The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged the
constitutionality of a City of Seattle policy that required a preemployment
urinalysis drug test for about half the vacancies filled by the City.
Division I of the Court of Appeals held that to be valid under Article I,
Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution as a "a warrantless
search without particularized grounds for suspicion," the employer must
show the testing program "is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
governmental interest."
The court had no difficulty concluding that the employer's drug testing
program was a warrantless search and an invasion of a job applicants' right
to privacy. The question was whether there were sufficiently compelling
reasons for the policy that would justify the intrusion. The court held that
public safety constitutes a compelling governmental interest for drug testing
and that preemployment testing could be required for applicants for police
and firefighter positions.
The court based its ruling on the Washington Constitution and not the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in large part because cases under
the federal constitution have held that there is an implied consent factor in
similar cases: Job applicants can choose not to be tested, although by doing
so, their applications will not be considered. Washington Supreme Court
decisions have rejected this theory in cases applying Article I, Section 7 of
the Washington Constitution. For example, court decisions have held that a
school district has no right to search students' bags as a condition for
going on a field trip, that police cannot erect random roadblock sobriety
checkpoints, and Seattle cannot conduct pat-down searches as a condition for
admission to Coliseum rock concerts.
Employer Must Show Safety Sensitivity of Each Position
In adopting its program, Seattle's City Council limited the testing to
positions involving:
1) public safety responsibilities;
2) handling dangerous substances; 3) hazardous physical activities; 4)
routine operation of motor vehicles, heavy equipment, or power tools; and 5)
routine performance of other safety-sensitive activities.
It also adopted a 600-page legislative record that found that most illicit
drug users are employed and are in all kinds of jobs, that workplace drug use
causes substantial monetary loss because of lost productivity, absenteeism,
turnover, health care costs, and increased accidents and injuries. The City
Council was concerned about becoming a "last resort employer"
because of the widespread preemployment testing in the private and public
sectors. It noted statistics showing that preemployment testing programs
reduce the number of new employees with drug problems.
On appeal, the employer told the court that its program was "narrowly
restricted to outside applicants for vacancies in safety-sensitive
positions." However, the court was skeptical "since half the city's
jobs are deemed to fall in this 'safety sensitive' category." For
example, the city claimed that safety-sensitive jobs included the use of
electricity, life guarding and operating motor vehicles and heavy equipment.
The problem for the court was that the city did not explain what safety-sensitive
duties were performed by accountants, ushers, librarians, administrative
assistants and public relations specialists subject to the testing.
Economic Considerations Not Compelling
The court rejected any suggestion that this latter group of jobs
implicates public safety because of the higher level as worker's compensation
claims among drug users. According to the court, this interest relates to
cost and efficiency, not safety, and "important as these concerns are,
they are not ordinarily considered compelling in the constitutional
sense."
Thus, the court could not conclude which jobs "directly and genuinely
implicate the safety of the public" and which ones do not, with the
exception of police officers, firefighters and positions requiring an employee
to carry a firearm. The dispute was remanded to the trial court for a
determination.
Robinson v. Seattle, No. 45511-7-1, (Wa. App., Oct. 2, 2000)