By Norman E. Anderson
Much sand has blown across the deserts since I last posted an opinion piece about Iraq. Nothing was to be said that wasn't already being said ad infinitum by far louder voices than mine. Now, however, the moment has come that I've been waiting for, a moment when enough time has passed for retrospective reflection in evaluative narrative form and when, at the same time, we can look ahead with great practical and pressing interest to possibilities for the constitutional future of Iraq.
George W. Bush, the 43rd President of the United States of America, ordered the invasion of Iraq. If Congress knew then what it knows now, many more of its members, perhaps the vast majority, would have opposed the invasion. The telling rationale, the sole rationale around which the Bush Administration itself could find consensus, was the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). None were found. Evidently, Saddam Hussein, in perhaps his one and only moment of genius, ordered them destroyed -- a moment of genius that was followed up with his usual unusually stupid stupidity. Still, Congress and most of the rest of the world believed that he had them.
I feared so too; but even before Secretary of State Powell made his famous presentation before the U.N., I had come to realize that evidence of nuclear weapons, at least, was wanting; for, if the Administration had had convincing proof, it would have presented it, there being compelling reasons to do; and it never did. A relevant aside: If I myself could recognize the absence of sufficient evidence from this distance, then I can only conclude that the President's application of his own critical abilities to intelligence reports was sadly deficient; either that or he had a hidden agenda.
Bush cut short the weapons inspection regime, the reinstitution of which had been a great success, and proceeded to go to war in a way that alienated many people in the U.S. and many peoples around the world, including some of America's staunchest allies, among them France and Germany. The issue was less whether Saddam, a notorious gangster and mass murderer in the position of a head of state, needed to go, than when. Unanswered questions about that remain. For instance, if the U.N. weapons inspectors had been able to report with confidence the absence of WMDs, would anyone have gone to war against Iraq?
My fear was that Saddam would ship WMDs by freighter to U.S. ports and that the U.S. would lose large parts of one or more cities; and, to this day, I am upset with President Bush for running that risk. Fortunately, the U.S. dodged that particular bullet, however, perhaps only because the Administration turned out to be wrong about Iraq's WMDs.
Despite my fears, I did think that a U.N. or U.N.-sanctioned action to depose Saddam was justifiable, first and foremost to protect the people of Iraq from a mass murderer and, second, to enforce its own mandates, which Saddam was dangerously, repeatedly, and conspicuously flouting. Saddam was "contained," and containment was working with respect to other nations in the region, but not with regard to either his own people or the credibility of the U.N.
The so-called "Coalition of the Willing," which finally undertook the invasion, left me feeling uneasy, despite its self-justifying appeal to U.N. resolutions. Not only were countless diplomatic loose ends left dangling, but the logic made no sense with respect to timing: If WMDs were the central issue, then why interrupt the inspections regime? That question prompted and continues to prompt many a doubt about the true motives for the war.
The invasion was executed masterfully, albeit, alas, with many civilian casualties; and Saddam was, at long last, deposed.
However, the aftermath was a shambles.
A professional approach should have been taken to nation-building. Extensive planning should have been done. Funds should have been in place for a quick start. Infrastructure, cultural sites, munitions dumps, headquarters of agencies that were there to help, such as those of the U.N., and much more should have been amply secured. Skilled people of all sorts should have been sent in to help. Damage to infrastructure should have been more rapidly addressed. And indigenous leaders and forces, both police and military, should have been heavily utilized from the start. Instead, what the whole world witnessed was a large-scale embarrassment -- even the looting of museums! -- and, worse yet, the rise of utterly barbaric insurgencies. (I use the plural advisedly; and even the word "barbaric" strikes me as too mild.)
Shall we skip over Halliburton, Vice President Cheney's old company, which was awarded a contract, competition-free, for Iraqi reconstruction, particularly of the oil industry, this in a context where businesses from countries not part of the "Coalition of the Willing" were being slighted? We saw not just the set of prima facie scandals which that particular contract presented to the world, but also the common scandals of bribery and the overcharging of U.S. taxpayers.
Iraq has been in the balance. Will it fall into civil war? Will it manage to establish democracy? Will it opt for the non-establishment of religion? Will it achieve stability?
President Bush has done one thing right: He has been steadfast. It is that very steadfastness that has kept the hope for democracy and stability in Iraq alive.
Well, he's been right about a few other things too. For instance, he was right to hold Saddam accountable, when much of the rest of the world was playing Saddam's game, some in the U.N. even being corrupted by Saddam.
However, Bush has been wrong about much. To give a couple of examples:
Still, it is Bush' steadfastness that is most important, and for persevering in that I give him much credit.
Now at last we're at the stage in the development of the new Iraq that interests me the most, the writing of a constitution. I have a bucking urge inside of me to write a constitution for Iraq myself. I would delineate the precise scope of government. I would narrowly define the role of the federal government. I would make human and civil rights relative to all types of power the very centerpiece of the constitution. And I would provide textual options regarding the handling of religions.
However, none of those options would have any resemblance to the one circulating about these days, that no civil law shall contradict sharia, Islamic or Islam-derived law. What does that solve with regard to competing factions within both Islam and within Iraq? Nothing, as far as I can see. Besides, such a formula gives up on any separation of mosque and state.
Oh, one can understand why the American or even the British approach to the issue of church and state might not inspire Iraqi hearts, besides the fact that an analogous separation of mosque and state is alien to the classical Islamic tradition. Look at the character of British and American culture, so much of which is degraded! The vacuum due to the absence of an established and strong religion would seem, from afar, to result in a vacuity of cultural character, that is, of moral fiber expressed through culture. So why would Iraq want to imitate such a course! Heaven knows, it's seen enough darkness within its own character!
"From afar." I happen to like the separation of church and state. Each corrupts the other when mixed, and citizens are the losers. Religious freedom, the freedom to worship and to express one's faith as one chooses, is precious. Lack of it is a coercive imposition and a violation of individual conscience. Religious freedom is placed at risk where there is no divide between church and state or at least a careful hemming in of the power of any given religion over any but its voluntary adherents.
However, in Iraq's case, a more than livable compromise comes to mind: Adopt those rights, rights only, that, under sharia, are either explicitly or implicitly granted, on the one hand, to each and every individual and, on the other, to the body politic, that is, the people as a whole. Let respect for those rights, in addition to those delineated in international statements of rights, be part of the basis for the formation of character, both individual and national. The imposition of Islamic law upon a pluralistic people is one thing, something not easily endured by all. The appropriation of rights for all from Islamic tradition is quite another, something that may be welcomed by all.
In 1797, Congress ratified the Treaty of Tripoli, Article 11 of which states: "As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity, of Mussulmen; and, as the said States never entered into any war, or act of hostility against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries." It is now with a sense of wistfulness that we read that the U.S. has never gone to war with a Muslim nation.
My Take: NEA Editorial
Posted, August 4, 2005; last modification, August 4, 2005
Copyright ©2005 by Norman E. Anderson
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