got cut off. [See - Newsweek, 9/29/01]

Ted Olson recollection of the call's timing was extremely vague, claiming that it "must have been 9:15 or 9:30. Someone would have to reconstruct the time for me." [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

Other versions place the calls around 9:25. [See - About 9:25, Miami Herald, 9/14/01, about 9:25, New York Times, 9/15/01 (C), "by 9:25," Washington Post, 9/21/01]

The call was said to have lasted approximately a minute. [See - Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B)]

In another version, she was standing near a single pilot, yet in another she was near two pilots. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

Three days following 9-11, Olson said, "I found out later that she was having, for some reason, to call collect and was having trouble getting through. You know how it is to get through to a government institution when you're calling collect." He stated that he didn't know what kind of phone was used, he had "assumed that it must have been on the aircraft phone, and that she somehow didn't have access to her credit cards. Otherwise, she would have used her cell phone and called me." [See - Fox News, 9/14/01]

The relationship of the credit cards doesn't make sense.

Still, in another interview on that same day, he stated that she used a cell phone; and that she may have gotten cut off "because the signals from cell phones coming from aircraft don't work that well." [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

Six months later, Olson claimed that she called collect "using the phone in the passengers' seats." [See - Telegraph, 3/5/02]

Many other details conflict; Olson faulted his memory, saying that he "tends to mix the two [calls] up because of the emotion of the events." [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

Some have questioned if Ted Olson can be trusted in his version of the call, since he had stated that lying to the public is justifiable. [See - Sydney Morning Herald, 3/20/02]

9:25 AM       According to NORAD American Flight 77 was reported heading toward Washington. This was supposedly not precise information, versus general information, across the "chat log."

Following 9:25 AM       Ted Olson supposedly called the Justice Department's control center to relay his wife's call from Flight 77 (See - 9:25 AM ). Accounts vary, as to whether or not the Justice Department already knows of the particular hijacking. [See - Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B), Channel 4 News, 9/13/01, New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)]

Olson reportedly said, "They just absorbed the information. And they promised to send someone down right away." He assumed that they would "pass the information on to the appropriate people." [See - Fox News 9/14/01]

9:26 AM       The FAA (Ben Sliney) halted all takeoffs nationwide. Airborne "Atlantic" international flights were instructed to land in Canada. This is not to be confused with the "land-now" order, which will be issued at approximately 9:40.

9:26 AM       On American Airlines Flight 77, Barbara Olson again reportedly called her husband, to describe the hijacking; reporting that the passengers and pilots were held in the rear of the aircraft. Again, she was the only person who supposedly made a call from American Airlines Flight 77.

9:26 AM       The FAA National Operations Manager Ben Sliney and Jane Garvey, the head of the FAA, "almost certainly after getting an okay from the White House, initiate[ed] a national ground stop, which forbids takeoffs and requires aircraft in the air to get down as soon as reasonable. The order, which had never been implemented since flying was invented in 1903, applie[s] to virtually every single kind of machine that can takeoff — civilian, military, or law enforcement." The military and law enforcement flights were allowed to resume at 10:31 AM, with a limited number of military flights — the FAA wouldn't reveal any details — being allowed to fly during this ban. [See - Time, 9/14/01]

Garvey later referred to it as "a national ground stop … that prevented any aircraft from taking off." [See - House Committee, 9/21/01]

However, the Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta later claimed that he was the one to give the order: "As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the attack, I called from the White House to order the air traffic system to land all aircraft, immediately and without exception." [See - State Department, 9/20/01] At the time, an estimated 4,000-plus aircraft were flying in the continental US. A later version holds that Ben Sliney, the FAA's National Operations Manager, made the decision, without first consulting his superiors, such as Jane Garvey. [See - USA Today, 8/13/02]

Another version by Linda Schuessler, manager of the tactical operations at the FAA Command Center, where Sliney was located, holds that " …it was done collaboratively… All these decisions were corporate decisions. It wasn't one person who said, Yes, this has got to get done." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12/17/01]

Approximately 500 aircraft landed in the next 20 minutes, with much more urgent orders to land, being issued at 9:45 AM. [USA Today, 8/13/02]

[9:25, Time, 9/14/01, 9:25, USA Today, 8/13/02, 9:26, House Committee, 9/21/01, 9:26, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, 9:26, Newsday, 9/23/01, 9:26, AP, 8/19/02, 9:26, Newsday, 9/10/02]

9:27 AM       Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice, now located in their bunker below the White House (See - 9:10 AM), were supposedly told by an aide that an aircraft was 50 miles out of Washington; heading toward it - Flight 77. The Federal Aviation Deputy Chief, Monty Belger, stated, "Well we're watching this target on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off. So we, have no identification." They were given further advisories when the aircraft was 30 miles out, then 10 miles out, until it disappeared from the radar (time unknown; the aircraft was reportedly said to be traveling around 500 mph; and 30 miles away at 9:30. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

The Transportation Secretary, Norman Mineta, gave virtually the same version before the 9-11 Commission. [See - 9-11 Commission, 5/23/03]

However, the 9-11 Commission later claimed that the aircraft heading toward Washington was only discovered at 9:32 (see 9:32 AM ).

9:27 AM       Tom Burnett reportedly called his wife Deena and said, "I'm on United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. The aircraft has been hijacked. We are in the air. They've already knifed a guy. There is a bomb on board. Call the FBI." Deena reportedly called the 911 line. [See - 9:27, 'she scribbled down what Tom told her and noted the time," Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 107, ABC News, 9/12/01, "within minutes" of 9:28, MSNBC, 7/30/02, "She recalls it was around 6:20 AM –9:20 Eastern time," [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01 (B), "… shortly after" Jeremy Glick's call, Toronto Sun, 9/16/01]

His wife Deena wondered if the call may have been prior to the cockpit being taken over, as he spoke quickly and quietly - as though he was being watched. He also reportedly had a phone headset, thus he could have conceivably made the reported call unnoticed. The original versions of this conversation appear to have been censored. The most recent version had the call ending with the statement, "We are in the air. The aircraft has been hijacked. They already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They're saying there is a bomb onboard. Please call the authorities." [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 107]

The major difference from earlier versions, being the mention of a gun. The call wasn't recorded, however Deena's call immediately afterward to 911 was, and she reportedly stated that, "They just knifed a passenger and there are guns on the aircraft." [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 108]

9:27 AM       According to NORAD, the Boston FAA reported a fifth aircraft missing - Delta Flight 89. Delta had taken off from Boston in the same time frame as United Flight 175, creating a case of ATC "jitters," per a hastily assembled "profile." Delta 89 was not hijacked; landing at Cleveland, approximately 40 minutes later – per the airline's request. [USA Today, 8/13/02, CNN SUNDAY MORNING, "Air Traffic Controllers Remember 9-11," September 8, 2002 - 09:11]

9:28 AM       A Cleveland Air Traffic Controller, Stacey Taylor, had been advised to watch the westbound transcontinental flights for anything suspicious. She later recalled, "I hear one of the controllers behind me go, "Oh, my God, oh my God," and he started yelling for the supervisor. He goes, "What is this aircraft doing? What is this aircraft doing?" I wasn't that busy at the time, and I pulled it up on my screen and he was climbing and descending and climbing and descending, but very gradually. He'd go up 300 feet, he'd go down 300 feet. And it turned out to be United 93." (The time of this event is not specified, presumably it happens prior to when the Cleveland controllers note Flight 93 descending 700 feet (See - 9:29 AM ). [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

9:28 AM       Richard Clarke, was directing a video conference with top officials, asking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers, "I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?" Myers replied, "Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but … Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert." This may be a mistaken reference to an on-going war game "Vigilant Guardian" (See - 6:30 AM ). Clarke asked, "Okay, how long to CAP (Combat Air Patrol) over DC?" Myers replied, "Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?" According to Clarke, Myers was, at that time, surrounded by generals and colonels.

9:28 AM       Flight 93 acknowledged a transmission from a Cleveland Air Traffic Controller. This was the last normal contact with the aircraft. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

According to the 9-11 Commission, less than a minute later, the controller and pilots of the aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin … " [See - after 9:25, Newsweek, 11/25/01, 9:28, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 9:28, Guardian, 10/17/01]

Seconds later, the controller responded: "Somebody call Cleveland?" Then there were more sounds of screaming, with someone yelling, "Get out of here, get out of here." [See - 9:28, MSNBC, 7/30/02, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 9:30, Observer, 12/2/01, 9:32: "90 minutes into the flight," Toronto Sun, 9/16/01, 9:58, Newsweek, 9/22/01, ]

Then the voices of the hijackers could supposedly be heard talking in Arabic. The words being later translated, showing that they were supposedly talking to each other, saying "Everything is fine." [See - Newsweek 11/25/01] This would be approximately 8 minutes - probably at least 12 minutes - after the hijackers had taken over the cockpit; while doing something to cause the FAA to notify NORAD of the United Airlines Flight 93 hijacking.

9:29 AM       Shortly after first hearing the strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, the Cleveland Air Traffic Controllers noticed that the aircraft had descended by 700 feet. They tried to contact the aircraft several times, with no answer.

9:29 AM       President Bush spoke at 9:29 in the library of Booker Elementary School.

Bush then gave a brief speech in front of the students and teachers. [See - Daily Mail, 9/8/02] "Today we've had a national tragedy. Two aircraft have crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our country" (see the text of the speech – Federal News Service, 9-11/01]). [See - MSNBC 9/22/01; Washington Post 9/12/01; CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; Federal News Service 9/10/01]

Why the "terrorist" clarity, that early?

9:29 AM       Captain Charles Leidig was then in command of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), "the military's worldwide nerve center." [See - CNN, 9/4/02]

The necessary telephone links were then established with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) located at the Pentagon (opposite side the side from where the Pentagon explosion would later happen), the Canadian equivalent command center, the Strategic Command, the theater commanders, and the federal emergency-response agencies. An Air Threat Conference Call was initiated; which would last for eight hours. Intermittently, Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, key military officers, leaders from the FAA and NORAD, the White House, were heard on the line. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The NORAD command director Captain Michael Jellinek claimed that this happened "immediately," after the second WTC crash. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Yet, the 9-11 Commission concluded that it started nearly half an hour later, roughly at 9:29. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Brigadier General Montague Winfield, who later took over for Leidig, said, "All of the governmental agencies there, that were involved in any activity that was going on in the United States at that point, were in that conference." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

The call continued through the Pentagon "event," as the NMCC didn't even feel the impact. [See - CNN, 9/4/02]

Despite the fact that he was in the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld didn't join in the NMCC or in the call until 10:30 (see 10:30 AM ).

9:29 AM       Aboard United Airlines Flight 93 - Jeremy Glick, a passenger, reportedly called his wife, describing the hijackers; and was then informed of the attacks in New York City.

9:30 AM       An ATC controller asked other nearby flights on his frequency if they've heard screaming from flight 93; several pilots claimed that they had. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:30 AM       Radar supposedly tracked Flight 77 as it closed within 30 miles of Washington. [See - 9:30, CBS News, 9/21/01]

Todd Lewis, Air Traffic Controller at the Washington's Dulles Airport, later recalled, " … my colleagues saw a target moving quite fast from the northwest to the southeast. So she — we all started watching that target, and she notified the supervisor. But nobody knew that was a commercial flight at the time. Nobody knew that was American 77 …. I thought it was a military flight." [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

Another version is similar, citing that just before 9:30 AM, a Dulles Airport controller saw an aircraft, without a transponder, traveling almost 500 mph; heading towards Washington, D.C. [See - USA Today, 8/13/02]

In yet another version, Danielle O'Brien, the Dulles Air Traffic Controller reportedly was said to have first spotted the blip, claiming that she didn't spot it until it was around 12 to 14 miles from Washington. [See - ABC, 10/24/01, ABC, 10/24/01 (B)]

But there were also versions that Vice President Cheney was told at approximately 9:27 that radar was tracking Flight 77 – then 50 miles away from Washington (See - 9:27 AM ). The 9-11 Commission claimed the aircraft wasn't discovered until 9:32 (see 9:32 AM ).

According to the NORAD timeline, three F-16s were airborne.

They were 105 miles away from the Washington area.

Supposedly, the pilots received a strange message, "A person came on the radio," General Haugen said, "and identified themselves as being with the Secret Service and he said, `I want you to protect the White House at all costs.' "

However, the probability of Secret Service having both the UHF radio and the correct frequency is unlikely.

Following 9:30 AM       Supposedly, Barbara Olson called her husband Ted Olson, once again (the reported timing of both calls are extremely vague.) ["About 9:30, five minutes after first call," Miami Herald, 9/14/01]

A few days later, Ted Olson described the conversation: "She said the aircraft had been high hijacked shortly after takeoff and they had been circling around, I think were the words she used. She reported to me that she could see houses. I asked her which direction the aircraft was going. She paused — there was a pause there. I think she must have asked someone else. She said I think it's going northeast…. She told me that [the hijackers] did not know she was making this phone call." [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]

She supposedly didn't mention the nationality, number, or other details of the hijackers. Then the phone supposedly went dead, Olson stated that didn't know why. [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C), Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B)]

Olson also stated that she said, "The pilot had announced that the aircraft had been hijacked. She said it had been hijacked shortly after takeoff." [See - Fox News, 9/14/01]

Unlikely statement from a pilot.

Her supposed last words before being cut off were, "What do I tell the pilots to do?" [See - BBC, 9/13/01]

She had supposedly asked this already, in her first call. [See - Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B)]

Then the phone goes dead, supposedly "moments before" the aircraft impacted the Pentagon [Newsweek, 9/29/01]. Ted Olson's timing recall was sufficiently vague, that it isn't clear if this was when the call happened; he stated that he didn't know why the call ended (see [CNN, 9/14/01 (C)]). The call was originally cited to have last approximately a minute [Washington Post, 9/12/01 (B)]. Ted Olson later claimed that it could have lasted up to four minutes. [See - CNN, 9/14/01 (C)] Most find it strange that there were no personal exchanges, on the order of "…are you all right?" or; "I love you."

9:30 AM       Chris Stephenson, the Air Traffic Controller in charge of the Washington airport tower, reportedly stated that he was called by the Secret Service in this time-frame. He was supposedly told that an unidentified aircraft was speeding toward Washington. Stephenson reportedly looked at the radar scope; seeing Flight 77 approximately five miles to the west. He supposedly looked out the tower's window to see the aircraft turning to the right and descending. He said that he followed it until it disappeared behind a building in nearby Crystal City, Virginia. [See - USA Today, 8/12/02]

A rogue aircraft that close to Dulles would have sent any controller into a panic, particularly on that day. It would have been dodging other aircraft, which would be landing & departing Dulles.

According to yet another version, just before 9:30 AM, a controller in the same tower discovered an unidentified aircraft on her radar, "heading toward Washington and without a transponder signal to identify it. It's flying fast, she said: almost 500 mph. And it's heading straight for the heart of the city. Could it be American Flight 77? The FAA warns the Secret Service." [See - USA Today, 8/13/02]

9:30 AM       The Air Traffic Controllers mistakenly suspect that Delta Flight 1989, flying west over Pennsylvania, had also been hijacked. The controllers briefly suspected that the hijackers' voices from Flight 93 were actually coming from this aircraft, only a few miles away. USA Today reported that the flight "joins a growing list of suspicious jets. Some of their flight numbers would be scrawled on a white dry-erase board throughout the morning" at the FAA headquarters. Mis-communications led to further suspicion of Flight 1989, even following the resolution of the issue - the source of the hijacker's message was finally confirmed to have come from Flight 93. Flight 1989 landed at Cleveland at 10:10. Approximately 11 flights would be suspected, with four of them actually being hijacked. [See - USA Today, 8/13/02 (B)]

The 9-11 Commission later offered still another explanation; claiming that at 9:41, the Boston ATC identified Flight 1989 as a possible hijacking strictly on the basis of its being a transcontinental 767, which had departed from Logan Airport. Although NEADS never lost track of the flight, it launched fighters from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it (see 10:01 AM pand (After 10:06 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

The Commission's timeline "9:41" is off, as Flight 1989 had been under ATC suspicion, since 9:27.

9:30 AM       As Bush began his speech in Florida, Richard Clarke ordered all of the US embassies overseas to be closed; ordering all military bases to alert level named "Combat Threatcon." Clarke discussed where Bush should go from Sarasota, Florida. He telephoned PEOC, the commander bunker where Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice were, stating, "Somebody has to tell the President he can't come right back here [to Washington]. Cheney, Condi, somebody. Secret Service concurs. We do not want them saying where they are going when they take off. Second, when they take off, they should have fighter escort. Three, we need to authorize the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft — including a hijacked passenger flight — that looks like it is threatening to attack and cause large-scale death on the ground. Got it?" [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 5-7]

However, when Bush departed on Air Force One approximately an hour later, there were no fighter escorts; none appeared for approximately an hour. (See - Between 10:55-11:41 AM ). If Clarke factually requested the authorization for a shoot-down order at this time, it was seemingly ignored, as the Commission accounts cite that neither President Bush nor Vice President Cheney gave the shoot-down authorization for another half an hour, at least (See - Between 10:00-10:15 AM ). {After the last plane had crashed.} However, Mineta's testimony supports Clarke's account, that the order had been given, possibly as early as 9:15.

Following 9:30 AM       Sarasota police officer, Kevin Down, recalled that immediately after Bush's speech concluded, "The Secret Service agent ran out from the school and said we're under terrorist attack we have to go now." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

He added, "I thought they were actually anticipating a terrorist attack on the president while we were en route." [See - BBC, 8/30/02]

ABC News reporter Ann Compton, part of the Presidential motorcade, recalled, "It was a mad-dash motorcade out to the airport." [See - BBC 9/1/02]

9:30 AM       The three F-16s at Langley, Virginia get airborne. [See - 9:30, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9:30, ABC News, 9-11/02, 9:35, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:30, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The pilots' were Major Brad Derrig, Captain Craig Borgstrom, and Major Dean Eckmann, from the North Dakota Air National Guard 119th Fighter Wing, then stationed at Langley. [See - AP, 8/19/02 (C), ABC News, 9-11/02]

9:30 AM       United Airlines began landing all of its flights inside the USA. [See - Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01]

Note all aircraft nationwide have been ordered down already (See - 9:26 AM ) but only told to get down in a reasonable amount of time. Now they're told to land immediately. Ed Ballinger, the flight dispatcher for United Airlines, later claimed he puts out a Stop-Fly alert to all United aircraft without waiting for his United superiors or the FAA. But he was specifically instructed by superiors not to tell the pilots why they were being instructed to land. [See - New York Observer, 6/04]

American Airlines began landing all of their flights five minutes later. [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

9:30 AM       The hijackers supposedly make an announcement to the passengers on Flight 77, telling them to phone their families as they were "all going to die." They also tell the passengers that they were going to strike the White House. [See - "When they took over the controls," Sunday Herald, 9/16/01, "around 9:30," Cox News, 10/21/01]

9:30 AM       The FAA's emergency operations center got up and running, five minutes after the FAA issued an order grounding all civilian, military, and law enforcement aircraft. [See - Time 9/14/01]

9:30 AM       The F-16s code-named "Huntress" took off from Langley AFB reportedly headed at first toward at NYC. A couple of minutes into their mission, according to General Haugen "A person came on the radio and identified themselves as being with the Secret Service" and said, "I want you to protect the White House at all costs." The F-16s were supposedly vectored to Washington D.C.

It's necessary to ask why the fighters were supposedly headed to NYC when American Airlines Flight 77 had been supposedly known to be headed directly for Washington D.C. for the previous 31 minutes; with no communication and no transponder signal for 34 minutes? There were no known airliners headed for NYC, or anywhere else, without communication and transponders. By 9:25, the air traffic controllers had already informed the U.S. Secret Service that American Airlines Flight 77 was approaching very fast.

9:30 AM       Bush, spoke to the nation from Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, saying the country had suffered an "apparent terrorist attack" and "a national tragedy." He claimed that he would chase down, "those folks who committed this act." Bush also stated, "Terrorism against our nation will not stand." That was an echo - "This will not stand," the words his father used a few days after Iraq had invaded Kuwait in August of 1990.

See –


Bush promised a full investigation into the attack; instead, he did everything possible to ensure that there would no responsible investigation into 911.

9:30 AM       The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who was in Lima, Peru abruptly made plans to return to Washington. "Get the aircraft," he told one assistant. "Go tell them we're leaving."

9:30 AM       United Airlines began landing all of its flights inside of the United States.

Following 9:31 AM       A hijacker on board Flight 93 can supposedly be heard on the alleged recovered cockpit voice recording order a woman to sit down. The woman – presumed to be a flight attendant, begged 'don't, don't. Please, I don't want to die."

Patrick Welsh, the husband of the presumed flight attendant Debbie Welsh, was later informed that a flight attendant was stabbed early in the takeover, strongly implying it was his wife. Debby was a first-class section flight attendant. Her husband said, "knowing Debby," she would have resisted.

The Cockpit Voice Recorder was supposedly recovered from a below-ground depth of 25 feet. The force required to get it there would have destroyed it. A bullet couldn't have penetrated that deeply.

9:32 AM       A Flight 93 hijacker reportedly stated that over the radio – by accident: "Ladies and gentlemen, here it's the captain, please sit down. Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb aboard." The Cleveland Air Traffic Controllers can supposedly understand approximately a minute of screams. A voice again reportedly stated something to the effect of a "bomb on board." A hijacker reportedly said in broken English that they were then returning to the airport. [See - 9:32, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:34, , 9:35, Newsweek, 9/22/01]

According to the 9-11 Commission's version, the hijacker's voice stated, "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond, "Calling Cleveland center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly." The controller notified his supervisor, who then passed the information up the chain of command (see 9:34 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:32 AM       Secret Service agents reportedly burst into Cheney's office, carrying him under his arms to the underground bunker of the White House.

9:32 AM       The New York Stock Exchange was closed.

9:33 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 is supposedly re-identified. According to The New York Times, it had been lost from the radar screen at 8:56 when it turned off its transponder. Washington air traffic control supposedly saw a fast moving blip on their radar screen, sending a warning to the Dulles Airport. The aircraft was supposedly lost for 37 minutes. Yet, the FAA warned that the aircraft was headed toward Washington at 9:25.

9:35 AM       United Airlines Flight 93 went off course near Cleveland, Ohio; making a 135 degree turn, heading southeast. United Airlines Flight 93 was supposedly 280 miles from Washington D.C.

9:35 AM       American Airlines began landing all of its flights inside the United States.

According to NORAD, the F-16s were reported airborne. The distinction must be made between the report timing, versus the actual take-off.

9:36 AM       Supposedly, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport instructed a military C-130, which had just departed Andrews Air Force base, to try to identify the American Airlines Flight 77. The C-130 supposedly reported that it was a B-767; moving low and fast.

Why/how was the flight allowed to take off?

9:37 AM       American Airlines Flight 77 was supposedly lost from the radar screens; reported to have impacted the west side of the Pentagon - that section of the Pentagon was newly renovated, with unoccupied offices. The Pentagon claimed that American Airlines Flight 77 struck at 9:37. Other reports had American Flight 77 striking at 9:40 to 9:43; with the New York Times published this at 9:45 (see 9:24 AM # 75).

Other evidence, such as a broken Pentagon clock and timelines put the greater probability at 9:31.

NORAD claimed that the F-16s from Langley were still 105 miles and 12 minutes away. This meant that their average speed was only around 190 knots, or 14% of their top flying speed. If the F-16s flew at top speed, they should have arrived just after 9:37. For fighters, 190 knots is extremely low.

The math doesn't work. Langley is located 130 miles from the Pentagon. The F-16s have a top speed of approximately 1,500 MPH. Deducting 105 miles from 130 miles equals 25 miles covered in the 7 minutes from their 9:30 take-off to 9:37. Dividing 25 miles by 7 minutes equals 3.57 miles per minute. Multiply that by 60; yields 186 knots, or 214 MPH.

NORAD Press Release: http://StandDown.net/NORADSeptember182001PressRelease.htm

AP Article On NORAD PR: http://www.AttackOnAmerica.net/8MinutesAway.htm

Two New York Times articles apologetically describe this:

Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet But Found No Way to Stop It http://www.attackonamerica.net/pentagontrackeddeadlyjet.html

Chronology of Plane Impactes: Orders, at the Time of Impact http://www.attackonamerica.net/ordersattimeofimpact.html

9:33 - 9:38 AM       Supposedly, the radar data showed Flight 77 crossing the Capitol Beltway; headed toward the Pentagon. But the purported aircraft, flying more than 400 mph, was supposedly too high when it neared the Pentagon at 9:35. It was described as crossing the Pentagon at approximately 7,000 feet. [See - , Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

The aircraft then supposedly made a high-speed descending turn. It reportedly made a 'downward spiral, turning almost a complete circle and dropping the last 7,000 feet in two-and-a-half minutes. The steep turn was so smooth, the sources say, it's clear there [is] no fight for [cockpit] control going on."

It reportedly got very near the White House during the turn. "Sources say the hijacked jet … [flew] several miles south of the restricted airspace around the White House."

The Telegraph later wrote, "If the airliner had approached much nearer to the White House it might have been shot down by the Secret Service, who were believed to have a battery of ground-to-air Stinger missiles ready to defend the president's home. The Pentagon is not similarly defended." [See - Telegraph, 9/16/01] White House spokesman Ari Fleischer suggested the aircraft went even closer to the White House, saying, "That is not the radar data that we have seen. The aircraft was headed toward the White House."

Again, the question, "Where is that data?"

9:32 AM       The New York Stock Exchange was closed. [See - MSNBC 9/22/01]

9:32 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the Dulles Airport terminal control facility had supposedly been searching for unidentified primary radar targets (see 9:21 AM ); now finding one. Several Dulles Air Traffic Controllers reportedly "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified the Reagan Airport. The FAA personnel at both Reagan and Dulles airports reportedly notified the Secret Service. The identity or aircraft type was supposedly unknown. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Yet, other versions placed the initial discovery of this aircraft as the effort of the Dulles controllers, earlier (See - 9:24 AM ) and (9:30 AM ). Vice President Cheney was supposedly told that radar was tracking Flight 77 at 9:27 (See - 9:27 AM ).

9:33 AM       The BBC reported that pilot Major Dean Eckmann got a message, as he was flying north from Langley, "They said — all aircraft, if you come within [a certain range - possibly 30] miles of Washington DC, you will be shot down." [See - BBC 9/1/02]

Yet, all reports indicate that the fighters were never authorized to shoot down any aircraft.

9:33 AM       The Air Traffic Controllers at the Dulles Airport supposedly activated a hotline, warning the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was headed toward Washington. [See - 9:33, Guardian, 10/17/01, after 9:30, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), after 9:30, USA Today, 8/13/02]

Chris Stephenson, the Air Traffic Controller in charge of the Reagan National Airport tower, reportedly stated that he was called by the Secret Service; told that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward Washington. Stephenson supposedly looked at the radar scope, seeing Flight 77 around five miles to the west. He supposedly looked out of the tower window, witnessing the aircraft turning to its right and descending. He reportedly followed it until it disappeared behind a building. [See - "about 9:30," but the location of Flight 77 would put it after 9:33, USA Today, 8/12/02]

However, a different version cites a Dulles Air Traffic Controller seeing the flight at 9:33 then calling Reagan National Airport to warn them. [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

Yet other version had Dulles locating the aircraft at 9:24; making immediate notification (See - 9:24 AM ).

9:34 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the news of the Flight 93 hijacking reached FAA's Washington headquarters. By this time, the headquarters had established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center. It had instructed the center to poll all of the ATC centers about suspect aircraft. Thus, at this time, the Command Center passed on Cleveland's message: "United 93 may have a bomb on board." The Command Center continually updated the FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it supposedly impacted. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:34 AM       Tom Burnett reportedly called his wife Deena a second time. He supposedly said, "They're in the cockpit." He was reported to have checked the pulse of the man, who had been knifed (later identified as Mark Rothenberg, sitting next to him in seat 5B) determining that he was dead. Deena told him about the strike on the WTC. He responded, "Oh my God, it's a suicide mission." As they continue to talk, he reportedly told her that the aircraft had turned back. By now, Deena was in communication with the FBI; and a policeman was at her house.

9:34 AM       Bush's motorcade left Booker Elementary School, heading to the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport. [See - 9:34, Washington Times, 10/8/02, 9:35, Telegraph, 12/16/01, 9:35, Wall Street Journal, 3/22/04]

A year later, Chief of Staff Andrew Card stated, "As we were heading to Air Force One, we did hear about the Pentagon attack, and we also learned, what turned out to be a mistake, but we learned that the Air Force One package could in fact be a target." [See - MSNBC, 9/9/02]

This conflicts with the flight taking off, knowing that there was no fighter protection. It also conflicts, as the threat was supposedly learned after the aircraft was en route to DC.

9:34 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center, asking about Flight 11. A manager there happened to mention, "We're looking — we also lost American 77." The Commission claimed, "No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77." [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Yet, 38 minutes earlier, the Air Traffic Controllers reportedly determined that Flight 77 was off course, out of radio contact; with no transponder signal (See - 8:56 AM ). They had also reportedly warned the American Airlines headquarters within minutes (See - Before 9:00 AM ).

9:35 AM       The Treasury Department was evacuated a few minutes before Flight 77 supposedly impacted. [See - Independent Commission, 1/26/04]

Yet, CNN noted that "after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) warned the military's air defense command that a hijacked airliner appeared to be headed toward Washington, the federal government failed to make any move to evacuate the White House, Capitol, State Department or the Pentagon." [See - CNN, 9/16/01]

A Pentagon spokesman stated, "The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way." Supposedly, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his aides in the Pentagon remained unaware of any danger up to the moment of the supposed impact. [See - Newsday, 9/23/01]

The Lawmakers were in the Capitol building were not evacuated until 9:48 (see 9:48 AM ). By all rational accounts, only Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice and a few others, were evacuated to safety a few minutes after 9:03 (See - 9:10 AM ). Yet, since at least the Flight 11 impact on the WTC, "military officials in a command center [the National Military Command Center] on the east side of the [Pentagon] [are] urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do." [See - New York Times, 9/15/01]

9:35 AM       The San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center reportedly received a call from an unnamed Flight 93 flight attendant, stating that the flight had been hijacked. That information was quickly passed on. [See - Independent Commission, 1/27/04]

Within approximately ten minutes, "everyone" in the United Airlines crisis center "now [knows] that a flight attendant on board had called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew." [See - Wall Street Journal 10/15/01]

9:35 AM       When Flight 93 was supposedly over Youngstown, Ohio, Stacey Taylor, with other Cleveland Air Traffic Controllers, saw it rapidly climb 6,000 feet above its assigned altitude of 35,000 feet; then descend rapidly. The aircraft supposedly dropped so quickly toward Cleveland that the Air Traffic Controllers worried that they might be the target. Other versions have the climb occur around 9:35. The controllers continue attempting to contact the aircraft; but get no response. [See - Guardian 10/17/01; USA Today 8/13/02; Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:36 AM       Flight 93 supposedly attempted to file a new flight plan to Washington, D.C., reversed course and headed toward Washington. [See - 9:35, "turned around near Cleveland," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, "turns off course,"9:36:01, Guardian, 10/17/01, 9:36, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:36, "made an ominous turn," Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 219] One ABC report claimed that Flight 93 attempted to file a new flight plan, reversed its course and headed toward Washington D.C.

This was widely reported - "ABCNEWS has learned that shortly before the aircraft changed directions, someone in the cockpit radioed in and asked the FAA for a new flight plan, with a final destination of Washington." If factual, this would have served as a major 'red flag;" an aircraft in factual distress would have diverted to the nearest suitable airport. If there was any fact behind the report, it could have been a message to Air Traffic Control. Specific "code" language should have been incorporated in the request.

Radar supposedly showed the aircraft turning 180 degrees. [See - CNN, 9/13/01 (B)]

The new flight plan supposedly scheduled the aircraft to arrive in Washington at 10:28.

9.36 AM       Reagan Airport ATC supposedly instructed the military C-130 ("Golfer zero-six") which had just departed Andrews Air Force Base, to intercept Flight 77 and to identify it. [See - Guardian, 10/17/01, New York Times, 10/16/01 (D)]

This C-130 was the same C-130 that was reportedly 17 miles from Flight 93 when it later crashed, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. [See - Minneapolis Star Tribune, 9-11/02, Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/01]

The C-130 pilot, Lt. Col. Steve O'Brien, claimed that they took off around 9:30, planning to drop supplies off in the Caribbean, then return to Minnesota. He later described his close encounter: "When air traffic control asked me if we had him [Flight 77] in sight, I told him that was an understatement — by then, he had pretty much filled our windscreen. Then he made a pretty aggressive turn so he was moving right in front of us, a mile and a half, two miles away. I said we had him in sight, then the controller asked me what kind of aircraft it was. That caught us up, because normally they have all that information. The controller didn't seem to know anything." O'Brien supposedly reported that the aircraft was either a 757 or 767 and its silver fuselage means it was probably an American Airlines aircraft. "They told us to turn and follow that aircraft — in 20-plus years of flying, I've never been asked to do something like that." [See - Minneapolis Star Tribune, 9-11/02]

The 9-11 Commission reported that it was a C-130H and that the pilot specifically identified the hijacked aircraft as a 757. Seconds after impact, O"Brian supposedly reported, "Looks like that aircraft impacted into the Pentagon sir." [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

The pilot was reporting a near midair collision, which would have shown on the ATC radar, with various alarms. There is no description of near panic, or even crew discussion. The estimated distance would not have evoked the report of "filling the windscreen." The time of the C-130 departure, versus the reported encounter, would not have allowed the aircraft to be in the vicinity of the purported 757. The C-130 would have been initially vectored away from the area, such that the timing of any course reversal would not have allowed the C-130 to be in the vicinity of the Pentagon, per the time cited. Add that ATC would never have allowed a potential mid-air collision to occur. Depending on the account, the "land-now" order had supposedly not yet been widely issued, thus, the local commercial traffic would have posed an additional collision hazard, relative to the description.

9:36 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, Cleveland ATC was asking the FAA Command Center whether or not someone had requested the military to launch fighters to intercept Flight 93. Cleveland reportedly offered to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center reportedly replied that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command would have to make that decision; and that they were working on the issue. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

Later, the C-130 arrives within 17 miles of the purported crash site of Flight 93 - requiring its course to be set in advance of the event; obviously predicted - BUT how? The Carribean or Minnesota; Shanksville is radically off course, for the C-130's arrival.

9:37 AM       The Arlington County Emergency Communications Center dispatched several units to deal with an apartment fire in Rosslyn, Virginia — in the vicinity of the Pentagon. The fire was reported to be in a high-rise building, thus nine fire and medical service units were dispatched. The first engine to arrive radioed that the fire had gone out. Conveniently, at the time of the Pentagon "event," a significant number of available fire and medical service units were already nearby. [See - Arlington County After-Action Report, July 2002; Fire Engineering, November 2002]

Additionally, Secret Service personnel were reportedly in the vicinity of the Pentagon heliport, near where Flight 77 would supposedly strike: "President Bush was scheduled to fly from Florida that afternoon, and his helicopter, Marine One, would carry him to the Pentagon. That meant Secret Service everywhere and their cars blocking the driveway." [See - Scripps Howard News 8/1/02]

However, there is no other description to suggest that they were factually on that site.

9:37 - 9:58 AM       The 9-11 Commission discarded the accounts that Vice President Cheney had left his office shortly after the second WTC impact (See - 9:10 AM ). In the Commission version, Cheney supposedly entered the bunker underneath the White House around 9:37, pausing in the hallway before reaching an emergency conference room. As the hallway reportedly had a secure telephone and a television, he supposedly attempted to call President Bush, discovering that the Pentagon had been 'struck." According to the Commission, "There is conflicting evidence as to when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room. We have concluded, after reviewing all the available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58." [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

Again, the Mineta testimony and the sequence of events better place Cheney's entrance to the bunker around 9:10 to around 9:15.

9:37 AM       The reported radar blip representing Flight 77 supposedly disappears. Its last known position was reported to be six miles from the Pentagon; four miles from the White House. [See - , Newhouse News, 1/25/02, ABC News, 9-11/02, USA Today, 8/13/02]

Supposedly, just before radar contact was lost, FAA headquarters was told, "The aircraft is circling. It's turning away from the White House." The aircraft was said to be flying at 500 mph; one mile for every seven seconds. [See - USA Today 8/13/02]

The purported speed implies that the supposed B-757 was in a very steep dive. The speed – if factual - would have produced frightening aerodynamic vibrations in the aircraft, add the distraction of cockpit audio speed warnings. The implied turn is that of a fighter jet, not an airliner. The turn radius would have been approximately 5 miles, carrying it over the white House. The purported maneuver is that of a well qualified jet pilot, not the amateur, which we're supposed to believe. The maneuver would have also taken the aircraft in and out of the Reagan Airport traffic pattern, producing incredible chaos [none reported]. While a fighter might have been able to produce such a turn, a B-757 did not.

9:37 AM       Supposedly, Jeremy Glick called his wife Lyz from Flight 93. He purportedly described the hijackers as Middle Eastern, Iranian looking; having put on red headbands. [Wrong color for the particular cause – they should have been green.] Three of them supposedly stood up, yelled and then ran into the cockpit. [No time to force the door open?] He was reported to be sitting in the front of the coach section, later sent to the rear with most of the passengers. The hijackers supposedly claimed to have a bomb, looking like a box with something red around it. He reportedly stated that the aircraft had turned around. Supposedly, the family members called emergency 911 on another phone line. The New York state police supposedly got patched-in, midway through the call. [Not the FBI?] Glick was supposedly told about the WTC towers. In theory, two other passengers on board also learned about the WTC, around this time. Glick's phone reportedly remained connected until the very end of the flight. [See - MSNBC 7/30/02; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B); Toronto Sun 9/16/01]

9:30 - 9:37 AM       The three Langley fighters were airborne. Their route is disputed. Varying versions hold that the fighters were ordered directly to Washington, New York, Baltimore; possibly no destination at all (See - 9:30 AM ). The 9-11 Commission reported that, the pilots didn't understand that there was an emergency, heading east. Three possible reasons are given:

1. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target, or the target's location.

2. A "generic flight plan" incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. The purpose of the generic flight plan was to quickly get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace. (Why would a factual intercept - on 9/11 - invoke a 'canned' flight plan?)

3. The lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" was newer guidance that superseded the original scramble order. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The Wall Street Journal gave a different explanation, "Once they got in the air, the Langley fighters observed peacetime noise restrictions requiring that they fly more slowly than supersonic speed and took off over water, pointed away from Washington, according to testimony before the [9/11 Commission]." Supposedly, the fighters which departed to New York City, more than half an hour earlier, traveled faster than supersonic speed, as they supposedly realized that they were in a national emergency (see 8:52 AM ). [See - Wall Street Journal, 3/22/04]

Yet, in greater contrast to those versions, the BBC reported that just prior to takeoff, the pilots were specifically told that Flight 77 may have been hijacked, and they supposedly got a cockpit signal, which indicated that they were in an emergency wartime situation (see 9:24 AM ). All versions seem to concur that, for whatever the factual reason, the fighters went too far east; not reaching the Washington area, until roughly 10:00 (See - 9:55 -10:10 AM ). Later pilot accounts suggest that the pilots were oblivious to the reason for their scramble.

9:38 AM       American Airlines Flight 77, reported to be carrying 58 passengers and a crew of 6, supposedly impacted into the west side of the Pentagon. Approximately 125 on the ground were later said to be killed or missing. [See - 9:37, NORAD, 9/18/01, 9:37, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:38, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:38, Guardian, 10/17/01, 9:38, USA Today, 8/13/02, 9:38, ABC News, 9-11/02, 9:38, CBS, 9-11/02 (B), 9:39, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 9:40, AP, 8/19/02, 9:43, CNN, 9/12/01, 9:43, MSNBC, 9/22/01, 9:43, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:43, New York Times, 9/12/01, 9:45, Boston Globe, 11/23/01]


Flight 77 struck the only section of the Pentagon which had been recently renovated — it was described as "within days of being totally [renovated]." [See - Defense Department, 9/15/01]

"It was the only area of the Pentagon with a sprinkler system, and it had been reconstructed with a web of steel columns and bars to withstand bomb blasts. The area struck by the aircraft also had blast-resistant windows — 2 inches thick and 2,500 pounds each — that stayed intact during the impact and fire. While perhaps 4,500 people normally would have been working in the hardest-strike areas, because of the renovation work only about 800 were there…." More than 25,000 people work at the Pentagon. [See - Los Angeles Times 9/16/01 (C)]

According to NORAD's presenter, Col. Alan Scott (Ret.), the confusion over the impact time was resolved in favor of a parking lot entry camera, which happened to be oriented toward the Pentagon at the time of the impact. It supposedly took around two weeks to discover the camera/tape.

[And, the tape is where?] If this is the same image, used for the infamous "fireball," why does the "public" version not show the correct time-date stamp?

Following 9:38 AM       A few minutes after Flight 77 supposedly impacted, the Secret Service commanded fighters from Andrews Air Force Base, 10 miles from Washington, to "Get in the air now!" [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

Reportedly, a call from someone else in the White House declared the Washington area "a free-fire zone." One pilot stated, "That meant we were given authority to use force, if the situation required it, in defense of the nation's capital, its property and people."

Reportedly, Lt. Col. Marc H. ("Sass") Sasseville and another pilot known by the code-name "Lucky" sprinted to their F-16s, which were armed only with "hot" guns and 511 rounds of "TP" — non-explosive training rounds. The pilots reportedly later stated that, if all else had failed, they would have rammed their aircraft into Flight 93.

In the meantime, the three F-16s, which were flying a training mission 207 miles away returned to Andrews Air Force Base. One aircraft, Major Billy Hutchison's, reportedly still had enough gas to take off again immediately; the other two aircraft needed to refuel. Hutchinson supposedly took off with no ammo. "Hutchison was probably airborne shortly after the alert F-16s from Langley arrive over Washington, although 121st FS pilots admit their timeline-recall "is fuzzy." " This would mean that Hutchison didn't leave Andrews until somewhere after 9:49 (See - 9:55-10:10 AM ). Yet, his aircraft was cited to be the first fighter to reach Washington. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

There were multiple reports of Andrews fighters being at the Pentagon before; also the fighters cited above were reported to have taken off. For instance, "Within minutes of the [Pentagon] attack … F-16s from Andrews Air Force Base were in the air over Washington DC." [Telegraph, 9/16/01]

"A few moments [after the Pentagon attack] … overhead, fighter jets scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base and other installations." [See - Denver Post, 9-11/01]

A year later, ABC reported, "High overhead [the Pentagon], jet fighters arrive. Just moments too late." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Still, other newspaper versions deny that fighters from Andrews were actually deployed [USA Today, 9/16/01], and some news sources deny that Andrews even had fighters at all! [USA Today, 9/16/01 (B)]

NORAD's commander, Major General Larry Arnold, had stated, "We [didn't] have any aircraft on alert at Andrews." [See - MSNBC 9/23/01 (C)]

It must be noted that the "alert status" is radically different than not having an inventory of fighters on the field.

9:38 AM       NORAD stated that the fighters were scrambled after Flight 77, taking off from Langley at 9:30, 129 miles away, yet when Flight 77 supposedly impacted they were still 105 miles away. Their average speed would be 185 knots. [See - Newsday, 9/23/01, NORAD, 9/18/01]

The F-16 pilot codenamed Honey later offered a different explanation of where the F-16s were at 9:38. He reportedly stated that they were flying toward New York, when they saw a black column of smoke coming from Washington, approximately 30 or 40 miles to the west. He was then supposedly asked, over the radio, by the North East Air Defense Sector of NORAD if he can confirm the Pentagon was burning. He confirmed it. The F-16s were then supposedly ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 76]

{His position was over the ocean?}

One of the three pilots, Major Brad Derrig, later claimed that their assigned destination was Reagan National Airport. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Another pilot, Major Dean Eckmann, also later claimed that their assigned destination was Washington. [See - AP, 8/13/02 (C)]

A NORAD officer, Major James Fox, claimed that he dispatched the jets without targets. "That would come later." [See - Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

9:38 AM       United Airlines Flight 93 supposedly completed its 135 degree turn; heading directly towards Washington D.C.

9:38 AM       Fireman Alan Wallace was reportedly at the Pentagon's heliport pad. As Wallace was supposedly walking in front of the Pentagon, he looked up to see Flight 77 coming straight at him. It was supposedly approximately 25 feet off the ground, a few hundred yards away; closing fast. He supposedly ran approximately 30 feet, then diving under a nearby van. [See - "About 9:40," Washington Post, 9/21/01]

The aircraft was traveling at supposedly around 460 mph, flying so low that it purportedly clipped the tops of street lights. [See - CBS News, 9/21/01]

Reportedly, he used the radio in the van to call his fire chief at nearby Fort Myer; saying, "We have had a commercial carrier impact into the west side of the Pentagon at the heliport, Washington Boulevard side. The crew is OK. The aircraft was a 757 Boeing or a 320 Airbus." [See - Scripps Howard News 8/1/02]

Following 9:38 AM       Having learned that the Pentagon had been struck, Vice President Cheney supposedly telephoned President Bush, now on his way to the airport, telling him that the White House had been "targeted." Bush reportedly stated that he wanted to return to Washington, but Cheney advised him not to "until we could find out what the hell was going on." According to Newsweek, that call took place within a tunnel en route to the PEOC (Presidential Emergency Operations Center) underground bunker. Supposedly, Cheney did not reach the bunker until 'shortly before 10 AM      " [See - Newsweek, 12/31/01]

Yet other versions, including those of the Richard Clarke and Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, put Cheney in the bunker before Flight 77 supposedly crashed at 9:38 (see also (9:10 AM ) and (9:27 AM ). [See - ABC News 9-11/02]

{No mention of the hijackers having the secret codes.}

Following 9:38 AM       After the Pentagon was struck, the fighters at nearby Andrews Air Force Base were still preparing to launch (See - After 9:03 AM ). At some point, flight squad commander Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville reportedly grabbed three F-16 pilots, giving them a curt briefing. He recalled saying, "I have no idea what's going on, but we're flying. Here's our frequency. We'll split up the area as we have to. Just defend as required. We'll talk about the rest in the air." All four dressed up and got ready. One officer at Andrews recalled, "After the Pentagon was hit, we were told there were more [airliners] coming. Not "might be" ; they were coming." In the meantime, a "flood" of calls from the Secret Service and local FAA ATC centers poured into Andrews, as the fighter response was being coordinated. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

However, the loading of missiles onto the fighters was very time-consuming; when the fighters finally took off, nearly an hour later, they launched without the missiles installed (See - 10:42 AM ).

Following 9:38 AM       An employee at a nearby gas station later stated that the gas station's security cameras should have recorded the moment of the Pentagon impact. However, he stated, "I've never seen what the pictures looked like. The FBI was here within minutes and took the film." [See - Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12/11/01]

A security camera atop a hotel, close to the Pentagon, also recorded the impact. Reportedly, the hotel employees watched the film several times before the FBI confiscated the video. [See - Gertz File, 9/21/01] Neither of the tapes have ever been released.

Following 9:38 AM       By all accounts, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was in his Pentagon office when Flight 77 impacted, although versions differ as to what he was doing there (See - 9:38 AM ). Rumsfeld later stated: "I was sitting here and the building was struck, and you could feel the impact of it very clearly, and I don't know what made me do anything I did, to be honest with you. I just do it instinctive. I looked out the window, saw nothing here, and then went down the hall until the smoke was too bad, then to a stairwell down and went outside and saw what had happened. Asked a person who'd seen it, and he told me that an aircraft had flown into it. I had been aware of an aircraft going into the World Trade Center, and I saw people on the grass, and we just, we tried to put them in stretchers and then move them out across the grass towards the road and lifted them over a jersey wall so the people on that side could stick them into the ambulances. I was out there for awhile, and then people started gathering, and we were able to get other people to do that, to hold IVs for people. There were people lying on the grass with clothes blown off and burns all over them. Then at some moment I decided I should be in here figuring out what to do, because your brain begins to connect things, and there were enough people there to worry about that. I came back in here, came into this office. There was smoke in here by then." [See - Defense Department, 10/12/01]

In his 2004 testimony to the 9-11 Commission, Rumsfeld no longer mentioned helping the wounded, saying, "I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long because I was back in the Pentagon with a crisis action team shortly before or after 10:00 AM." [See - Independent Commission, 3/23/04]

But there are no photographs or eyewitness versions of Rumsfeld being outside the Pentagon that morning, with the exception of one photograph of him walking down a sidewalk with some aides. In Richard Clarke's version, Rumsfeld was in a video conference, moving only from one secure teleconferencing studio to another, elsewhere in the Pentagon. There are also no images of the wounded which Rumsfeld described.

9:38 A.M. There are conflicting versions of what Rumsfeld did in the 35 minutes between the second WTC impact (See - After 9:03 AM ) and the Pentagon "event." In his 9-11 Commission testimony, he cited the time frame in terms of "shortly thereafter:" "I was in my office with a CIA briefer and I was told that a second aircraft had strike the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of then unknown origin." [See - Independent Commission, 3/23/04]

Bob Woodward wrote, "Aware of the attacks on the World Trade Center, Rumsfeld had been proceeding with his daily intelligence briefing in his office" when the Pentagon got struck. [See - Bush at War, by Bob Woodward, 11/02 , p. 22.]

However, according to Richard Clarke, Rumsfeld joined a video conference shortly after the second WTC strike (See - 9:10 AM ), staying with the conference, from his office. After being told that the Pentagon had been struck, Clarke said, "I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen, so the whole building didn't get struck" (See - Between 9:38-9:45 AM ).

The military response to the 9-11 crisis was then being coordinated in the NMCC, apparently located around 200 feet away, directly below Rumsfeld's office. [See - Defense Department, 9/15/01 (B), Reuters, 9-11/01]

9:39 A.M. On NBC, news reporter, Jim Miklaszewski, stated: "Moments ago, I felt an explosion here at the Pentagon," [ Television Archive, WDCN 9:30]

Captain Charles Leidig, who was a low ranking officer, temporarily in charge of the NMCC, was then handling a crisis teleconference. He mentioned reports of an impact into the opposite side of the Pentagon, requesting that Rumsfeld be added to the conference. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

As one magazine noted, "On Sept. 11, the normal scramble-approval procedure was for an FAA official to contact the [NMCC] and request Pentagon air support. Someone in the NMCC would call NORAD's command center and ask about availability of aircraft, then seek approval from the Defense Secretary — Donald H. Rumsfeld — to launch fighters." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Rather than join the NMCC conference, Rumsfeld reportedly went out of the Pentagon to witness the impact site; remaining out of contact for some time (See - After 9:38 AM ) and (10:30 AM ).

9:38 AM       The C-130 which had been reportedly sent to follow Flight 77, supposedly flew close to Flight 77 as it impacted. This is the same C-130 which will later allegedly approach within 17 miles of the purported Flight 93 when it later supposedly impacts into the Pennsylvania field. [See - Minneapolis Star Tribune, 9-11/02, Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/01]

Several people claim to have seen this aircraft fly remarkably close to Flight 77:

1. Kelly Knowles stated that seconds after seeing Flight 77 pass, she saw a 'second aircraft that seemed to be chasing the first [pass] over at a slightly different angle." [See - Daily Press, 9/15/01]

2. Keith Wheelhouse stated that the second aircraft was a C-130, two others aren't certain. [See - Daily Press, 9/15/01]

Wheelhouse "believes it flew directly above the American Airlines jet, as if to prevent two aircraft from appearing on radar while at the same time guiding the jet toward the Pentagon." As Flight 77 descended toward the Pentagon, the second aircraft veered off to the west. [See - Daily Press, 9/14/01]

3. USA Today reporter Vin Narayanan, who saw the Pentagon explosion, said, "I hopped out of my car after the jet exploded, nearly oblivious to a second jet hovering in the skies." [See - USA Today, 9/17/01]

4. USA Today Editor Joel Sucherman saw a second aircraft. [See – e-Week, 9/13/01]

5. Brian Kennedy, press secretary for a congressman, and others also saw a second aircraft. [See - Sacramento Bee, 9/15/01]

6. An unnamed worker at the Arlington national cemetery 'said a mysterious second aircraft was circling the area when the first one attacked the Pentagon." [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/20/01]

7. John O'Keefe was reportedly driving his car when he saw the Pentagon impact. "The first thing I did was pull over onto the shoulder, and when I got out of the car I saw another aircraft flying over my head…. Then the aircraft — it looked like a C-130 cargo aircraft — started turning away from the Pentagon, it did a complete turnaround." [See - New York Law Journal, 9/12/01]

The pilot of the C-130, Lt. Col. Steve O'Brien, was later interviewed. However, his version differs from the ground eyewitnesses. He claimed that just before the explosion, "With all of the East Coast haze, I had a hard time picking him out," implying he was not near by. He also reportedly stated that just after the explosion, "I could see the outline of the Pentagon," again implying that he was not near by. He then asked "the controller whether [I] should set up a low orbit around the building," but he was told "to get out of the area as quickly as possible. "I took the aircraft once through the plume of smoke and thought if this was a terrorist attack, it probably wasn't a good idea to be flying through that plume." " [See - Minneapolis Star Tribune, 9-11/02]

By all photos, the day was incredibly clear.

9:38 AM       Accounts differ as to how far distant the Langley F-16 fighters are, when Flight 77 purportedly impacted. The Langley, Virginia base is 129 miles from Washington. NORAD originally claimed that at the time of the impact the fighters were 105 miles away, despite having taken off seven minutes earlier. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

The 9-11 Commission claimed that at 9:36, NEADS discovered that Flight 77 was only a few miles from the White House; and that the fighters have headed east over the ocean (See - 9:30-9:37 AM ). The fighters were ordered to Washington immediately, but were still approximately 150 miles away - further away than their home airfield. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The F-16 pilot code-named "Honey" (Captain Craig Borgstrom (See - 9:24 AM ) offered a different explanation. He reportedly stated that they were flying toward New York, when they saw a black column of smoke coming from Washington, approximately 30 or 40 miles to the west. He was then asked over the radio, by NEADS, if he can confirm the Pentagon was burning. He confirms it. The F-16s were then ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 76, New York Observer, 2/11/04]

The maximum speed of an F-16 is around 1,500 mph. [See - AP, 6/16/00]

Had the fighters traveled straight to Washington at 1,300 mph, they would have reached Washington at least one minute prior to Flight 77.

Prior to 9:38 AM       Representative Christopher Cox later claimed that he was still meeting with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. They were still supposedly discussing "missile defense," completely oblivious to the approaching – alleged - Flight 77. While watching the television coverage from New York, Rumsfeld supposedly said to Cox, "Believe me, this isn't over yet. There's going to be another attack, and it could be us." According to the Telegraph, Flight 77 struck the building "moments later." [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

In another account, Cox claimed that Rumsfeld said, "If we remain vulnerable to missile attack, a terrorist group or rogue state that demonstrated the capacity to strike the US or its allies from long range could have the power to hold our entire country hostage to nuclear or other blackmail. And let me tell you, I've been around the block a few times. There will be another event." Rumsfeld supposedly repeated that sentence for emphasis. According to the Cox account, "Within minutes of that utterance, Rumsfeld's words proved tragically prophetic." Cox also is said to have claimed, "I escaped just minutes before the building was struck." [See - Rep. Cox Statement, 9-11/01]

Conversely, Rumsfeld claimed that the meeting with Cox ended prior to the second WTC impact (See - After 9:03 AM ). Cox himself stated that after being advised of the WTC strike, "[Rumsfeld] sped off, as did I." Cox stated that he immediately headed to his car; thus it was impossible for him to still be in the Pentagon "just minutes before" it was struck. [See - AP, 9-11/01]

Another version puts Rumsfeld's statement "I've been around the block a few times. There will be another event" two minutes prior to the first WTC impact, when Rumsfeld supposedly made other predictive comments (See - Before 8:46 AM ). [See - AP 9/16/01 (C)]

Between approximately 9:38 - 9:45 AM       At some time after Flight 77 purportedly struck the Pentagon, Richard Clarke was supposedly given a note by the head of the Secret Service. The note read, "Radar shows aircraft headed this way. I'm going to empty out the [White House.]" Supposedly, the Secret Service knew this, as they could supposedly see what the FAA's radar was seeing. [Discriminating primary targets would take superior skill, not casual observation.] The note was too late, as Flight 77 had already – theoretically – impacted the Pentagon. At almost the same time, another aide said to Clarke, "An aircraft just struck the Pentagon." Clarke supposedly replied, "I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen, so the whole building didn't get struck. No emotion in here. We are going to stay focused." Clarke orders an aide, "Find out where the fighter aircraft are. I want Combat Air Patrol over every major city in this country. Now." [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 7-8, Australian, 3/27/04]

The scrambling of the other fighters took time. Aside from the fighters in New York City and Washington, two fighters also took off from Toledo, Ohio at 10:16 (see 10:01 AM ); more took off from Syracuse, New York at 10:44. [See - Toledo Blade, 12/9/01]

9:39 AM       The hijackers reportedly inadvertently transmitted over the radio: "Hi, this is the captain. We'd like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board. And we are going to turn back to the airport. And they had our demands, so please remain quiet." [See - MSNBC, 9/3/02]

The 9-11 Commission gave a nearly verbatim version. [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 9:38, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:39, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 209, 9:39, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The controller responded, "United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead;" there was no response. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:40 AM       The transponder signal from Flight 93 reportedly ceased. [See - 9:30, MSNBC, 9/3/02, after turning at 9:35, MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B), 9:40, CNN, 9/17/01, 9:41, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The aircraft could still be tracked as a primary target; and was supposedly tracked by the Cleveland Air Traffic Controllers; and at United's headquarters. [Unknown, whether or not the primary targets can be displayed on the 'repeater" corporate screens.] The aircraft altitude can no longer be determined, without visual sightings from other aircraft. The Flight 93 speed supposedly begins to vary wildly, between 400 and 600 mph before settling at around 400 mph. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

The speed variations – if factual – imply steep climbs & descents.

9:40 AM       Newark Air Traffic Controller Bob Varcadapane was talking on the phone with the FAA's central command center; being told that there were at least 10 aircraft which they were still suspicious of, for one reason or another; all regarded as possible hijackings. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

9:40 AM       According to NORAD, Flight 93 had turned its transponder off, beginning a left turn back toward the East.

9:40 AM       At the Pentagon, Captain Chuck Gibbs arrived.

9:40 AM       At the Pentagon, Captain Mark Penn arrived at Arlington County EOC.

9:40 AM       The Flight 93 transponder signal stopped.

9:40 AM       Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, at the White House bunker, was on an open line to the FAA operations center, supposedly monitoring Flight 77, with radar tracks cited every seven seconds. The reports cited that the aircraft was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out - until the message reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.

Mineta reportedly shouted in the phone to Monte Belger at the FAA: "Monte, bring all the aircraft down." There were over 4,500 aircraft in the air at the time. Belger supposedly stated, "We're bringing them down per pilot discretion."

"F___ pilot discretion," Mineta supposedly yelled back. "Get those goddamn aircraft down."

The FAA then stopped all civilian flight operations in the U.S.; ordering that all of the airborne aircraft land at the nearest airport. This was the first time that all flights in the USA had been grounded.

9:41 AM       Fire Battalion Chief Bob Cornwell arrived at the Pentagon; assuming Incident Command. ACFD Fire Truck 105 arrived at the Pentagon

9:41 AM       Reportedly, Marion Birtton called a friend from Flight 93; telling him that two people had been killed; and that the aircraft had been turned around. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01]

9:41 AM       Newark, Air Traffic Controller Greg Callahan spoke to an FBI agent on the phone. The agent stated - about Flight 93 "We suspect that this aircraft has now been taken over by hostile forces." The agent supposedly described the sharp turn it made over eastern Ohio; and stated that it was heading back over southwestern Pennsylvania. Callahan reportedly stated that he could tell that the aircraft was on a course for Washington. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B)]

9:42 AM       Mark Bingham supposedly called his mother from Flight 93, saying, "I'm on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the aircraft and they say they have a bomb." [See - 9:42, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01 (B)]

In another version, he stated, "I'm in the air, I'm calling you on the Airfone. I'm calling you from the aircraft. We've been taken over. There are three men that say they have a bomb." [See - Toronto Sun 9/16/01; Boston Globe 11/23/01]

9:41 AM       ACFD Captain Edward Blunt arrived at the Pentagon; establishing EMS Control.

9:41 AM       According to NORAD, the FAA reported that Delta 89, which had been reported as missing, was now reported as a possible hijacking; thus adding some confusion.

9:42 AM       Flight 93 passenger, Mark Bingham, called his mother. "Mom, this is Mark Bingham," he said, nervously. "I want to let you know that I love you. I'm calling from the aircraft. We've been taken over. There are three men that say they have a bomb."

9:43 AM       At the Pentagon, the MWAA first Crash Rescue responders arrive from Reagan Airport.

9:43 AM       In Florida, a thorough security check prior to boarding Air Force One delays the takeoff.

Bush's motorcade arrived at the Sarasota airport; pulling up close to Air Force One. He learned that an aircraft had struck the Pentagon as the motorcade approached the airport. Bush immediately boarded the aircraft. [See - Washington Times, 10/8/02, Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Security then conducted an extra-thorough search of all baggage, belonging to the other passengers, delaying the takeoff until 9:55. [See - St. Petersburg Times 9/8/02 (B)]

9:44 AM       NORAD briefed the NMCC teleconference on the possible hijacking of Delta Flight 1989. Four minutes later, a representative from the White House bunker asks if there were any indications of other hijacked aircraft. Captain Charles Leidig, temporarily in charge of the NMCC (see 8:30 AM ), mentions the Delta flight; commenting, "that would be the fourth [fifth] possible hijack." Flight 1989 was in the same general vicinity as Flight 93, yet NORAD didn't scramble fighters toward either aircraft. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04, Federal News Service, 6/17/04]

9:45 AM       The White House was evacuated.

9:45 AM       Tom Burnett supposedly called his wife Deena for the third time. She told him about the reported impact into the Pentagon. Tom spoke about the bomb he'd mentioned earlier, saying, "I don't think they have one. I think they're just telling us that." He reportedly stated that the hijackers were talking about impacting the aircraft into the ground. "We have to do something." He reportedly stated that he and others were making a plan. "A group of us." [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 111]

It should not be a passenger orchestrating the counter-measures, versus the flight attendants.

Even by his second call, the FBI was listening in. [See - Toronto Sun 9/16/01]

Why were they not "… joining in?"

9:45 AM       The Secret Service, with automatic weapons, begins directing people away from the White House.

The White House began a general evacuation. That was approximately 30 minutes after the probable time that Cheney had been evacuated from the White House (See - 9:10 AM ). [See - 9:43, New York Times, 9/12/01, 9:45, MSNBC, 9/22/01, 9:45, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 9:45, Telegraph, 12/16/01, 9:45, CNN, 9/12/01, 9:48, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:48, AP, 8/19/02]

Initially the evacuation was reported to be orderly, but soon the Secret Service agents were reportedly yelling that everyone should run. [See - ABC 9-11/02]

9:45 AM       Reportedly, Ben Sliney, the FAA's National Operations Manager, independently ordered the entire nationwide air traffic system shut down. Approximately 4,000 flights were grounded. Sliney reportedly made the decision without consulting the FAA head, Jane Garvey, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, or other bosses, however, they quickly approve. [See - USA Today, 8/13/02, USA Today, 8/13/02 (B)]

It was reported that 75 percent of the aircraft landed within one hour of the order's issuance. [See - USA Today, 8/12/02 (C)]

The Washington Post reported that it was Mineta who told Monte Belger at the FAA: "Monte, bring all the aircraft down," even adding, "[Expletive] pilot discretion." [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

However, it was later reported by a different Post reporter that Mineta didn't even know of the order being given, until 15 minutes later. This reporter 'said FAA officials had begged him to maintain the fiction." [See - Slate 4/2/02]

9:45 AM       Accounts hold that after having some trouble with his phone, Flight 93 passenger Todd Beamer was able to speak to Verizon phone representative Lisa Jefferson, with the FBI listening in. [No FBI intervention??] He supposedly talked for approximately 15 minutes. Beamer reportedly stated that he had been herded to the back of the aircraft along with nine other passengers and five flight attendants. A hijacker, who reportedly stated that he had a bomb strapped to his body, was guarding them. [The guard let Beamer call for help? ] Twenty-seven passengers were supposedly being guarded by a hijacker in the first class section, which was separated by a curtain. [This isn't a time for elitism, versus visibility and control.] One hijacker had supposedly gone into the cockpit. One passenger was reported to be dead (leaving one passenger unaccounted for — presumably the man who is supposed to have made a call from the bathroom). It's implied that the two pilots were dead. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/16/01, Newsweek, 9/22/01, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01 (B)]

A conflicting version [see - Boston Globe, 11/23/01] stated that the twenty-seven were in the back, and that he saw four hijackers. Beamer reportedly stated that they have voted to storm the hijackers and the supervisor hears before he hangs up "Are you guys ready? Let's roll."

The key problem in this account is the missing mention of flight crew presence and the expected authority of at least one flight attendant. However popular, the account simply isn't credible.

9:45 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, around this time, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, the lead Secret Service agent, the President's military aide, and Air Force One pilot Colonel Mark Tillman conferred on a possible destination for Air Force One. According to witnesses, Bush wanted to return to Washington, but the others advise against it. The issue is still not decided when Air Force One took off; supposedly departing without a destination (See - 9:56 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

One must try to imagine the Secret Service flying into a seeming oblivion, at a time such as this. Seemingly, they have few answers, but the purported terrorists seem to have a long 'reach" with aircraft. Instead of "whisking" Bush to a safe ground location, they jump aboard Air Force one, with no fighter escort, and no destination, let alone a known secure destination.

Between 9:45 - 9:55 AM       At some point after the White House was evacuated (See - 9:45 AM ), Richard Clarke instituted the "Continuity of Government" (COG) plans. The key government personnel, especially those in line to succeed the President if he should die, were evacuated to alternate command centers. Additionally, Richard Clarke reportedly got a phone call from the PEOC command center, containing Cheney and Rice. An aide supposedly told him, "Air Force One is getting ready to take off, with some press still on board. [Bush will] divert to an air base. Fighter escort is authorized. And … Tell the Pentagon they have authority from the President to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft." However, the acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, wanted the rules of engagement clarified before the shoot down order was passed on; thus Clarke orders that the guidelines be given to the pilots.

Who is in the position of ultimate authority? Clarke?

9:45 AM       Bush's motorcade left the Elementary School in Sarasota, heading for Air Force One, at the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport.

9:45 AM to 9:48 AM       The Capitol Building and the White House were evacuated.

9:46 AM       According to the purported Flight 93 voice recording, around this time one hijacker in the cockpit reportedly said to another, "Let the guys in now." A vague instruction was supposedly given to bring the pilot back in. It's not clear if this was a reference to an original pilot or a hijacker. Investigators were not sure if the original pilots were killed or allowed to live.

9:46 AM       Rumsfeld's office and Myers' office report to the NMCC teleconference that they were still trying to track down Rumsfeld and Myers, respectively, to bring them into the conference. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Rumsfeld was apparently outside the Pentagon looking at the "event" site, although Richard Clarke suggested that Rumsfeld was actually elsewhere in the Pentagon for much of the time (See - After 9:38 AM ). Myers' whereabouts in the period following the Pentagon "event" have not been fully explained (See - Before 10:30 AM ). Rumsfeld and Myers reportedly don't enter the NMCC until around 10:30 (See - 10:30 AM ).

9:47 AM       On Flight 93, Jeremy Glick was reportedly still on the phone with his wife Lyz. He advised her that the passengers were taking a vote, as to whether they should try to take over the aircraft or not. [See - About the same time as a different phone call, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01 (B)]

He later reportedly stated that all of the men on the aircraft have voted to attack the hijackers. [See - No time marker, Toronto Sun, 9/16/01]

With the purported number of hijackers on the flight, it's an extreme of imagination that the men would be permitted to communicate, let alone congregate, so as to exercise a bizarre male-only democracy. One might imagine an immediate group of men deciding on a course of action – but "…all the men?"

Add that the Flight Attendants would have been working feverishly on a solution – including keeping the passengers calm. They are conspicuously not mentioned.

When supposedly asked about the hijackers" weapons, Glick reportedly stated that they don't have guns, just knives. His wife Lyz got the impression from him that the hijacker standing nearby claiming to hold the bomb would be easy to overwhelm. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 153-154]

9:47 AM       Commanders worldwide were ordered to raise their threat alert status four notches to "Delta", the highest level, to defend United States facilities. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld raised the defense condition signaling of the United States offensive readiness - to DefCon 3, the highest it had been since the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. U.S. officials also sent a message to the Russians, who were planning a military exercise not far from Alaska, urging them to rethink their plans.

9:47 AM       According to NORAD, Delta 89 cleared the system by landing in Cleveland; no longer treated as a hijacking.

9:48 AM       At the Pentagon, Assistant Fire Chief James Schwartz arrived and assumed Incident Command

9:48 AM       The Capitol building in Washington began its evacuation. [See - AP, 8/19/02]

Senator Tom Daschle, the majority leader of the Senate, later stated, "Some capitol policemen broke into the room and said, we're under attack. I've got to take you out right away." Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, third in the line of succession to the presidency - behind Vice President Cheney, was in the Capitol building with other congressmen. Only after 9:48 were Hastert and the others in the line of succession moved to secure locations. At some point after 9:48, Hastert and the other leaders were flown by helicopter to secret bunkers. [See - ABC News 9-11/02]

9:49 AM       In the words of the 9-11 Commission, the commander of NORAD (General Ralph Eberhart) directed "all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations fully armed." [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This is assumed to mean that all fighters with air defense missions were to get armed; ready to scramble. Richard Clarke, claimed that after the Pentagon was struck, he ordered an aide, "Find out where the fighter aircraft are. I want Combat Air Patrol over every major city in this country. Now" (See - Between 9:38-9:45 AM ). It has not been explained why this order wasn't given much earlier. Calls from Air Force bases across the country asking to help had started "pouring into NORAD" shortly after 9:03, when televised reports made an emergency situation clear (See - After 9:03 AM ).

9:49 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the FAA Command Center had just twice warned FAA headquarters that United 93 was now "29 minutes out of Washington, DC." Someone at headquarters reportedly stated to someone at the Command Center, "They're pulling Jeff [last name unknown] away to go talk about United 93." Command Center replies, "Uh, do we want to think about, uh, scrambling aircraft?" FAA headquarters replies, "Uh, God, I don't know." Command Center said, "Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes." FAA headquarters answered, "Uh, ya know everybody just left the room." [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

This would have been around 13 minutes since Cleveland ATC had asked the Command Center in vain about a military response to Flight 93 (See - 9:36 AM ).

9:49 AM       The FAA ordered the Pittsburgh control tower to be evacuated. Shortly before, the Cleveland Air Traffic Controllers supposedly called Pittsburgh ATC and reportedly stated that an aircraft was heading toward Pittsburgh; refusing to communicate. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 9/23/01 (B)]

9:49 AM       At the Pentagon scene, FBI Special Agent Chris Combs arrived, as the FBI representative to Incident Command.

9:49 AM       The F-16s from Langley AFB arrived over Washington, to perform a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the city. It took the F-16s 19 minutes to reach Washington D.C. from Langley AFB; approximately 130 miles to the south.

By simple mathematics, if the F-16s were flying at top speed it should have taken them just over 7 minutes to arrive. They should have been there at approximately the same time that the Pentagon "event" happened; supposedly American Airlines Flight 77 - at 9:37.

By most accounts, the aircraft were directed out over the ocean; factually accounting for the time – disregarding the bizarre 'reasoning" behind the extended routing.

By arriving at 9:49, that would mean the F-16s' average flight speed was only around 350 knots; 410 MPH. That equates to only 27.4% of their top speed.

Their mission was to protect the nation's capital. Langley AFB is 130 miles from the Pentagon. The F-16s have a top speed of around 1,500 MPH. 19 minutes, divided by 60 (minutes) = .317. 130 miles, divided by .317 = 410 MPH; divided by 1,500 MPH = 27.4% of their top speed.

Further, cruising slowly on any day is "un-manly" to a fighter pilot.

The F-16s took-off at 9:30; 43 minutes after American Airlines Flight 11 impacted the North Tower of the WTC - 27 minutes after United Airlines Flight 175 impacted into the South Tower of the WTC.

Few in America didn't know of the WTC attacks, within a few minutes of the first impact. Knowing this, why would these F-16s fly at any slow speed, on any route other than straight toward DC? That just doesn't make sense.

The U.S. Air Force is the most technologically advanced military force known to man. Especially on the day of a 'readiness exercise," how can any reasonable person believe that there were no available fighters on either routine patrols or training missions?

There were none. AND, the command of NORAD was at the helm of a Canadian!

Most glaring is that there was not as much as a letter of reprimand written, for the purported failures of 9-11.

NORAD Press Release:


9:49 AM       Pittsburgh International Airport flight tower was evacuated.

9:50 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Chief Schwartz establishes Fire Suppression Branch, River Division, EMS Division, and A E Division

9:50 AM       At the Pentagon scene, three area hospitals prepare to receive patients from the Pentagon.

9:50 AM       The ABC News reporter, Ann Compton, who was with the presidential motorcade; traveling to the Sarasota airport, recalled, "We raced to where Air Force One was prepped and ready to go. The President was hustled quickly on board Air Force One — no waving good-bye, no shaking hands — on board and the door sealed. And the Secret Service agents standing with the 13 of us from the press who get on the rear stairs were yelling "move it, move it, move it!" We scrambled on board the aircraft and took off very, very quickly." [See - BBC 9/1/02]

9:50 AM       Reportedly, flight attendant, Sandra Bradshaw, called her husband from Flight 93; saying, "Have you heard what's going on? My flight has been hijacked. My flight has been hijacked with three guys with knives." [See - Boston Globe, 11/23/01]

She supposedly told him that they were in the rear galley filling pitchers with hot water to use against the hijackers. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B)]

In reality, the flight attendants should have been speaking to the airline, in some fashion. However grand love may be, family would have been secondary, to seeking help from the company. At a minimum, they would want to know what was known by the company. They should have been gathering the fire extinguishers as an assault weapon, mentioning "making coffee/hot water," versus "…getting hot water together."

They should have been citing the gathering of their kitchen utensils (knives) and have spoken about finding "Able-Bodied Passengers." Not to mention the improbability of being able to call – period. The theoretic hijackers should have never lost control of the cabin; enabling such privacy to call, or preparations to be made.

9:53 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the FAA headquarters informed the FAA Command Center that the Deputy Director for Air Traffic Services was then talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, regarding the scrambling of fighters after Flight 93. The FAA Headquarters was informed that Flight 93 was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

9:53 AM       Supposedly, the hijackers in the cockpit of Flight 93 were concerned that their passengers might retaliate. One hijacker supposedly urged that the aircraft fire ax be held up to the door's peephole to scare the passengers.

(As though the ax could be seen through the peephole. Further, if the crash ax was their superior weapon, how could they have initially taken over the aircraft?)

9:54 AM       Reportedly, Tom Burnett called his wife for the fourth and last time. In early reports of this call, he supposedly said, "I know we're all going to die. There's three of us who are going to do something about it." [See - No time marker, Toronto Sun, 9/16/01, no time marker, Boston Globe, 11/23/01]


However, in a later and a supposedly much more complete version, he sounded much more upbeat. "It's up to us. I think we can do it." 'don't worry, we're going to do something." He supposedly mentioned that they planned to regain control of the aircraft over a rural area. [See - 9:54, "again Deena noted the time," Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 118]

From their perspective, they would be looking at thousands of miles of nothing but rural area. Why would that be a priority? The statements are nonsensical.

9:55 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Assistant Fire Chief John White arrived and was assigned as the EMS Branch Commander.

9:55 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Fire Captain Gibbs evacuated the immediate impact area; anticipating the roof collapse.

9:55-10:10 AM       The three Langley F-16s, which were theoretically scrambled after Flight 77 (See - 9:30 AM ), reach Washington. While the 130 mile distance should theoretically have been covered in six minutes, the most probable account has them having taken a large, detour over the ocean (See - 9:30 -9:37 AM ). The exact time of arrival is unclear. Originally, NORAD claimed that they arrived as early as 9:49. But the 9-11 Commission implied that they didn't arrive until shortly after 10:00. However, no exact time was specified. [See - CNN 9/17/01; NORAD 9/18/01; New York Times 9/15/01; CBS 9/14/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

Media accounts as to when the first fighters reach Washington are highly contradictory. The early news accounts of the fighters arrival from Andrews Air Force Base "within minutes," "a few moments," or "just moments" after the Pentagon impact, seem to be versions of the Langley fighters. (See - 10:38 AM ). [See - Telegraph, 9/16/01, Denver Post, 9-11/01, ABC News, 9-11/02]

Yet other newspaper versions inaccurately deny that fighters from Andrews were ever deployed [USA Today, 9/16/01]. Some accounts deny that Andrews even had fighters. [See - USA Today, 9/16/01 (B)]

Defense officials initially claimed, "There were no military aircraft in the skies over Washington until 15 to 20 minutes after the Pentagon was struck" — in other words, 9:53 to 9:58. [See - Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9/14/01]

ABC News reported that by 10:00, 'dozens of fighters are buzzing in the sky" over Washington. [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

The New York Times reported, "In the White House Situation Room and at the Pentagon, the response seemed agonizingly slow. One military official recalled hearing "words to the effect of, "Where are the aircraft?" " The Pentagon insisted it had air cover over its own building by 10 AM      , 15 minutes after the building was struck. But witnesses, including a reporter for The New York Times who was headed toward the building, did not see any until closer to 11." [See - New York Times, 9/16/01 (B)]

By any account, it is very likely, though uncertain, that some fighters could have reached Washington before Flight 93 would have, had it not –theoretically - have crashed. (See - 10:13 -10:23 AM ).

It should also be noted that the shoot-down order was not issued, until after the last airliner had crashed.

Following 9:55 AM       The Langley F-16s over Washington were advised that all aircraft in the U.S. had been ordered to land (See - 9:45 AM ). According to the New York Times, at some point after this, someone from the Secret Service got on the radio and told the pilots, "I want you to protect the White House at all costs." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

F-16 pilot "Honey" (Captain Craig Borgstrom (See - 9:24 AM ) gave a similar account. At some point after the F-16s had set up their defensive perimeter over Washington (See - 9:55-10:10 AM ), the lead pilot (Borgstrom) reportedly received a garbled message about Flight 93, which wasn't heard by the other two pilots. "The message seemed to convey that the White House was an important asset to protect." Honey reportedly stated that he was later told the message is, "Something like, "Be aware of where it is, and it could be a target." " Another pilot, code-named "Lou," reportedly stated that Honey told him, "I think the Secret Service told me this." [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 76]

The question comes in, that the frequency being used would be almost a secret. Depending on the radio setup, the message might have been encrypted. Further, such messages would have an "authentication" procedure.

It should be clear to history, that both "Lou" and "Honey" stated that they were never given clear and direct orders to shoot down any aircraft that day.

9:55 AM       Bush arrived at the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport; boarding Air Force One.

9:55 AM       Inside the White House bunker, a military aide supposedly asked Cheney, "There is an aircraft 80 miles out. There is a fighter in the area. Should we engage?" Cheney is reported to have immediately said, "Yes." As the fighter supposedly got nearer to Flight 93, Cheney was asked the same thing twice more; responding "yes" both times.

Following 9:56 AM       Airborne in Air Force One, Bush talked to Vice President Cheney on the phone. Cheney is reported to have recommended that Bush authorize the military to shoot down aircraft under the control of the hijackers. "I said, "You bet," " Bush later recalled. "We had a little discussion, but not much." [See - "After Flight 77 impacted into the Pentagon," Newsday, 9/23/01, time unknown, USA Today, 9/16/01, "Once airborne, Bush spoke again to Cheney," Washington Post, 1/27/02, after Bush was airborne, CBS, 9-11/02]

The 9-11 Commission claimed that Cheney told Bush that there were three aircraft still missing, with one having struck the Pentagon. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Bush later stated that he didn't make any major decisions as to how to respond to the 9-11 attacks, until after Air Force One was airborne. [See - Wall Street Journal 3/22/04]

Flight 93 was still airborne, with fighters supposedly given orders to intercept it; possibly to shoot it down. [See - ABC News 9-11/02]

9:56 AM       Bush departed from the Sarasota, Florida, airport on Air Force One. [See - 9:54, Dallas Morning News, 8/28/02, 9:55, New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), 9:55, Daily Mail, 9/8/02, 9:55, Washington Post, 1/27/02, 9:55, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 9:55, AP, 9/12/01, 9:55, ABC News, 9-11/02, 9:55, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 9:56, Wall Street Journal, 3/22/04, 9:57, CBS, 9-11/02 (B), 9:57, New York Times, 9/12/01, 9:57, CNN, 9/12/01, 9:57, Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Amazingly, his aircraft took off without any fighters to protecting it. "The object seemed to be simply to get the President airborne and out of the way," according to an administration official. [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

According to the "official" account, the aircraft initially headed toward Washington. Then, the story of the "… hijackers with the digital codes to Air Force One" had Air Force One turning toward Barksdale.

Fighters reportedly met Air Force One around an hour later (See - Between 10:55 -11:41 AM ).

9:56-10:40 AM       Air Force One took off and quickly gaining altitude. Reportedly, once the aircraft reached cruising altitude, it supposedly flew in circles. Accounts have the on-board journalists sensing this, as the television reception for a local station generally remained good. "Apparently Bush, Cheney and the Secret Service argue over the safety of Bush coming back to Washington." [See - Salon 9/12/01 (B); Telegraph 12/16/01]

Following 9:56-10:06 AM       Inside the White House bunker, a military aide asked Cheney, "There is an aircraft 80 miles out. There is a fighter in the area. Should we engage?" Cheney immediately answers "Yes." [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

An F-16 fighter, near Washington, supposedly headed out, in pursuit of Flight 93. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01 (B)]

However, a different explanation claimed, "The closest fighters were two F-16 pilots on a training mission from Selfridge Air National Guard Base near Detroit." These were supposedly ordered to intercept Flight 93, even though but they reportedly were not armed with any weapons. It was claimed they were supposed to ram Flight 93, if they could not persuade it to land. [See - ABC News, 8/30/02, ABC News, 9-11/02]

In either case, as the fighter(s) approached Flight 93, Cheney was supposedly asked twice more to confirm that the fighter(s) should engage; responded "yes" both times. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

Montague Winfield, who was in charge of the Pentagon's command center, later said, "At some point, the closure time [between the fighter and Flight 93] came and went, and nothing happened, so you can imagine everything was very tense at the NMCC." [See - ]

Interestingly, Major Gen. Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, claimed that no military aircraft were sent after Flight 93. [See - Seattle Times, 9/16/01]

In support, the pilots flying over Washington – whom have so far spoken – claim that none of them even learned about Flight 93 - or any aircraft impacting in Pennsylvania - until they returned to their base in the afternoon. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 222]

Following 9:56 AM       It was reported that at some point after the F-16s were in the air, someone from the Secret Service got on the radio and told the pilots, "I want you to protect the White House at all costs." [See - New York Times, 10/16/01]

9:57 AM       Supposedly, from the purported cockpit recording, one of the hijackers in the Flight 93 cockpit asked if anything was going on, meaning outside of the cockpit door. "Fighting," the other person said. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 210]

The "official" analysis of the alleged cockpit voice recording suggested that the passenger struggle actually started in the front of the aircraft (where passengers Bingham and Burnett were sitting) around a minute before a struggle took place in the back of the aircraft (where Beamer was sitting). [See - Observer, 12/2/01]

It was later theorized that the Flight 93 passengers supposedly reached the cockpit, using a food cart as a battering ram and a shield. They claimed that a digital enhancement of the cockpit voice recorder revealed the sound of plates and glassware impacting around 9:57. [See - Newsweek 11/25/01]

9:57 AM       and Afterward) The alleged cockpit voice recording supposedly yielded "In the cockpit! In the cockpit!" being heard. The hijackers were reportedly heard telling each other to hold the door. In English, someone outside supposedly shouted, "Let's get them." The hijackers were also praying "Allah o akbar" (God is great). One of the hijackers supposedly suggested shutting off the oxygen supply to the cabin (which has been commented that it wouldn't have had an effect since the aircraft was already below 10,000 feet – no explanation as to how the altitude was determined, however).

A hijacker supposedly said, "Should we finish?" Another one said, "Not yet." The purported sounds of the passengers get clearer, and in unaccented English "Give it to me!" was heard. "I'm injured," someone reportedly said in English. Then something on the order of "roll it up" and "lift it up" was heard. The Passengers' relatives were reported to believe that this sequence proved that the passengers took control of the aircraft. [See - MSNBC 7/30/02; Telegraph 8/6/02; Newsweek 11/25/01; Observer 12/2/01]

9:58 AM       Sandy Bradshaw supposedly told her husband, "Everyone's running to first class. I've got to go. Bye." She had been reportedly speaking with him since 9:50. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B); Boston Globe 11/23/01]

In the purported scene, the flight attendants would have been first concerned about finding a pilot, among the passengers. They would have been seeking medical help and some form of law enforcement or "Able-Bodied-Passengers." Next, they would have been concerned with assigning priorities. This purported tape defies reality.

9:58 AM       A man supposedly called 911 from a bathroom on the aircraft, crying, "We're being hijacked, we're being hijacked!" [See - Toronto Sun, 9/16/01], then it was reported that "he heard some sort of explosion and saw white smoke coming from the aircraft and we lost contact with him." [ABC News, 9-11/01 (B), ABC News, 9-11/01 (C), AP, 9/12/01 (B)]

One minute after the call began, the line goes dead. [See - Pittsburgh Channel, 12/6/01]

Investigators believe this was Edward Felt, the only passenger not versioned for on phone calls. He was sitting in first class, so he probably was in the bathroom near the front of the aircraft. At one point he appears to have peeked out the bathroom door. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 193-194, 196]

The mentions of smoke and explosions on the recording of his call were now denied. [See - Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 264]

The person who took Felt's call was not allowed to speak to the media. [See - Mirror, 9/13/02]

The caller would not have access to a window, in the lavatory. Explosion, from what? Smoke, from where? Lacking a window, a cell phone signal would be unlikely to reach outside of the aircraft, at any altitude. Even if the aircraft had been at a low altitude, at the aircraft speeds, the cell-tower switching speed of the time would be inadequate to make or keep a connection. The account defies reality – again.

9:58 AM       Todd Beamer reportedly ended his phone call saying that they planned "… to jump" the hijacker in the back, who purportedly had the bomb. [It makes no sense that a factual hijacker would allow the call to be made, or continued.] In the background, the phone operator reportedly could hear an "awful commotion" of people shouting, and women screaming, "Oh my God," and "God help us." Beamer supposedly let go of the phone, leaving it connected. His last spoken words were reportedly: "Are you ready guys? Let's roll" (alternate version: "You ready? Okay. Let's roll"). [See - Newsweek 9/22/01; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B)]

9:58 AM       According to mayor Rudy Giuliani's 9-11 Commission testimony in 2004, approximately one minute before the first WTC tower fell, he was able to reach the White House. He spoke to Chris Henick, the deputy political director to President Bush; learning that the Pentagon had been struck. He asked about fighter cover over New York City. Henick reportedly replied, "The jets were dispatched 12 minutes ago and they should be there very shortly, and they should be able to defend you against further attack." [See - Independent Commission, 5/19/04]

This statement implies that the Otis fighters were scrambled around 9:46, not at 8:52, from other claims (See - 8:52 AM ). It is interesting that Giuliani's version, seems to be wildly off, relative to many other reports of the fighters scrambling much earlier. However, it is consistent with reports which emerged shortly after 9-11. In the first few days after 9-11, Richard Myers and NORAD's spokesman, Mike Snyder, claimed that no fighters were scrambled anywhere - until after the Pentagon was struck. [See - General Myers' Senate confirmation hearing, 9/13/01, Boston Globe 9/15/01]

The story changed on the evening of September 14, 2001, following the CBS news report, "contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were under way." [See - CBS 9/14/01]

9:58 AM       In another supposed cell phone call, flight attendant, CeeCee Lyles, reportedly said to her husband, "Aah, it feels like the aircraft's going down." Her husband Lorne said, "What's that?" She replied, "I think they're going to do it. They're forcing their way into the cockpit" (an alternate version said, "They're getting ready to force their way into the cockpit"). A little later she screamed, then said, "They're doing it! They're doing it! They're doing it!" Her husband reportedly hears more screaming in the background, then he heard a "whooshing sound, a sound like wind," then more screaming; the call then breaks off. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B)]

A flight attendant would have no doubt if the aircraft was descending, between the angle of the floor, a change in "weight," meaning that an abrupt descent would induce a feeling of weightlessness – add popping ears.

9:58 AM       The purported confrontation with the hijackers and the passengers begins aboard Flight 93. Supposedly, an Emergency 911 dispatcher in Pennsylvania received a call from a passenger aboard Flight 93. The passenger reportedly said: "We are being hijacked!" The 911 emergency operator, Glen Cramer, was supposedly told that the passenger had locked himself inside one of the lavatories.

Cramer said that the passenger had spoken for around one minute. "We're being hijacked, we're being hijacked!" the man screamed into his mobile phone. "We confirmed that with him several times," Cramer stated, "and we asked him to repeat what he said. He was very distraught. He reportedly said he believed the aircraft was going down. He did hear some sort of an explosion and saw white smoke coming from the aircraft, but he didn't know where. And then we lost contact with him." This was the last of the purported cell phone calls, made from any passengers onboard any of the aircraft.

9:59 AM       Richard Clarke was supposedly told in private by Dale Watson, the counterterrorism chief at the FBI, "We got the passenger manifests from the airlines. We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaeda." Clarke supposedly replied, "How the f___ did they get on board then?" He was told, "Hey, don't shoot the messenger, friend. CIA forgot to tell us about them." As they talked about this, they saw the South WTC tower collapse on television. [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 13-14]

Supposedly, some of the purported hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta's, were identified on a reservations computer over an hour earlier (See - Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ).

Again, the manifest claim doesn't bear fruit, in the final analysis.

9:59 AM       The south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed; being struck by United Flight 175 at 9:02. [See - Washington Post 9/12/01; MSNBC 9/22/01; AP 8/19/02; ABC News 9-11/02; New York Times 9/12/01 (B); CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01; US Army authorized seismic study; USA Today 12/20/01]

Prior to 9:59 AM      

Between 9:25 and 9:45, one senior New York fire chief recommended to the Fire Department Chief that there might be a WTC collapse in a few hours and therefore fire units probably shouldn't ascend much above the sixtieth floor. This advice was not followed or not passed on. Apparently no other senior fire chiefs foresee the possibility of the WTC towers falling. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 5/19/04]

However, New York City Mayor Rudoph Giuliani recounts, "I went down to the scene and we set up headquarters at 75 Barkley Street, which was right there with the police commissioner, the fire commissioner, the head of emergency management, and we were operating out of there when we were told that the World Trade Center was going to collapse. And it did collapse before we could actually get out of the building, so we were trapped in the building for 10, 15 minutes, and finally found an exit and got out, walked north, and took a lot of people with us." [See - ABC News, 9-11/01 (D)]

As can be seen by another version of similar events, this happens prior to the first WTC tower falls, not the second. [See - Independent Commission, 5/19/04]

It wasn't clear who told Giuliani to evacuate when no fire chiefs were considering the possibility of an imminent collapse.

9:59 AM       The 9-11 Commission reports, "An Air Force Lieutenant Colonel working in the White House Military Office [joins] the [NMCC] conference and state[s] that he had just talked to Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley. The White House request[s]: (1) the implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts for Air Force One, and (3) the establishment of a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, DC." [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Richard Clarke gave the continuity of government orders a few minutes before from inside the White House (See - Between 9:45-9:55 AM ). This was consistent with Bush's claim that he didn't make any major decisions about the 9-11 attacks until shortly before 10:00 (See - After 9:56 AM ).

9:59 AM       According to Major Daniel Nash, pilot of one of the two fighters first scrambled on 9-11 (see 8:52 AM ), the fighters over New York City were never given a shoot down order by the military that day. He recalled that around the time of the collapse of the South Tower, "The New York controller did come over the radio and say if we have another hijacked aircraft we're going to have to shoot it down." [See - BBC, 9/1/02]

However, he stated that this is an off-the-cuff personal statement, not connected to the chain of command. [See - Cape Cod Times 8/21/02]

9:59 AM       Air Force One Departed Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, Sarasota, Florida bound for Washington D.C. Air Force One departed with no extra military protection, even though 2 of the 7 military air stations we had on full alert to protect the continental United States that day were based in Florida. Homestead Air Station in Homestead is 185 miles and the Tyndall Air Station in Panama City is 235 miles from Sarasota.

These two air stations should have been ordered to scramble their fighters at 8:20 or 8:40 or 8:43 or 8:46:26 or 9:02:54 or at the very least, at 9:24. Flying at top speed, both of these air stations fighters could have been in Sarasota in around 20 minutes to protect Air Force One. Where were the fighters from both of these air stations? Did both of these air stations have something better to do that day than protect Air Force One? Please, this just did not happen.

Also, was the place to be in the air when there were still hundreds of airliners in the air, and who knew then how many of them were hostile or not?

We have captured and saved the video of Bush as he arrives at Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, and the take-off of Air Force One.

Go to:


Also, please take a look at the August 30, 2002 BBC article which states: In the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks US fighter aircraft took to the skies to defend America from any further attacks. Their mission was to protect pResident George W. Bush and to intercept any hijacked aircraft heading to other targets in the US.


9:59:04 AM       The south tower of the World Trade Center suddenly collapses, plummeting into the streets below. A massive cloud of dust and debris quickly fills lower Manhattan. It was later explained (disinformation) that the collapse was not directly caused by the impact, but the intense heat caused by the fire fueled by the jet's fuel weakening the steel support beams of the concrete floors. The WTC towers were built to withstand a 707 being flown into them. A 767 carries almost the same amount of fuel as a 707.

Seismographs at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York, 21 miles north of the WTC, recorded very interesting seismic activity on September 11, 2001 that has still not been explained.

While the aircraft impacted caused minimal earth shaking, significant earthquakes with unusual spikes occurred at the beginning of each collapse. The Palisades seismic data recorded a 2.1 magnitude earthquake during the 10-second collapse of the South Tower at 9:59:04 and a 2.3 quake during the 9-second collapse of the North Tower at 10:28:31.

The Palisades seismic record shows that -- as the collapses began -- a huge seismic "spikes" marked the moment the greatest energy went into the ground. The strongest jolts were both registered at the beginning of the collapses, well before the falling debris struck the earth.

These unexplained "spikes" in the seismic data tended to lend credence to the theory that perhaps a massive explosion(s) in the lowest level of the basements where the supporting steel columns of the WTC met the bedrock caused the collapses.

A "sharp spike of short duration" was how seismologist Thorne Lay of University of California at Santa Cruz told AFP an underground nuclear explosion appears on a seismograph.

The two unexplained spikes were more than twenty times the amplitude of the other seismic waves associated with the collapses and occurred in the East-West seismic recording as the buildings began to fall.

In the basements of the collapsed towers, where the 47 central support columns connected with the bedrock, hot spots of "literally molten steel" were discovered. Such persistent and intense residual heat, 70 feet below the surface, could explain how these crucial structural supports failed. Peter Tully, president of Tully Construction of Flushing, New York, told AFP that he saw pools of "literally molten steel" at the World Trade Center. Tully was contracted on September 11 to remove the debris from the site.

Tully called Mark Loizeaux, president of Controlled Demolition, Inc. (CDI) of Phoenix, Maryland, for consultation about removing the debris. CDI called itself "the innovator and global leader in the controlled demolition and implosion of structures." Loizeaux, who cleaned up the bombed Federal Building in Oklahoma City, arrived on the WTC site two days later and wrote the clean-up plan for the entire operation.

AFP asked Loizeaux about the report of molten steel on the site. "Yes," he said, "hot spots of molten steel in the basements." These incredibly hot areas were found "at the bottoms of the elevator shafts of the main towers, down seven [basement] levels," Loizeaux said. The molten steel was found "three, four, and five weeks later, when the rubble was being removed," Loizeaux said. He stated that molten steel was also found at 7 WTC, which collapsed mysteriously at 5:20 on September 11th.

Construction steel has an extremely high melting point of around 2800° Fahrenheit (1535° Celsius). Asked what could have caused such extreme heat, Tully said, "Think of the jet fuel."

A way to prove that explosives had blasted the supporting steel columns of the Twin Towers would be to examine fragments from them among the debris for evidence of what metallurgists call "twinning". While steel is often tested for evidence of explosions, despite numerous eyewitness reports of explosions in the towers, the engineers involved in the FEMA-sponsored building assessment did no such tests.

The WTC debris was removed as fast as possible and no forensic examination of the debris was permitted by the FBI or any other government agency. Almost all the 300,000 tons of steel from the Twin Towers was sold to New York scrap dealers and exported to places like China and Korea as quickly as it could be loaded onto the ships, thereby removing the evidence.

The magazine Fire Engineering, a respected journal of firefighting for 125 years, which publishes studies of catastrophic fires, criticized the American Society of Civil Engineers and FEMA investigations as "a half-baked farce." Fire Engineering editor WiIliam A. Manning wrote in the January issue: "...the structural damage from the aircraft and the explosive ignition of jet fuel in themselves were not enough to bring down the towers." Why was such there disparity in opinion within the ranks of the fire-engineering community?

The immense clouds of dust and apparent disintegration of the 425,000 cubic yards of concrete of the World Trade Center cause me to question the MIT version of events. Describing the ruins, television evangelist Dr. Robert Schuller stated that "...there was not a single block of concrete in that rubble." One observer described the scene "as if some high-energy disintegration beam or laser had been focused on the towers and pulverized the concrete into minute particles of ash and dust." The 110-ten-story World Trade Center reduced to dust by jet fuel?

Dr. Michael Baden, New York state's chief forensic pathologist and an expert in pathology stated that in September that most of the victims' bodies should be identifiable, because the fires had not reached the 3,200°F for 30 minutes necessary to incinerate a body. At a November press conference, Dr. Charles Hirsch, the chief medical examiner, told grieving relatives that many bodies had been "vaporized." Are we to believe that the people killed on 9-11 were "vaporized" at 1700° F?

The World Trade Center smoldering pits of molten steel burned for exactly 100 days, despite the constant spray of water being applied. The fires were finally reported extinguished on December 19.

Also, the collapses of the south tower at 9:59:04 took only 10 seconds while the collapse of the north tower at 10:28:31 took only 9 seconds, this is only slightly more than a free fall from the same height, indicating that there was very little resistance. Yet the floors themselves were quite robust, each one was 39" thick; the top 4" is a poured concrete slab, with interlocking vertical steel trusses underneath. This steel would absorb a lot of kinetic energy by crumpling as one floor fell onto another. So how did both of the towers fall so quickly?

In a newly release audio, two of New York City's Bravest were heard to have made it up to where United Airlines Flight 175 impacted, the 78th floor. Their voices where calm, they explain what was needed to help the many causalities and to put out the two small fires that they discovered. The type of fire that these two NYC Firemen describe did not seem to jive at all with the inferno that was blamed for melting the support beams and bringing down the first steel high-rise or skyscraper ever.

Also, Louie Cacchioli 51, another NYC firefighter, assigned to Engine 47 in Harlem, had stated that on September 11, 2001: "We were the first ones in the second tower after the aircraft struck. I was taking firefighters up in the elevator to the 24th floor to get in position to evacuate workers. On the last trip up a bomb went off. We think there were bombs set in the building. I had just asked another firefighter to stay with me, which was a good thing because we were trapped inside the elevator and he had the tools to get out."

"There were probably 500 people trapped in the stairwell. It was mass chaos. The power went out. It was dark. Everybody was screaming. We had oxygen masks and we were giving people oxygen. Some of us made it out and some of us didn't. I know of at least 30 firefighters who were still missing. This is my 20th year. I am seriously considering retiring. This might have done it."

When cameraman and Jules Naudet arrived at WTC tower one along with other crews of NYC Firemen and entered the building's ground floor lobby, they were to a one completely puzzled, actually astonished, to find significant and widespread damage to the entire lobby area; although not of a deep, structural kind. Moreover, nowhere was there any indication whatsoever of an incendiary-type explosion or any kind of fire in this area.

Yet the incredible number of blown-out windows and other extensive though rather superficial damage throughout the lobby area was profoundly perplexing to these experienced professional firefighters in relation to the impact of the aircraft eighty stories above. As one put it: "The lobby looked like the aircraft strike the lobby!"

Other reports, from firemen, have stated that the FBI's offices in NYC that were on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th floors of the north tower of the WTC were totally destroyed, presumably by bombs.

Seismic article:


Seismic charts:


Seismic article:


Seismic article and chart:


Fire still burning:


Fire still burning:


The Twin Towers Were Deliberately Demolished: http://911research.wtc7.net/talks/towers

Also - http://wtc7.net

Following 9:59 AM       Some time following the first WTC tower collapse, Richard Clarke ordered all of the landmark buildings - and all of the federal buildings in the US - to be evacuated. He also ordered that all of the American harbors and borders be closed. As he was arranging these matters - after at least 10:06, an aide advised him, "United 93 is down, impacted outside of Pittsburgh. It's odd. Appears not to have strike anything much on the ground."

Between 9:59 AM and 10:28 AM ) At some point between the collapse of the two WTC towers, it was reported that the fire chief ordered the firefighters to come down. It has not been confirmed exactly who issued the order - or when. Witnesses claimed that scores of firefighters were resting on lower floors, during the minutes before the second tower collapsed, unaware of the impending danger. "Some firefighters who managed to get out said they had no idea the other building had already fallen, and said that they thought that few of those who perished knew." At least 121 firefighters in the tower died. The fire department blamed equipment failure in the form of a radio repeater. However, the Port Authority later claimed that transcripts of radio communications demonstrated that the repeaters worked. [See - New York Times 11/9/02 (B)]

10:00 AM       In another alleged cell phone call, Flight attendant Elizabeth Wainio reportedly said to her stepmother, "Mom, they're rushing the cockpit. I've got to go. Bye," then she hung up. [See - MSNBC 7/30/02; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 10/28/01 (B)]

10:00 AM       The NRC told all of the nuclear power stations to go to the highest level of alert.

10:00 AM       Suposedly, the transponder for Flight 93 briefly came back on. The aircraft was supposedly at 7,000 feet. The transponder stayed on until around 10:03. It is unclear why the transponder signal briefly returned. [See - MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Guardian 10/17/01]

Prior to 10:00 AM       A fighter and helicopter are reported to both fly directly above the Pentagon on 9-11.

Yet, the defense officials initially claim, "There were no military aircraft in the skies over Washington until 15 to 20 minutes after the Pentagon was struck" — 9:53 to 9:58. [See - Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9/14/01]

However, several sources later claimed that fighters were above Washington within "minutes" or "moments" of the Pentagon explosion. [See - Denver Post, 9-11/01, Telegraph, 9/16/01, ABC News, 9-11/02]

ABC News reported that by 10:00, 'dozens of fighters are buzzing in the sky. F-16s scrambled at Andrews Air Force Base in nearby Maryland" (Exact times are not given, but the estimate is between 9:45 and 10:00 in a later ABC News chronology of 9-11). [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

A few days after 9-11, the New York Times reported, "In the White House Situation Room and at the Pentagon, the response seemed agonizingly slow. One military official recalled hearing "words to the effect of, "Where are the aircraft?" " The Pentagon insisted it had air cover over its own building by 10 AM, 15 minutes after the building was struck. But witnesses, including a reporter for The New York Times who was headed toward the building, did not see any until closer to 11." [See - New York Times 9/16/01 (B)]

10:01 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the FAA Command Center told FAA headquarters that a nearby aircraft in Pennsylvania had seen Flight 93 "waving his wings." The Commission described, "The aircraft had witnessed the radical gyrations in what we believe was the hijackers' effort to defeat the passenger assault." [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Bill Wright was reportedly piloting that observing aircraft. Wright later stated that he was flying a small aircraft when an Air Traffic Controller asked him to take a look around, outside his window. He reportedly saw Flight 93 three miles away — supposedly close enough to see the United Airlines paint scheme. Supposedly, the ATC facility asked him about the aircraft's altitude, then commanded him to get away from the aircraft and to land immediately. Wright supposedly saw the aircraft rock back and forth a few times, before he left the area. [See - Pittsburgh Channel 9/19/01]

10:01 AM       The FAA ordered F-16 fighters to scramble from Toledo, Ohio. The base had no fighters on standby alert status, but it managed to get fighters in the air, approximately 16 minutes later. This was 10 minutes after the last hijacked aircraft had crashed. [See - Toledo Blade, 12/9/01]

The 9-11 Commission concluded that the Toledo fighters, and some fighters from Michigan (See - After 10:06 AM ), were scrambled toward Delta Flight 1989 (See - 9:30 AM ). Amazingly, no fighters were scrambled to intercept Flight 93 - at all. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04] One interesting aspect of 9-11, is that NORAD claimed that it didn't scramble fighters from bases nearer to the hijacked aircraft, as they only used bases in the NORAD defensive network (7 bases in the entire US). However, the Toledo base wasn't part of that network; leaving the matter open, as to the obvious discrepancy in their logic. There also exists the matter of the claim of a seismological detection of a sonic boom in Western Pennsylvania at 9:22. Could that have been a Toledo fighter tracking Flight 93?

It is frightening to think that national defense would depend on the proverbial "fine print."

10:02 AM       The purported cockpit voice recording of Flight 93 would have been recorded on a 30 minute "continuous" reel, which means that as new tape was recorded the old information was being erased. The government later lets relatives listen to the alleged tape, which began at 9:31; running for 31 minutes, ending one minute prior to the "official" impact time (See - 10:03-10:10 AM ). [See - CNN, 4/19/02, Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 206-207]

The New York Observer reported, "Some of the relatives are keen to find out why, at the peak of this struggle, the tape suddenly stopped recording voices and all that is heard in the last 60 seconds or so is engine noise. Had the tape been tampered with?" [See - New York Observer 6/17/04]

The "official" time clashes with the seismic signature timing. The suggestion is that the tape was a fake, indexed to the wrong time frame; demanding that the chronology be shifted, even if it required blatant lies. Otherwise, there is no imaginable excuse for the time discrepancy.

10:02 AM       The White House bunker, which was housing Cheney and other government leaders, purportedly starts receiving reports from the Secret Service of a presumably hijacked aircraft heading toward Washington. The Secret Service was reportedly getting this information on Flight 93 through links to the FAA. In theory, they were only looking at a projected path, versus an actual radar return. Thus, they supposedly didn't realize when the aircraft actually impacted, already. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:02 AM       The Chicago Sears Tower began an evacuation. Other prominent buildings and landmarks began an evacuating, around an hour later. [See - Ottawa Citizen 9-11/01]

10:02 AM       From a later review of the "mystery" radar tapes, a radar target, believed to be Flight 93 was supposedly detected near Shanksville, Pennsylvania; for this time. It is noteworthy that it is difficult to discriminate.

10:03 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the NMCC just learned about the Flight 93 hijacking. Given that the FAA hadn't yet been connected to the NMCC conference call (See - 9:29 AM ), the news came from the White House, via the Secret Service; with the Secret Service having learned about Flight 93 from the FAA. By all accounts, NORAD was still unaware of Flight 93. Four minutes later (10:07), a NORAD representative in the conference call stated, "NORAD has no indication of a hijack heading to Washington DC at this time." [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:03 AM       According to NORAD, Flight 93 impacted at 10:03. [See - NORAD, 9/18/01]

Interestingly, the 9-11 Commission gave the exact time of 10:03:11; claiming [this] "time is supported by evidence from the staff's radar analysis, the flight data recorder, NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] analysis, and infrared satellite data." But they note, "The precise impact time has been the subject of some dispute." [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

As a somewhat final answer, a seismic study, authorized by the U.S. Army determined the "official" aircraft impact time, concluding that the impact happened at 10:06:05. [See - US Army authorized seismic study]

The Philadelphia Daily News published an article on the matter, called the "Three-Minute Discrepancy in Tape." The article noted that leading seismologists agreed on the 10:06 time, within a few seconds. [See - Philadelphia Daily News, 9/16/02]

10:04 AM       The Johnstown-Cambria County Airport reported Flight 93 as being 15 miles south, and coming fast. "As the plane neared Somerset County, air traffic controllers in Cleveland alerted their counterparts at John P. Murtha Johnstown-Cambria County Airport that a plane was about 12 miles away, "heading directly at the airport at about 6,000 feet," said Joe McKelvey, the airport's executive director." [http://www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20010913flightpathreg2p2.asp]

The problem in this account is that the aircraft transponder would need to be operating, in order to generate an altitude readout. The Johnstown County Airport didn't have radar, of its own.

Prior to 10:06 AM       CBS television reported at some point prior to the purported impact, that two F-16 fighters were tailing Flight 93. [See - Independent, 8/13/02]

10:06:05 AM       According to seismic data, United Airlines Flight 93 purportedly impacted near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, approximately 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh. That location is 125 miles or 15 minutes away at a fighter jet speed of 500 MPH from Washington D.C.Or; 7 to 10 minutes from D.C. at 1,000 MPH.

The New York Observer illustrated that in addition to the Army's seismology study, "The FAA gives a impact time of 10:07 AM. And The New York Times, drawing on Air Traffic Controllers in more than one FAA facility, put the time at 10:10 AM. Up to a seven-minute discrepancy? In terms of an air disaster, seven minutes is close to an eternity. The way our nation had historically treated any airline tragedy was to pair up recordings from the cockpit and air-traffic control and parse the timeline down to the hundredths of a second. But as [former Inspector General of the Transportation Department] Mary Schiavo pointed out, "We don't have an NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) investigation here, and they ordinarily dissect the timeline to the thousandth of a second." " [See - New York Observer 2/11/04]

It must be considered that the Langley F-16s supposedly arrived over Washington D.C. at 9:49 AM      . The F-16 has a top speed of 1,500 MPH. After the Pentagon was purportedly struck by American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:37, only one rogue airliner was left with its transponder off. That aircraft was allegedly heading directly for Washington D.C.; United Airlines Flight 93. Why didn't the F-16s try to intercept United Airlines Flight 93 – as an assigned mission, or on their own?

These fighters have the onboard targeting radar to independently locate an aircraft. The 9-11 airliners were on such bizarre routes, that they would not have been difficult to locate.

NORAD Press Release:


AP Article On NORAD PR:


It should be observed that the 9-11 Commission later concluded that the pilots of the Langley fighters were never briefed as to why they were scrambled. The lead pilot explained, "I reverted to the Russian threat … I'm thinking cruise missile threat from the sea. You know you look down and see the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us …. [See - You couldn't see any aircraft, and no one told us anything."] Obviously, the pilots knew their basic mission was to identify and divert aircraft flying within a given radius of Washington, D.C. However, on this mission, they apparently didn't know that the threat came from hijacked aircraft.

What is also puzzling is the chance that the pilots could be ignorant of what was happening, relative to the early events of 9-11.

At the 9-11 Commission hearings, it was presented that the fighter cover over D.C. was considered the priority mission. Yet, considering the distance of Flight 93 – alone, the time to intercept, observe and react would be minimal. Thus, to say that Flight 93 had no priority is unreasonable. The variable is whether or not NORAD had any measure of knowledge about Flight 93. The FAA was clearly playing the role of the "Keeper of the Secrets."

The Commission also noted that NEADS didn't know where Flight 93 allegedly crashed. The Commission wondered if NEADS would have determined its location, then passed it to the pilots, before the aircraft could have reached Washington. The Commission concluded, "NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure." [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

A number of eyewitnesses claimed to see and hear United Airlines Flight 93 just before its impact. It is difficult to make sense of all the different versions. What is consistent, are the descriptions - backed by corroborating physical evidence – no big aircraft parts, a huge spread of very small parts and debris; nothing which resembles the expected thick black cloud of burning jet fuel.

The single 'smoke" evidence photograph [ordnance blast] of Flight 93 attests to the extremely high improbability of a shoot-down. There is no elongated pattern of fires or large aircraft pieces from the sky.

Smaller debris fields were found, as much as eight miles away from the purported main impact site. [See - The Daily Mirror, 8/13/02]

Residents in the vicinity of Shanksville reported 'discovering clothing, books, papers and what appeared to be human remains. Some residents said they collected bags-full of items to be turned over to investigators. Others reported what appeared to be impact debris floating in Indian Lake, nearly six miles from the immediate impact scene. Workers at Indian Lake Marina said that they saw a cloud of confetti-like debris descend on the lake and nearby farms minutes after hearing the explosion…." [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/13/01]

Immediately after the purported crash, Carol Delasko initially thought that someone had blown up a boat on Indian Lake: "It just looked like confetti raining down all over the air above the lake." [See - Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 9/14/01]

Investigators claimed that the distant wreckage "probably was spread by the cloud created when the aircraft impacted and dispersed by a 10 mph southeasterly wind." [See - Delaware News Journal, 9/16/01]

However, the only real-time photo of the scene, the towering mushroom cloud, demonstrates a negligible wind.

10:06 AM       Allegedly, Flight 93 impacted in the Pennsylvania countryside, just north of the Somerset County Airport, approximately 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, 124 miles or 15 minutes from Washington DC. [See - 10:00, MSNBC, 9/22/01, 10:03, NORAD, 9/18/01, 10:06, Guardian, 10/17/01, 10:06, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/01, 10:06, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 10:06, Mirror, 9/13/02, 10:06, USA Today, 8/13/02, 10:07, AP, 8/19/02, 10:10, CNN, 9/12/01, 10:10, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 10:10, New York Times, 9/12/01, 10:10, Boston Globe, 11/23/01, 10:06:05, US Army authorized seismic study]

Little information about the impact site has yet been made public.

Shortly after 9-11, an Air Traffic Controller in New Hampshire ignored a ban on FAA controllers speaking to the media; it was reported that he claimed "that an F-16 fighter closely pursued Flight 93… the F-16 made 360-degree turns to remain close to the commercial jet, the employee said. "He must've seen the whole thing," the employee said of the F-16 pilot's view of Flight 93's impact." [See - AP 9/13/01 (C); Nashua Telegraph 9/13/01]

He reportedly learned this from speaking to controllers nearer to the impact. [See - AP, 9/13/01, Nashua Telegraph, 9/13/01]

Conversely, a Cleveland Air Traffic Controller named Stacey Taylor later claimed to have not seen any fighters on radar around the impact. [See - MSNBC, 9-11/02 (B)]

Major Gen. Paul Weaver, the director of the Air National Guard, had previously claimed that no military aircraft were sent after Flight 93. [See - Seattle Times, 9/16/01]

Yet a different explanation was offered by ABC News, "The closest fighters are two F-16 pilots on a training mission from Selfridge Air National Guard Base" near Detroit, Michigan. These were ordered to go after Flight 93, even though they supposedly were not armed with any weapons. It was claimed they were supposed to ram Flight 93; if they cannot persuade it to land. [See - ABC News, 8/30/02, ABC News, 9-11/02]

However, the fighters apparently were not even diverted from Michigan until after Flight 93 had allegedly crashed (See - After 10:06 AM ).

Following 10:06 AM       At some point after Flight 93 allegedly impacted, NORAD diverted "unarmed Michigan Air National Guard fighter jets that happened to be flying a training mission in northern Michigan since the time of the first attack." [See - AP 8/30/02]

The 9-11 Commission concluded that these fighters - and fighters from Ohio (see 10:01 AM ) - were scrambled after Delta Flight 1989. This flight was never hijacked, nor was it even out of contact (See - 9:30 AM ). Strangely, again, no fighters were scrambled on Flight 93 - at all. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

Following 10:06 AM       Richard Clarke was reportedly told by an aide, "Secret Service reported a hostile aircraft ten minutes out." Two minutes later he was given an update: "Hostile aircraft eight minutes out." When Flight 93 purportedly impacted at 10:06, it was "logically" still around 15 minutes away from Washington (See - 10:13 -10:23 AM ), by virtue of the physical distance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers then supposedly reported, "We have three F-16s from Langley over the Pentagon. Andrews is launching fighters from the DC Air National Guard. We have fighters aloft from the Michigan Air National Guard, moving east toward a potential hostile over Pennsylvania. Six fighters from Tyndall and Ellington are en route to rendezvous with Air Force One over Florida. They will escort it to Barksdale." [See - Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 8-9, NORAD, 9/18/01]

However, the fighters apparently didn't join up with Air Force One until around an hour later (See - Between 10:55 - 11:41 AM ). Franklin Miller, a senior national security official who worked alongside Richard Clarke on that day, and another official later failed to recall hearing any aide warning that an aircraft could be only minutes away. [See - New York Times, 3/30/04 (B)]

The exact time of this incident was not given; the Michigan fighters were not diverted until after 10:06 (See - After 10:06 AM). If that event took place after 10:06, it would operate in parallel to similar warnings given to Cheney, elsewhere in the White House (see 10:02 AM, (Between 10:00-10:15 AM ), and (Between 10:00 -10:15 AM ).

Following 10:06 AM       Just after Flight 93 impacted, "At least half a dozen named individuals …have reported seeing a second aircraft flying low and in erratic patterns, not much above treetop level, over the impact site within minutes of the United flight impacting. They describe the aircraft as a small, white jet with rear engines and no discernible markings." [See - Independent, 8/13/02]

The A-10 "Warthog" should not be ruled out, as a possibility.

Lee Purbaugh said: "I didn't get a good look but it was white and it circled the area about twice and then it flew off over the horizon." [See - Mirror, 9/13/02]

"Lee Purbaugh is one of at least half a dozen named [Shankesville] individuals who have reported seeing a second aircraft flying low and in erratic patterns, not much above treetop level, over the impact site within minutes of United Airlines Flight 93 impacting. They describe the aircraft as a small, white jet with rear engines and no discernible markings."

Susan Mcelwain also reported seeing a small white jet with rear-mounted engines, with no discernible markings. She described it as swooping low over her minivan near an intersection; disappearing over a hilltop. She reportedly saw this less than a minute prior to the explosion – whatever it was. [See - Bergen Record, 9/14/01]

She later added, "There's no way I imagined this aircraft — it was so low it was virtually on top of me. It was white with no markings but it was definitely military, it just had that look. It had two rear engines, a big fin on the back like a spoiler on the back of a car and with two upright fins at the side. I haven't found one like it on the internet. It definitely wasn't one of those executive jets. The FBI came and talked to me and said there was no aircraft around…. But I saw it and it was there before the impact and it was 40 feet above my head. They did not want my story — nobody here did." [See - Mirror, 9/13/02]

In a conversation between Dennis Decker and Rick Chaney, Decker said: "As soon as we looked up [after hearing United Airlines Flight 93 impact], we saw a midsize jet flying low and fast. It appeared to make a loop or part of a circle, and then it turned fast and headed out." Decker and Chaney described the aircraft as a Lear-jet type, with engines mounted near the tail and painted white with no identifying markings. "It was a jet aircraft, and it had to be flying real close when that 757 went down. If I was the FBI, I'd find out who was driving that aircraft." [See - Bergen Record, 9/14/01]

Jim Brandt and Tom Spinello both reported a small aircraft with no markings flying around one or two minutes over the impact site prior to its departing.

The FBI later claimed that this was a Fairchild Falcon 20 executive jet, directed by ATC to descend from 37,000 feet to 5,000 feet, so as to establish the coordinates for the impact site to aid rescuers. The FBI also stated that there was a C-130 flying at 24,000 feet, estimated to be 17 miles away. But, the FBI claimed that aircraft wasn't armed and played no role in the impact. [See - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/16/01, Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/01]

This was the same C-130 which purportedly flew very close to Flight 77, immediately before that aircraft supposedly impacted into the Pentagon (see 9:38 AM ).

The unspoken message is that the C-130 would have needed to set a course, directly to the impact site – anticipating a supposed "mystery" crash! They knew! Further, they would need a priority to fly at the speed, which they did. Add that they would be risking a "bust" for flying in a prohibited airspace.

It is also highly questionable as to why a cargo plane - of all aircraft types - would be dispatched to intercept the airliners.

Given the nearly identical small nature of the "aircraft parts," it's worth questioning whether or not the parts were 'salted" from the air; from the C-130.

The private jet claim is bizarre! The 9:45 "land-now" order would have prevented a private jet from doing anything but seek a nearby airport. The C-130 could have provided the coordinates/location – as there was a mysteriously missing trail of smoke.

Jim Brandt reported seeing a small aircraft with no markings circle approximately one or two minutes over the impact site, prior to leaving the area. [See - Pittsburgh Channel, 9/12/01]

Tom Spinelli stated: "I saw the white aircraft. It was flying around all over the place like it was looking for something. I saw it before and after the impact." [See - Mirror, 9/13/02] For more information on United Airlines Flight 93:


10:07 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NEADS received a call from Cleveland ATC about Flight 93. Cleveland passed on the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was unable to locate it on its radar, as it had already impacted. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:08 AM       Bush was told of the "crash" of Flight 93 a few minutes later. Because of Cheney's earlier order, he supposedly asked, 'did we shoot it down or did it impact?" Several hours later, he was assured that it had crashed. [See - Washington Post 1/27/02]

10:08 AM       Cleveland Air Traffic Controller, Stacey Taylor, had supposedly asked the C-130 to look to Flight 93's last known position. The pilot supposedly told Taylor that he saw smoke from the presumed impact site.

According to the 9-11 Commission, the FAA Command Center reported to the FAA headquarters that Flight 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania. "It struck the ground. That's what they're speculating, that's speculation only." The Command Center confirmed that Flight 93 "crashed," at the report time of 10:17. [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04; MSNBC 9-11/02 (B); Guardian 10/17/01]

10:10 AM       All of the U.S. military forces were ordered to Defcon Three (or Defcon Delta), "The highest alert for the nuclear arsenal in 30 years." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02] [10:10, ABC News, 9-11/02, 10:10, CNN, 9/4/02, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, p. 15, 12:00, Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Rumsfeld later claimed that he made the recommendation. However the timeline doesn't fit, as he stated that he discussed it with acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers in the NMCC first – with neither of them arriving there until approximately 10:30 (See - 10:30 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission, 3/23/04]

One media version asserted that the command was implemented after 10:30. However, the massive blast doors to the U.S. Strategic Command, headquarters for NORAD - in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado - were first closed at 10:15. [See - BBC, 9/1/02, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

In another version, Richard Myers gave the Defcon order by himself. President Bush had also claimed that he gave the order. [See - Wall Street Journal 3/22/04]

10:10 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, the NEADS Mission Crew Commander was sorting out what orders that the Langley fighters had. He was unaware that Flight 93 had been heading toward Washington; or that it had already crashed. Thus, he instructed the Langley fighters that they cannot shoot down the aircraft — that they have "negative clearance to shoot" aircraft over Washington. The implication is that they may have been able to shoot it down, over a rural area. The authorization to shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft reached NEADS at 10:31 (long after the last aircraft had crashed); even then, it wasn't relayed to the pilots (see 10:31 AM ). [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

Between 10:10 - 10:15 AM       The Secret Service was being provided with projected path information, regarding Flight 93; they didn't realize that the flight had supposedly already crashed (see 10:02 AM ). Based on the erroneous information, a military aide advised Cheney and other leaders in the White House bunker that the aircraft was 80 miles away from Washington. Cheney was asked for the authority to engage the aircraft. He quickly gave the authorization. The aide returned a few minutes later; reportedly stating that the aircraft was 60 miles out. Cheney again gave the authorization to engage. A few minutes later, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Joshua Bolten, suggested that Cheney contact President Bush to confirm the engage order. Bolten later told the 9-11 Commission that he hadn't heard any prior discussion on the topic with Bush, thus, he wanted to make sure that Bush knew. Apparently Cheney then called Bush; obtaining the confirmation. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

That history leaves the question of whether or not Bush approved a shoot-down, prior to this exchange, or if Cheney simply assumed the authority to make that decision (See - Between 10:00-10:15 AM ). Newsweek cited the matter as a moot point, given that the decision was made on false data; and that there was no aircraft to shoot down. [See - Newsweek 6/20/04]

In a pragmatic sense, the point is not the least bit "moot."

Between 10:00 - 10:15 AM       According to a 9-11 Commission staff report, Vice President Cheney was told that a combat air patrol had been established over Washington (See - 9:55-10:10 AM ). Cheney then called President Bush to discuss the rules of engagement for the pilots. Bush authorizes the shoot down of hijacked aircraft at this time. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

According to a Washington Post article, which places the call after 9:55, "Cheney recommended that Bush authorize the military to shoot-down any such civilian airliners — as momentous a decision as the president was asked to make in those first hours. "I said, "You bet," " Bush recalled. "We had a little discussion, but not much." " Bush then talked to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to clarify the procedure, and Rumsfeld passed word down the chain of command. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

Cheney and Bush recalled this phone call between them, and National Security Advisor Rice recalled overhearing it. However, the Commission notes, "Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning there is no documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources were incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's Chief of Staff, [I. Lewis] Libby, who sat next to him, and [Lynne] Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room." The commission also denied that Bush and Rumsfeld talked about such procedures at that time (See - Between 10:00-10:35 AM ). [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Commission Chairman Thomas Kean said, "The phone logs don't exist, because they evidently got so fouled up in communications that the phone logs have nothing. So that's the evidence we have." Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton reportedly said of the shoot down order, "Well, I'm not sure it was carried out." [See - Independent Commission, 6/17/04 (C), New York Daily News, 6/18/04]

Newsweek reported that it "has learned that some on the commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the Vice President's version and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report. According to one knowledgeable source, some staffers "flat out didn't believe the call ever took place." " After vigorous lobbying from the White House, the report "was watered down," in the words of one 9-11 Commission staffer. [See - Newsweek, 6/20/04]

A version by Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek, overseeing NORAD's Colorado headquarters, claims that he heard Bush give a shoot down order early in the morning, as well as the order to empty the skies of aircraft (See - 9:45 AM ), now appears to be totally discredited. [See - Toronto Star 12/9/01]

10:12 AM       CNN reported an explosion at Capitol Hill. CNN determines this was untrue 12 minutes later. [See - Ottawa Citizen 9-11/01]

10:13 AM       Federal buildings in Washington began evacuating. The UN building evacuated first; others follow. [See - CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01]

10:14 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, beginning at this time, the White House repeatedly conveys to the NMCC that Vice President Cheney confirmed fighters were cleared to engage the inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked (See - Between 10:10-10:15 AM ). [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:15 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NEADS called Washington ATC; asking about Flight 93. ATC responded, "He's down." It was clarified that the aircraft impacted 'somewhere up northeast of Camp David." [See - 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:15 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Fire Chief Schwartz ordered a full evacuation of the area, due to a warning of an approaching hijacked aircraft. Note that the aircraft has already purportedly crashed.

10:15 AM       The section of the Pentagon reportedly strike by the impact of Flight 77 collapses. [See - 10:10, CNN, 9/12/01, 10:10, New York Times, 9/12/01, recorded live on WDCC-TV at 10:15, Television Archive, WDCC 10:00]

Other accounts cite approximately 9:55 as the collapse time.

A few minutes prior to the Pentagon wall's collapse, firefighters saw warning signs and sounded a general evacuation tone. No firefighters were injured. [See - NFPA Journal 11/1/01]

10:15 AM       According to NORAD they received the report that the Pentagon was impacted.

10:15 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Fire Chief Schwartz orders full evacuation because of warning of approaching hijacked aircraft. [Arlington FD AAR]

10:15 AM       The Palestinian group Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) reportedly took responsibility for the crashes, but this was quickly denied by a senior officer of the group.

10:15 AM       2,000 aircraft have landed in the U.S. A. since the 9:40 FAA order was issued, directing all aircraft in the air to land at the nearest airport.

10:17 AM       Two F-16s from the 180th Fighter Wing in Toledo, Ohio took off, heading east.

10:17 AM       The National Military Command Center (NMCC) had been conducting an important teleconference, coordinating the response to the hijackings (See - 9:29 AM ). Yet the 9-11 Commission reported that the FAA was unable to join in until this time, apparently due to technical difficulties. NORAD asked three times before the last hijacked aircraft impacted for the FAA to provide a hijacking update to the teleconference. When an FAA representative finally joins in, that person had no proper experience, no access to decision makers, and no information known to senior FAA officials at the time. Furthermore, the highest level Defense Department officials relied on this conference; not talking directly with high FAA officials. That translates to the reality that the leaders of NORAD and the FAA were effectively out of contact with each other, during the entire crisis. [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

Those with experience with the FAA, know this to be a 'standard" interference tactic.

10:20 AM       United Airlines headquarters received a confirmation from the airport manager in Johnstown, Pennsylvania that Flight 93 had impacted. [See - Independent Commission 1/27/04]

Between 9:50-10:40 AM       There were numerous false reports of additional terror attacks. Before 10:00, some heard reports on television of a fire at the State Department building. At 10:20 AM - and apparently again at 10:33 AM - it was publicly reported this was caused by a car bomb. [See - 10:00, Ottawa Citizen, 9-11/01, 10:19, Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/02, 10:20, Telegraph, 12/16/01]

10:22 AM       The Justice and State departments were evacuated, as well as the World Bank.

10:23 AM       The Associated Press reported, "A car bomb explodes outside the State Department, senior law-enforcement officials say." [See - Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/02]

Richard Clarke heard the reports at this time, asking the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, in the State Department to see if the building he's in had been struck. He went outside the building, discovering no bomb, then called his colleagues to update them. There were also reports of a fire at the Capitol Mall; quickly found to be false. [See - ABC, 9/15/02 (B), Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, pp. 8-9]

Numerous more false reports circulated over the next hour, including a report of explosions at the Capitol building; and at the USA Today headquarters. [See - Broadcasting and Cable, 8/26/02]

10:24 AM       Jane Garvey, head of the FAA, ordered the diversion of all international flights en route to the U.S. Most of the flights were diverted to Canada. [See - Time 9/14/01; MSNBC 9/22/01; CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01]

10:28 AM       The WTC north tower collapsed; taking only approximately ten seconds. It was struck by Flight 11 at 8:46. [See - 10:28, MSNBC, 9/22/01, 10:28, CNN, 9/12/01, 10:28, New York Times, 9/12/01, 10:28, AP, 8/19/02, 10:28 (based on seismic data), New York Times, 9/12/01 (B), 10:29, Washington Post, 9/12/01, 10:28:31, ]

The northern tower standing longer than the southern tower was attributed to the impact region being higher, the speed of the aircraft was believed to be lower, with the affected floors supposedly having their fire proofing upgraded. However, there is room for debate, given that if the original asbestos had been "upgraded," the new material would not be as effective as the asbestos.

At the beginning of the collapse of the north tower, it is claimed that there was a seismic event, equivalent to a magnitude 2.3 earthquake. That "spike" in the seismic data directs attention to the theory of thermite melting, possibly massive explosion(s) at the lowest level of the basement, where the supporting steel columns met the bedrock(see 9:59:04 AM # 109).

10:30 AM       The White House bunker was given a report of still another aircraft heading towards Washington. Cheney's Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, later stated, "We learn that an aircraft is five miles out and had dropped below 500 feet and can't be found; it's missing." Believing that there is only a minute or two available, Cheney ordered fighters to engage the aircraft, saying, "Take it out." However, the reports of another hijacking were mistaken; the alleged hijacked aircraft - five miles away - had been a Medevac helicopter. [See - Newsweek 12/31/01; 9-11 Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:30 AM       Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld finally entered the Pentagon National Military Command Center (NMCC). There, the military response to the 9-11 attacks was being coordinated. [See - shortly before 10:30, 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04, 10:30, CNN, 9/4/02]

Rumsfeld later claimed that he only began to gain a situational awareness of after arriving at the NMCC. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Rumsfeld was supposedly in his office - only 200 feet from the NMCC until the Pentagon "event." His actions there, during that time, is disputed (See - After 9:03 AM ) and (9:38 AM )). He then went outside, to the purported Flight 77 impact site (See - 9:38 AM ) and (After 9:38 AM ), staying elsewhere in the Pentagon (See - Between 10:00-10:30 AM ). According to Brigadier General Montague Winfield, "For 30 minutes we couldn't find him. And just as we began to worry, he walked into the door of the National Military Command Center." [See - ABC News, 9-11/02]

Winfield himself appears to only show up at the NMCC around the time frame of10:30, as well (see 8:30 AM ).

Prior to 10:30 AM       Richard Myers entered the NMCC; however, exactly when this happened isn't clear. He was known to be on Capitol Hill, in the offices of Senator Max Cleland (D); Richard Clarke claimed Myers took part in a video conference for much of the morning (See - After 8:48 AM ). Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who entered the NMCC around 10:30, claimed that as he entered, Myers "had just returned from Capitol Hill." [See - Defense Department, 3/23/04]

In Myers' testimony before the 9-11 Commission, he failed to say where he was - or what he was doing - from the time of the Pentagon "event" until approximately 10:30, except to say, "I went back to my duty station. And we — what we started doing at that time was to say, "OK, we've had these attacks. Obviously they're hostile acts. Not sure at that point who perpetrated them." " [See - 9-11 Commission 6/17/04 (B)]

Between 10:00 - 10:30 AM       In Rumsfeld's testimony before the 9-11 Commission, he stated that he returned from the Pentagon impact site "by shortly before or after 10:00 AM." (See - After 9:38 AM ). Then he said that he had "one or more calls in my office, one of which was with the president." [See - 9-11 Commission, 6/17/04 (B)]

According to the 9-11 Commission, the call with Bush was of little significance: "No one can recall any content beyond a general request to alert forces." The topic of shooting down hijacked aircraft was not mentioned. [See - 9-11 Commission Report, 6/17/04]

Rumsfeld went to the Executive Support Center, before finally reaching the NMCC (See - 10:30 AM ). Richard Myers repeated all these details. [See - Independent Commission, 6/17/04 (B)]

The Executive Support Center had secure video facilities [Washington Times, 2/23/04], making it possible that Rumsfeld joined or rejoined the video conference, which Richard Clarke had claimed that Rumsfeld was a participant of, during much of the morning (See - After 9:03 AM )and(Before 9:38 AM ).

10:31 AM       According to the 9-11 Commission, NORAD's commander Major General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following message over a NORAD chat log: "10:31 Vice President [Cheney] has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond, per CONR CC [General Arnold]."

NEADS first learned of the shoot-down order from this message. However, NEADS didn't pass that shoot down order to the fighter pilots, as they were unsure as to how the pilots should proceed with that guidance. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The point is to be well taken, as to shoot down an aircraft over, or near a city is a disaster of another form. Add the need to first confirm that the aircraft is actually hijacked, etc. There would be a natural fear of a "cowboy" with an itchy trigger finger.

10:31 AM       "The FAA [allowed] military, and law enforcement flights to resume (and some flights that the FAA can't reveal that were already airborne)." All civilian, military and law enforcement flights had been ordered to land as soon as reasonably possible, approximately one hour earlier (See - 9:26 AM ). [See - Time 9/14/01]

10:32 AM       Cheney purportedly called Bush, telling him of a threat to Air Force One. The caller had supposedly used the Air Force One code word, "Angel," suggesting that terrorists had inside information.

Bush (Andrew Card) was told that it would take between 40 and 90 minutes to get a fighter escort to Air Force One. His aircraft (purportedly headed toward DC) turned toward Louisiana. [See - Washington Post, 1/27/02]

By all reasonable accounts, the threat to Air Force One was bogus. Thus, much of the "official" line unravels. For instance, Representative Martin Meehan (D) said, "I don't buy the notion Air Force One was a target. That's just PR, that's just spin." [See - Washington Times, 10/8/02]

A later version called the threat "completely untrue," asserting that Cheney probably made the story up. A well-informed and anonymous Washington official said, "It did two things for [Cheney]. It reinforced his argument that the President should stay out of town, and it gave George W an excellent reason for doing so." [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

It's difficult to imagine the hijackers being possessed of such arrogance, that they would warn the White House that they had the codes. It's worth also asking what a terrorist would do with such codes. The television stations gave the location of Air Force One; what more could be desired by terrorists? It doesn't make sense that such killers would telegraph warnings. The fear of the White House being able to trace the calls would prevent such a call; not to mention the effort it would take to get through to the white house on 9-11. In theory, the hijackers were airborne, with serious passenger & crew handling challenges.

For nearly two weeks after 9-11, White House spokesman, Ari Fleicher, repeated the 'standard" litany – 'real," 'specific" – and of course the constant, "credible!"

It should be noted that much of Bush's treatment was that of a puppet. His deportment at the school in Florida, the departure without a fighter escort and the lack of plausibility in Bush's 9-11 "cover story" attest to that, as a most likely probability. In the small plane scare of 2005, the White House – including his wife – were evacuated; with Bush being informed as a low priority. The most probable reason for his treatment on 9-11, was to keep him away from the media.

The major point of Air Force One, is that it was an easy target, given its known location, and its size. Lacking as much as a helicopter gunship escort for the takeoff, the flight was foolish – unless the factual threat (zero) was previously known.

10:35 AM       The Washington D.C. Police were reportedly alerted about a bomb in a car outside the State Department. Later reports claim that nothing happened at the State Department.

10:35 AM       Air Force One reportedly turned toward Louisiana. It had been decided that Bush should not go directly to Washington. [See - CBS 9-11/02 (B); Washington Post 1/27/02]

Prior to 10:36 AM       A Secret Service agent supposedly, again, contacted Andrews Air Force Base (See - After 9:03 AM ) and (After 9:38 AM ), commanding, "Get in the air now!" According to Lead pilot, Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville, almost simultaneously, the base received a call from someone else in the White House declaring the Washington area as "a free-fire zone. That meant we were given authority to use force, if the situation required it, in defense of the nation's capital, its property and people." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

Presumably, that second call was made to General David Wherley, the flight commander of the Air National Guard, at Andrews. He had supposedly contacted the Secret Service, upon hearing reports that it wanted fighters airborne. Reportedly, one Secret Service agent, relayed instructions to Wherley, from a Secret Service agent in the White House; upon receiving instructions from Cheney. Wherley's fighters were directed to protect the White House; shooting down any aircraft which threatened Washington. Bush and Cheney later claimed that they were not aware that fighters had scrambled from Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04] Sasseville and Lucky took off approximately six minutes after reaching their fighters (See - 10:42 AM ).

10:37 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Flight 93 was just reported to have impacted 80 miles south of Pittsburgh, PA. [Arlington FD AAR]

10:38 AM       At the Pentagon scene, Fire Chief Schwartz sounded the all clear, ending the Pentagon rescue personnel evacuation. [Arlington FD AAR]

10:38 AM       The 9-11 Commission claimed that the first fighters from Andrews Air Force Base had scrambled at this time and were flying patrol over Washington by 10:45. [See - Independent Commission Report, 6/17/04]

The three F-16s, which were flying on a training mission 207 miles away (See - After 9:03 AM ) have been recalled to Andrews. As soon as the lead pilot, Major Billy Hutchison, checked in via radio after landing, he was reportedly told to take off again immediately. His fighter was reported to have no weapons whatsoever; the other two fighters had only training rounds for their guns, but very little fuel. "Hutchison was probably airborne shortly after the alert F-16s from Langley arrive over Washington, although [the] pilots admit their timeline-recall "is fuzzy." " The officer who dispatched Hutchison "told him to 'do exactly what ATC asks you to do." Primarily, he was to go ID [identify] that unknown [aircraft] that everybody was so excited about. He blasted off and flew a standard departure route, which took him over the Pentagon." The pilots later supposedly said that, had all else failed, they would have rammed Flight 93. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 9/9/02]

This description is strange, as the military should have had full control of the fighters – period. The fighters would need to depend on radar capable of easily discriminating primary targets; that's not the FAA radar. Also, the 'standard" route would never have taken an aircraft over the top of the Pentagon.

10:39 AM       Vice President Cheney reportedly tried to brief Rumsfeld, relative to the NMCC's conference call, as Rumsfeld had just arrived to the NMCC (See - 10:30 AM ). Cheney supposedly explained that he had given the authorization for any hijacked aircraft to be shot down; and that this had been relayed to the fighter pilots. Rumsfeld asked, "So we've got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at the present time?" Cheney replied, "That is correct. And it's my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out." Then Rumsfeld supposedly said, "We can't confirm that. We're told that one aircraft is down but we do not have a pilot report that they did it." Cheney was not correct in his statement that his command had actually reached the pilots (see 10:31 AM ). [See - Independent Commission Report 6/17/04]

10:42 AM       The FAA advised the White House that it still could not account for three aircraft, in addition to the four which had crashed. It took the FAA approximately another hour and a half to account for the three other aircraft. [See - Time, 9/14/01]

Vice President Cheney later supposedly said, "That's what we started working off of, that list of six, and we could version for two of them in New York. The third one we didn't know what had happened to. It turned out it had strike the Pentagon, but the first reports on the Pentagon attack suggested a helicopter and then later a private jet." [See - Los Angeles Times, 9/17/01]

10:42 AM       Two F-16s took off from Andrews Air Force Base, being lightly armed with nothing more than non-explosive training rounds. The Lead pilot was Lt. Col. Marc Sasseville; the other pilot was known by the code-name "Lucky." [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

These fighters had been supposedly waiting to be re-armed with AIM-9 missiles, a process which required approximately an hour to do - at another base. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Given that they departed without the missiles, they could have presumably taken off unarmed much earlier; given that the first 'scramble" came not long after 9:00 (See - After 9:03 AM ). Two more F-16s, armed with AIM-9 missiles took off approximately twenty seven minutes later - at 11:09. These were flown by Major Dan Caine and Captain Brandon Rasmussen. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02, Independent Commission, 6/17/04 (B)]

More F-16s from Richmond, Virginia and Atlantic City, New Jersey (See - 8:34 AM ) reportedly arrived over Washington, a short time later. [See - Aviation Week and Space Technology 9/9/02]

10:43 AM       Air Force One reportedly proceeds on a course to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. It was described as being within easy range, with the potential for food and fuel, plus the President having access to its more sophisticated communications systems.

However, there were bases in Florida, with that same potential, including the U.S. Central Command, at McDill; only a few miles to the north.

10:45 AM       All federal office buildings in Washington D. C. were evacuated.

10:48 AM       Police confirmed the impact of a large aircraft in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.

The "Confirmation" is suspect, as there were only a smoking crater, and a small parts 'scattering" to suggest an aircraft had crashed.

10:50 AM       The Pentagon "event" section reportedly collapsed.

Between 10:55 - 11:41 AM       The fighter escorts reached Air Force One. No fighters escorted Air Force One until this time period.

According to one version, around 10:00 Air Force One "is joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base near Jacksonville, Florida," but this was contradicted by Cheney's comment, reported a month later. [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

Another version said, "At 10:41, … Air Force One headed toward Jacksonville to meet jets scrambled to give the presidential jet its own air cover." [See - New York Times, 9/16/01 (B)]

But Air Force One had occasion to take evasive action, around 10:55, with no fighter escort (see 10:55 AM ). NORAD's commander, Major General Larry Arnold, later said, "We scrambled available aircraft from Tyndall [near Tallahassee, not Jacksonville] and then from Ellington in Houston, Texas;" he didn't say when. [See - Code One Magazine, 1/02]

In another version, two F-16s arrived, piloted by Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts, launched from the Texas Air National Guard; but none from any Florida bases. [See - CBS, 9-11/02]

By 11:30 there were reported to be six fighters protecting Air Force One. [See - Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]

10:55 AM       Reportedly, Colonel Mark Tillman, the command pilot of Air Force One, was advised of a threat to Bush's aircraft. Tillman reportedly had an armed guard placed at the cockpit door, as the Secret Service double-checked the identity of everyone on board. Then traffic controllers supposedly warned that a suspect airliner was dead ahead. Tillman is quoted as saying, "Coming out of Sarasota there was one call that said there was an airliner off our nose that they did not have contact with." Tillman reportedly pulled high above normal traffic. [See - CBS, 9-11/02 (B)]

10:57 AM       At the Pentagon scene, the West wall was reported to have collapsed (conflict of timeline). [Arlington FD AAR]

11:00 AM       Robert Bonner, the head of Customs and Border Protection, later testified, "We ran passenger manifests through the system used by Customs — two were strike on our watch list of August 2001." (This presumably referenced the purported hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, allegedly watch listed on August 23, 2001.) "And by looking at the Arab names and their seat locations, ticket purchases and other passenger information, it didn't take a lot to do a rudimentary link analysis. Customs officers were able to ID 19 probable hijackers within 45 minutes. I saw the sheet by 11 AM. And that analysis did indeed correctly identify the terrorists." [See - New York Observer, 2/11/04]

Some of the hijacker names, including Mohamed Atta's, were supposedly identified on a reservations computer, around 8:30 (See - Between 8:27 AM - 8:30 AM ), Richard Clarke was told that some of the names were al-Qaeda around 10:00 (See - 9:59 AM ).

This account flies in the face of the fact that no documentation can yet be produced to show that the hijackers bought tickets, or were actually on an aircraft, that day.

11:00 AM       The route of Air Force One was supposedly started with flying in circles somewhere over Florida for approximately 40 minutes prior to heading west. Reportedly, the first escort aircraft came from Ellington. Rumors have it that Bush's father has a lucrative fuel contract there.

11:00 AM       The FAA's command center was advised that all of the flights over the United States were accounted for; and were reported to be complying with the FAA controllers. [See - USA Today, 8/13/02 (B)]

11:08 AM       Canada shut down all of its airports.

11:17 AM       American Airlines reported that it had lost two aircraft; Flight 11, with 81 passengers and 11 crewmembers, as well as Flight 77, with 58 passengers and six crewmembers.

11:26 AM       United Airlines reported that Flight 93, en route from Newark, to San Francisco, had crashed in Pennsylvania, to the southeast of Pittsburgh.

11:30 AM       General Wesley Clark, the former supreme commander of NATO, stated, "This is clearly a coordinated effort. It hasn't been announced that its over…. Only one group had this kind of ability and that is Osama bin Laden's." [See - Ottawa Citizen 9-11/01]

The "ability" claim is strange, as bin Laden was far more famous for bombings. Strangely, Clark isn't famous for being a supporter of the current "establishment."

11:40 – 11:45 AM       Air Force One arrived at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, near Shreveport, Louisiana. "The official reason for landing at Barksdale was that Bush felt it necessary to make a further statement, but it wasn't unreasonable to assume that — as there was no agreement as to what the President's movements should be — it was felt he might as well be on the ground as in the air." [See - Salon, 9/12/01 (B), New York Times, 9/16/01 (B), Telegraph, 12/16/01, CBS, 9-11/02]

In practical terms, the landing is difficult to account for, other than a PR stop.

11:45 AM       From Barksdale Air Force Base, Bush made a brief and informal initial statement to the effect that terrorism on U.S. soil would not be tolerated, stating that "freedom itself has been attacked and freedom will be protected."

11:53 AM       United Airlines confirmed that Flight 175, had crashed with 56 passengers and nine crewmembers aboard.

11:55 AM       The border between the U.S. and Mexico was reportedly placed on highest alert, but was not closed.

12:00 Noon Sen. Orrin Hatch (R), a member of both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary Committee, stated that he had just been "briefed by the highest levels of the FBI and of the intelligence community." He stated, "They've come to the conclusion that this looks like the signature of Osama bin Laden, and that he may be the one behind this." [See - Salon, 9/12/01 (B)]

12:00 Noon Bush arrived at the Barksdale Air Force base headquarters. [See - Telegraph, 12/16/01]

12:02 PM The Taliban government of Afghanistan denounced the 9-11 attacks.

12:04 AM       CIA Director Tenet reportedly told Rumsfeld that a message from a bin Laden agent, who was celebrating the attacks, was intercepted two hours earlier (see 9:53 AM ). Rumsfeld wrote in his noted that the lead was "vague," that it "might not mean something," and that there was "no good basis for hanging hat." More evidence suggesting an al-Qaeda link comes several hours later (See - 2:40 PM). [See - CBS 9/4/02]

12:04 AM       Los Angeles International Airport was evacuated.

12:15 AM       San Francisco International Airport was evacuated and shut down.

12:15 PM      The Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico were on the highest state of alert. No decision was made, as to closing the borders.

12:16 PM       The FAA stated that all of the aircraft which were ordered to land at 9:40 have landed.

12:36 PM      The Bush finally appeared on television from a Barksdale Air Force Base conference room. He spoke haltingly, while mispronouncing several words, as he looked at his notes. He claimed that all of the appropriate security measures were being taken, including that of putting the United States military on high alert - worldwide.

1:02 PM      Rumsfeld later claimed that he stated that to President Bush over a secure line, "This is not a criminal action. This is war." [See - Washington Times 2/23/04]

1:04 PM      President Bush put the US military on high alert worldwide. [See - CNN 9/12/01; AP 8/19/02]

1:27 PM       Mayor Anthony A. Williams of Washington, D.C., declared a state of emergency; the National Guard arrives on site. [See - CNN 9/12/01; New York Times 9/12/01]

1:44 PM      The Navy dispatched aircraft carriers and guided missile destroyers to both New York and to Washington. All over the USA, fighters, airborne radar aircraft, and refueling aircraft scramble. The North American Aerospace Defense Command went to its highest alert level. [See - MSNBC 9/22/01; CNN 9/12/01]

1:48 PM       President Bush left Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana aboard Air Force One; flying to the Strategic Command bunker at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. There he finds secure facilities, which allow a meeting of his National Security Council in Washington, via a video link.

2:00 PM      F-15 fighter pilot, Major Daniel Nash, returned to Otis around this time, after patrolling the skies over New York City. He reportedly stated that when he got out of the aircraft, "he was told that a military F-16 had shot down a fourth airliner in Pennsylvania, a report that turned out to be incorrect." [See - About 1:30, Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02, about 2:30, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

2:15 PM      Bush, onboard Air Force One, en route to the Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska talked to Cheney again; scheduling a 4 PM meeting of his national security staff. He also reportedly talked to Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Gov. George Pataki.

2:30 PM      The FAA announced that there would be no U.S. commercial air traffic until noon EDT Wednesday.

2:40 PM      Bush and Andrew Card took part in a video conference, from inside an Offutt Air Force Base bunker.

According to the 9-11 legends, earlier in the day, the CIA purportedly determined from aircraft passenger manifests that three of the hijackers were suspected al-Qaeda operatives (See - 9:59 AM ) and (11:00 AM ). Rumsfeld was now given this information. In his notes, which were supposedly composed at this time (which were leaked almost one year later), Rumsfeld wrote that: "One guy is associate of [USS] Cole bomber." (This was a probable reference to Khalid Almihdhar or Nawaf Alhazmi.) Rumsfeld had also supposedly been given information indicating that an al-Qaeda operative had advanced details of the 9-11 attack (see 12:05 AM ). Rumsfeld supposedly began planning an attack against bin Laden; and possibly Iraq. He reportedly wrote that he wants the "best info fast. Judge whether good enough strike S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL." [Usama bin Laden]

3:06 PM      Air Force One landed at the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Bush was ushered into the secure command center.

3:30 PM      Bush convened a meeting of his National Security Council; others were connected by secure video links, from the various command centers in Washington.

The CIA Director, Tenet, reported that he was virtually certain that Osama bin Laden and his network were behind the 9-11 attacks. Purportedly, a check of the passenger manifests of the hijacked aircraft had revealed three known al-Qaeda operatives on Flight 77, which had struck the Pentagon. However, on any publicized manifest, there were no Arabic names on the list.

3:55 PM      Karen Hughes, a White House counselor, stated that the President was at an undisclosed location. This was, of course, later revealed to be Offut Air Force Base; with Bush conducting a National Security Council meeting by phone. Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice were located in the underground bunker at the White House. Donald Rumsfeld was reported to be located at the Pentagon.

4:00 PM      CNN National Security Correspondent David Ensor reported that U.S. officials claimed that there were "good indications" that Osama bin Laden was involved in the attacks. This was said to be based on "new and specific" information, supposedly developed since the attacks.

4:10 PM      Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex was reported to be on fire.

4:30 PM      NORAD released a statement, denying the shooting down of United Airlines Flight 93.

4:36 PM Bush left Offutt Air Force Base, aboard Air Force One, to return to Washington D.C.

5:20 PM      World Trade Center Building 7, a 47-story skyscraper, collapsed, under mysterious conditions.

Twin Towers Deliberately Demolished:


Also - http://wtc7.net

6:10 PM Mayor Rudy Giuliani urged the New Yorkers to stay home Wednesday, if they possibly can.

6:34 PM      Air Force One landed at Andrews AFB. On the way back to the White House, the Marine One helicopter flew over the Pentagon to give Bush a first-hand look at the damage.

6:40 PM      U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held a news conference inside the Pentagon, citing the Pentagon as being operational. "It will be in business tomorrow," he said.

6:54 PM      Bush arrived at the White House aboard Marine One; scheduled to address the nation at 8:30 PM. CNN's John King reported that First Lady, Laura Bush, had arrived earlier, by motorcade, from a "secure location."

7:17 PM      U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft stated that the FBI was setting up a Web site for tips on the attacks.

7:45 PM      The New York Police Department stated that at least 78 of their officers were missing. The city also stated that possibly half of the first 400 firefighters on the scene were killed.

8:30 PM      Bush addressed the nation, stating that "The U.S. government would make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them." He added that the government offices in Washington were reopening for essential personnel Tuesday night; and for all workers on Wednesday.

9:00 PM      Bush met with the National Security Council, followed roughly half an hour later by a meeting with a smaller group of key advisers, who would become his new war cabinet.

By this time, Colin Powell was back in Washington, from Peru. He described the immediate diplomatic tasks as being to deal with Afghanistan and its ruling Taliban, which he cited as harboring bin Laden, and the neighboring Pakistan, which he described as having closer ties to the Taliban regime than any other nation. "We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan this is show-time," Powell said.

"This is a great opportunity," Bush said, adding that the administration now had a chance to improve relations with other countries around the world, including Russia and China. It was more than flushing bin Laden out, he indicated.

Cheney raised the military problem of retaliating against al-Qaeda's home base, noting that in Afghanistan, a country decimated by two decades of war, it would be hard to find anything to strike.

Bush returned to the problem of Usama bin Laden's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Tenet stated that they must deny the terrorists that sanctuary by targeting the Taliban as well. Tell the Taliban we're finished with them, he urged.

Rumsfeld stated that the problem was not just bin Laden and al-Qaeda but the countries that supported terrorism-the point of the president's address that night.

Bush is quoted: "We have to force countries to choose."

9:22 PM      CNN's McIntyre reports the fire at the Pentagon was still burning and was considered contained but not under control.

9:30 PM      Bush brought together his most senior national security advisers in a bunker beneath the White House grounds. It was just 13 hours after the deadliest attack on the U.S. homeland in the country's history. At the war cabinet, discussion turned to whether Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and the Taliban were the same. Tenet stated that they were. Usama bin Laden had bought his way into Afghanistan, supplying the Taliban with tens of millions of dollars.

9:57 PM      Giuliani stated that New York City schools would be closed Wednesday and that no more volunteers were needed for Tuesday evening's rescue efforts. He stated that there was hope that there were still people alive in the rubble. He also stated that power was out on the west side of Manhattan and that the health department tests showed that there were no airborne chemical agents about which to worry.

10:49 PM      CNN Congressional Correspondent Jonathan Karl reported that Attorney General Ashcroft told members of Congress that there were three to five hijackers on each aircraft armed only with knives.

10:56 PM      CNN's Zahn reported that the New York City police believed there were people alive in buildings near the World Trade Center.

11:00 PM      The Bush war cabinet finished its meeting and had decided to embark upon a military strike against Afghanistan, and a prolonged war on terror.

11:00 PM      There were reports of survivors buried in the rubble in New York making cell phone calls.

11:08 PM      Bush was quoted at the White House, saying "We think it's Usama bin Laden."


In sum, far too much is ‘wrong’ with the official account of 9-11. Micro-managing a huge volume of excuses doesn’t offset the collective aberration of the official accounts 9-11 – and beyond. Beyond two aircraft hitting the WTC towers, little can be trusted in the “official” version of 9-11.

No intelligent person of integrity can conclude anything other than 9-11 being an inside job. That which is clearly impossible denies any possibility of 95% of the official accounts being true; add the only possible motivation for that which has been sealed by “National Security.”

If the “official” account of 9-11 is factual; there is NO possible reason to ‘seal’ the documentation and evidence of 9-11. It’s that simple.

The events of 9-11 and beyond speak exclusively to a global quest for power which the German Nazis attempted – and nearly succeeded. The descriptor “Next-Generation Nazism” fits perfectly. The American money trail, alone, speaks to that. Add such documents as the “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC) – noting the names involved. Also supporting the obvious global conquest effort, are such books as Brezinski’s “The Grand Chess Board,” and Barnett’s “The Pentagon’s New Map.”

Since when did global control/conquest become a mission for America’s “Defense Department?”

Obvious propaganda claims aside:

1. There is no documented record of the purported 9-11 terrorists making a plane reservation. If so, there would be a “record locator,” complete with details.

2. There is no documented record of the purported 9-11 terrorists buying or using a ticket. (IDs required)

3. There is no hard-copy of a printed ticket ‘copy.’

4. There is no record of the purported 9-11 terrorists on any of the passenger manifests, with all legitimate passengers being accounted for.

5. There is no record of the purported 9-11 terrorists in the autopsies.

6. There is not as much as a suggestion that the purported 9-11 terrorists had the needed pilot skills - but rather the contrary.

7. At least seven of the purported 9-11 terrorists are known to be still alive - with no questions being asked.

8. There is no documentation (per the FBI [Mueller] to link the purported 9- 11 terrorists to the events of the day!

9. The presented pictures of the 9-11 hijackers don't match the purported terrorists.

10. There is no viable evidence of a plane crash at the 9-11 Pentagon or in Pennsylvania - versus salted wreckage pieces. In the case of the Pentagon, they were even the wrong color!

11. A stopwatch says that THREE buildings at the WTC came down as controlled demolition. Add the video captures of the sequenced blasts.

12. There is no way to account for the purported WTC ‘collapse’ temperatures of the 'official' line.

13. The White House did their best to block a legitimate investigation of 9- 11.

14. For all the failures, no official has been punished for 9-11. (with trivia such as a general who had an affair being sacked, in the background.)

15. There were no WMDs. Saddam has been long deposed. Iraq had no possible connection to 9-11. For all the horrors of the USA-made Saddam, his crimes are dwarfed by the tribal genocide of Africa. How did Saddam become the ‘humanitarian’ priority?

16. Bush's invasions continue as War Crimes!

17. With the Mexican border held wide open by the White House, how much “terror” can be factual? It’s simply not possible.

18. The "terror" is assured, sooner or later. When it arrives, it will be in the form of "revenge."

- END -

| HOME |