

Violence Versus Policy: Political Party Affiliation as an Indicator of
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Turned Action in Germany and the United States

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Introduction

The early to mid 1990s were a time marked by extreme anti-immigrant feelings throughout the Western world. This sentiment was often most vivid in nations such as Germany where mobs of youth firebombed refugees' homes in the cities of Hoyerswerda in 1991; Rostock, Mölln, and Cottbus in 1992; and Solingen in 1993 (Adler, 1996). However, the United States had its fair share of anti-immigrant sentiment manifested in the passing of Proposition 187 in California and proposed limitations on the amounts of immigrants entering the country (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996). In both nations, the rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment led people to act, yet both nations had qualitatively different popular responses.

While most Germans did not participate in the violence against immigrants, there was little action from both the state and bystanders to halt the violence and the police response was to let the rioters continue with their attacks (Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995). This inaction by the police and by many Germans has been labeled by some a result of the anti-immigrant sentiments which were held by the general public at the time and may have reflected the social influence of right-wing political parties (Adler, 1996; Geis, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998). It may also have been supported by a general attitude which permeates Germany's policy toward immigrants and immigration.

Germany considers itself a nation that does not have immigrants. Immigration to Germany began shortly after World War II when the country began to import guest workers or *Gastarbeiter* to help rebuild the nation and work in the reconstructed industries and unskilled service sector. For decades, there were severe limitations on the types of workers allowed into the nation and their status within Germany. The initial guest workers were single men who were only allowed to live in the country temporarily, but as more began to take skilled jobs, authorities

allowed for longer terms of stay and for families to enter the country (Adler, 1996; Freeman, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998). Another key element of German immigration policy is its intake of refugees. The nation has traditionally played host to refugees from political and economic persecution which. However, the national policy has been that refugees are not permanent residents and that they shall eventually return home (Adler, 1996; Freeman, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998). Finally, Germany's criteria for citizenship are some of the most stringent and complex in the world. There is a two-tiered system for attaining citizenship in Germany: (1) citizenship is granted almost immediately to any immigrant who can prove to be of ethnic German descent with little question or other criteria, but (2) residency of at least ten years with steady employment for seven of those years with five years at a single job is required for all other migrants (refugees are not given this option because of the policy that their residence in Germany is temporary) (Adler, 1996; Freeman, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998). These policies may help to contribute to some of the anti-immigrant sentiment in the nation

The double standard in criteria for naturalization and strict immigration policies reflect a general sentiment in Germany that it is still an ethnic state defined by a citizenry which shares some idea of Germanness (Geiss, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995; Von Trotha, 1995). This notion of an ethnic German is key in the formation of new right-wing parties in Germany which exploit anti-immigrant sentiment for their own political gain (Adler, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Pettigrew, 1998). It is also the rallying cry for many German youth who have not matured to voting age and may not be affiliated with a specific political party (Adler, 1996). Therefore, in Germany, we see a unique combination of ethnic identity, state policy, and political

party influence which may be to blame for attitudes toward immigration which result in acts of ethnoviolence.

Anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States, while not very different from Germany's, appears to have manifested itself in ways quite distinct from Germany. Americans have chosen to react through legislative pressure and policy changes rather than through direct acts of violence. The US is considered by many within and outside the country as a nation of immigrants (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Freeman, 1995; Jaret, 1999; Sachs, 1996). It is interesting to note that despite such a title, the nation has consistently limited the influx of new immigrants. Historically, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, China, Japan, and more recently Latin American and Southeast Asia have faced restrictions and quotas on immigration (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Jaret, 1999). The American democratic political system has been able to respond to pressure from established groups with political power to legislate restrictions on immigration throughout the nation's history. An example of this power was the effort by a newly formed labor union led by Irish workers [that] managed to convince Congress that Chinese immigrants were taking jobs away from native born whites that led to Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996: 2). This demonstrates that once assimilated into the political mainstream, even formerly discriminated against ethnic groups such as the Irish are more than willing to work against other immigrants for special government protection. It is interesting to note that competitive aspects of capitalism, combined with nativism in the United States manifest themselves in anti-immigrant sentiment.

It seems that while it stems from unique sources, anti-immigrant sentiment is evident in many Western nations. However, there are key differences in how anti-immigrant sentiment manifests itself throughout the West. As we have seen, Germany has suffered a tide of anti-

immigrant violence which has only resulted in pushing right-wing political agendas to the fore of the nation's political conscience. While in the United States, fear of illegal immigration results in ballot initiatives such as Proposition 187 in California which restricts access to social services and education for illegal immigrants and calls for severe restrictions on immigration to the US. Why have these two nations had such divergent responses to very similar sentiments? Some have argued that there is something unique about the German approach to ethnic identity (evidenced by its double standards for naturalization and restrictions on immigration) and history of extreme violence (witch hunts in the 16th-18th centuries and the holocaust) which have led to the violent extremes of the early to mid 1990s (Geiss, 1995). However, the United States has experienced its own history of ethnoviolence, specifically manifested in the massacre of its native population and the acts of terror committed by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups (Adler, 1996; Geiss, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995). Clearly, the difference in action against immigrants must result from more than a unique position of Germans vis-à-vis their ethnicity and anti-immigration policies. I hypothesize that this difference in activity is linked to nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia and the political orientation of Germans and Americans. Far-right political parties have often served as breeding grounds for extreme violent activities (Knigge, 1998; Levin & McDevitt, 1993). Americans have generally identified as politically moderate rather than identifying with political extremes, whereas Germans tend to identify across the political spectrum. Because some Germans identify with far-right political parties, the possibility for extra-legal activities such as ethnovoilent attacks on immigrants becomes more likely than policy changes experienced in the United States.

Method

In order to test my hypothesis that political party affiliation associated with attitudes of

nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia results in varying degrees of reaction to immigration, I chose to analyze data found in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for 1995. The ISSP is a survey of attitudes of residents of 29 countries on specific issues. The topic for the 1995 survey was national identity and immigration. Respondents were asked to describe pride they feel in their nation's accomplishment, their nation's role in relation to the international community, and their views on immigrants. Demographic information such as subjective social class, political party affiliation, trade union membership, age, sex, and race are also covered.

Since the original survey contained data on 29 nations, the data set was filtered for responses exclusively from the United States, East Germany, and West Germany (although data was collected after German reunification, the ISSP divides Germany into East and West for this data set). The designations of East and West Germany were further collapsed into a dummy variable based on the coding of United States as a distinct variable with all other nations (East and West Germany) coded together.

The ISSP had a distinct question (If there is a general election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?) for political party affiliation. Answers to this question are left intact as distinct variables per country, but it is also recoded by the parties originally administering the ISSP on a continuum from far left to far right as the variable Political Party Affiliation I. I will be using this as my independent variable for correlations related to concepts of national pride, nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia.

Using the index model developed by Hjerm (1998) in his analysis of this ISSP data, I chose to create indexes related to concepts of national pride, nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia. National pride is defined as individual sentiments of pride directed towards the nation state (Hjerm, 1998: 342). The ISSP provides several variables measuring national pride.

In order to create my national pride index, I used the following variables related to the question,

How proud are you of the United States/Germany in terms of each of the following? :

- " Its political influence in the world
- " Its economic achievements
- " Its scientific and technological achievements
- " Its achievements in sports
- " Its achievements in the arts and literature
- " Its armed forces
- " Its history (ISSP, 1995)

Variables regarding pride in the way democracy works and the nation's social security system which were included in Hjerm s (1998) index were removed because they reflect pride in the structure of the state rather in the nation as an abstract concept. The answers were coded on a four point Likert scale with the following responses: very proud, somewhat proud, somewhat not proud, not very proud. This created an index ranging from 1-28 (28=most proud) which was further compressed into a four point scale (1 [1-7 on the original index] = little or no national pride, 2 [8-14 on the original index] = some national pride, 3 [15-21 on the original index] = moderate national pride, and 4 [22-28 on the original index] = extreme national pride) which will be used for cross-tabulation with the political party affiliation.

Xenophobia can be seen as a negative attitude toward, or fear of, individuals or groups of individuals that are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the group(s) to which one belongs (Hjerm, 1998: 341). In this case, xenophobia will be defined by its connotative meaning as a negative attitude toward immigrants. The variables, based on the following question : There are different opinions about immigrants living in the United States/Germany. (By immigrants we mean people who come to settle in the United States/Germany.) How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

- " Immigrants increase crime rates.

- " Immigrants are generally good for the American/German economy.
- " Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the United States/Germany
- " Immigrants make the United States/Germany more open to new ideas and cultures. (ISSP, 1995)

The answers to these questions ranged from agree strongly to disagree strongly on a five point, Likert scale. Together, they formed a 1-20 point index (20 = most xenophobic) which was compressed into a four point scale of xenophobia similar to the scale for national pride.

Following the model created by Hjerm (1998) for developing indexes from data in the ISSP, I chose to create two other variables related to anti-immigrant sentiment, nationalism and isolationism. Nationalism is defined as the feeling of loyalty to and superiority of one's nation.

In order to develop an index of nationalism, I used the following variables:

- " Important: to be born in the United States/Germany
- " Important: to have citizenship of the United States/Germany
- " Important: to have lived most of one's life in the United States/Germany
- " Important: to be able to speak English/German
- " Important: to be Christian
- " Important: to respect American/German political institutions and laws
- " Important: to feel American/German
- " Would rather be a citizen of the United States/Germany
- " There are some things about the United States/Germany that make me feel ashamed.
- " The world would be a much better place if people in other countries were more like people in the United States/Germany.
- " The United States/Germany is better than most.
- " People should support their country, even if it is wrong. (ISSP, 1995)

These variables were adjusted to all reflect a four point scale and placed in an index ranging from 1-48 (48 = most nationalist) and compressed into a 4 point scale similar to the other compressed indexes of national pride and xenophobia.

Isolationism is the belief that the nation should restrict its interactions with other nations and pursue its domestic interests as a primary goal. This implies the restriction of imports and

immigration to the nation, as well as contact with other nations/cultures through international bodies. The index consists of the following variables:

- " The United States/Germany should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
- " For certain problems, like environmental pollution, international bodies (e.g. UN, EU, WHO) should have the right to enforce solutions.
- " The United States/Germany should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly.
- " The United States/Germany should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflict with other nations.
- " Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in the United States/Germany.
- " American/German television should give preference to American/German films and programmes.
- " Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.
- " The United States/Germany should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. (ISSP, 1995)

These items were scored on a five point Likert scale which created an index ranging from 2-39 (39 = most isolationist) and compressed into a four point scale for comparison with similar indexes.

The indexes created above were then analyzed vis-à-vis political party affiliation with the results to follow.

Results

Some have suggested that the extreme anti-immigrant violence experienced by Germany has been the result of a uniquely German view of ethnicity and nationalism (Geis, 1995; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995). If this hypothesis were true, Germans would score higher on indexes of national pride, nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia because the aforementioned Germany ideology is uniquely nationalist and xenophobic. In order to refute this claim, I performed a simple comparison of mean scores for the indexes previously mentioned for Germany and the United States (Table 1). The most surprising result of these findings is that

Americans scored higher on all the indexes than Germans. This refutes the notion that German nationalism and xenophobia are greater than that of people in other nations. It is also significant to note that generally, Americans scored 3-5 points higher than Germans on all the indexes (with the exception of xenophobia which was nearly equal). It appears that there is nothing unique about German nationalism and xenophobia that would result in violence. In fact, the index scores would seem to show that Germans are less nationalist and more tolerant of foreigners than Americans. At this point, we may return to my hypothesis that political extremism helps to fuel the extreme levels of violence in Germany.

Hate crimes such as those perpetrated by German youth against immigrant homes and refugee centers are often committed as a result of influence by more committed members of hate groups and extreme right wing parties. Levin and McDevitt (1993) create a three pronged typology for hate crimes. Thrill crimes are committed by groups of youth who are influenced by older, ideologically committed leaders who attack others for the excitement which it brings. Reactive crimes are committed by individuals who share racist/xenophobic beliefs and respond to an incident such as minorities/immigrants moving into their neighborhood (or in the case of Germany, country). Finally, mission hate crimes are committed by individuals or small groups who are ideologically committed to ideas of racial/ethnic hatred as part of a political act against said people (often labeled as the first act of a race war) (Levin & McDevitt, 1993). There is evidence that the attacks on immigrants contained elements of all three types of hate crimes (Adler, 1996; Maier-Katkin, Stemmler & Stretesky, 1995). What is important to note is the influence of the extreme right in all three types of hate crimes. Members or sympathizers of extreme right-wing parties or political ideologies are always present in the three forms of hate crime whether they act as inspiration in the thrill, influence or direct agents in the reactive, or

combatants in the mission hate crimes. It seems that membership in extreme right-wing parties which sympathize with violence coupled with extreme attitudes of nationalism and xenophobia would be predictors of violent activity against immigrants whereas a clustering of political identification with moderate or mainstream political parties would influence individual to seek policy changes to deal with the immigrant problem.

In order to test this hypothesis, I attempted to correlate political party affiliation based on a far left – far right continuum with the compressed national pride, nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia indexes for Germany and the United States (Tables 2-9). Before discussing the results, it is important to note that American political party affiliation is distributed along the political center with no one reporting their political affiliation as far left or far right. As was expected extreme national pride in Germany had a higher concentration (52.9%) among people with a right-wing party affiliation whereas American national pride was almost evenly divided among all parties. However, it is also important to note that 32.7% of those who reported extreme national pride and 50.0% of those who reported moderate national pride identified themselves as left, center left affiliated. This may be due to the neutral nature of national pride. It is possible for individuals to feel national pride without resorting to extreme political positions often associated with the political right. The findings on extreme nationalism are much more telling. The majority (51.9%) of Germans who were placed into the extreme nationalism category identify themselves as politically right, while the distribution for Americans was, once again virtually even among political party affiliations (it is interesting to note that almost 40% of Americans who identify as extremely nationalist also identified as politically left). What is most telling is that 70% of Germans who identify as far right politically also identify as either moderately or extremely nationalist according to the compressed index. Isolationism findings are

consistent with nationalism for both Germany and the United States. A majority (55.8%) of Germans who rated extremely nationalist in the scale were affiliated with the right or far right, but Americans were once again evenly distributed. As with the nationalism scale, the vast majority of far right affiliated Germans (92.7%) were identified as being moderately or extremely isolationist. The findings for xenophobia were less telling. The distribution of political affiliation of respondents who were rated extremely xenophobic was virtual even among all political categories for both Germans and Americans. This may be due to the fact that anti-immigrant sentiment had become a part of the legitimate political discourse in Germany by the time the survey was administered (Adler, 1996; Hjerm, 1998; Knigge, 1998; Pettigrew, 1998). What is interesting is that only one German respondent who identified politically as far right was classified as having little or no national pride and none were classified as having little or no feelings of nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia. These findings are very consistent with the association of such characteristics with right-wing political movements (Adler, 1996; Hjerm, 1998; Knigge, 1998; Pettigrew, 1998).

In order to truly appreciate the difference between political orientation and national pride, nationalism, isolationism and xenophobia, I also compared mean scores to the indexes in relation to political party affiliation by nation (Tables 10 & 11). The differences in mean scores between Germans who identified as far left and far right are staggering. German Respondents who identify with the political left scored four points lower than political rightist on the national pride and xenophobia indexes, and seven points lower on the nationalism and isolationism indexes. American respondents, however, showed little or no difference in mean scores. These findings demonstrate that there is significant difference in the influence of political party affiliation with relation to feelings of national pride, nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia. This difference

is important in that people who identify with the extreme political right are more likely to commit violent hate crime (Levin & McDevitt, 1993).

Given the range in mean scores between people who identify as far left and far right and the propensity for people with extreme political views to act directly against political targets, it is little wonder that German youth were so willing to attack immigrants with molotov cocktails. It may also be argued that because Americans affiliate with more moderate, even centrist political positions, they are less likely to strike out with violence against immigrants despite their negative feelings toward them. Since Americans associate with legitimate parties within the two-party system and overwhelmingly turn away from extreme political parties, they turn to political solutions for perceived social problems such as immigration. For this reason, they turn to ballot initiatives and state regulation on immigration rather than directly against immigrants.

Conclusion

The early to mid 1990s brought with them a general feeling of anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the Western world. This sentiment was expressed in a variety of ways in differing nations. In much of Europe, parties of the far right began to gain political support among the general population (Adler, 1996; Geis, 1995; Hjerm, 1998; Pettigrew, 1998). An equally dangerous movement of neo-Nazi (and supporting) youth turned to physical violence in Germany between 1991 and 1993, burning down the homes, temporary residences, and cultural centers of immigrant and refugee groups (Adler, 1996). At the same time, Americans plagued by paranoia of illegal immigration passed Proposition 187 in California which denied state resources to illegal aliens within the state (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996). Why would two Western nations with similar economic situations and similarly negative views of immigrants have such different expressions of anti-immigrant bias occur? I hypothesize that there may be some

relationship between the existence of far right political parties (and the level of support they receive), negative attitudes toward immigrants coupled with feelings of nationalism and isolationism, and the expression of anti-immigrant bias through violent means versus policy initiatives.

My research has found that although, Germans tend to express less nationalism, isolationism, and anti-immigrant sentiment than Americans (through lower mean scores on indexes testing those concepts), there is much more variation within German sentiment than American. Germans who are affiliate with far right political parties overwhelmingly expressed greater nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia. They also accounted for the majority of respondents who expressed feelings of extreme nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia. On the other hand, Americans consistently scored close to one another on these indexes regardless of political orientation. Americans who expressed these feelings often were evenly distributed across the limited political spectrum (Americans did not self-report as being members of either far left or far right parties).

Because extremist political parties and groups are less likely to turn to the state to act on their behalf and forward their political agendas, their members are more likely to turn to extra-legal acts. The support which far right parties have in Germany coupled with the high levels of nationalism, isolationism, and xenophobia which their members hold may serve as facilitators for extreme violent action on the part of some German youth. While, in the United States, the ability to petition the state for policy changes through the electoral system and the distribution of Americans within legitimate political parties may have led to the policy oriented response against immigration witnessed in the early to mid 1990s. The correlations I have found may serve to explain these extreme differences in action.

Table 1 : Mean Scores for National Pride, Nationalism, Isolationism, and Xenophobia Indexes Compared By Nation

Nation	National Pride	Nationalism	Isolationism	Xenophobia
Germany	16.40	28.64	20.60	10.79
United States	21.07	33.97	23.69	10.82
Total Mean	18.36	30.88	21.90	10.80

Table 2: National Pride Index (Compressed) by Political Party in Germany

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No National Pride	Some National Pride	Moderate National Pride	Extreme National Pride
Far Left	3 3.6%	26 6.8%	60 6.0%	62 2.2%
Left, Center Left	49 59.0%	229 59.9%	503 50.0%	91 32.7%
Center, Liberal	-----	20 5.2%	62 6.2%	19 6.5%
Right, Conservative	28 33.7%	89 23.3%	339 33.7%	147 52.9%
Far Right	1 1.2%	4 1.0%	23 2.3%	13 4.7%
Other, No Specific	-----	2 0.5%	1 0.1%	-----
No Party, No Preference	2 2.4%	12 3.1%	18 1.8%	3 1.1%
Total	83 100.0%	382 100.0%	1006 100.0%	278 100.0%

Pearson R= .000

Table 3: National Pride Index (Compressed) by Political Party in the United States

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No National Pride	Some National Pride	Moderate National Pride	Extreme National Pride
Left, Center Left	5 29.4%	31 41.3%	173 34.7%	248 33.4%
Center, Liberal	9 52.9%	33 44.0%	194 39.0%	240 32.3%
Right, Conservative	3 17.6%	9 12.0%	120 24.1%	242 32.6%
Other, No Specific	-----	2 2.7%	11 2.2%	12 1.6&
Total	17 100.0%	75 100.0%	498 100.0%	742 100.0%

Pearson R= .002

Table 4: Nationalism Index (Compressed) by Political Party in Germany

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Nationalism	Some Nationalism	Moderate Nationalism	Extreme Nationalism
Far Left	6 18.2%	32 7.0%	53 5.3%	5 1.8%
Left, Center Left	11 33.3%	316 69.5%	458 45.6%	101 35.4%
Center, Liberal	1 3.0%	16 3.5%	69 6.9%	15 5.3%
Right, Conservative	12 36.4%	80 17.6%	375 37.4%	148 51.9%
Far Right	-----	4 0.9%	25 2.5%	12 4.2%
Other, No Specific	1 3.0%	1 0.2%	1 0.1%	-----
No Party, No Preference	2 6.1%	6 1.3%	23 2.3%	4 1.4%
Total	33 100.0%	455 100.0%	1004 100.0%	285 100.0%

Pearson R= .000

Table 5: Nationalism Index (Compressed) by Political Party in the United States

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Nationalism	Some Nationalism	Moderate Nationalism	Extreme Nationalism
Left, Center Left	2 20.0%	35 33.0%	211 30.7%	219 39.9%
Center, Liberal	6 60.0%	51 48.1%	268 39.0%	161 29.3%
Right, Conservative	2 20.0%	16 15.1%	192 27.9%	164 29.9%
Other, No Specific	----	4 3.8%	16 2.3%	5 0.9%
Total	10 100.0%	106 100.0%	687 100.0%	549 100.0%

Pearson R= .000

Table 6: Isolationism Index (Compressed) by Political Party in Germany

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Isolationism	Some Isolationism	Moderate Isolationism	Extreme Isolationism
Far Left	3 6.0%	46 5.8%	43 4.8%	4 9.3%
Left, Center Left	32 64.0%	471 59.5%	366 41.3%	15 34.9%
Center, Liberal	2 4.0%	46 5.8%	53 6.0%	-----
Right, Conservative	12 24.0%	210 26.5%	373 42.1%	17 39.5%
Far Right	-----	3 .4%	31 3.5%	7 16.3%
Other, No Specific	-----	-----	3 0.3%	-----
No Party, No Preference	1 2.0%	15 1.9%	18 2.0%	-----
Total	50 100.0%	791 100.0%	887 100.0%	43 100.0%

Pearson R= .000

Table 7: Isolationism Index (Compressed) by Political Party in the United States

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Isolationism	Some Isolationism	Moderate Isolationism	Extreme Isolationism
Left, Center Left	16 38.1%	98 41.7%	325 32.9%	28 30.4%
Center, Liberal	18 42.9%	98 41.7%	344 34.8%	30 32.6%
Right, Conservative	7 16.7%	35 14.9%	300 30.3%	34 37.0%
Other, No Specific	1 2.4%	4 1.7%	20 2.0%	-----
Total	42 100.0%	235 100.0%	989 100.0%	92 100.0%

Pearson R= .002

Table 8: Xenophobia Index (Compressed) by Political Party in Germany

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Xenophobia	Some Xenophobia	Moderate Xenophobia	Extreme Xenophobia
Far Left	5 4.6%	34 5.1%	46 5.9%	10 5.2%
Left, Center Left	63 57.8%	375 56.3%	351 45.2%	79 41.1%
Center, Liberal	5 4.6%	37 5.6%	50 6.4%	6 3.1%
Right, Conservative	33 30.3%	209 31.4%	293 37.7%	70 36.5%
Far Right	-----	1 0.2%	16 2.1%	24 12.5%
Other, No Specific	-----	1 0.2%	1 0.1%	1 0.5%
No Party, No Preference	3 2.8%	9 1.4%	20 2.6%	2 1.0%
Total	109 100.0%	666 100.0%	777 100.0%	192 100.0%

Pearson R= .000

Table 9: Xenophobia Index (Compressed) by Political Party in the United States

Political Party Affiliation	Slight or No Xenophobia	Some Xenophobia	Moderate Xenophobia	Extreme Xenophobia
Left, Center Left	20 35.1%	159 34.5%	222 34.7%	50 35.0%
Center, Liberal	20 35.1%	164 35.6%	233 36.4%	52 36.4%
Right, Conservative	15 26.3%	132 28.6%	173 27.0%	37 25.9%
Other, No Specific	2 3.5%	6 1.3%	12 1.9%	4 2.8%
Total	57 100.0%	461 100.0%	640 100.0%	143 100.0%

Pearson R= .978

Table 10: Means Scores for National Pride, Nationalism, Isolationism, and Xenophobia by Political Party Affiliation in Germany

Political Party Affiliation	National Pride	Nationalism	Isolationism	Xenophobia
Far Left	15.65	25.45	20.51	11.19
Left, Center Left	15.66	27.32	19.47	10.27
Center, Liberal	17.73	29.48	20.82	10.60
Right, Conservative	17.70	31.08	21.75	11.18
Far Right	19.68	32.78	27.17	15.61
Other, No Specific	13.67	19.67	24.00	12.67
No Party, No Preference	15.66	27.49	20.23	10.91

Table 11: Means Scores for National Pride, Nationalism, Isolationism, and Xenophobia by Political Party Affiliation in the United States

Political Party Affiliation	National Pride	Nationalism	Isolationism	Xenophobia
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Left, Center Left	20.95	34.95	23.06	10.88
Center, Liberal	20.27	32.40	23.42	10.84
Right, Conservative	22.36	34.89	24.89	10.71
Other, No Specific	21.04	32.76	23.68	10.92

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