The Lost Souls of ValuJet 592
The Uncensored Version

The crash of ValuJet 592 has been the heated topic of a host of conspiracy theorists. Ironically, their collection and analysis of information has had the two-fold effect of portraying the collective facts in a far more objective context; and illuminating the known selective omissions of the investigation to date. As time goes on, these 'conspiracy theorists' have the unnerving common characteristic of telling the whole truth - in proper prospective.

Conversely, the debunkers are becoming prominently known as just that,regardless of the credentials they claim. The 'conspiracy theorists' are largely crusading professionals who are trying desperately to alter the future by diminishing the body count of air disasters.

The individuals, labeled as 'conspiracy theorists,' are properly referred to as, "safety activists;" a lonely but determined lot.

As a reader, you should be aware that independent scientific testing has clearly revealed that the oxygen canister theory simply doesn't hold up - by ANY reasonable standard. Conversely, the theory points to a typical - yes, typical - government attempt to hide the truth - so far, they are winning.

"He who controls the past, controls the future.
He who controls the future, controls the past."

- George Orwell - "1984"

To be brief, the FAA tests required the 'firing pins' of the tested oxygen canisters to be manually pulled; no amount of jostling would achieve the desired result. An independent lab proved that, beyond any doubt.

Further, the FAA testing 'magically' was able to obtain a canister temperature 70 degrees in excess of the manufacturer's specifications. Had that been factual, the manufacturer would have had a serious certification problem with the FAA.

Reconstructing this crash from an independent perspective suggests a complex system of propaganda, involving a huge cast of players. The propaganda mysteriously has one trait, it favors the profits of airlines, saving money by being blatantly illegal. By deduction, one must ponder the idea that some accountant sold the argument that aviation was disproportionately safe. Numbers aside, the human tragedy in that concept couldn't scream louder.

On that May 11th afternoon in 1996, an emergency dispatcher got a cellular phone call from a fisherman in the Everglades Holiday Park, reporting the crash, offering it's location per a GPS navigation unit. Thus, the crash site was unusually easy and quick to locate. In a strange twist, the dispatcher was certain of the crash and its location, before ATC was. The fisherman was an engineer and a private pilot with competent observation and communication skills.

Following a very short period of nearly straight-and-level flight, the aircraft hit the Everglades, while banked steeply to the right; pointed downward at approximately 70 degrees. The aircraft shattered on contact with the surface.

Everyone aboard died - two pilots, three flight attendants, and 105 passengers. If still alive, it's doubtful that they were conscious on impact.

The accident analysis is hardly to be considered finished business. The official investigation claims that the "cause" has been found, with a variety of contributing factors. The FAA got a slap on the wrist. The 'usual suspects' were rounded up and resignations were obtained, even from the lady with the white hat who did her damndest to prevent the accident.

The Federal Aviation Administration has issued new regulations and has since had a fetish for HAZMAT incidents, which have since become a reliable cash-cow for the FAA. Many have expressed outrage at the crash; individuals have been named as being responsible. The facts have been obscured. The ValuJet players now wear AirTran hats. We are to believe that the company is committed to safety.

Strangely, airline companies and their managers remain Teflon coated. Pilots and mechanics are quickly and mercilessly targeted. HAZMAT shippers are targets of opportunity - not inappropriately, however. Citing selected statistics, the FAA purports the illusion that it is protecting lives by ensuring safety - marginally correct at best.

The ValuJet accident continues to haunt the industry with the obvious two disturbing questions - "What actually happened; and "Why did it happen."?

From the beginning, these questions illustrated clearly that something similar would probably happen in the near future - it did, for essentially the same reasons. You may be certain that more tragic death is to come. As the questions increase, in quality and number, they become more difficult for the government to answer.

To date, the FAA has never answered for their failure to ground ValuJet, per their own inspectors' recommendations, PRIOR to the ValuJet crash.

Further, the FAA conveniently omitted that information in their original "final review," as well as a report, which accompanied those recomendations, that ValuJet had failed to comply with the terms of a consent agreement to improve its performance, following the VJ-592 crash.

Instead, ValuJet was essentially rewarded by being allowed to merge with AirTran Airways, a Florida carrier.

While the news media asked the FAA for an accounting of the modified final report, the initial response was a refusal to comment.

Alarming also is the fact that this same methodology was in place, hiding the recent (March 24, 1997) Hong Kong DC-10 emergency which was nearly a disaster in the identical fashion of the ValuJet maintence 'outsourcing'. While the FAA was supposed to be committed to attending to the contract maintenance issue, identified by VJ-592, the reality was far different.

The Hong Kong incident (Air Mike 985) had a safe outcome, clearly demonstrating the value of Crew Resource Management (CRM), applied in a similar fashion as UA-232. Strangely, the incident was made to disappear (not the least bit uncommon); the captain (member of the union safety committee) was battered by his company and the FAA; essentially (and mysteriously) abandoned by his union.

Beyond the maintenance issue, the FAA clearly wanted no part of the proven safety science of Crew Resource Management (CRM). Corporate savings appear to be the motive. The selective abandonment of that issue alone triggered a massive order for body-bags. Eleven were used for AA-1420; Eighty-eight for AK-261. The remainder await the FAA's victims. It's unlikely that the remaining body-bags will go to waste.

Most disturbing is the persistence of the government in facilitating still more accidents, being clear that they can be prevented. It may be presumed that until some of the high-ranking (and respected) politicians die in accidents, nothing is likely to change without a massive outcry from those who are or will be passengers.

Tombstones are profitable; the Wall Street airline statistics tell us that business is good.

The risk-analysis survivors and the associated families, being mortal human beings, quickly go into a catatonic state (withdrawal / shutdown) preferring denial over action. They are not to be blamed; it's an expected human reaction; the 'system' counts on this response. There are those who do become the safety activists, however, that number is yet small and largely unsupported.

To keep matters simple, let it be said that there are four basic causes of aircraft accidents:

1. An undesirable act is committed.
2. A desirable act is omitted.
3. Mechanical failure.
4. Acts of God - typically weather related.

Often, all four elements are present in an aircraft accident.

The most common error is a conscious "procedural" mistake in the 'commission' or 'omission' category. Making an incorrect decision or failing to make the correct one.

Mechanical failure also has the 'commission' or 'omission' characteristic, whether the event(s) is a function of engineering or maintenance.

Acts of God are the most pondered, whether it was wind shear, an unpredictable shift in the weather or a lightening strike. Often, the proverbial element of Murphy's Law is involved.

Those who believe in predestination are haunted by the 'why' of these accidents. Unfortunately, the 'why' is most frequently an obvious mandate to learn a lesson.

With rare exception, the truthful lesson goes unheeded, as the facts inherently command personal action. The individuals who ponder the spiritual aspect of the mystery, expect a spiritual solution, as opposed to heeding a call to their personal responsibility. For some obscure reason, that seems to ask too much. Writing a simple letter requires too much time; postage stamps cost thirty-three cents, at the time of this writing.

With rare exception, the blame-game is passionately fueled. Worse, any subsequent crusaders are discounted or condemned until someone loses a loved one to the unheeded lesson - far too late. Still worse, if there is any glory to being a crusader, think of a name. Ralph Nader is still, unfortunately, considered a trouble-maker; Mary Schiavo is discounted regularly. Strangely, messengers have always suffered the risk of death.

Most failures defy initial understanding. Ultimately failures are illuminated by careful examination of facts and physical evidence, ideally, resulting in solutions. Tragically, many failures are allowed to selectively slip by unnoticed; politics wins far too frequently. The truth often lies in the shadows and rubble created and controlled by the politics. Rest assured that in the days of modern media "truth" is now mythical. The public only has a right to know that which is profitable. Rarely does 'the public' protest. Such is currently the fate of the lost souls of ValuJet 592.

The obvious conclusion is that the public is afraid of facts. To acknowledge truth is to admit vulnerability. Human nature first requires survival, then safety. Selective perception (denial) creates a seemingly satisfactory solution over actual corrective action. Enter the 'immortality complex' (" won't happen to me.")

The 'system' is obviously keen on the failings of human nature, hence the public is left to wallow in a world of plausible assertion or denial, as the political situation demands. Facts are too frightening. Hence, to date, the truth of the ValuJet 592 remains largely buried in the rubbish of the temple.

The airline industry is highly competitive. The industry's intent is to make money, however, it is required by law to first be safe, moving the public as cheaply as possible in high speed flight. Safety must be first, as by definition, the public is paying for their safe conduct. Knowing their submissive state in an aircraft, risk must be minimal.

However, risk is a subjective concept; enter the term, 'acceptable risk.' The element of risk will always be a matter of practical compromises. Depending on the perspective, the view of risk is inherently subjective and often obscured.

Current media coverage indicates that, in fact, management will knowingly trade safety for money, sometimes for just convenience. The damning part of that information is that the FAA and entire government system seem content to protect the profits and accountability of certain companies over the safety of the public. The 'profane' are fair game for FAA enforcement action.

The CEO of an airline articulately and passionately describes a factual economic crisis of the airline to the FAA. (No mention is made of the associated 'holding company.') With the agency's second lawful mandate being to promote commerce, the FAA sympathizes, giving the airline the regulatory 'room' (often compromising safety) to find the profits for survival and growth. The public understands.

The accountants in the associated background holding company shake their heads in dismay at the naivete' of the airline employees and public; but, they smile in approval.

The law says nothing about the method of determining the economic health of the airline. There is no legal mandate to consider the economic function of the holding company. The associated holding company is just doing its job.

Leveling the field of transportation safety statistics is wonderfully profitable. The public isn't supposed to ask the obvious questions; conveniently, they don't.

While the particular threat of a crash is often a product of a series of bad decisions, the decision makers often get away with the decisions as a result of the arbitrary nature of Murphy's Law. Reliable statistics tell us that what can go wrong usually doesn't; hence, the risk-taking temptation. Accountants do love those statistics.

The nightmare of all involved is that day when a few of the bad decisions results in the 'markers' being called in - all at once.

Langewiesche correctly asked, "Who, then, is really to blame?" The viable answer is, "Those who knew the high probability of an accident and did nothing to prevent it." Government agencies and the individual bureaucrats are high on that list. Corporate managers are in a tight second place.

The documentation illuminating the high probability of a ValuJet 592 style crash is only exceeded by the unadulterated rubbish intended to obscure the issue or blatantly deny the obvious. The second category is huge; not by any means limited to ValuJet.

Let's go back to that date and examine the basic facts. Some of the information was volunteered by the investigation, much had to be dug from underneath a bureaucrat's carpet. The puzzle is being correctly pieced together by a rare combination of individuals who have a conscience which will not allow them to remain either silent or idle.

...... May 11, 1996.

ValuJet 592 departs Miami's runway 09-left, with a turn to the north, then northwest. The flight was being radar vectored on its course to Atlanta. The captain was Candalyn Kubeck, thirty-five, and copilot Richard Hazen, fifty-two.

From the modicum of information which has been made public, only a rough sketch can be made, but the probable reality isn't that far away.

Approximately five minutes into the flight, things quickly began to go wrong. A non-descript noise was heard which caught the attention of both pilots. One report indicates it was a tone, heard over the PA system. The noise was reported to have sounded like a chirp, with a simultaneous beep on the PA system. The captain, Candalyn Kubeck, asked, "What was that?" Hazen replied, "I don't know."

It could easily have been an electrical 'spike,' possibly a short, due to the onset of an electrical problem, as it is coincident with the airspeed and altitude anomaly on the flight data recorder (FDR). There also appears to be a glitch in the vertical acceleration on the NTSB provided data. The altitude excursion shown on the FDR was 600 feet in aproximately 2 seconds - not likely to be in any way actual.

Eight seconds later, while the recording is garbled, the captain is presumed to have asked, "About to lose a bus (electrical source)?" Then, the captain anounces, "We got some electrical problem."

The first Officer replied, "Yeah. That battery charger's kickin' in. Oooh, we gotta ..." The last comment suggests that the 'emergency' power was now in use.

It may be presumed that some other event caught the first officer's attention, causing his voice to trail off in bewilderment.

Two seconds later, the captain responded, "We're losing everything." (Presumably major instrument failures were evident, indicative of a massive electrical failure.) A total electrical system failure would not have been particularly threatening in the relatively clear weather - by itself. Some electrical power was still available.

Two seconds later, the CVR records, "We need, we need to go back to Miami."

Three seconds later the voices from the passenger cabin are heard, "Fire! fire! fire!" "We're on fire! - we're on fire!" The shouting continued for thirteen seconds, it's unknown why the shouting subsided - if it did.

An audio warning is heard, consistent with a throtttle being pulled to Idle, indicating that a descent is being attempted. Consistently, the FDR records the No. 2 engine (right-hand side) "EPR" falling to .98 EPR (No power was being produced); the engine was being dragged through the air. The power setting on the No. 1 engine doesn't change. Its control cable has been severed, presumably by fire. The NTSB only reported the power settings of the engines, as opposed to such parameters as internal engine temperature, oil pressure, etc. It's worth questioning if there is more data not being reported on the voice recorder or FDR.

Climbing northwest, through 11,000 feet, the first officer, Richard Hazen, radioed to Departure Control, "Ah, five-ninety-two needs an immediate return to Miami."

The radar controller gave the flight clearance to turn initially toward the west, away from Miami and conflicting traffic flows. The flight was cleared to begin a descent to the airport. "Critter five-ninety-two, ah roger, turn left heading two-seven-zero, descend and maintain seven thousand."

Hazen responds, "Two seven zero, seven thousand, five-ninety-two."

While the return request had to have been made in an urgent tone of voice, the controller is obviously unclear as to their exact situation. Ideally, the first officer should have immediately confessed the nature of the problem, but was probably victimized by his own humanity, manifesting itself as psychological denial. Catatonia (shutting down) was probably in close trail.

In hindsight, it can be argued that the controller should have cleared the aircraft directly to Miami (13 miles away, at that point). However, initially, the exact nature of the emergency is not that apparent to ATC.

The controller then asked, "What kind of problem are you having?"

The CVR picks up the sound of a horn, probably caused by a throttle being closed. However, the FDR shows no EPR change, suggesting that one engine is at idle power or failed - failure is not likely. The No. 1 engine EPR is constant; it is producing approximately climb power.

In response to the ATC information request, Kubeck verbalized, off-radio, "Fire;" and Hazen transmitted in an urgent tone, "Smoke in the cockpit. Smoke in the cabin."

While the captain said 'fire,' Hazen only cited smoke. Without obvious panic in his voice, Hazen diminished the seriousness of the situation. Cockpit smoke isn't all that rare, hence, it was unlikely that the report would have been viewed in quite the same light as a report of a fire. Admittedly, human nature aside, it can be debated that it should receive the same treatment. Procedurally, the ATC policy probably commanded exactly that.

Upon hearing the smoke report, one the radio the controller said, "Roger," then called out to the radar room, "I need a supervisor here!" The supervisor came over and plugged in his headset.

The controller noticed that the aircraft had not yet started to turn, giving another heading, farther to the south, heading 250; clearing them down to 5,000 feet. The airport was off their left wing with time rapidly running out.

Hazen acknowledged the new heading but misread the altitude assignment, citing seven thousand. The aircraft had a major fire with the situation rapidly getting away from the pilots.

A second later, a flight attendant announces, "Completely on fire!"

With the interphone previously known to be inoperative, she instinctively opened the cockpit door to communicate; allowing any smoke or gasses to enter the cockpit.

An intermittant horn is heard.

Strangely, after one minute into the emergency, the NTSB presents the aircraft still tracking away from Miami, it had not begun to effect their return. It may be reasonably assumed that the crew was preoccupied by a variety of distractions, including the assumption of imminent death.

To an experienced pilot, the NTSB data is disturbing. The report doesn't indicate certain information which is obvious to a pilot to be somewhere present in the actual history of the flight. Given the problems at hand, there is an obvious void of conversation concerning analysis and reactions to the cockpit reality, nigh-unto-mystery.

Pilots turn into chatter-boxes in times such as this. Observations are verbalized, controls are operated; meters are checked. The other pilot verbalizes a response, even if it's profanity. Something is distinctly missing on the CVR account.

Strangely also, (according to NTSB data) there is no supplementary prompting from ATC to make the obviuously needed turn. More strange is that there is no clearance direct to MIAMI or any airport.

Finally, the heading changes to a more southerly track. It may be presumed that the left-right thrust differential may have played a role in the slow turn.

The NTSB data also indicated that there was no rudder deflection. This is particularly strange, as the rudder would have been the first control choice for directional control with the one engine at idle. This is a standard technique which preserves full aileron (banking) authority.

The CVR picks up a sound of rushing air. Probably from the aircraft acceleration in the descent, recorded also by the FDR.

Hazen radioed, "Critter five-ninety-two, we need the, ah, closest airport available." The situation was clearly getting desperate.

On the ground, the controller supposedly did not hear Hazen's request. It's possible that the controller was distracted by other voices in the radar room. For whatever reason, without hearing Hazen's request, many question why the controller didn't suggest a closer airport, regardless of the runway size. Given their southerly location, many argue that Collier County Airport was a better choice, considering the time/distance of the turn radius to Miami.

Given the flight's position as only nineteen miles to the northwest, Miami may have appealed to the controller as the best choice. That statement assumes the accuracy of the presented radar data. If so, in the clarity of hindsight, we can be certain that the distance was too far.

It's also possible that because "Miami" was the request he had heard, and he responded to it. Still, things simply don't make sense.

The significant question which pops up, is: "Where was the supervisor in the picture?" The lack of agresssive intervention attracts major questions, by itself.

Opa Locka airport was only 14 miles away, directly behind them.

We will never be certain as to the controllers decisions. Later obtained data strongly suggests that the NTSB presented radar track was nothing less than false and incomplete, conveniently leading to "politically correct' conclusions as to the causes and circumstances of the accident.

An NTSB radar expert attempted to attack claims that the presented radar data and ground track was false. He claimed that radar was simply not a perfect technology. By implication, he described the NTSB as needing to 'shape' the data to fit the "facts." Imagine that argument being presented in a criminal court.

Forceful requests to the FAA ultimately produced radar data which clearly proved that the NTSB presentation of the radar track was blatantly false. The FAA provided data clearly showed that ValuJet 592 continued inbound toward Miami past the crash site distance (17 miles from the airport). The FAA data illustrated the aircraft continuing past the end of the radar track created by the NTSB, not disappearing from the radar scope until it reached a point 12 miles from the Miami Airport; 5 miles beyond the actual crash site!

Another recorded ATC transmission has the aircraft headed directly toward Opa Locka airport, fifteen miles away; again, beyond the crash site. According to the NTSB data, the aircraft is in radar contact, nearly a minute from impact. At least a 360 degree turn will be needed within a minute, before crashing. That data is consistent with statement of an FAA air traffic controller stating that the aircraft disappeared from the radar scope, 12 miles from the Miami Airport. That same position was confirmed in the radio communications transcripts contained in the NTSB factual reports. The NTSB went to extremes to developed a false radar track.

The collective data carries a cruel suggestion that they possibly could have made it back to Miami.

Two witnesses told the NTSB investigators that they saw the aircraft flying westbound (away from the airport) at low altitude, then make a 180 degree right turn and disappear below their visual horizon. The described turn is consistent with the power differential. It is also consistent with the pilots either being incapacitated or attempting a last-second ditching in the everglades, out of desperation. The NTSB didn't record the testimony; nor did they act on it.

There was another witness, a Chinese student pilot who witnessed the actual crash. The NTSB claimed that no such witness existed. Under pressure, the NTSB finally interviewed the witness. His testimony was consistent with that of the other eye witnesses.

The student pilot's testimony also refutes the NTSB account of the radar track, as the pilot witnessed the plane flying from west to east for about fifteen seconds before the crash. The NTSB's purported radar track has the aircraft flying south at that time.

The ultimate suggestion is that either a desperate attempt at a ditching was being made, or that the crew had lost control of the aircraft - probably the latter; we don't know why.

An attempted landing on a nearby road is another possibility.

While not citing the data source, the NTSB taxes the extremes of credibility by asserting that, "Flight 592 descended 6,400 feet (from 7,400 feet to 1,000 feet) in 32 seconds" An AVERAGE of 13,000 feet-per-minute!

In the distance depicted, (approximately 7 miles) the aircraft would have needed to additionally accelerate by approximately 200 Knots in those same 32 seconds, arriving at 1,000 feet at approximately 460 Knots - with one engine at idle power!

It is clear that the descent is factual, however, the cited time frame is impossible.

The NTSB strangely evaded the electrical fire issue with extreme prejudice. Politically, this is understandable; morally, it is not.

Media reports cited parts (such as the folded air-stair) of the aircraft as being heavily sooted; yet there is no attention given to the obvious parts. There is no analysis of the soot.

The NTSB data contains an alleged mechanic's report to the VJ-592 investigating team that two critical circuit breakers were hot-wired prior to the aircraft departing Atlanta. There is no record that the report was ever investigated, nor turned over to the FBI (the hot-wiring was a felony; if true). By law and by regulation, the report should have been forwarded to the FBI.


Despite the passionate citation of the oxygen canisters being the cause of the fire, neither the FAA nor independent laboratory oxygen canister testing, nor the timing of events in the crash is consistent with that assertion.

If the oxygen canisters were sufficiently jostled during loading, the fire would have occurred and been over with, prior to the onset of the emergency. If the jostling had occurred in flight, there wasn't enough time to have produced such a fire when the events began happening.

"When you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains,
however improbable; must be the truth."
- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

The FAA service difficulty reports (SDRs) indicated numerous electrical problems on this specific aircraft. NTSB`s records reveal that the company was infamous for continuing flights with electrical problems. The particular aircraft was known to be experiencing several electrical problems on the day of the accident. The flight had been delayed in Atlanta while mechanics attempted to find and fix the electrical problems. Despite the attempts, the electrical problems continued.

There was plenty of evidence of an electrical fire on ValuJet 592, which the NTSB re-shaped to their own conclusions. Independent experts illuminated the NTSB's false and misleading statements regarding an electrical fire. It didn't matter. The NTSB's investigators claimed that wires which were discovered to be burned showed "little or no evidence of embrittlement."

Hold it! Electrically heated / burned metal is rendered soft and pliable! it is not 'embrittled.'

The lack of wire embrittlement, according Pat Cahill, the FAA's own expert on wiring, is indicative of an electrical fire - not a fire from an external source. It didn't matter; the NTSB final report cites the wires as showing no evidence of an electrical fire. Rubbish!

Imagine a police report reading, "The football player's lack of heavy breathing indicated that he was not in a distressed condition at the time observed." Hmmm, does it matter that unconscious or dead people have a habit of NOT breathing heavily? The NTSB assertion is just that absurd.

There can be no doubt that part of the fire externally burned some of the aircraft wiring, thus it is moot that a desired sample of wire is available for selection. It's all a matter of debris selection and the spin that's put on the information.

While the back panel of the wrecked cockpit circuit breaker panel was discovered by the NTSB to be scorched and covered with soot; why was this information dismissed? Why was there no analysis of the soot? Where is that same panel today? Where are the other panels which were similarly described?

Most alarming is that the NTSB treatment of the electrical fire issue is consistent with the political distortion and omission which characterize the entire report.

Convenient also was the timing cited in the NTSB presentation of the accident scenario - it varied widely. The NTSB elected to use the "timing on the CVR." Beyond the recorder being unreliable due to an undisputed electrical problem, the NTSB data suggests that the timing was altered - pure & simple.

The NTSB data should have referenced the CVR against the extremely accurate atomic clock (WWV) to which the FAA radar data tapes are 'slaved.' The NTSB chose the reverse. According to the NTSB record, the recorder failed twice during the flight. Why would ANYONE trust the CVR timing? It just doesn't make good sense.

The timing is sufficiently altered that the NTSB account has ATC clearing the aircraft down to 3,000 feet, after the aircraft is already well below that altitude on the radar data. Back the clearance up by the appropriate amount; the pieces fit - but not to the benefit of the NTSB conclusions!

Had the NTSB used the ATC clock record as the time datum, the CVR recording could have been accurately calibrated, within acceptable tolerances. Worse, the same independent audio expert hired on the Aloha Airline accident confirmed that approximately one minute is missing on the "20 minute" ATC tape.

The NTSB also ignored reliable evidence of the actual crash time. The fisherman eye witness made a 911 call within 20-30 seconds after the crash. The time was recorded, based on a clock slaved to the same atomic clock used by the FAA ATC radar. The call being received at 14:15:22, puts the time of the crash at approximately 14:15:00, local time.

In any event, it is obvious that the aircraft needed a window of time to fly the five miles from the point of radar loss, 12 miles from the airport, back to the crash site. The time discrepancy is more than sufficient to account for the time needed for the plane to have maneuvered as described by the unreported testimony of two eye witnesses and the student pilot.

About those tires in the cargo hold -

The NTSB would also have us believe that an inflated tire ruptured. That rupture is supposed to have broken a flight instrument static pressure line, producing a false altitude change on the FDR data.

1. The tire should have been deflated for shipment.

2. If it had ruptured, there would have been an unmistakable explosion on the CVR tape.

3. Thermal relief "fuse plugs" would have precluded the tire from rupturing, as described.

4. It would have been inflated with nitrogen, which would have acted as a God-sent fire extinguisher.

5. If it had ruptured, as described, the damage would have been tremendous, if not catastrophic, by itself.

Review the most obvious:

  • The aircraft crashed approximately 17 miles northwest of the airport; five miles BEHIND the point of radar loss. Yet, the NTSB presented a radar track leading right to the crash site, depicting the aircraft flying in a southerly direction at the time of impact.

  • Assuming the report of the impact crater is correct, that is probably a fact. Yet, HOW can that be. The implication is a full turn-and-a-half; 450 degrees of right turn!

  • The flight path depicted in the last 14 seconds of the presented radar track is impossible. The radar track depicts the aircraft flying essentially straight , when the eye witnesses adamantly reported the aircraft to be at a steep bank angle. It's not rocket science that it's all but impossible to fly an aircraft straight while in such a steep bank angle. This is particularly true, given the aircraft speed.

  • The NTSB disregarded statements from three eye witnesses that the aircraft was flying away from the airport shortly before the crash. This information is in direct contradiction to the presented radar track.

  • The presented radar track is additionally impossible by virtue of the vertical angle of the 'radar horizon.'

  • Clearly, the so-called "raw" Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) data presented by the NTSB is blatantly false.

  • The NTSB virtually ignored the maintenance history of the specific aircraft.

  • With extensive evidence of electrical failures on the aircraft, preceding Flight 592, the NTSB ignored overwhelming evidence of an electrical fire.

  • The pilots reported smoke in the cockpit; the captain cited 'fire,' yet, the NTSB ignored this evidence, claiming that "only a small amount of smoke entered the cockpit," in the fashion of, "..a little bit pregnant."

  • On August 15, the NTSB set the official crash time at 14:13:43 local time (Eastern Daylight Time). The Abstract of Final Report, issued a few days later, reset the time at 14:14:42 ).

  • The reliable evidence suggests that the aircraft flew for approximately one minute after the original NTSB crash time. However, the NTSB Abstract of Final Report does not account where the aircraft flew during the additional minute nor how it arrived at precisely the same crash site, one minute later. In one minute, at the published airspeed, the distance should have been considerable.

  • The NTSB Abstract of Final Report does not account for the fact that an impossible FAA radar track leads to the crash site at 14:13:43 EDT, with the aircraft, according to the NTSB, lingering in time for another minute before crashing at the supposed radar location, at 14:14:42 EDT.

  • Elementary logic dictates that the aircraft did not follow the flight path depicted in the presented FAA radar track. The presented FAA radar track had to have been altered to conform to the 'convenient' theory of the crash.

  • The presented "raw" radar data shows no other aircraft in the area. It is rather elementary that, at a major international airport, "raw" radar data would reveal more than one aircraft. For additional proof, refer to the Chinese student pilot and the other recorded radio communication. There were other aircraft, contrary to NTSB denials.

  • Within reason, it may be presumed that the pilots might have been badly disoriented from smoke in the cockpit. Possibly they didn't have more than their compasses to navigate by. It is also possible that they had decided to ditch in the swamps of the everglades.

  • The pilot's requested ATC for directions to the nearest airport; their desperation is obvious.

  • The pilots requested radar vectors, indicating either their loss of navigation capability or their disorientation. In a pilot's world, a request for radar vectors is an efficiency methodology. With radar vectors being provided, the pilots can better concentrate on controlling the aircraft and dealing with the emergency.

  • The fact that they were flying away from the airport would explain where the plane was for this additional time, consistent with the ATC final radar report and eye witness accounts. The major question is, "Why were they not maneuvering toward an airport, regardless of which one it was?" In all likelyhood, they couldn't.

  • ValuJet 592 did not and could not level off close to the ground "by itself."

  • There is the possibility that the maneuvering in the last minute was a function of a smoke-filled cockpit, but it's not likely, as the oxygen masks and smoke goggles were not used.

  • The greater possibility is that eventually, the pilots were either radically distracted or inacpacitated; the latter is more likely. It's also conceivable that they finally lost control capability.

  • Given the recorded loud noise of the rushing air and the "G" load of the final aircraft bank angle, the pilots would have otherwise had an overwhelming indication that the aircraft attitude was dangerously extreme. If possible, they would have done something about it.

  • The NTSB report cites a loud rushing noise. The report suggests that the pilots opened a side window to get rid of the minor amount of smoke which we are to believe entered the cockpit. No, a crew would not attempt that for a minor amount of smoke. Further, opening a side window produces a frightening roar. They were simply accelerating.

  • The eye witness accounts of the aircraft's last seconds describe a 'graveyard spiral' in the truest sense of the term.

  • As violent as the crash was, forensic examination of the pilot's remains would have yielded important details of the last seconds of the crash, particularly the pattern of the broken bones.

  • The NTSB report also fails to cite the fact that the aircraft was not in compliance with the new FAA-required cabin interior materials. Hence, any fire in the interior of the VJ-592 aircraft had the additional hazard of hydrogen cyanide production. If the passengers put their heads down to evade the heat; they stuck their noses into the 'heavy' cyanide-laden layer of air, near the floor.

  • Why is there such a quantity of unquestioned omissions and distortions, if not outright lies?

For all the reliable evidence, why won't the government investigators look at the possibility of an electrical fire? Why was there no attempt at an autopsy of any body parts? Why is the government so content to sell the "maybe-if" idea with no viable proof?

What is to be concluded, then?

For a moment, forget opinion and data, look to recent history.

1. The DC-9 aircraft are being parked in the desert faster than the required smoke detectors are being installed.

2. There is no appreciable evidence that the VJ-592 safety mandates were complied with.

3. There was a nearly perfect repeat of VJ-592, without a disaster. AirTran Flight 913. An electrical malfunction with an associated fire in view of the passengers.

Will they tell the truth this time? Will they review VJ-592? Maybe, but it's doubtful.

It would be wonderful to be wrong in that thought.


If you don't think for yourself,
someone WILL do your thinking for you!