Forensic Psychology – Education, training and certification Footnote

 

Stephen L. Golding, Ph.D.

Professor

Department of Psychology

 

Adjunct Professor

Department of Psychiatry

and

College of Law 

 

University of Utah

 

[Citation: Golding, S. L. (2005). Forensic Psychology – Education, training and certification. In Encyclopedia of Forensic and Legal Medicine. Pp. 346-350. Oxford, UK:Elsevier Press.]

 

 

          Psychologists were involved in the judicial system as early as the late Nineteenth Century (Cattell, 1895; Munsterberg, 1908; for a scholarly review, see Bartol & Bartol, 1999). However, psychologists (as opposed to psychiatrists) did not become significantly involved in forensic applications of their discipline until after the broader field of clinical psychology began to receive funding from the Veterans Administration and the National Institutes of Mental Health to support training and research after the end of World War II. An educational and training model for clinical psychologists, the so-called “Boulder Model” was developed in 1949 and the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology began to grant diplomate status to certify advanced competencies for clinical psychologists at approximately the same time. As psychologists became increasingly involved in the judicial system, an economically based turf war with psychiatry became inevitable, and the American Psychiatric Association, in 1954, attempted to assert that only medically trained psychiatrists should be allowed to offer testimony in judicial forums about mental “illnesses.” Forensic psychologists involved in both clinical and research contexts continued to struggle to establish their specialty in a rather uncoordinated fashion until three seminal events occurred.

 

          First, in 1962, Judge David Bazelon, a leading mental health law jurist, wrote the majority opinion in Jenkins v. United States [1962]. The Jenkins case was an appeal of a trial judge’s instruction to the jury that they could disregard the forensic evidence offered by Jenkins’ forensic psychologists because, as psychologists, they were not qualified to offer expert testimony on the issue of mental illness. In a scholarly tour de force, Judge Bazelon argued that its was the expert’s training, knowledge and expertise that formed the basis for acceptance or rejection as an expert witness, not the nature of their title or degree. This powerful opinion by a respected jurist helped to break down the previously unchallenged assumption of psychiatric superiority and placed the focus squarely upon the quality, nature and extent of an expert’s knowledge and the scientific status of that knowledge. Since forensic psychologists differ from their forensic psychiatric colleagues primarily by a relatively stronger focus on the empirical foundations of forensic knowledge, this decision had the additional impact of encouraging the formation of empirically-based forensic training programs that were more consistent with traditional psychological than with psychiatric training models.

          Second, in 1968, Saleem Shah became the director of the National Institutes of Mental Health’s Center for the Studies of Crime and Delinquency. Between that time and his untimely and tragic death in 1992, he spearheaded the funding of a variety of seminal forensic psychology research grants that helped to lay the empirical and conceptual foundations of the discipline [Grisso & Steadman, 1995]. In addition, he helped to introduce many of the first generation of forensic psychologists to each other thus laying further grounds for the development of the discipline by making individuals aware of the work of others.

 

          The third development, also in 1968, was the organization of the American Psychology-Law Society (APLS) which began formal operations the following year (Grisso, 1991). The formation of this group has proven to be a critical step in the development of forensic psychology as a discipline because it allowed for the routine exchange of scientific and professional knowledge, provided a network for trainers and students, and was pivotal in the development of ethical and professional standards for the profession (Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1995). Eventually, APLS merged with Division 41 (Psychology and Law) of the American Psychological Association (APA), and in 2001, forensic psychology was officially recognized as a specialty by the Commission for the Recognition of Specialties in Professional Psychology (CRSPP), an organizational unit of the American Psychological Association.

 

          As forensic psychologists organized and defined their discipline, they adopted a broad and inclusive definition of their field in recognition of the many areas of psychological scholarship, research and practical competencies that produced expertise of relevance to the judicial system as a whole. Thus, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, a set of ethical and professional guidelines adopted by APLS/Division 41, defined “forensic psychology” as “all forms of professional psychological conduct when acting, with definable foreknowledge, as a psychological expert on explicitly psycholegal issues, in direct assistance to courts, parties to legal proceedings, correctional and forensic mental health facilities, and administrative, judicial, and legislative agencies acting in an adjudicative capacity (Committee on Ethical Guidelines, 1995, p. 657). When forensic psychology was recognized as a specialty by CRSPP, very similar language was used. Thus, while the majority of forensic psychologists are trained in programs that emphasize applied aspects of psychology such as clinical psychology or neuropsychology, a sizeable group of forensic psychologists work in areas such as social, developmental, experimental and physiological psychology. What they share in common is applying psychological knowledge to issues of legal relevance. The result is an extreme broad array of conceptual, empirical and practical “psycholegal issues,” as is apparent from inspection of the table of contents of widely cited “psychology and law” handbooks (Goldstein, 2003;Hess and Weiner, 1999;Kagehiro and Laufer, 1992; Parry and Drogin, 2000, 2001) and from scholarly articles attempting to define forensic psychology (Brigham, 1999; Hess, 1999; Poythress, 1979). This conceptual, empirical and practical breadth has some interesting implications for models of education and training (Otto et al., 1990). In 1995, a conference, organized by the leaders of broadly defined forensic psychology, explicitly acknowledged that diversity of appropriate training models was required because of the breadth of the discipline (Bersoff et al., 1997).

 

          There are a wide variety of doctoral training models in forensic psychology (Baldwin & Watts, 1996; Otto, Heilbrun & Grisso, 1990; Packer & Borum, 2003). Current (and somewhat overlapping) listings of 28 such programs in the United States and Canada may be found either at the APLS website [www.unl.edu/ap-ls/programs.htm] or at the APA website [www.psywww.com/careers/forensic.htm]. Nine graduate programs offer forensic psychology training in either clinical or non-clinical areas; four of these also offer dual psychology and law degrees Footnote . Eight graduate programs offer forensic psychology training exclusively oriented towards clinical issues and eleven programs (two of which are dual degree programs) offer exclusively non-clinical forensic training programs. In addition, an unknown number of forensic psychologists are trained in graduate psychology departments without specialized programs but with one or more faculty members who specialize in forensic psychology. A variety of post-doctoral programs, as well as other training in forensic facilities are also available (Heilbrun & Annis, 1988; Packer & Borum, 2003).

 

          Given this wide array of training models, it is difficult to describe “forensic psychology training,” but most programs tend to share a common training assumption that derives from the “forensic” aspect of the discipline. That is, the adjective “forensic Footnote ” implies that the professional and scholarly aspects of the discipline will appear in public and legal settings and will be subjected to legal scrutiny, debate and cross-examination. While psychological theories and data are subjected to scientific scrutiny in research and scholarly settings, a different set of rules and issues arise when those theories and data are admitted as evidence in a legal setting. While the evidentiary “hurdles” that psychological evidence must pass are increasingly seen in terms that are familiar to psychological scientists as reflecting a Popperian view of science [Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 1993], legal disputation is fundamentally different than scientific disputation. As a consequence, forensic training programs, whether they emphasize clinical, developmental, experimental, neuropsychological or social aspects of the discipline must prepare students for the legal scrutiny of their scholarly and professional products. In “ordinary” clinical work, for example, an assessment report may be reviewed by another professional, but it will not be subjected to rigorous scrutiny or cross-examination Footnote . Thus, this fundamental “forensic” assumption gives rise to a series of characteristics that are distinctive. The nature of some of these distinctive characteristics is most easily seen in forensic clinical psychology. Role relationships between forensic clinicians and those that they evaluate or treat are fundamentally and systematically different than traditional clinician - client role relationships (Greenberg & Shuman, 1997). In fact, the “client” in such relationships is most often an attorney or a court, not the person evaluated or treated. There are corresponding major differences in respect of issues of privilege and confidentiality, record keeping and reporting requirements (Golding, 1990). Forensic clinical assessments often involve specialized assessment techniques and instruments that focus on distinct psycholegal constructs (Grisso, 2003; Melton et al., 1997) and employ special methods that often target deceptiveness and collateral sources of information (Heilbrun, 2001). Most fundamentally, forensic clinical psychologists are trained in the details of the legal issues and adjudicative processes in which they participate, though they most often do not complete law degrees.

 

          While APA and CRSPP officially recognize forensic psychology as a specialty, they do not award advanced certification of specialization or diplomate status to particular individuals. Within the United States, diplomate status has been traditionally granted by the American Board of Forensic Psychology (ABFP), which is part of a larger organization, the American Board of Professional Psychology (ABPP). ABFP and ABPP have many administrative and professional links with APA, but they are separate organizations. Other organizations also grant diplomate status in forensic psychology, but problems associated with their procedures will be discussed subsequently.

 

          Diplomate status from ABFP “attests to the fact that an established organization of peers has examined and accepted the Diplomate as functioning at the highest level of excellence in his or her field of forensic competence” (ABFP, 2004). It is important to note that when ABFP was formed in 1978, the original members of the organization did not “grandfather” themselves as diplomates. Rather, each was examined by others in the founding group, to ensure that they possessed the higher level of training, skill and knowledge Footnote expected of a “diplomate.” (Kaslow, 1989). The current examination process is extremely rigorous and essential involves the following steps. An applicant must first be accepted as a candidate. This involves a) a review of credentials to ensure that the individual has a doctoral degree from an accredited institution in the United States or Canada; b) is either a licensed psychologist or works as such in a statutorily recognized way; c) has at least 1000 hours of forensic psychology experience, most of which must be accumulated post-doctorally; d) does not have a history of adjudicated ethical or professional complaints; and e) has at least 100 hours of specialized training in forensic psychology. The second stage of the ABFP process is an evaluation of work products. Each applicant is required to submit two professional work products that reflect their advanced expertise in two different areas of forensic psychology. These work samples are reviewed by two examiners according to published criteria. Finally, an applicant sits for both a written examination concerning advanced knowledge of forensic psychology and associated legal issues, and an oral examination concerning ethical and professional issues and aspects of the candidate’s own chosen aspects of particular expertise. Data from a two year period, 1995-1997 demonstrate the rigors of the examination process. During that time period, 39% of the applicants whose credentials were substantiated failed the examination process because of the nature of their professional work samples. Of those who stood for the final stage of the examination process, 48% failed at that stage.

 

          Whether due to the rigors of this examination process, economic incentives to obtain “advanced certification or diplomate status” in forensic psychology or other unknown considerations, a cottage industry of “vanity” diplomate boards has grown up in the United States in the past decade (Dattilio, Sadoff & Gutheil, 2003; Otto & Heilbrun, 2002). Originally, such vanity boards, as described in articles in the Wall Street Journal (MacDonald, 1999), the American Bar Association Journal (Hansen, 2000) and elsewhere (Golding, 1999) were clearly in the business of “sheepskins for sale.” They routinely granted diplomate status on the basis of weak criteria, had few or no mechanisms for checking on the validity of claimed experience Footnote , never appeared to turn anyone down who had applied, required no peer review of professional work products, and had no other mechanisms for verifying that the applicant indeed had advanced levels of knowledge, skill and experience (for detailed analyses of the functional differences between mainstream diplomating organizations and such vanity boards, see Foxhall, 2000; Golding, 1999). Sufficient alarm about the impact of the flood of such “vanity” certified experts, in a host of different professional fields, lead to strong cautionary statements being published in professional mental health journals (Dattilio et al., 2003; Heilbrun & Otto, 2003; Otto & Heilbrun, 2002) and in materials being circulated to sitting judges and practicing attorneys Footnote (Parry and Drogin, 2001), with a focus on the necessity to carefully scrutinize the nature of an expert’s claimed expertise and certification as a “specialist,” “diplomate,” or “board certified” expert.

 

          Any internet search using the terms “diplomate” and “forensic” will now uncover a dizzying array of hits and organizations. The real task facing a consumer [whether attorney, judge or juror] in understanding what a given expert’s “diplomate” status means and does not mean has become enormously more difficult since the first publications analyzing vanity boards, “check-book” diplomates and the like. Many of the organizations originally criticized for their use of lax procedures, no meaningful examinations, “grandfathering,” or having little or no review of work products have now begun to change their publically announced requirements and procedures. Whether or not such announcements reflect any meaningful change awaits further demonstration and documentation. Thus, while many now announce an “examination” as part of the process, it is unclear whether they meaningfully assess the types of advanced competencies and knowledge that are reflected by the meaning commonly associated with “diplomate” or “board certified.” For example, one of the original “examinations” from such organizations contained the following question: “In giving testimony at a deposition, it is appropriate to engage in shouting matches or arguments with abusive attorneys. True or false?” (MacDonald, 1999). The adoption of meaningful examinations will in part be indexed by the number of applicants who do not pass such examinations.

 

          Other than the general cautions and caveats published by professional psychological and legal organizations, some states have begun to adopt more aggressive administrative procedures (Farkas, DeLeon & Newman, 1997) or institute statutory regulation. For example, California has given the term “board certified” administrative meaning by requiring that physicians may not describe themselves as “board certified” unless the “board” uses meaningful and psychometrically valid testing procedures to examine whether or not the physician has the required education, training, experience expected of a “board certified” specialist [California Business and Professions Code §651(h)(5)(B)]. The regulations which implement this statute [California Code of Regulations §1363.5] specify a set of boards that qualify and also provides a set of criteria by which to evaluate “applicant boards” not specifically listed. This mechanism Footnote for regulating use of “board certification” was upheld in a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [American Academy of Pain Management v. Ronald Joseph, Executive Director of the Medical Board of California, 2004]. The logic of this decision comports with other professional analyses of the problem of separating the “wheat” from the “chaff” by focusing upon the meaningfulness and rigor of the review and evaluation process (Dattilio, Sadoff & Gutheil, 2003; Golding, 1999). Logically, it must also be noted that having had one’s training, knowledge and skill examined and “certified” at one point in time does not guarantee a similar status at a future point in time. Similarly, not being a “diplomate” nor “board certified” does not carry the logical or empirical implication that a particular expert is less qualified than one who has stood for a rigorous examination of their knowledge and skills. However, having chosen to obtain such a “certification” from a vanity board as opposed to allowing one’s work to be subject to rigorous peer scrutiny, does have other logical implications that may be effectively pursued during rigorous cross-examination (Golding, 1999). If the cross-examiner can effectively link an expert’s having chosen to obtain a “vanity diploma” with questions about the adequacy or rigor of his or her methods and reasoning, a particularly forceful synergy is accomplished. Obviously, having a “traditional” diplomate in forensic psychology does not guarantee current competence, professionalism, or the correctness of one's opinion. However, it does guarantee that the individual has chosen to have his or her professional work reviewed by peers, has had the nature, quality and sufficiency of their professional forensic training scrutinized, and has stood for a wide-ranging and meaningful examination of their specialized and well as general knowledge of forensic psychology, and of ethical and professional standards of practice. The alternative choices end up speaking for themselves to triers of fact if they are explored in functional detail, either during voir dire or cross-examination. An additional and apparently unappreciated legal consequence of presenting oneself as a “diplomate” or “board certified” is that this sets the standard of care to which they will be held in any tort action Footnote .

 

American Academy of Pain Management v. Ronald Joseph, Executive Director of the Medical Board of California. No. 01-15764. [Ninth Cir., ½/2004]

 

American Board of Forensic Psychology (2004). Brochure. Accessed 1/15/2004 at www.abfp.com/brochure.asp.

 

Baldwin, M., & Watts, B. (1996). A survey of graduate education and training experiences in psychology and law. American Psychology-Law Society Newsletter, 16, 10-11.

 

Bersoff, D.N., Goodman-Delahunty, J., Grisso, T., Hans, V.P., Poythress, N.G., & Roesch, R.G. (1997). Training in law and psychology: Models from the Villanova conference. American Psychologist, 52, 1301-1310.

 

Brigham, J. (1999). What is forensic psychology anyway? Law and Human Behavior, 23, 273-298.

 

Coleman v. Wilson. 88 A. 1059 [N.J. 1913].

 

Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists. (1995). Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Law and Human Behavior, 15(6), 655-665.

 

Cattell, J. M. (1895). Measurements of the accuracy of recollection. Science, 2, 761-766.

 

Dattilio, F.M., Sadoff,R.L., & Gutheil, T.G. (2003). Board certification in forensic psychiatry and psychology:separating the chaff from the wheat. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 31, 5-19.

 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

 

Farkas, G., DeLeon, P., & Newman, R. (1997). Sanity examiner certification: An evolving national agenda. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 28, 73- 76.

 

Foxhall, K. (2000). What’s behind that credential? When it comes to credentialing, caveat emptor. Monitor on Psychology, September.

 

Golding, S. (1990). Mental health professionals and the courts: The ethics of expertise. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 13, 281-307.

 

Golding, S. L. (1999). The Voir Dire of Forensic Experts: Issues of qualification and training [Subtitle: "Sheepskins for sale: Shortcut to Slaughter?]. Paper presented at the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA., 8/22/1999. Available at www.xmission.com/~sgolding/publications/expert_voir_dire.htm

 

Goldstein, A.M. (Ed). (2003) Handbook of psychology: Forensic psychology, Vol. 11. New York: Wiley.

 

Greenberg, S., & Shuman, D. (1997). Irreconcilable conflict between therapeutic and forensic roles. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 28, 50-57.

 

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Grisso,T., & Steadman, H.J. (Eds.) (1995). Special section of commemorative articles in memory of Saleem A. Shah. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 1-48.

 

Hansen, M. (2000). Expertise to go. ABA Journal, 86, 44-52.

 

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 Jenkins v. United States, 307 F. 2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

 

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Melton, G.B., Petrila, J., Poythress, N.G. & Slobogin, C. (1997). Psychological evaluations for the courts: A handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers. Second edition. New York: Guilford.

 

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