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State Employees Sample Articles:DISABLED
CORRECTIONS OFFICER DENIED REQUEST STATE PATROL CHIEF MAY DELEGATE DISCHARGE AUTHORITY EASTERN
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GUILTY OF SHUTTING WHEN
A RESIGNATION IS NOT ONE A corrections officer working at the Washington Corrections
Center for Women in Gig Harbor claimed that the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate her disability. Division II of the Court of Appeals disagreed,
finding that she could not perform the essential functions of her job due to
back and knee injuries.
The officer was assigned to work the control booth at the center after she suffered her injuries. The control booth is a locked room with reinforced windows. Generally, the control booth officer rarely leaves the building and has no contact with inmates. But in an emergency, such as a riot or a fire, the control booth officer may be called upon to help restrain inmates. The officer gave the employer a letter from her physician excusing her from defense tactics training, part of a routine training session for corrections officers. The employer asked the physician to comment on the officer's ability to perform the essential functions of her job, and the physician responded that the officer was not fit to "wrestle with inmates." Job Function Essential Even Though Rarely Performed The officer argued that she had never been pulled out of the control booth to restrain inmates, and therefore restraining inmates should not be considered an essential function of a control booth officer. The appeals court disagreed because (1.) she was hired as a general correctional officer; (2.) the job description states that typical work includes the use of physical force; (3.) the supervisor viewed the ability to restrain inmates as an essential function of the assignment; (4.) the collective bargaining agreement contemplates a variety of situations in which she could be called out of the control booth; and (5) a witness with extensive experience working in control booths testified that he had been called out on more than one occasion to restrain inmates. The court explained that the officer's request for accommodation in the form of reinstatement to control booth officer would create an undue hardship for employer by compromising safety in emergency situations and reducing its staffing flexibility. Citing case law, the court stated that an employer does not have to grant the precise accommodation the employee requests, but "was limited to locating an opening for which the officer was qualified." Dedman v. Personnel Appeals Board, No. 24163-3-II, (Wn. App., December 17,
1999)
The Washington State Patrol (WSP) established a "trial board" proceeding, pursuant to RCW 43.43, to conduct a hearing and make recommendations concerning the misconduct of a trooper. The statute designates the WSP Chief as the reviewing officer who makes the final decision. In this case, Chief Annette Sandburg disqualified herself because of a potential conflict of interest and designated the Assistant Chief as her replacement. In her prior employment as counsel for the Washington State Troopers Association, she had presented the same trooper in an unrelated case. The assistant chief accepted the trial board's findings against the trooper and terminated him. On appeal, the trooper argued that the statute simply states that the chief should be the reviewing officer and contains no language regarding delegation. Statutory Silence No Bar In a 2-1 decision, the appeals court held that the trooper's argument "confuses omission with prohibition." It agreed with the employer that Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows for the disqualification and replacement of a reviewing officer, fills the void in RCW 43.43 regarding conflicts of interest. Because the APA is applicable, the chief had discretion to disqualify herself and appoint the assistant chief in her stead. The dissenting judge opined that "the Legislature had the opportunity to provide for delegation in the case of bias," but did not do so. Moreover, it omitted mention of the WSP from its list of agencies covered by the applicable sections of the APA. The dissent added that the "Legislature may have good reason to distinguish the WSP from other agencies in this respect." Jackstadt v. Washington State Patrol, No. 22304-0-II, (May 14, 1999) The Personnel Resources Board found Eastern Washington University violated its collective bargaining agreement with a unit of employees represented by Washington Federation of State Employees when it denied a union employee the chance to be considered for an electrician position ahead of the general public. In the Board's opinion, the school discriminated against the employee by questioning him about his union activities and failing to provide him opportunity or consideration equal to what was provided to non-union applicants. However, it did agree with the university that it does not owe union members promotional opportunities simply because they meet the minimum qualifications. Employer Misconduct Deliberate The grievant, a 19-year employee of Eastern Washington University, applied for an electrician position. The recruitment bulletin was posted as "promotional only," which meant it was advertised only to union members. However, the grievant learned prior to his interview that the employer was accepting outside candidates. Two electricians who were part of the selection committee asked the grievant about his seniority and whether he would continue with his union activities if he were offered the position. The selection committee did not use objective scoring criteria and discussed the candidates with the existing group of electrician employees. When the grievant asked why he did not get the job, the employer explained that it was seeking a certified electrician to fill the position. However, the recruitment bulletins did not mention certification. During the grievance procedure, the employer agreed that it had violated the parties' agreement because it inadvertently failed to interview the grievant before accepting outside applications. It assured the grievant that steps would be taken to assure inside candidates interviews prior to advertising open positions. The Board found several procedural contract violations. It admonished the employer for its unfair and arbitrary candidate selection process, concluding that the employer unfairly "raised the bar on minimum qualifications after the recruitment period ... without the grievant's knowledge. "It also ruled that the questions posed to the grievant about his union activities violated the parties' agreement prohibiting discrimination on the basis of union membership or activities. Promotional "Rule of One" Conflicts with Board Rule As to whether the grievant, as minimally qualified, was automatically entitled to the position, the Board found for the employer. The disputed contract language stated: The Employer agrees that it will offer positions which represent promotional opportunities to the members of the promotional unit prior to those positions being offered to other eligibles. Another provision stated: The Employer agrees that classified staff employees will be considered first for promotional opportunities into vacant, classified positions prior to seeking applications from outside the University. The union contended that the word "offer" requires the employer to give a job to a union applicant (the "promotional unit") if he/she meets the minimum qualifications. The employer stated that its negotiating team understood the word "offer" to mean that it would go to its own employees first but did not consider it to mean a "rule of one." It argued that this interpretation is consistent with the parties' agreement as a whole. The Board agreed with the employer's position and confirmed that the union's interpretation would conflict with WAC 251-18-260, which allows an employer to decline to appoint a candidate when a there are fewer than seven applicants. Despite its agreement with the employer on the meaning of the contract language, the Board determined that because of the employer's procedural violations, particularly the fact it discriminated against the grievant because of his union activity, the grievant should be placed in the disputed electrician position and made whole for lost back pay. It cited the U.S. Supreme Court's observation in Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel that a remedy in arbitration should provide a "fair solution of a problem" to support the remedy ordered. It also admonished the university for changing the minimum qualifications for the position after it was posted, conducting interviews with no scoring mechanism in place, and discussing the candidates with other employees in the shop. Rast v. Eastern Washington University, 97 ARB-110 (2000)
The Personnel Resources Board resolved a dispute over the interpretation of a letter containing the word "resign" but not meant as a resignation from state service. Virginia Klingman worked as a registered nurse at University of Washington's Harborview Medical Center for ten years in an acute care ward. She transferred to the RICU (Respiratory Intensive Care Unit). A nurse educator assessed Klingman's performance in the RICU, found it deficient in several respects, and recommended that she return to acute care. The same day, Klingman met with her supervisor, who counseled her to write a memo saying she no longer wanted to work in the RICU. The supervisor allegedly told her that he would find her a position in acute care. Klingman told the supervisor she did not want to return to the acute care ward she had worked in prior to her transfer to RICU. Afterward, Klingman wrote a memo to the supervisor which stated: I am writing this notice in reference to our meeting today. I am requesting to resign my position in the RICU ... I regret that I am not able to continue on in the RICU. I would appreciate it if you would inquire into an acute care position on day shift per our meeting. Klingman then took several days' vacation. She reconsidered her decision and sent another memo to her supervisor rescinding her letter resigning from RICU. Her supervisor wrote to Klingman denying her request and informed her of the date of her last day of work. The Board ruled that based on the understanding between Klingman and the supervisor, her letter did not indicate that she was resigning from State service. The Board further noted that the handwritten letter did not resemble a letter of resignation and did not meet the 30-day notice required by the collective bargaining agreement. It suggested that the supervisor may have acted in bad faith when he decided to interpret Klingman's as resignation from State service only after receiving her letter of rescission. The Board granted Klingman reinstatement to the RICU with full back pay. Klingman v. University of Washington, PRB No. 99 ARB-74 (2000) |
